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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Using CNNs as static detectors against malicious Android APKs</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Andrea Chezzi</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Christian Catalano</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vita Santa Barletta</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dario Rollo</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Danilo Caivano</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science, University of Bari Aldo Moro</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Bari</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Department of Innovation Engineering, University of Salento</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Lecce</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Android mobile devices are an ideal target for malware attacks due to their widespread use and open source nature. This study discusses the issues posed by Android malware and introduces a new Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based malware detection solution. Using static analysis, the suggested approach converts binary executables into pixel images for classification, separating dangerous from benign software. The study uses four CNN architectures: ResNet50v2, ResNet101v2, VGG16, and InceptionV3, using a dataset of 7,172 malware and 10,442 goodware samples. The ResNet50v2 model outperformed expectations, attaining great accuracy and balance. This study illustrates the potential of CNNs in improving Android malware detection and underscores the importance of novel methods to cybersecurity.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;CNN</kwd>
        <kwd>malware</kwd>
        <kwd>static malware detection</kwd>
        <kwd>static analysis</kwd>
        <kwd>security</kwd>
        <kwd>Android</kwd>
        <kwd>APK</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>The smartphone has become an essential part of our daily lives, and Android stands as the dominant
operating system in the smartphone market. Projections indicate that the global population of
smartphone users is expected to expand significantly, reaching an impressive 7.7 billion by the year 2028
[1]. This upward trend in smartphone usage highlights the growing importance of these devices in our
daily lives. Moreover, when we consider mobile operating systems, Android emerges as the dominant
player in the market. As of November 2023, Android held a substantial market share of 70.5% [2],
demonstrating its widespread adoption and influence in the mobile technology landscape. Android’s
open nature allows users to download apps from either the oficial Google Play Store or alternative
third-party app markets. Nevertheless, this very popularity and openness have rendered Android a
magnet for malicious intent. In particular, the platform’s vast user base and versatile environment have
made it an attractive target for cyber attackers [3, 4]. This heightened risk stems from the fact that
Android devices can easily fall victim to the insidious infiltration of malicious software, often referred
to as malware. Such malware, once introduced into the Android ecosystem, can swiftly disseminate
and compromise the integrity of otherwise benign Android devices, posing a substantial threat to the
security and privacy of users. As a result, the Android community and security experts must remain
vigilant in their eforts to combat and mitigate the impact of these digital threats. Cyber attackers
are motivated by a variety of factors, ranging from seeking rewards and self-validation to indulging
in entertainment or using their skills as a form of digital weaponry [5]. As these motives drive their
actions, it’s crucial to consistently evolve and innovate in the realm of detecting Android malware.
With the expanding landscape of mobile technology and the increasing sophistication of these cyber
threats, the development of new, robust methods for identifying and combating such threats becomes
an ongoing, critical mission for cybersecurity experts and the tech community at large [6].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Related Works</title>
      <p>Android malware detection has been a focus of numerous studies, reflecting the growing concern over
the security of mobile devices. Traditional malware detection methods rely heavily on signature-based
techniques, which, while efective, are limited by their inability to detect new or rapidly evolving threats.
To address this issue, machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) techniques have gained popularity
in recent years.</p>
      <p>One of the early approaches in malware detection using ML was based on feature extraction from
static and dynamic analyses. Arp et al. [7] introduced Drebin, a lightweight Android malware detector
using static analysis. They extracted permissions, API calls, and other features from APKs, achieving a
high detection rate. Although Drebin was efective, it faced limitations in dealing with new variants of
malware that could evade signature-based detection methods.</p>
      <p>In recent years, deep learning has emerged as a powerful alternative due to its ability to learn
hierarchical representations. Chaymae and Khalid [8] explored the use of Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) for Android malware detection by transforming APK files into grayscale images. This method
highlighted the capability of CNNs to analyze spatial characteristics within binary data, paving the
way for the approach used in this study. Similarly, Hou et al. [9] proposed Deep4MalDroid, a
CNNbased model that analyzed images generated from system call sequences, achieving notable success in
detecting malware families.</p>
      <p>Other studies have employed CNNs in combination with other architectures. For example, Grosse
et al. [10] demonstrated a hybrid model incorporating Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to capture
sequential information from API calls while using CNNs for spatial feature extraction. This hybrid
