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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Exploring Fairness in Ethereum PoS: The Impact of Protocol Design and MEV</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Stefano Bistarelli</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ivan Mercanti</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Adele Veschetti</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>TU Darmstadt</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Perugia</institution>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper analyzes fairness in the Ethereum Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol using a Python-based simulation framework. Our model enables flexible modifications to protocol parameters, allowing us to assess fairness across diferent settings. We investigate how reward distribution aligns with stake proportionality and explore the efects of various protocol adjustments on fairness outcomes. Additionally, we examine the role of MEV in influencing reward variance and its potential impact on fairness. Our findings provide insights into the mechanisms driving fairness in PoS Ethereum, ofering guidance for improving protocol design to ensure more equitable reward distribution.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Ethereum</kwd>
        <kwd>Proof of Stake</kwd>
        <kwd>MEV-boost</kwd>
        <kwd>analysis</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Blockchain technology enables secure, decentralized, and transparent peer-to-peer transactions without
intermediaries. By leveraging cryptographic techniques and consensus mechanisms, blockchains ensure
tamper-resistant records of digital assets and transactions. Over the years, blockchain applications have
expanded beyond cryptocurrencies—such as Bitcoin [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]—to include smart contracts on Ethereum [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ],
decentralized finance (DeFi) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], supply chain traceability [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], and secure voting systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Early blockchains like Nakamoto’s [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] used Proof of Work (PoW), where nodes solve puzzles to
validate transactions. Due to PoW’s energy demands [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], many systems now adopt Proof of Stake (PoS),
which selects validators by stake, cutting energy use while preserving security.
      </p>
      <p>Fairness in PoS, especially in reward distribution and stake growth, is a key challenge. Ideally,
rewards should scale with stake without promoting wealth concentration. However, factors like
protocol design and external incentives (e.g., Maximal Extractable Value or MEV) can disrupt this
balance. Understanding these efects is essential for building fair and sustainable networks. We define
fairness as stake-proportional reward allocation: validators should earn rewards in line with their stake
over time, despite randomness in block proposals. This reflects economic fairness, where returns match
contributions—i.e., staked tokens—rather than factors like timing, position, or access to MEV.</p>
      <p>
        We analyze fairness in Ethereum’s PoS protocol using a Python-based simulation framework. Unlike
prior works that rely on formal modeling tools like PRISM [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref7 ref8 ref9">7, 8, 9, 10</xref>
        ], our approach allows for greater
lfexibility in modifying protocol parameters and assessing their impact on fairness. We examine the
relationship between stake and reward distribution under diferent protocol settings, including the
presence and absence of MEV Boost. Our simulations reveal how validator rewards deviate from
expected stake-proportional outcomes and highlight the extent to which MEV influences fairness in
Ethereum’s PoS system. This flexibility is key, as existing state-of-the-art tools often require rigid
specifications and struggle to scale with complex blockchain scenarios. They’re also typically tied to
ifxed protocol assumptions, limiting exploration of how design tweaks, like reward schemes or validator
selection, impact fairness. Our simulation framework fills this gap, enabling rapid testing across diverse
protocol setups and adversarial behaviors—vital in Ethereum’s evolving landscape, where features
like MEV Boost and dynamic staking are under active debate. This work is motivated by ongoing
questions about whether Ethereum’s shift to PoS ensures fair participation. We investigate how protocol
structures shape long-term wealth distribution and whether MEV opportunities worsen inequality. Our
lfexible simulation environment enables empirical exploration of these issues, helping inform future
protocol design.
      </p>
      <p>The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides background on Ethereum’s PoS protocol
and fairness considerations. Section 3 introduces our simulation model and its key design choices.
Section 4 presents our experimental results, analyzing stake distribution, reward fairness, and the
impact of MEV. Section 5 discusses related work on PoS fairness analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes
our findings and outlines directions for future research.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background</title>
      <p>The transition of the Ethereum blockchain to a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, known as
the Merge, marked a significant evolution in its architecture. This shift replaced the energy-intensive
Proof-of-Work (PoW) system with a more sustainable and eficient model based on validator staking.
