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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>F. Fredda);</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Design: Designing Incentives for Collaborative Economies in Local Com munities</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Irene Domenicale</string-name>
          <email>irene.domenicale@unicam.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Flavia Fredda</string-name>
          <email>flavia.fredda@unicam.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Emanuele Spadaro</string-name>
          <email>emanuele.spadaro@unito.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Claudio Schifanella</string-name>
          <email>claudio.schifanella@unito.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="editor">
          <string-name>Token Economy, Incentives, Toolkit, Collaborative Economies, Blockchain for Local Communities</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>University of Camerino, International School of Advanced Studies</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Piazza Cavour 19F, 62032 Camerino</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Turin</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Corso Svizzera 185, 10149 Torino</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>000</volume>
      <fpage>0</fpage>
      <lpage>0001</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The integration of blockchain technology into collaborative economies presents a transformative opportunity to empower local communities-conceived as systems built around shared goals and collective processes. This research explores how tokenomics can support civic engagement and community participation by introducing blockchain-based tokens as tools to manage access to resources and recognize individual contributions, with a focus on non-monetary incentive. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the proposal bridges socio-economic theory and blockchain system design. It identifies the specific needs of local communities and introduces a curated set of token-based artifacts and smart contract templates aimed at supporting the development and long-term sustainability of tokenized collaborative economies.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        The integration of blockchain technology to enhance collaborative economies represents a
transformative approach to empower local communities, intended as a closed system characterized by shared
goals and collective processes. Collaborative economies, characterized by the sharing of resources
and services, align well with blockchain’s capabilities to foster transparency, trust, and decentralized
governance [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. The relevance of blockchain in the context of non-monetary exchanges is particularly
highlighted by its tokenomics aspect, which addresses the system of value exchanges allowing for the
creation and management of tokens that represent various forms of non-monetary value. The synergy
between blockchain and collaborative economies is especially significant for small local communities
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], where traditional economic systems often fail to address the unique challenges and opportunities
inherent in collaborative environments and where transparent systems for non-monetary value exchanges
can enhance social cohesion and economic stability. Indeed, while blockchain has been extensively
studied in the context of financial transactions and large-scale enterprise applications, its potential
to revolutionize non-monetary value exchanges in small, collaborative economies remains largely
untapped. Existing literature on this topic is sparse [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], highlighting a significant gap in understanding
how tokenomics can enhance the eficiency, transparency, and sustainability of local sharing systems.
Addressing this research gap will provide valuable insights and practical frameworks for leveraging
blockchain technology to support and strengthen the economic and social fabric of local communities.
      </p>
      <p>This proposal aims to address the following research questions:
• RQ1 What non-functional requirements are essential for designing a tokenized collaborative
economy?
systems?
• RQ2 What types of incentives can efectively support the sustainability and engagement of such
∗Corresponding author.</p>
      <p>CEUR
Workshop</p>
      <p>ISSN1613-0073
• RQ3 What types of token-based artifacts are best suited for representing and implementing the
incentive model?</p>
      <p>This research provides several key contributions. Methodologically, it proposes an interdisciplinary
framework that integrates socio-economic theories with the technical design of blockchain-based
systems. In particular, it highlights the role of motivation theory and non-financial economic models
as design principles for incentive mechanisms and token engineering within tokenized collaborative
economies. A second contribution is the identification of context-specific requirements for local
communities, intended to guide the design of tokenized systems and inform the development of
nonmonetary incentive structures that promote user participation. Finally, it develops and presents a
curated set of tokens readily usable by local communities seeking to implement a tokenized system for
a collaborative economy.</p>
      <p>This paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 introduce the theoretical background and related
literature. Section 4 builds on this by identifying system requirements and mapping key actors and needs.
Section 5 explores suitable incentive structures, with a focus on non-monetary incentives. Section 6
presents a set of tokens that reflect these requirements and incentives, illustrating their application
through concrete case studies. Finally, Section 8 ofers concluding reflections and outlines potential
next steps for future research and implementation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. Blockchain for Local Communities</title>
        <p>
          In recent years, there has been a growing proliferation of blockchain-based applications and
experimental initiatives aimed at fostering social impact, promoting social good, and supporting sustainable
development, particularly through the co-production of public services within the social domain [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ].
Within this emerging landscape, our research investigates the potential of blockchain technology to
support local communities by enabling systems that foster civic participation and facilitate alternative
forms of value circulation within local economies. In contrast to traditional market-driven models, these
applications prioritize non-monetary exchanges, mutual support, and community-driven approaches to
resource sharing and cooperation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5">2, 5</xref>
          ]. A distinctive feature of blockchain-based systems for local
communities lies in their emphasis on participatory design processes and local accessibility, combined
with their capacity to promote civic engagement. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ]. Concrete examples of these dynamics within local
community contexts include decentralized systems for resource sharing (such as Libraries of Things),
where everyday objects are lent and exchanged, fostering sustainable consumption and strengthening
social ties. Additionally, blockchain systems can support mechanisms for recognizing and rewarding
citizen participation, for instance through local tokens that can be exchanged for discounts, cultural event
access, or shared space usage, thereby reinforcing engagement in local socio-economic life. Further
applications include the transparent management of community-owned spaces and the development
of incentive structures to promote sustainable tourism practices, where tour operators can encourage
environmentally responsible behavior among visitors through token-based rewards.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Collaborative Economies</title>
        <p>
          The field of collaborative economies encompasses a wide variety of diferent economic models and
sectors, for this reason it is dificult to give an univocal definition [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. It is necessary here to briefly
address the diferent types of collaborative economies in order to clarify which applications will be
considered for the present research. A general framework can be given by stating that collaborative
economy platforms aim to match people who want to share assets and services [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. The term
collaborative economies is often associated with terms such as sharing economy, gig economy, platform
economy, to name a few [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]. Part of this phenomenon has resulted in the commodification of social
relations and the proliferation of extractivist digital platforms [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]; it is from this type of outcome
that we intend to distance ourselves. Instead, we intend to consider for this research those models of
collaborative economies oriented toward nonprofit and peer-to-peer transactions. These cases can be
defined as new socioeconomic models [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ] and allow the redistribution of resources according to a logic
of mutualization, which refers to the possibility of access to resources without implying the transfer of
ownership [11? ].
