<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Y. Landeck);</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Knowledge-Augmented Security Risk Identification for OT Container Deployments</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Yannick Landeck</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dian Balta</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Tomas Bueno Momcilovic</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Martin Wimmer</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Christian Knierim</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Siemens AG</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Munich</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>fortiss GmbH</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Munich</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>000</volume>
      <fpage>0</fpage>
      <lpage>0001</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Container deployments in operational technology (OT) environments pose unique security challenges, especially when privileged configurations are used. Traditional risk identification methods often fall short in addressing the complexity, dynamic nature, and interdisciplinary collaboration required in these settings. We propose a knowledge augmentation approach that combines semantic modelling, automated reasoning, and tool support to enhance security risk identification. Our approach is demonstrated through an industrial case study, highlighting its practical application. We also examine how large language models (LLMs) can support the instantiation and integration of the approach, improving usability and scalability.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Security Risk Identification</kwd>
        <kwd>Knowledge Augmentation</kwd>
        <kwd>Container Security</kwd>
        <kwd>Operational Technology</kwd>
        <kwd>LLMs</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Industries increasingly adopt containerised applications to modernise operational technology (OT)
environments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ]. However, containers often require runtime privileges that introduce significant
security risks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ]. For instance, anomaly detection on industrial networks may require deployment
with –net=host in Docker. It is often unclear whether such privileges are necessary or if safer
alternatives exist—making risk assessment essential to understand potential impacts.
      </p>
      <p>
        Yet, risk identification is complicated by dynamic architectures, frequent changes, and the need for
collaboration across roles [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">5, 6</xref>
        ]. Traditional approaches, like security consulting, are too
resourceintensive and fail to address these challenges. As a resolution, we propose a knowledge augmentation
approach that integrates semantic modelling, automated reasoning, and tool support to help stakeholders
identify risks based on deployment configurations. We demonstrate the approach in an industrial case
study and explore how large language models (LLMs) support its instantiation and integration.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Challenges in Security Risk Identification</title>
      <p>
        Identifying security risks in OT container deployments presents both technical and organisational
challenges. These arise from the decoupling of development and deployment, where containers built
in controlled environments are deployed in dynamic, interconnected OT systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref7">5, 7</xref>
        ]. OT systems
often prioritise availability and integrity over confidentiality, shifting the threat landscape compared to
traditional IT environments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. The convergence of IT and OT introduces hybrid architectures that
blur traditional security boundaries and create new dependencies and attack surfaces [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9, 10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A key issue is the fragmentation of knowledge. Security risk identification relies on stakeholders—such
as developers, operators, and security experts—interpreting shared artefacts like Dockerfiles to assess
risks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref6">11, 6</xref>
        ]. However, these artefacts are often incomplete, inconsistently documented, or interpreted
diferently across roles, leading to gaps in understanding and inconsistent assessments.
      </p>
      <p>
        The dynamic nature of containerised systems further exacerbates these issues. Frequent updates
to container images, deployment settings, or host configurations can invalidate previous risk
assessments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13">12, 13</xref>
        ]. Without mechanisms for continuous knowledge exchange and automated reasoning,
stakeholders struggle to keep pace with changes, resulting in outdated or incomplete evaluations.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Proposed Approach: Knowledge-Augmented Risk Identification</title>
      <p>We propose a model-based approach for identifying security risks in OT container deployments,
using semantic web technologies to formalise domain knowledge. Ontologies represent deployment
configurations, system assumptions, and threat scenarios in a structured, interoperable format, enabling
consistent and context-aware assessments across roles.</p>
      <p>
        Automated reasoning applies formal semantics to infer threats, validate assumptions, and assess the
impact of changes. This integration—referred to as knowledge augmentation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]—enhances expert
judgement by making relevant knowledge more accessible, contextualised, and actionable. It supports
scalable and collaborative security engineering in dynamic OT environments.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Industrial Case Study</title>
        <p>We applied our approach in a case study on a large-scale industrial platform using Docker Compose
for deployment. While operators can inspect Docker images (e.g., via vulnerability scans), doing so
for every container is often too costly. As a result, decisions rely mainly on Docker Compose files. We
formalised risks associated with these settings to support stakeholder risk identification.</p>
        <p>Figure 1 illustrates the approach, structured into three iterative phases: Model, Instantiate, and
Integrate. In the case study, we revisited earlier phases to refine the ontology and improve the knowledge