Understanding the fundamentals of Ethereum’s PoS, particularly the role of validators and the emergence
of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) and its mitigation through MEV-Boost, is crucial for contextualizing
the simulations presented in this paper.</p>
      <p>
        Ethereum Proof-of-Stake (Consensus Layer). Following the Merge [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], Ethereum transitioned to
a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus governed by the Beacon Chain [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. The Beacon Chain organizes time
into epochs, each composed of 32 slots lasting 12 seconds. In every slot, a validator is pseudo-randomly
selected to propose a block, while a committee of validators is tasked with attesting to its validity. To
participate, validators must stake 32 ETH and operate validator software. They receive rewards for
proposing and attesting to blocks correctly, and can be penalized or slashed for malicious or negligent
behavior. Validator selection relies on a pseudo-random mechanism (RANDAO) based on staked ETH.
Block finality is achieved through justification and finalization: a checkpoint (first block of an epoch)
becomes justified when attested by more than two-thirds of the total stake, and is finalized once another
justified checkpoint builds upon it.
      </p>
      <p>Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). In parallel to the base consensus mechanism, a phenomenon
known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged within blockchain networks, including
Ethereum. MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from transaction ordering and
inclusion within a block, beyond the standard block reward and transaction fees. This can involve various
strategies, such as front-running user transactions on decentralized exchanges (DEXs), back-running
profitable arbitrage opportunities, or liquidating undercollateralized positions in lending protocols.</p>
      <p>While MEV can incentivize eficient transaction processing and arbitrage, it also presents potential
risks. Uncontrolled MEV extraction can lead to increased gas prices, network instability due to priority
gas auctions, and concerns about fairness and censorship if block proposers prioritize MEV-maximizing
transactions over standard user transactions.</p>
      <p>MEV-Boost. To mitigate the negative impacts of MEV and broaden its benefits, Ethereum introduced
MEV-Boost: a relay middleware that connects validators with external "builders". Builders optimize
blocks for MEV opportunities and submit bids to proposers via the relay. When selected, a validator’s
client fetches the highest-paying valid block and broadcasts it, allowing validators to benefit from MEV
without specialized expertise.</p>
      <p>By separating transaction bundling from block proposing, MEV-Boost fosters a more competitive
and transparent block market. It can improve validator rewards, reduce centralization risk, and improve
censorship resistance by encouraging diverse transaction inclusion. These dynamics are relevant to
our PoS model simulations, which may reflect eficiency gains and incentive efects similar to those
introduced by MEV-Boost.</p>
      <p>
        Fairness. A central challenge in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols, including Ethereum’s, is ensuring a
fair and attack-resistant allocation of block proposal opportunities among validators. Attacks such as the
nothing-at-stake problem [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] and the branching process attack [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] exploit weaknesses in block selection
fairness. In Ethereum’s current PoS mechanism, the chance of being selected as a block proposer is
directly proportional to a validator’s staked ETH. This means that validators with larger stakes are
more likely to propose blocks and earn rewards, which in turn increases their stake even further. Over
time, this dynamic can lead to increasing centralization, as wealthier validators gain a compounding
advantage, making it harder for those with smaller stakes to participate in block production.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Proof of Stake Simulation Model</title>
      <p>In this section, we present a Python-based simulation model for the Ethereum Proof of Stake (PoS)
protocol. The model focuses on token distribution among peers in the network, validator selection, and
the consequences of corrupted validators. It mimics a decentralized blockchain network where validators
are selected based on their stake, rewarded for their actions, and penalized if they are corrupted.