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>2.3. Motivation Theory</title>
        <p>
          Another crucial aspect to consider in participatory contexts is the motivation of participants. To address
this, we draw upon motivation theory to better understand what drives users engagement. Research in
psychology has extensively examined human motivation, which encompasses the reasons behind our
actions, desires, and needs, while traditional economic models often prioritize extrinsic motivations,
particularly financial incentives. For this reason a more comprehensive understanding necessitates
considering intrinsic and varied forms of motivation, as highlighted by Self-Determination Theory
(SDT, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ]). SDT emphasizes the distinction between the amount of motivation and its orientation,
recognizing that the underlying reasons for action are crucial, especially when examining behaviors like
volunteering in non-profit organizations [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ]. SDT diferentiates between intrinsic motivation, driven
by inherent interest, and extrinsic motivation, pursued for external rewards. Furthermore, SDT claims
that social and environmental factors significantly influence intrinsic motivation, which is seen as an
inherent human tendency that flourishes under supportive conditions. Cognitive Evaluation Theory
(CET) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ], a sub-theory of SDT, specifies that social contexts fostering feelings of competence are
key to enhancing intrinsic motivation through elements like optimal challenges and positive feedback.
While classical perspectives contrasted extrinsic motivation unfavorably with intrinsic drive, SDT ofers
a more nuanced view, acknowledging that some forms of extrinsic motivation can be internalized and
pursued with a sense of volition. In essence, understanding both intrinsic motivation, which involves
engaging in activities for inherent enjoyment and fuels development, and extrinsic motivation, which
is directed towards separable outcomes and is often influenced by social connections and the need for
belonging (relatedness), is crucial for a more complete picture of human economic behavior [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Related Work</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Incentive Mechanisms for Blockchain-based Systems</title>
        <p>
          The work of Kim et al. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ], broadly categorizes the study of token economies into the economist’s
perspective and token engineering. The economist’s perspective, exemplified by works like Catalini
and Gans [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ] and studies on mining incentives [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref19">18, 19</xref>
          ], speculative investment [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
          ], and platform
usage [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
          ], predominantly employs closed-form economic models. These models, while providing
analytical rigor, often simplify the complex interactions between multiple stakeholders within tokenized
ecosystems, even in studies incorporating dynamic elements [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
          ]. In contrast, the token engineering
ifeld, as highlighted by Pazaitis et al. [ 23] and Dhaliwal et al. [24], emphasizes a systematic approach to
designing token economies, prioritizing simulation-based modeling to capture the nuanced behaviors
and interactions of diverse participants. Beyond these broad categories, research grounded in motivation
theories ofers valuable insights into the drivers of participation in tokenized systems. Restuccia et
al.’s work on participatory sensing [25], while focusing on a specific application domain, provides a
useful taxonomy of incentive mechanisms, distinguishing between application-specific and
generalpurpose approaches, and further categorizing the latter into game-theoretical and non-game-theoretical
methods. Notably, their analysis points to the limitations of assuming perfect user rationality in
gametheoretical models and suggests the potential of behavioral game theory (BGT) to better understand user
behavior. Similarly, Hülsemann and Tumasjan’s investigation [26] into prediction markets, utilizing
agent-based modeling and drawing from the Token Classification Framework (TCF) and user motivation
theory, empirically demonstrates the varying efectiveness of diferent token designs (cryptocurrencies,
network tokens, investment tokens) in attracting and retaining users, highlighting the importance of
non-monetary rewards for long-term engagement. Furthermore, the challenge of managing common
resources within tokenized systems has been addressed by works like Kraner et al.’s [27], which applies
tokenization to the “tragedy of the commons”. This research argues that traditional monetary systems
are inadequate for addressing issues with complex, non-monetary dimensions like environmental
impact, and proposes multi-dimensional tokens to incentivize self-regulation by aligning individual
actions with the collective good. Their mathematical framework explores how this approach can deviate
from traditional, potentially unsustainable, economic optima.