graph based on feedback from operators and container developers.</p>
        <p>
          In the Model phase, we developed an ontology linking Docker Compose settings, OT context
scenarios, and CORAS [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ]-based risk modelling elements. This captures how specific combinations—such
as –net=host with –cap-add=NET_ADMIN—can lead to elevated risks. In the Instantiate phase,
we manually populated the ontology with context scenarios and expert-curated risk elements. This
included threats, vulnerabilities, exposures, impacts, likelihoods, and treatments, forming a security
risk knowledge graph tailored to the platform. In the Integrate phase, we developed a command-line
tool that extracts deployment settings from Docker Compose files, queries the knowledge graph using
SPARQL, and generates structured JSON-based risk factsheets.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Leveraging LLMs for Risk Modelling and Usability</title>
        <p>Large language models (LLMs) supported our approach from two perspectives: assisting risk modelling
and improving usability. First, LLMs were used during the Instantiate phase to automate aspects of risk
modelling. For example, they helped generate threat scenario templates from high-level deployment
descriptions. While this improved eficiency, further research is needed to explore how LLMs can
identify novel risks, connect attack vectors to impacts, and model complex, chained threat scenarios.</p>
        <p>Second, LLMs enhanced the readability and accessibility of the CLI tool’s output by translating
machine-readable JSON factsheets into human-friendly summaries. These summaries included key
risks, treatment measures, and references to hardening guidelines. LLMs also show promise in adapting
such resources to user-specific scenarios, such as translating general advice into context-specific
recommendations. However, integrating LLMs into modelling introduces challenges: hallucinated risks
may reduce trust, and overlooked threats may lead to false negatives. Thus, while LLMs ofer valuable
support, expert validation remains essential.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Discussion</title>
      <p>Scalability and Practical Impact The semantic structure of the knowledge base enables scalability
through modular updates, versioning, and integration with existing workflows. Users in our case study
recognise the potential to automate risk assessment, especially as frequently updated applications from
external providers are deployed. The adoption of risk factsheets reduces reliance on manual consulting
and supports cross-role collaboration in dynamic OT environments. While initial efort is required to
design the ontology and instantiate the knowledge base, the integration of command-line tools and
LLMs improves long-term value. By making tool outputs deterministic, traceable, and actionable, the
approach ensures that modelling eforts yield lasting benefits through structured knowledge reuse.
Insights and Limitations Our evaluation highlights the potential of the proposed approach, but
several limitations must be considered. We employ a qualitative method for risk assessment, meaning
the quality of the generated factsheets depends heavily on the accuracy and detail of expert-driven
modelling. Greater diligence during modelling improves the efectiveness of the results. In the case
study, we primarily analysed Docker Compose files, which provide only partial insight into the
applications. As such, the resulting factsheets reflect only the static deployment configuration and should
be interpreted with caution. Additional artefacts—such as Dockerfiles, image vulnerability scans, or
runtime behaviour—are currently not included but represent promising directions for future work.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusion and Future Work</title>
      <p>We proposed a knowledge augmentation approach for identifying security risks in OT container
deployments, combining semantic modelling, reasoning, and tool support. The method addresses key
challenges and improves usability through LLM integration. Future work will focus on evaluating the
completeness of identified risks, refining treatment measures, and exploring reliable LLM integration.
Including additional artefacts like Dockerfiles and runtime data will further enhance applicability.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this work, the authors used Microsoft Copilot in order to: Grammar and
spelling check, paraphrase and reword. After using these tool/service, the authors reviewed and edited
the content as needed and take full responsibility for the publication’s content.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
            <surname>Goldschmidt</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Hauck-Stattelmann</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Malakuti</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Grüner</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Container-based architecture for flexible industrial control applications</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Journal of Systems Architecture</source>
          <volume>84</volume>
          (
          <year>2018</year>
          )
          <fpage>28</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>36</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016/j.sysarc.
          <year>2018</year>
          .
          <volume>03</volume>
          .002.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
            <surname>Arnold</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Jöhnk</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Vogt</surname>
          </string-name>
          , N. Urbach,
          <article-title>IIoT platforms' architectural features - a taxonomy and five prevalent archetypes</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Electronic Markets</source>
          <volume>32</volume>
          (
          <year>2022</year>
          )
          <fpage>927</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>944</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1007/ s12525-021-00520-0.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Souppaya</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Morello</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Scarfone</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Application Container Security Guide,
          <source>Technical Report NIST SP 800-190</source>
          , National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
          <string-name>
            <surname>MD</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>2017</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          . 6028/NIST.SP.