1 def pos_simulation():
2 corrupted_peers = np.sort(np.random.choice(range(1, number_of_peers + 1),</p>
      <p>number_of_corrupted_peers, replace=False))
3 token_distribution = np.sort(np.random.randint(min_tokens_per_peer, max_tokens_per_peer + 1,
number_of_peers))
for iteration in range(1, number_of_iterations + 1):
stakeable_tokens = np.floor((stakeable_percentage / 100) * token_distribution).astype(int)
stakeable_total = np.sum(stakeable_tokens)
stake = np.zeros(number_of_peers, dtype=int)
validators = np.zeros(number_of_validators, dtype=int)
for i in range(number_of_validators):
r = np.random.randint(1, stakeable_total + 1)
s, j = 0, 0
while s &lt;= r:
s += stakeable_tokens[j]
j += 1
j -= 1
if stake[j] == 0:
validators[i] = j
stake[j] = stakeable_tokens[j]
corrupted_validators = np.intersect1d(validators, corrupted_peers)
token_distribution -= stake
stake += reward_tokens
for v in corrupted_validators:
stake[v] -= reward_tokens
stake[v] = np.floor(stake[v] * (penalty_percentage / 100)).astype(int)
token_distribution += stake</p>
      <p>Listing 1: Proof of Stake Simulation Model</p>
      <p>Though inspired by Ethereum’s PoS, our model adopts simplifying assumptions to support controlled
experiments and clearer analysis of fairness. We bound initial token allocations using min_tokens_per_peer
and max_tokens_per_peer to explore both equal and unequal wealth distributions. While Ethereum
imposes no such caps, this design lets us simulate a range of starting conditions, essential for studying
wealth centralization under protocol rules. We also introduce a tunable parameter, stakeable_percentage,
to define what fraction of a peer’s tokens are staked. While Ethereum validators stake exactly 32 ETH
per validator, real users vary their stake based on factors like liquidity needs or risk tolerance. This
lfexibility lets us model a range of validator behaviors—from cautious to fully committed—and assess
fairness under diverse strategies. Finally, our simulation includes a fixed block reward and a penalty
for malicious behavior, reflecting Ethereum’s reward–punishment model in simplified form. Instead of
fully modeling slashing or complex incentives, we apply deterministic penalties to corrupted validators,
enabling repeatable and focused fairness evaluations.</p>
      <p>The simulation is controlled by key parameters defining the network. number_of_peers sets the
total number of peers, each holding a random token amount between min_tokens_per_peer and
max_tokens_per_peer. A portion, defined by stakeable_percentage, is used for staking. The
parameter number_of_corrupted_peers defines how many peers act maliciously when selected as
validators, attempting to exploit the system, while number_of_validators sets how many validators
are chosen per round to validate blocks, a core part of PoS. The fixed reward per validator is controlled
with the parameter reward_tokens, while penalty_percentage reduces rewards for corrupted
validators. Finally, number_of_iterations determines how many rounds of validator selection,
staking, and reward distribution the simulation runs.</p>
      <p>The simulation, presented in Listing 1, begins by defining the peer network, where each peer is
assigned a random number of tokens within the specified range. However, only a portion of these
tokens, determined by the stakeable_percentage, is available for staking. These staked tokens are
used to participate in the validator selection process. In the first step, the simulation randomly selects
a set of corrupted peers. These corrupted peers will attempt to manipulate the validation process by
reducing their rewards, simulating malicious behavior within the network.</p>
      <p>The initial token distribution is created by randomly assigning tokens to each peer. The simulation
then outputs various statistics on this initial distribution, including the total number of tokens, the
mean number of tokens per peer, and the standard deviation. Next, the validator selection process
begins. Validators are chosen randomly, with selection probability weighted by each peer’s stake—those
with more tokens are more likely to be picked. Selected validators receive a fixed reward for validating
blocks. If a corrupted peer is selected, their reward is reduced based on the penalty_percentage,
simulating the impact of malicious behavior. After rewards are applied, token balances are updated:
staked tokens are subtracted, and rewards are added. Corrupted validators receive reduced rewards to
reflect penalties. At the end of each iteration, updated token distributions and statistics are displayed.
This process repeats for the specified number of iterations, modeling how rewards, stake, and corruption
afect fairness over time.</p>
      <p>This model is not intended to mirror Ethereum’s protocol line-for-line, but rather to ofer a
parameterized environment where protocol dynamics can be isolated, manipulated, and studied with respect
to fairness. By enabling control over variables that are fixed or emergent in real-world settings, we
provide a framework for empirical exploration of reward distribution under diferent assumptions and
adversarial conditions.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Simulations</title>
      <p>This section presents simulation experiments to evaluate fairness in Ethereum’s Proof-of-Stake protocol.