        </p>
        <p>While the cited literature provides a strong foundation in understanding token economics, incentive
design, and the role of user motivations, a noticeable gap exists. The majority of contributions tend to
focus on either abstract economic models or specific application domains. There is a relative scarcity of
research that specifically models and designs token-based incentive mechanisms tailored to the unique
characteristics and goals of social collaborative economies within localized community settings.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Classification of tokens</title>
        <p>Prior research on token economies has largely focused on the economic incentives and classifications of
tokens, laying the groundwork for understanding their financial functions in blockchain systems. [ 28]
provides an early framework categorizing tokens into asset, payment, and utility classes, whereas [29]
ofers a detailed taxonomy by proposing eight primary token archetypes and refining these through
multiple dimensions such as purpose, technical layer, and aspects of trading and ownership. Similarly,
[30] introduces both structural and behavioral classifications, highlighting token characteristics like
fungibility and divisibility, and examining incentive mechanisms related to governance and financial
inclusion. While these works note potential applications in areas such as healthcare, identity management
and decentralized energy systems, they fail on explicitly addressing collaborative mechanisms.</p>
        <p>In contrast to these works emerging studies are beginning to explore tokens in settings that emphasize
collective and social benefits. For example, [ 31] reinterprets tokens as experimental units in a public
goods game, where they serve as tools to study cooperation and community governance, while [32]
investigates tokenization in cultural services with a focus on democratization of access, transparency,
and community engagement. [33] further extends the discussion by applying a multi-dimensional token
model to address the tragedy of the commons, suggesting that token-based mechanisms can contribute
to sustainable, self-regulated outcomes. Additionally, [34] examines the impact of token incentives
on information-sharing behavior, revealing complex interactions between intrinsic motivation and
ifnancial rewards.</p>
        <p>Despite these contributions, several literature gaps remain. There is no structured comparison of
token designs that promote cooperation, inclusivity, and participation in collaborative economies.
Existing work focuses on financial mechanisms and ownership, neglecting non-financial incentives
crucial for community resilience and public-goods funding. These gaps highlight the need for further
exploration into token designs that support the collaborative and participatory governance mechanisms
vital for local community development.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Local Community Requirements</title>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Collaborative Economy Requirements</title>
        <p>Table 1 presents a structured overview of the Design feature as a fundamental element in collaborative
economy systems of local communities, organized into two primary design dimensions: core objectives
and operational attributes. Under core objectives, three distinct value orientations are defined. The
ifrst, social value, underscores the function of the system as more than just a technical infrastructure. It
functions as a social instrument that fosters trust and recognizes individual contributions within the
community, highlighting how economic transactions are embedded in broader social relationships. In
doing so, it challenges the notion of money as a neutral and isolated medium of exchange, instead framing
value circulation as deeply intertwined with social dynamics and communal meaning. The second
value orientation, Collective Decision-Making, involves participatory governance frameworks, allowing
token holders or verified community members to vote on critical decisions such as feature development,
allocation of shared digital or physical resources (e.g., community spaces, digital infrastructure) or
updates to local usage policies. The third value orientation, shared benefits , refers to mechanisms that</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Dimensions</title>
        <p>Design</p>
        <p>Core Objectives
Operational attributes
social value
collective decision-making
shared benefits
Continuity
Interoperability
redistribute the value generated by the platform back to its contributors. These benefits may take the
form of periodic token-based dividends, access to exclusive services or tools, or increased governance
weight, thus encouraging long-term participation and reinforcing a sense of shared ownership and
collective gain.</p>
        <p>The second dimension, Operational attributes, captures cross-cutting attributes essential for
sustainable operation. Continuity highlights the importance of ongoing system evolution driven by user input,
such as built-in feedback loops, community-led testing initiatives, or issue-reporting dashboards, which
allow the platform to iteratively improve over time. Interoperability refers to the system’s capacity
to seamlessly integrate with external platforms and local infrastructures. This could include linking
with municipal digital identity systems, embedding cultural event calendars from local institutions, or
enabling authentication through existing civic apps. Together, these design components ensure that the
collaborative economy platform remains context-aware, community-driven, and capable of adapting to
the complex and evolving needs of local ecosystems.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Feature</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>Dimensions</title>
        <p>Participation
Incentives
Governance structure</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>Types</title>
        <p>Diversified
Secure
Rewarding
Adaptable
Calibrated
Engaging
Managerial
Social</p>
        <p>Table 2 outlines the Participation feature as a central pillar of local community collaborative economy
systems, structured into two key sub-features: Incentives and Governance Structure. The Incentives
dimension encompasses a variety of mechanisms designed to attract, recognize, and retain meaningful
community engagement. A Diversified incentive system is necessary to account for the heterogeneous
nature of contributions, ranging from knowledge sharing and peer assistance to resource provision
and maintenance, by translating these actions into recognition forms such as badges, participation
tokens, or access privileges. To preserve integrity and trust, these mechanisms must also be Secure,
relying on decentralized verification methods (e.g., cryptographic proofs, zero-knowledge attestations,
or blockchain-based audits) that eliminate dependence on centralized gatekeepers. A Rewarding system
further enhances participation by ensuring that all forms of engagement yield tangible benefits. To
maintain long-term relevance, incentive mechanisms should be Adaptable flexibly in response to
shifts in community priorities or needs, such as prioritizing collaborative design contributions during
development phases or support services during rollout periods. Finally, incentives should be Calibrated
to the singular citizen to emphasize sustained involvement over time, for example, through mechanisms
that provide compounding rewards for ongoing participation.</p>
        <p>The second sub-feature, Governance Structure, defines the participatory architecture through which
collective decision-making and resource management are enacted. An Engaging governance structure
enables shared ownership and accountability, potentially realized through decentralized autonomous
organization (DAO) models or token-based voting systems. A Managerial component is equally vital,
addressing the stewardship of shared community resources, digital or physical, by empowering members
to curate, maintain, and evolve the communal oferings. This could involve roles such as resource
coordinators, peer moderators, or maintenance task forces. Lastly, the Social aspect of governance
involves creating communicative spaces, either through embedded community forums, chat integrations,
or links with existing social platforms, where members can exchange feedback, deliberate on system
proposals, and foster mutual learning.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>Feature</title>
        <p>Authentication</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-7">
        <title>Functional Categories</title>
        <p>Privacy
Attributes</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-8">
        <title>Types</title>
        <p>Identity
Data
Adaptability
Scalability</p>
        <p>Table 3 presents the Authentication feature as a critical element in the design of local community
collaborative economy systems, focusing on enabling secure, trustworthy access while preserving
individual privacy and aligning with community-specific contexts. This feature is structured around
two sub-categories: Privacy and Attributes.</p>
        <p>Within the Privacy category, two core types are identified. The first, Identity, emphasizes the need for
robust yet socially sensitive identity verification mechanisms. These may include the use of verifiable
digital credentials, such as decentralized identifiers (DIDs) or digital wallets linked to national electronic
identities (eIDs), as well as community-based verification models, in which existing trusted members
vouch for new participants. This hybrid approach ensures both accountability and inclusivity. The
second type, Data, addresses the ethical management of personal information. It requires strict
privacypreserving protocols to protect user data, ensuring that sensitive attributes, such as address, participation
history, or token holdings, are not exposed, sold, or repurposed without explicit consent. Technologies
such as end-to-end encryption, diferential privacy, and zero-knowledge proofs may be employed to
achieve these goals, reinforcing user trust and compliance with data protection regulations.</p>
        <p>The second category, Attributes, pertains to the structural qualities of the authentication process itself.