approach achieved significant accuracy but also required substantial computational resources, making
it less practical for real-time deployment.</p>
      <p>The efectiveness of CNNs for malware detection is further supported by Zhou et al. [ 11], who used a
CNN-based model trained on binary and opcode sequences, obtaining high accuracy rates. These studies
reinforce the idea that CNNs can identify complex patterns within static representations of malware,
which are challenging to detect with conventional methods. However, the need for computational
eficiency and generalizability remains a central challenge for applying CNNs in real-world settings.</p>
      <p>Our study builds upon these findings by using static analysis to convert APK binaries into pixel
images. By evaluating multiple CNN architectures, we demonstrate the eficacy of these networks in
diferentiating malicious from benign applications. This paper extends previous work by focusing on
multiple architectures, including ResNet50v2, ResNet101v2, VGG16, and InceptionV3, and by evaluating
their relative performances, which provides a comprehensive comparison to aid future researchers in
the field.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Background</title>
      <p>Malware presents a significant challenge within the open-source Android operating system. It’s feasible
to disassemble an APK file, make alterations to its code, reassemble it, append code triggered by certain
events, repackage, sign it, and subsequently release it to the market through reverse engineering tools
[12]. This process involves a sequence of steps that can manipulate an application’s code, potentially
creating security vulnerabilities and allowing for the distribution of malicious software within the
Android ecosystem. Malware creators employ a technique known as piggybacking [13] to craft malicious
replicas of established software. According to research conducted by Zhou and Jiang [14], approximately
86 percent of Android malware is introduced through piggybacking. While there are indeed other forms
of malware, piggybacking stands out as a notably convenient method to implant and execute malicious
code on an Android device. This method leverages the familiarity and trust associated with legitimate
applications, exploiting them by embedding malicious code within, which is often challenging to detect
until it’s activated on a user’s device [15]. The prevalence of this approach underscores the importance
of stringent security measures to protect against such deceptive tactics in the Android environment. The
central focus of this paper lies in a comprehensive analysis of the limitations and opportunities inherent
in leveraging neural network algorithms to enhance cyber threat detection systems designed for Android
platforms. By delving into this subject matter, the paper aims to contribute novel perspectives that can
guide the development of more efective practices for constructing models and tools aligned with the
evolving landscape of cybersecurity policies and requirements. To ensure clarity in our examination, it
becomes pertinent to revisit and reinforce the definitions of the fundamental concepts elucidated in
this paper.</p>
      <p>APK. The Android APK (Android Package) file format serves as a distribution package, encompassing
various resources such as layout files and images stored within directories like assets and res, alongside
the Android VM bytecode file classes.dex [ 16]. The DEX (Dalvik Executable) file is a crucial component
of Android applications, containing the bytecode that the Android Runtime (ART) or the Dalvik Virtual
Machine (DVM) executes. The DEX format is optimized for eficient execution on resource-constrained
mobile devices, making it a fundamental part of Android app development [17]. Additionally, DEX files
support features like dynamic class loading and memory-eficient storage, contributing to the overall
performance and flexibility of Android applications. Understanding the structure and content of DEX
ifles is essential for developers and security researchers alike, as it provides insights into the inner
workings of Android apps and aids in tasks such as optimization, analysis, and security assessment.</p>
      <p>Malware. Malware, also known as malicious code and malicious software, is a program that is
surreptitiously inserted into a system, often with the intention of compromising the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system. Its purpose may extend
to causing annoyance or disruption to the victim. In contemporary computing landscapes, malware has
evolved into the most substantial external threat for numerous systems, inflicting widespread damage
and posing significant challenges to cybersecurity [18] [19] [20].</p>
      <p>Malware detection. A malware detector is a specialized program crafted to identify and flag
malicious programs or code within a system [21] [22]. In a broader conceptualization, the role of a
malware detector can be encapsulated in a function, as defined below [20]:</p>
      <p>⎧ malicious if  contains malicious code;
() = ⎨ benign if  does not contain malicious code;</p>
      <p>⎩ undecidable if  fails to determine .</p>
      <p>where  signifies the decision function, serving the crucial role of discerning whether a given
application or program  falls into the category of benign or malicious.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. CNN malware detector</title>
      <p>The approach for implementing our malware detector is in line with most of the criteria established in
the existing literature.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Architecture overview</title>
        <p>The illustrated malware detector is essentially a Convolutional Neural Network algorithm designed to
solve a binary image classification problem with two classes: "malware" and "goodware". In this context,
"goodware" denotes any benign program or executable that operates without any deliberate malicious
intent.</p>
        <p>The setup aims to minimize the occurrence of false negatives during the prediction phase by adopting
a preventive and more conservative approach. Figure 1 depicts the architecture of the malware detector.