The goals are to understand how stake evolves under varying conditions and to assess the impact
of external factors—particularly MEV Boost—on reward distribution and validator selection. Each
experiment isolates key mechanisms influencing fairness.</p>
      <p>We begin by investigating the influence of initial stake on validator rewards and how the protocol’s
design reinforces or mitigates inequalities. This is followed by a comparative analysis of diferent initial
stake distributions to explore the emergence of wealth concentration. The section concludes with an
assessment of the impact of MEV-like strategies on both block production eficiency and fairness.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Stake Growth and Validator Behavior</title>
        <p>To examine how the amount of initial stake influences long-term reward accumulation, we track two
validators: one starting with the highest number of tokens and one with the lowest. As shown in
Figure 1a, the validator with the larger initial stake consistently earns more rewards and grows its
wealth at a faster pace. This divergence remains stable across iterations, suggesting that the protocol
maintains consistency over time while allowing initial inequalities to persist, if not intensify. This
observation raises fairness concerns, as it indicates a compounding advantage for early or wealthy
participants. Such efects, if unchecked, may lead to increasing centralization of power within the
validator set.</p>
        <p>In parallel, we analyze how validator behavior—specifically, honest versus malicious activity—afects
stake evolution. Figure 1b compares an honest validator with a corrupted one. While both start with
similar initial conditions, the corrupted validator exhibits stagnating or declining stake levels due
to penalties applied for dishonest behavior. This contrast highlights the protocol’s efectiveness in
discouraging attacks and maintaining network integrity, though it does not resolve the broader issue of
wealth accumulation among honest yet already advantaged actors.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Distributional Efects and Wealth Inequality</title>
        <p>To further explore fairness, we evaluate how the initial distribution of stake afects long-term outcomes.
Figures 2a and 2b present the system before and after simulation under a uniform distribution of tokens.
Although the initial allocation is nearly linear and equitable, the final distribution reveals a striking
increase in inequality, with some peers amassing significantly greater wealth than others. This emergent
disparity is a direct consequence of the proportional validator selection mechanism, which favors those
with more staked assets.</p>
        <p>(a)
(b)</p>
        <p>To model more realistic starting conditions, we repeat the experiment using a normally distributed
token allocation (Figures 3a and 3b). Even with moderate initial inequality, the protocol produces
sharper divergence over time. Validators with above-average stake benefit from increased selection
probability, leading to faster compounding of rewards. These results align with economic patterns of
wealth concentration, demonstrating that PoS systems may inherently amplify even modest disparities.</p>
        <p>A broader view of this dynamic is captured in Figure 4, which displays the net change in stake for each
validator. While many honest participants see positive gains, a substantial portion—especially those
lfagged as corrupted—experience losses. This underscores the dual role of stake as both an incentive
and a mechanism of diferentiation, reinforcing merit-based growth while preserving initial advantages.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. Block Production and Validator Participation</title>
        <p>Validator participation over time is another key dimension of fairness. Figure 5a compares the cumulative
number of blocks produced by honest and corrupted validators. As expected, honest validators dominate
block production, owing both to their larger stake and to the protocol’s penalization of misbehavior.
This result afirms the protocol’s resilience to manipulation, but also hints at a deeper pattern: honest
validators with more frequent selections continue to grow their dominance, potentially skewing
longterm participation rates.</p>
        <p>To assess how additional incentives alter this dynamic, we introduce MEV-like strategies into the
simulation. Figure 5b reveals a dramatic increase in total block production when MEV Boost is enabled.
This outcome suggests improved network eficiency—but also introduces new concerns about the
distribution of these additional rewards.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4.4. Fairness Under MEV Boost</title>
        <p>The final set of experiments isolates the efect of MEV Boost on fairness. Figure 6 compares the initial
stake of each validator to the total rewards they accumulate when MEV Boost is active. While a general
trend of proportionality is observable, a number of outliers deviate sharply from it—most notably,
validators with modest initial stake who achieve disproportionately high rewards. These anomalies
indicate that MEV opportunities, though potentially rare, can significantly distort reward distribution
by introducing variance unrelated to stake size.</p>
        <p>By contrast, when MEV Boost is disabled (Figure 7), the reward distribution more closely mirrors the
initial stake, with fewer extreme deviations. This reinforces the idea that MEV introduces an element
of randomness that, while beneficial to overall throughput, may undermine the fairness guarantees
typically associated with stake-based systems.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>4.5. Discussion</title>
        <p>Taken together, these results illustrate a nuanced trade-of at the heart of Ethereum’s PoS design. On
one hand, the protocol efectively discourages malicious activity and maintains consistent validator
selection mechanics. On the other hand, it amplifies pre-existing inequalities and, when combined with
MEV, introduces further distortions in reward distribution. These findings underscore the importance of
protocol-level safeguards to prevent excessive centralization and suggest a need for fairness-enhancing
mechanisms—particularly in the context of MEV reward extraction.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Related Works</title>
      <p>In blockchain systems, fairness is closely tied to wealth distribution among nodes. Analyzing validator
rewards ofers insight into the trade-of between investment power and equal opportunity.</p>
      <p>
        Several works study wealth distribution in PoW and PoS systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15 ref16 ref17">15, 16, 17</xref>
        ]. For example, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]
discusses preferential attachment, where top Bitcoin holders accumulate wealth faster than others.