The first attribute, Adaptability, reflects the need for authentication methods to align with the cultural
and operational norms of the specific community. For instance, in low-tech or tightly-knit local groups,
in-person or ofline verification (e.g., local assemblies, trusted peer introductions, or physical token
issuance) may be more appropriate and acceptable than purely digital solutions. The second attribute,
Scalability, acknowledges that the system does not require large-scale user onboarding typical of global
platforms. Altogether, the Authentication feature balances technological rigor with human-centered
design, ensuring that access control supports both system integrity and community values.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-9">
        <title>4.2. Actors</title>
        <p>Local communities are characterized by unique features that are not present in other web3 configurations.
For instance, even though these systems are blockchain-based and digitally conceived, there is still a
need for human roles. Defining distinct actors within a community is essential for designing efective
tokens that achieve their intended purpose.</p>
        <p>Actors are autonomous entities, such as users or software programs, that interact by sending and
receiving messages. Within this specific context, these actors are designed and implemented to embody
corresponding roles within the local community system:
• Human Actor
– Token Issuer: a local community association responsible for designing, issuing, and
managing the tokens. Humans here set policies and adjust parameters as needed to reflect
community values and objectives.
– Individual user: the community member who participates in local events, initiatives, or
volunteer opportunities and ultimately earns tokens as recognition for their contributions.
– Validator: trusted community members who verify that a token transfer or reward is justified
(e.g., confirming a volunteer’s contribution). Their endorsement adds a layer of trust and
accountability.
– Auditor: a human oversight team that reviews flagged transactions, handles disputes, and
ensures that the system’s operations align with community guidelines. They step in when
automated systems detect irregularities or when nuanced judgment is required.
– Smart Contract Administrator (Human Oversight): while the contract itself automates most
operations, a human administrator is needed to manage updates, resolve issues, and adjust
the system rules in response to evolving community needs.
• Automated Actor
– Transfer Facilitator: a smart contract or mobile app module that verifies transaction
conditions (e.g., event attendance via QR codes) and executes token transfers without manual
intervention.
– Benefit Distributor: an automated platform or interface that allows community members to
redeem tokens for non-monetary benefits (like discounts at local businesses or event access).</p>
        <p>It validates token balances, applies redemption rules, and updates user statuses seamlessly.
– Automated Audit Systems: software tools that continuously monitor and record transactions,
lfag anomalies, and generate reports.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-10">
        <title>4.3. Core Needs for Blockchain-Based Collaborative Economies in Local</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-11">
        <title>Communities</title>
        <p>Based on the identified requirements, it is possible to delineate a set of core needs for local communities
seeking to implement token-based systems in support of collaborative economies.
Role Diferentiation: A foundational need lies in the ability to define and manage diferentiated
roles within the community. These roles shape the interactions and relationships that the token system
is designed to facilitate. Accordingly, tokens may serve a range of functions—from enabling value
exchange and granting access to services, to conferring governance rights. Crucially, the functionality
of the token is contingent upon the broader economic logic adopted by the community. In the context
of collaborative economies, this logic transcends market-driven principles to incorporate forms of
reciprocity, redistribution, and non-market exchange [35], which are essential for fostering social
cohesion and collective agency.</p>
        <p>The present proposal identifies four essential roles commonly found within a local community context.
These roles form a dynamic framework that each community can specify and adapt to reflect their
particular needs, structures, and objectives.</p>
        <p>• Initiator : Typically the community manager, this role is responsible for launching the tokenized
collaborative economy and has the authority to assign roles to participants.
• Association: Community-based, non-profit organizations that ofer services and organize
initiatives to support the local social fabric.
• Local Retailer : Small businesses and commercial entities operating within the community.
• Community Member : Citizens who actively participate in the socio-economic life of the
community.</p>
        <p>Token Typologies Aligned with Community Values: Local communities require tokens that
reflect a variety of use cases and value systems, including:
• Asset Representation: Tokens that represent tangible or intangible assets, designed to meet the
circulation needs defined by values of the community and the collaborative economy purpose see
2.1 and 2.2
• Non-Monetary Incentives: Tokens functioning as drivers of participation, aimed at recognizing
and motivating civic engagement through mechanisms that go beyond financial remuneration.</p>
        <p>See 2.3</p>
        <p>Section 6 presents token types that can represent use cases aligned with the needs of a local
community.</p>
        <p>Tools for Initiate a Collaborative Economy: Given the technical complexity inherent in
blockchainbased infrastructures, there is a pressing need for tools that facilitate both the initiation and long-term
management of community systems. These tools must mediate between technical design and community
engagement, supporting the early stages of organizational setup while also enabling processes of
codesign, capacity building, and the progressive decentralization of governance.</p>
        <p>For this reason, Section 6 presents a toolkit containing a repository of smart contracts designed to
reflect the requirements for designing and implementing a collaborative economy in a local community.