          <volume>800</volume>
          -
          <fpage>190</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Martin</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Raponi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
            <surname>Combe</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R. Di</given-names>
            <surname>Pietro</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Docker ecosystem - Vulnerability
          <string-name>
            <surname>Analysis</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Computer Communications</source>
          <volume>122</volume>
          (
          <year>2018</year>
          )
          <fpage>30</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>43</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016/j.comcom.
          <year>2018</year>
          .
          <volume>03</volume>
          .011.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Landeck</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Balta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Wimmer</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Knierim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Software in the Manufacturing Industry: Emerging Security Challenge Areas for IIoT Platforms</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 46th International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP '24)</source>
          ,
          <year>2024</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1145/3639477. 3639724.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Landeck</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Balta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Wimmer</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Knierim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Assurance of Application Security on IIoT Platforms with Knowledge Augmentation, in: 2024 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Workshops (ACSAC Workshops)</article-title>
          , IEEE, Honolulu,
          <string-name>
            <surname>HI</surname>
          </string-name>
          , USA,
          <year>2024</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>108</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>119</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1109/ ACSACW65225.
          <year>2024</year>
          .
          <volume>00019</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Tange</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>M. De Donno</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>X.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Fafoutis</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dragoni</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>A systematic survey of industrial Internet of Things security: Requirements and fog computing opportunities</article-title>
          ,
          <source>IEEE Communications Surveys &amp; Tutorials</source>
          <volume>22</volume>
          (
          <year>2020</year>
          )
          <fpage>2489</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>2520</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Prinsloo</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Sinha</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B. Von</given-names>
            <surname>Solms</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>A Review of Industry 4.0 Manufacturing Process Security Risks, Applied Sciences</source>
          <volume>9</volume>
          (
          <year>2019</year>
          )
          <article-title>5105</article-title>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .3390/app9235105.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Landeck</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Balta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Wimmer</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Knierim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Software in the Manufacturing Industry: A Review of Security Challenges and Implications</article-title>
          , in: 18th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik,
          <year>2023</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Dragoni</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Giallorenzo</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A. L.</given-names>
            <surname>Lafuente</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Mazzara</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Montesi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Mustafin</surname>
          </string-name>
          , L. Safina, Microservices: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow,
          <source>Present and ulterior software engineering</source>
          (
          <year>2017</year>
          )
          <fpage>195</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>216</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Bolici</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Howison</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Crowston</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Stigmergic coordination in FLOSS development teams: Integrating explicit and implicit mechanisms</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Cognitive Systems Research</source>
          <volume>38</volume>
          (
          <year>2016</year>
          )
          <fpage>14</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>22</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016/j.cogsys.
          <year>2015</year>
          .
          <volume>12</volume>
          .003.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A. Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Wong</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>E. G.</given-names>
            <surname>Chekole</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Ochoa</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Zhou</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>On the Security of Containers: Threat Modeling, Attack Analysis</article-title>
          , and Mitigation Strategies,
          <source>Computers &amp; Security</source>
          <volume>128</volume>
          (
          <year>2023</year>
          )
          <article-title>103140</article-title>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          . 1016/j.cose.
          <year>2023</year>
          .
          <volume>103140</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Mills</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>White</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Legg</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Longitudinal risk-based security assessment of docker software container images</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Computers &amp; Security</source>
          <volume>135</volume>
          (
          <year>2023</year>
          )
          <article-title>103478</article-title>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016/j.cose.
          <year>2023</year>
          .
          <volume>103478</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          [14]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J. P.</given-names>
            <surname>Delgrande</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>Glimm</surname>
          </string-name>
          , T. Meyer,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Truszczynski</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Wolter</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning</source>
          ,
          <year>2023</year>
          . arXiv:
          <volume>2308</volume>
          .
          <fpage>04161</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          [15]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M. S.</given-names>
            <surname>Lund</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>Solhaug</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Stølen</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Model-Driven Risk</surname>
            <given-names>Analysis</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
          <year>2011</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1007/978-3-
          <fpage>642</fpage>
          -12323-8.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>