The initial phase involves preprocessing, which converts binary executables into pixel images. Once
the image samples are prepared, they are inputted into the trained CNN architecture, which provides
classification scores used to determine the class of the analyzed sample.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Main properties</title>
        <p>The developed malware detector has the following main properties:
• It employs static analysis: the executable files are examined without being executed. The relevant
information used to make decisions is extracted directly from the content of the DEX files.
• Signature detection: the detector relies on the knowledge gained during the machine learning
training phase, where it learned specific features and signatures of existing malware from a given
dataset.
• Similarities with anomaly detection: this detector learns not only the signatures of the malware
samples from a dataset but also the features of harmless goodware. It then makes predictions
based on this learning. This behavior is similar to several anomaly detection methods.
• Utilizes images rather than flat byte strings as input.</p>
        <p>Although it must be stressed that one cannot rely solely on CNNs for malwere detection, it is worth
noting that the present work fully recognizes the novelty and usefulness of CNNs in the context of
malware detection having achieved an excellent result.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. Implementation</title>
        <p>For this study, we selected four of the most popular CNN architectures: ResNet50v2, ResNet101v2,
VGG16 and InceptionV3. They were implemented using the Keras and TensorFlow frameworks for
Python 3.10.13 (64-bit).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4.4. Dataset and Training</title>
        <p>The malware APK samples were downloaded and selected from VirusShare.com, a repository of malware
samples [23]. On the other hand, the goodware samples collection were collected by self-produced web
scraping tools from en.uptodown.com. Therefore, at this point, the dataset consists entirely of APKs:
• 7172 malware samples
• 10442 goodware samples</p>
        <p>To create a dataset suitable for training a CNN learning algorithm, we selected DEX file from APKs
to turn them into RGB images through tools written by us: each byte from the DEX file is mapped
to a pixel which has each color component labelled from value 0 to value 255. For the training task,
it is necessary to divide the dataset into training data and testing data. For this study, the dataset is
splitting into two subset: the training set (80%) and the test set (20%). The validation test is derived
by TensorFlow directly from the test split. Table 1 shows the results for evaluating the prediction
performance of CNN models trained on test set samples. The results clearly show that the ResNet50V2
model is superior in terms of accuracy and balance across criteria. The diference in performance
between ResNet50V2 and ResNet101V2 is minor, demonstrating that increasing model depth does not
always result in considerable improvements in this particular scenario. Other considerations to consider
are training time and computing complexity, and shallower models like VGG16 may nevertheless play
an essential role in resource-constrained applications.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Future Works</title>
      <p>To address the limitations identified in this work, several directions for future work can be considered.
Incorporating dynamic analysis Future research could integrate dynamic analysis to supplement
static detection. By analyzing runtime behaviors, such as API calls, system logs, and network trafic, a
more comprehensive detection system can be developed. A hybrid model combining static and dynamic
analysis may enhance resilience against evasion techniques and improve detection accuracy for new
malware variants.</p>
      <p>Adversarial Robustness As malware authors continually evolve their techniques to evade detection,
future work should focus on improving adversarial robustness. Techniques such as adversarial training,
which involves exposing the model to adversarial examples during training, can help enhance the
model’s ability to detect obfuscated malware. Additionally, incorporating model-agnostic defense
strategies may improve generalizability against a wide range of evasion techniques.
Development of Real-Time Detection Systems To improve the practical application of CNNs in
malware detection, future work could focus on the development of real-time detection systems that can
operate on-device. This would require optimizing the inference process and minimizing latency. Edge
computing and federated learning are promising areas for enabling on-device detection, allowing for
real-time malware detection without compromising user privacy or device performance.</p>
      <p>While this study highlights the potential of CNNs for Android malware detection, addressing these
areas in future research can enhance the efectiveness, adaptability, and eficiency of CNN-based
solutions. By continuing to innovate and refine these methods, researchers can contribute to building
more robust defenses against the ever-evolving landscape of mobile malware.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Human-in-the-Loop and Explainability</title>
      <p>While the present study emphasizes the eficacy of CNN-based static analysis for Android malware
detection, integrating human expertise into the system’s workflow remains a crucial direction for
practical deployment. Malware detection is rarely a fully automated task; instead, it often requires
security analysts, system administrators, or application developers to interpret the results and decide
on appropriate mitigation strategies. Designing systems that support human decision-making ensures
that automated solutions augment, rather than replace, expert judgment [24].</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>6.1. Human-in-the-Loop Interaction</title>
        <p>The proposed system supports human decision-making by providing, along with its binary classification
(malware or goodware), a confidence value associated with each prediction. When this value falls below
a predefined threshold, the output is flagged as uncertain, signaling the need for human review. This
allows analysts to focus on the most ambiguous cases, reducing the risk of misclassification. Moreover,
these uncertain samples can be re-labeled by human experts and reintegrated into the training pipeline,
enabling the system to continuously improve through human feedback [25]. This interaction creates a
feedback loop where AI assists the human operator in prioritizing suspicious samples, while humans
contribute to refining the AI’s knowledge base.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-2">
        <title>6.2. Explainability and Transparency</title>
        <p>At present, the proposed CNN-based approach does not incorporate explicit explainability features, and
therefore operates largely as a black box. While this does not hinder its predictive accuracy, it limits
user trust and interpretability. Future work could address this limitation by integrating explainability
methods such as saliency maps, Class Activation Maps (CAMs), or feature attribution, which would
make the internal decision-making process more transparent [26]. Such methods could help analysts
better understand why a particular application is flagged as malicious, strengthening accountability
and enabling more informed human–AI collaboration.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-3">
        <title>6.3. Usability Considerations</title>
        <p>Beyond accuracy, usability remains a key factor in the adoption of AI-driven malware detection.