These smart contracts implement role-based logic and provide communities with a ready-to-use set of
tokens to support the launch of their collaborative systems.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Incentives</title>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Motivations can be classified into two main types, as mentioned in 2.3</title>
        <p>• Extrinsic Motives: These arise from external rewards, such as financial compensation or material
benefits. In this case, the primary driver is not the action itself but the anticipated outcome or
utility. While extrinsic incentives are common and often necessary, they should not be the sole
motivator.
• Intrinsic Motives: These stem from internal satisfaction and personal engagement with the work.</p>
        <p>Individuals driven by intrinsic motivation find meaning, enjoyment, or intellectual stimulation in
their tasks, leading to personal growth and skill development.</p>
        <p>Efective incentive design requires a diversified approach that addresses these diferent types of
motivations. In motivation theory, an incentive is defined as anything that prompts an individual to act.
The study of incentive structures is central to understanding economic activities, both at the level of
individual decision-making and in the context of cooperation and competition within institutions [36].
Incentives can be broadly classified as positive (ofering rewards) or negative (threatening punishment),
and they can motivate agents in various ways. Our aim here is to broaden the understanding of incentives
beyond the specific application of cryptoeconomics, which focuses on designing incentives to encourage
honest behavior within competitive environments, particularly in blockchain-based ecosystems. Tokens
serve as one example of such economic incentives within blockchains [37]. As native units of value, they
primarily incentivize the use and operation of the blockchain [38]. Building upon these foundations,
this proposal focuses on positive incentives and distinguishes between monetary and non-monetary
forms. Our goal is to identify the most efective ways to design incentives that resonate with these
diverse types of motivations.</p>
        <p>Monetary incentives involve compensating participants with a specific amount of tokens, which,
in the given context, take the form of community currency. These incentives function as rewards
and can be categorized based on their timing: input-based compensation, which is provided prior to
task completion, and output-based compensation, which is granted upon fulfillment of a task. While
such incentives predictably augment extrinsic motivation, their impact on intrinsic motivation is
often detrimental. This phenomenon can be attributed to the crowding-out efect [ 39], wherein the
introduction of tangible rewards shifts the motivation from inherent enjoyment or personal gratification
to the external incentive, thereby undermining intrinsic interest in the activity itself.
Non-monetary Incentives This section proposes a classification of incentives, tailored for a local
community context, that fall outside the monetary domain. Recognizing the inherent interconnectedness
of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, a clear dichotomy between non-monetary incentives and intrinsic
motivation is not always discernible. Rather, certain incentives exhibit a stronger afinity with intrinsic
drivers, while others appeal to both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. The latter category includes, for
instance, access to resources or services ofering tangible benefits, and gamification strategies that
integrate the inherent enjoyment of an activity with external objectives such as the acquisition of
collectibles or other forms of reward.</p>
        <p>
          Another example of a non-monetary incentive strongly linked to intrinsic motivation is ”Contribution,”
which can manifest as access to a voting system or membership privileges. This form of incentive
directly addresses the fundamental psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness,
as posited by self-determination theory. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ] We conceptualize ”Contribution” as a mechanism for
recognition that serves as an alternative to traditional reputation systems, deliberately avoiding rating
systems and instead focusing on the acknowledgment and valorization of the efective contributions
made by individual participants.
        </p>
        <p>Incentive
Monetary</p>
        <p>Monetary
Non-monetary
Non-monetary
Non-monetary</p>
        <p>Form</p>
        <p>Example
Input-based Compensation</p>
        <p>Airdrop, “Welcome reward”
Output-based Compensation</p>
        <p>Access
Gamification
Contribution</p>
        <p>Reward for a task
Resources, Services</p>
        <p>Collectible
Membership, Voting</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Tokenization for Local Communities</title>
      <p>In this section, we propose in details the incentive tokens engineered to foster engagement and value
exchange within local communities, following the results found in Sections 4 and 5. We begin by
delineating each token construct according to four dimensions: their functional category that delineates
the primary purpose of the tokens, on‑chain characteristics that focus on the role-based conditions that
shape token’s design -such as minting, burning and transferability, incentive forms (based on Section 5
and [30]), and illustrative real-world usage scenarios. Thereafter, we present our open‑source toolkit on
GitHub, which implements these constructs, enabling researchers and practitioners to instantiate and
evaluate token‑driven ecosystems with minimal setup.</p>
      <p>In the following use cases, we define a structured role-based framework for managing token functions
within the community ecosystem. Each role is assigned to a particular component, defining clear
responsibilities and privileges. With this organized approach, actions related to token management are
performed only by designated participants who possess the appropriate authority.</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>6.1. Community Value Token</title>
        <p>Category : This token can be considered a form of community currency, designed to support collective
goals within local social and economic contexts. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the exchange of
services and resources that promote community well-being, mutual support, individual empowerment,
and stronger local connections. A designated issuer creates and distributes these tokens (community
coins), which can be exchanged among community members for goods, services, or shared resources.