      </p>
      <p>
        A broader analysis in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] compares leading accounts across platforms, showing that tokens tend to
centralize more than native coins, based on evolving statistical indicators.
      </p>
      <p>In contrast, [20] takes a theoretical approach, defining fairness as selection probability proportional
to stake. It studies scenarios with 1% and 40% corrupted nodes. In the first, wealth grows proportionally
even for the rich, raising fairness concerns; in the second, penalties eventually eliminate malicious
nodes, potentially restoring balance.</p>
      <p>To mitigate fairness issues, some propose protocol changes. e-PoS [21] enhances fairness via
blindblock auctions in smart contracts to widen participation. Similarly, RPoS [22] selects validators by coin
ownership but caps coinage, countering accumulation attacks and Nothing-at-Stake vulnerabilities.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>We analyzed fairness in Ethereum’s Proof-of-Stake using a Python-based simulation, exploring how
stake distribution and protocol design afect reward allocation, including the impact of MEV Boost.</p>
      <p>Our results show that wealthier validators consistently earn more, reinforcing stake inequality.
While the protocol penalizes malicious behavior efectively, honest validators still face uneven reward
outcomes. Notably, MEV Boost disrupts stake-proportionality, enabling some low-stake actors to gain
outsized rewards and amplifying reward variance.</p>
      <p>Though MEV Boost improves eficiency, it introduces fairness trade-ofs. These findings point to a
need for mechanisms like reward redistribution or MEV mitigation to ensure more equitable outcomes.
Future work should explore protocol adjustments—such as changes to validator incentives or staking
rules—to support long-term fairness and sustainability.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>S. Bistarelli and I. Mercanti are members of the Gruppo Nazionale Calcolo Scientifico-Istituto Nazionale
di Alta Matematica (GNCS-INdAM). This work has been partially supported by: the ATHENE project
“Model-centric Deductive Verification of Smart Contracts"; INdAM - GNCS Project, codice CUP_
E53C24001950001 MUR project PRIN 2022TXPK39 - PNRR M4.C2.1.1. “Empowering Public
Interest Communication with Argumentation (EPICA)” CUP H53D23003660006, funded by the European
Union - Next Generation EU, Missione 4 Componente 1; MUR PNRR project SERICS (PE00000014
AQuSDIT: CUP_H73C22000880001, COVERT: CUP_J93C23002310006), funded by the European Union
– Next Generation EU; EU MUR PNRR project VITALITY (J97G22000170005), funded by the European
Union – Next Generation EU; University of Perugia - Fondo Ricerca di Ateneo (2020, 2022) – Projects
BLOCKCHAIN4FOODCHAIN, FICO, RATIONALISTS, “Civil Safety and Security for Society”; Piano
Sviluppo e Coesione Salute PSC 2014-2020 - Project I83C22001350001 LIFE: “the itaLian system wIde
Frailty nEtwork” Linea di azione 2.1 “Creazione di una rete nazionale per le malattie ad alto impatto”
Traiettoria 2 “E-Health, diagnostica avanzata, medical devices e mini invasività” Codice locale progetto
T2-AN-12 CUP J93C22001080001.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this work, the authors used ChatGPT in order to: Grammar and spelling
check, Paraphrase and reword. After using this tool, the authors reviewed and edited the content as
needed and take full responsibility for the publication’s content.
[20] A. Leporati, Studying the compounding efect: The role of proof-of-stake parameters on wealth
distribution, in: DLT, volume 3460 of CEUR Workshop Proceedings, CEUR-WS.org, 2023.
[21] M. Saad, Z. Qin, K. Ren, D. Nyang, D. Mohaisen, e-pos: Making proof-of-stake decentralized and
fair, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems 32 (2021) 1961–1973. doi:10.1109/
TPDS.2020.3048853.
[22] A. Li, X. Wei, Z. He, Robust proof of stake: A new consensus protocol for sustainable blockchain
systems, Sustainability 12 (2020) 2824.</p>
    </sec>
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