Presenting results through intuitive dashboards that highlight both classification confidence and uncertainty
status would empower security analysts to make better decisions, even without deep technical expertise.
By combining clarity with confidence thresholds, the system ensures that users can quickly distinguish
between highly reliable results and those requiring manual inspection. Human-centered design in this
context improves both efectiveness and trust in AI-assisted cybersecurity [27].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-4">
        <title>6.4. Collaborative Defense and Workshop Relevance</title>
        <p>The human-in-the-loop approach also facilitates collaborative defense strategies, where analysts across
organizations can share uncertain cases, human-validated samples, and insights derived from AI outputs.
This iterative process exemplifies the principles of the COllaboration and Learning through Symbiotic
Artificial Intelligence (COL-SAI) workshop: fostering symbiotic co-adaptation between humans and
AI systems. By allowing AI to filter and prioritize tasks while relying on humans for contextual
understanding and validation, the proposed framework supports co-creation and continuous learning.
In this way, the system not only strengthens malware detection but also advances the broader goal of
designing AI tools that enhance human decision-making, adapt through human feedback, and enable
collaborative problem-solving in cybersecurity.</p>
        <p>By explicitly incorporating decision thresholds, human oversight, and potential explainability
features into its design, this work moves toward AI systems that are trustworthy, symbiotic, and
adaptable—qualities that resonate strongly with the objectives of the COL-SAI workshop.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Conclusion</title>
      <p>This work revealed the eficiency of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) models in detecting malware
on Android systems. Specifically, the ResNet50V2 model stood out for its accuracy and overall
performance balance, demonstrating that increased model depth does not always result in a considerable
boost in performance. The adopted process, which entails transforming DEX files into RGB images,
has enabled us to fully harness the potential of CNNs for binary classification of malware and benign
software.</p>
      <p>Possible future advancements in this research include refining the model’s architecture by
investigating and testing new neural network structures, such as deep neural networks or recurrent neural
networks, to see whether they can improve malware detection skills. To improve the model’s
generalization and resilience, the dataset should be expanded with more samples of malware and goodware
from other sources. Another major development area is real-time analysis, which involves creating
detection systems that can examine the behavior of programs during execution and combining dynamic
analysis approaches with the static analysis approach utilized in this study.</p>
      <p>In addition, this work highlights the importance of integrating human-in-the-loop elements. By
providing a classification confidence score and flagging uncertain cases for human review, the proposed
system fosters a collaborative workflow in which humans and AI systems co-adapt and improve together.
Although the current approach does not yet implement explainability features, future eforts in this
direction could further enhance transparency, usability, and trustworthiness.</p>
      <p>These aspects resonate with the objectives of the COllaboration and Learning through Symbiotic
Artificial Intelligence (COL-SAI) workshop, which emphasizes symbiotic collaboration between humans
and AI for efective decision-making and co-creation. By designing CNN-based malware detection
systems that are not only accurate but also supportive of human judgment and adaptable through
human feedback, this research contributes to the broader vision of building AI systems that collaborate
with, learn from, and evolve alongside their human counterparts in real-world cybersecurity contexts.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Acknowledgment</title>
      <p>This work was partially supported by project “SEcurity and RIghts In the CyberSpace - SERICS”
(PE00000014 - CUP H73C2200089001) under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) funded
by the European Union - NextGenerationEU</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>The author(s) have not employed any Generative AI tools.
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