Issuers retain the ability to mint additional coins when necessary, in response to community needs or
to provide specific incentives. In this way, community token function both as a medium for exchanging
social value and as a monetary reward mechanism that encourages active participation and contribution
within the local ecosystem.</p>
        <p>Characteristics:
• Base token standard: ERC20
• Open Transferability: this token can be transferred without restriction.
• Designed Tokenomics: The behavior of the token and its underlying economic model are critical
design elements that should be collectively determined by the community.</p>
        <p>Incentive Form: Fungible token designed for use within a specific community, acting as both a medium
of exchange. It can be considered a monetary incentive and incentive enabler: medium of exchange
and unit of account.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-2">
        <title>6.2. Purpose Driven Token</title>
        <p>Category : This token is designed to support clearly defined social, civic, or environmental objective
within a given ecosystem. Unlike general-purpose or purely speculative tokens, purpose-driven tokens
are engineered to support mission-aligned behaviors, incentivize targeted actions, or facilitate access to
resources that advance the goals of a community or initiative. This token serves as a means to recognize
and reward community members for their engagement in collective actions. Its value proposition lies
in transforming civic engagement from an often unrewarded efort into one that is acknowledged,
incentivized, and empowering for participants. In this context, a specific association can issue a token
tailored to reward a defined civic activity or to support targeted community initiatives. Through the
definition of a Purpose Driven Token, it will be possible to define sub-communities (of citizens or
associations or stores) identified by new roles, and it will be possible to establish within a smart contract
the paths that the tokens can take, so that specific community initiatives can be implemented.
Characteristics:
• Base token standard: ERC20
• Role-based Minting: The ability to mint tokens is assigned to specific roles—such as Association
—who act as authorized issuers within the system.
• Role-based Transferability: this token can be transferred with some limitation based on the
purpose of the case. It can be transferred from minter to token holder, but not between token
holders.</p>
        <p>Incentive Form: Monetary incentive, output-based compensation. Fungible token designed for use
within a specific community, serving as a mechanism to recognize participation in community activities.
It functions as a an incentive driver by allowing participants to get rewards.</p>
        <p>
          Example scenario: A possible scenario involves the recognition of youth volunteering through
tokenbased incentives. Young volunteers participate in civic activities organized by local associations and, in
return, receive reward tokens in their digital wallets. These tokens are issued by a social cooperative
responsible for educational initiatives on behalf of the municipality. Volunteers can then use a dedicated
exchange mechanism to convert their tokens into digital coupons, which are redeemable at participating
local businesses and cultural venues. This system not only acknowledges civic engagement but also
strengthens the connection between youth, community services, and the local economy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ]. In this
example scenario, the purpose driven token allows:
• to identify a specific group of citizens (the youth volunteers)
• to make only certain types of token transfer possible (from the association promoting the initiative
to youth and from youth to shops)
Defining these sub-communities of users and transfer constraints within a smart contract allows for
the implementation of specific spending circuits
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-3">
        <title>6.3. Coupon</title>
        <p>Category : These tokens are issued in order to represent specific benefits as: discount vouchers for local
goods and services; free access passes to cultural or community events; time-limited rights to use shared
spaces (e.g., music rehearsal rooms, coworking areas). Once issued, the coupons can be distributed
to users, who may then redeem them. Upon redemption—especially if the tokens are returned to the
original issuer—they are considered “consumed” and cannot be reissued or recirculated.
Characteristics:
• Base token standard: ERC20
• Role-based Minting: The ability to mint tokens is assigned to specific roles—such as Association
or Local Retailer —who act as authorized issuers within the system.
• Open Transferability: this token can be transferred without restriction.
• Burnable Upon Use: Once a coupon is used to access the intended service or resource, it is burned,
when it is transferred from a Community Member to the Association or Local Retailer
Incentive Form: Non-monetary incentives, Access. Fungible tokens used to grant access to services or
resources within a community. They function as incentive enablers, as they confer the right to utilize
specific services or material resources.</p>
        <p>
          Example scenario: Community tokens (e.g., ERC-20), earned through civic participation or
contributions to the community, can be exchanged for digital coupons. This mechanism incentivizes active
engagement in the local socio-economic ecosystem, promoting both community participation and local
economic circulation. For example, volunteers may use their tokens to obtain coupons issued by local
commercial or cultural service providers. These coupons, which represent specific benefits or discounts,
are redeemed in person by transferring them to the retailer’s wallet [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ].
6.4. Badge
Category : It is an artifact—a unique, non-fungible token (NFT) recorded on the blockchain—used to
certify the completion of a task. In a community context, this NFT serves to represent achievement
and merit. Badges are verifiable proof of participation,confirming that an individual has carried out a
specific activity, attended an event, or been present at a designated location.
• Base token standard: ERC721
• Role-based Minting: The ability to mint tokens is assigned to specific roles—such as Association
or Local Retailers—who act as authorized issuers within the system.
• Role-based Transferability: this token can be transferred with some limitation based on the
purpose of the case. It can be transferred from Association to Community Member, but once
received, it becomes non-transferable.
• Unique Acquisition: A Community Member can only earn a specific badge once from the
Association.
• Task-Based Acquisition: Badges are awarded upon the completion of specific tasks or task
sequences, or as proof of presence at designated events or locations.
• Additionally, the badge can be designed with two possible functionalities:
– Burnable for Additional Rewards: Users may choose to burn multiple collected badges in
exchange for further rewards or benefits.
– Collectible as Proof of Presence or Achievement: Alternatively, badges may serve as
immutable proof of participation, presence, or task accomplishment, contributing to a user’s
reputation or history within the system.
        </p>
        <p>Incentive Form: Non-monetary incentive, Gamification. It can be considered as an incentive drivers
by allowing participants to get rewards.</p>
        <p>Example scenario: A possible application of this token could be in the tourism sector, aimed at
incentivizing visits to lesser-known locations and promoting sustainable tourist practices. In this
scenario, local businesses and associations could collaborate to create a networked circuit, where each
participating activity or site is part of a shared system. Tourists who visit one or more of these locations
would receive a badge as proof of participation. Upon completing the entire circuit, tourists could
gain access to additional ofers, rewards, or experiences within the local area, thereby fostering both
sustainable behaviors and local economic engagement.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-4">
        <title>6.5. Membership - Soul Bound Token</title>
        <p>Category : These tokens verify eligibility to participate in governance processes, access community
services, and benefit from collective resources. Because SBTs are secure and immutable, they provide
a reliable method for verifying identity and membership status, helping to ensure that only eligible
participants engage in restricted community functions. Their non-transferable nature reinforces the
authenticity of each member’s contributions, creating a permanent and tamper-proof record of
involvement. This can promote long-term engagement, as members know their contributions are formally
recognized. In this model, receiving an SBT after participating in community activities efectively grants
individuals full membership status, including voting rights and access to community services—thus
encouraging sustained civic participation and collective responsibility.</p>
        <p>Characteristics:
• Base token standard: ERC721
• Role-based Minting: The ability to mint tokens is assigned to specific roles, such as an Initiator
• Role-based Transferability: The token can be transferred only from the Initiator to the Community
Member, and its transferability is strictly tied to community membership: it is non-transferable
and permanently linked to their account
• Multiple Acquisition Method
– Contribution-Based: Members collect ERC20 reward tokens by completing tasks and then
exchange these reward tokens for a SBT membership token representing their contribution.
– Attendance-Based: Members collect ERC721 Proof of Presence tokens by participating in
community events and then exchange these for a SBT membership token representing their
attendance.</p>
        <p>Incentive Form: Non-monetary incentive, Contribution. It is used to recognize community
members’ contributions, acting as an incentive driver by granting access to roles and benefits within the
community.</p>
        <p>Example scenario: In a local neighborhood, a community association holds regular meetings to discuss
and manage various activities, such as neighborhood clean-ups, local events, or neighborhood
improvement projects. These meetings are crucial for governance and decision-making within the community.
At each meeting, attendees receive a Proof of Attendance token (or attendance record), which can be
tracked digitally. The system is designed so that after a member has attended a specified number of
meetings or completed certain community engagement tasks, they earn eligibility to receive an SBT,
which grants them full membership status within the community.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-5">
        <title>6.6. Representation of Physical Objects</title>
        <p>Category : This artifact, implemented as a non-fungible token (NFT), serves as the digital representation
of a physical object within the tokenized system. It facilitates borrowing dynamics among participants
by ofering a verifiable and transferable record of ownership and possession.</p>
        <p>Characteristics:
• Base token standard: ERC721
• Role-based Transferability: this token can be transferred with some limitation based on the
purpose of the case. It can be transferred to Community Member to Community Member.
• Temporary Transfer: The transfer of the token is specifically linked to the act of borrowing an
item. When an item is borrowed, the corresponding non fungible token is transferred to the
borrower’s account for the duration of the borrowing period.</p>
        <p>Incentive Form: Non-monetary, Access. A non-fungible token (NFT) used to represent physical objects
within a tokenized system, granting access to the community lending system. For this reason it is an
incentive driver that enables the access to a resource.</p>
        <p>Example scenario: Consider a decentralized ”Library of Things” where physical objects are represented
by unique ERC721 non-fungible tokens. A blockchain-based application facilitates the reservation
and regulation of object exchanges. The exchange of the physical object occurs directly between two
participants, eliminating the need for intermediaries as found in traditional libraries. In this model, the
ERC721 token functions as the digital representation of the shared resource, with properties ensuring
its uniqueness, clear ownership and transferability limited to the duration of a borrow [40].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-6">
        <title>6.7. Event Ticketing</title>
        <p>Category : This token is designed to enable local associations, grassroots initiatives, or informal groups
of citizens to autonomously create, distribute, and manage digital tickets for community-based events
such as cultural performances, concerts, exhibitions, and educational workshops.</p>
        <p>Characteristics:
• Base token standard: ERC721
• Role-based Minting: The ability to mint tokens is assigned to specific roles—such as Associations
or Local Retailers —who act as authorized issuers within the system.
• Role-based Transferability: this token can be transferred with some limitation based on the
purpose of the case. It can be transferred from Association to Community Member and from
Community Member to Association, but not between Community Members.
• Lifecycle Options:
– Burnable: Tickets are burned either after they are used for the event entrance or once the
event has expired.</p>
        <p>– Collectible NFT: Tickets are not burnt, serving as collector’s items or memorabilia.
Incentive Form: Non-monetary incentive, Access and Gamification. It acts as incentive enabler giving
the right to participate to events or use community shared spaces
Example scenario: Tickets can be used to manage events such as concerts, exhibitions, and festivals
within local communities. These events play a vital role in strengthening local identity, fostering social
cohesion, and activating public spaces. This can be especially valuable for smaller community-led
associations, which often lack access to afordable and adaptable ticketing infrastructure that aligns
with their values of inclusivity, transparency, and decentralization.</p>
        <p>Toolkit We have released an open‐source software toolkit on GitHub 1 that provides a reference
implementation of the token constructs delineated in our proposed use‐cases. This toolkit encompasses
the full lifecycle of each token variant ofering practitioners a robust foundation for the deployment of
token‐based local communities. Central to the architecture is a modular registry component, which
maintains a comprehensive record of all defined community roles and systematically associates each
community member’s address with its role that defines its permitted token operations. By cloning the
repository and specifying the requisite role definitions within the registry, researchers and developers
can instantiate a token‐governed ecosystem for experimental evaluation or production use.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Blocchi Project Use Case</title>
      <p>A concrete use case for the implementation of tokenized collaborative economies is Blocchi project2,
currently developed through the integration of CommonsHood [41, 42], a blockchain-based wallet
platform, and FirstLife [43], a geo-referenced civic social network. This use case targets the challenge
of increasing tourist flows to lesser-known mountainous regions by enabling the creation of tokenized
systems designed directly by stakeholders.</p>
      <p>CommonsHood enables non-technical users—including citizens, institutions, and merchants—to issue
and manage cryptographic tokens via customizable templates using a no-code interface. In this project
the platform is integrated with FirstLife’s interactive mapping and geolocation capabilities, in order to
support the promotion of local tourism ecosystems by allowing visitors to discover, interact with, and
benefit from geographically located services and opportunities.</p>
      <p>Merchants can independently create discount tokens and ofer promotions and also collaborate to
design tourism circuits, creating interoperable, token-driven experiences that encourage mobility and
cross-promotion among local actors. This fosters a bottom-up economic network grounded in mutual
benefit and shared governance principles. The system architecture enables the issuance of multiple
token types functioning as non-monetary incentives.</p>
      <p>• Coupons represent a non-monetary incentive that grant access to specific services or discounts.
1https://github.com/EmanueleSpadaro/tokenized-communities
2BLOCCHI: tokenization tools for supporting tourism in rural and mountain areas. part of the NODES project, funded by MUR
– Mission 4, Component 2, Investment 1.5 – Creation and Strengthening of ”Innovation Ecosystems”, building ”Territorial RD
Leaders” – of the PNRR, funded by the European Union – NextGenerationEU grant agreement no. ECS00000036. 2023 - 2025
• Badges, issued as non-transferable NFTs, serve a dual function: they act as proof-of-presence
tokens within tourism circuits and activate gamification mechanisms that stimulate intrinsic
motivation through collection and achievement-based engagement. Completion of a full circuit
unlocks additional utility (e.g., reward coupons), reinforcing continued participation.</p>
      <p>This layered token model enhances the attractiveness and dynamism of the tourist ofering while
creating network efects among local businesses. Preliminary co-design sessions with local stakeholders
validated both the interaction model and the underlying infrastructure, confirming strong interest in
token-based tools that serve both commercial and civic purposes. Findings also emphasized the need for
localized onboarding strategies, including simplification of crypto terminology and a user-friendly wallet
interface. This use case demonstrates a practical implementation of a multi-token system supporting
diverse motivational drivers through non-monetary incentives. While currently limited in scope, the
architecture is extensible: future iterations will integrate governance modules (e.g., DAOs) to allow local
stakeholders to make collective decisions regarding token issuance and resource allocation. Moreover,
interoperability frameworks will be developed to allow token recognition across multiple communities,
enabling scalable, decentralized networks of collaboration anchored in local value creation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>8. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The integration of blockchain technology into collaborative economies presents a promising pathway
for empowering local communities through decentralized, transparent, and participatory systems.
By conceptualizing local communities as closed systems with shared goals and processes, this study
has examined how blockchain—particularly through tokenomics—can facilitate non-monetary value
exchange and support collective action. Through an interdisciplinary approach, we have identified the
non-functional requirements and socio-economic needs critical for establishing a tokenized collaborative
economy. Drawing on motivation theory, we argue that non-monetary incentives are essential to
ensure long-term sustainability, user engagement, and alignment with the intrinsic and transcendent
motivations of community members.</p>
      <p>Furthermore, we have mapped the core roles that typically emerge within such ecosystems and
explored which types of tokens are most appropriate to represent the diverse use cases and value
exchanges within these contexts. As a practical contribution, this research proposes a toolkit comprising
a repository of smart contracts specifically designed to translate the identified requirements into
operational components for implementing tokenized systems tailored to the needs of local communities.
These contracts serve as modular building blocks for configuring non-monetary incentive mechanisms,
managing value flows, and supporting community participation. As a future line of research, we
plan to expand the toolkit by integrating additional token types, incorporating decentralized voting
mechanisms, and developing simulation tools to model and optimize the dynamics of token economies,
with the goal of ensuring long-term sustainability and governance adaptability.</p>
      <p>Ultimately, enabling local communities to autonomously manage their economic infrastructure
through blockchain technologies requires both theoretical investigation and practical tools. Addressing
this gap contributes to a more robust understanding of how digital infrastructures can be leveraged to
reinforce social cohesion and economic resilience at the local level. To improve the evaluation of design
principles and non-functional requirements, we propose using the OKR (Objectives and Key Results)
methodology. This provides clear, outcome-focused benchmarks that streamline early research and are
easy for communities to adopt. While a standard OKR framework will be included in the design toolkit,
communities can customize it to reflect their local needs and values. Future developments will explore
the integration of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) as governance actors within these
systems. Embedding modular governance mechanisms will enable stakeholders to collectively manage
decision-making processes, including funding allocations and token issuance policies. Additionally,
the framework will be extended to support interoperability, allowing tokens to be recognized and
exchanged across diferent community networks—thus enabling cross-community collaboration and
resource sharing while preserving local autonomy.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <sec id="sec-9-1">
        <title>The authors did not use Generative AI tools during the writing of this paper.</title>
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