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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The Role of Artificial Intelligence in SOC Operations: Adoption, Perception, and Workforce Impact</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Daniel Boughton</string-name>
          <email>daniel.boughton@myport.ac.uk</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Iain Reid</string-name>
          <email>iain.reid@port.ac.uk</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="editor">
          <string-name>North Macedonia</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Artificial intelligence; machine learning; Security Operations Centres; SOC; human factors; workforce1</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Portsmouth</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Portsmouth</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UK">United Kingdom</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper examines the incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity operations, with a specific focus on applied machine learning within Security Operations Centres (SOCs). A mixed-methods approach was used, surveying 58 cybersecurity professionals from sectors including banking, healthcare, and technology, to investigate adoption, perceived advantages and drawbacks, and the implications for the human workforce. Quantitative results indicate extensive use of machine learning for alert triage and behavioural analytics, while qualitative findings underscore conditional trust, deficiencies in training, and the evolving dynamics of analyst roles. Thematic analysis identified fundamental categories such as AI as copilot, explainability and trust, and ethical risk. These findings indicate that although machine learning improves efficiency and alleviates cognitive burden, its adoption relies on transparent governance, continuous human monitoring, and professional development. This study enhances academic and industrial discussions by prioritising practitioner perspectives and clarifying the socio-technical considerations of machine-learning adoption in SOCs.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        The cybersecurity landscape is evolving quickly, as organisations increasingly adopt automation to
match the complexity of threat actors and the scale of digital infrastructure [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ]. Security
Operations Centres (SOCs) function as essential environments tasked with real-time threat detection,
investigation, and mitigation. SOC analysts often experience overwhelming alert volumes, false
positives, and the cognitive strain associated with continuous operations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ]. These difficulties have
accelerated the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) as a means to improve operational
efficiency and mitigate human fatigue.
      </p>
      <p>
        The use of AI in cybersecurity includes machine learning, natural language processing, and
behavioural analytics systems that can detect abnormalities, prioritise warnings, and facilitate
incident response [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5">2, 5</xref>
        ]. Despite the extensive technical literature on algorithmic performance and
threat detection efficacy, there exists an important gap in research that critically evaluates the
impact of AI on SOC operations relating to workforce dynamics and human-machine collaboration
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        This study aims to ascertain whether the integration of AI into SOC processes has
reduced challenges including alert fatigue and manual triage, or if it has created new complexities
affecting trust, skill deficiencies, and explainability. Organisations must strategically evaluate if
AI enables a reduction in human personnel or involves retraining and role transformation.
Researchers such as Taddeo and Floridi (2018) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] contend that AI ought to augment—not
supplant—human decisionmaking, a stance corroborated by experts in contemporary literature and
industry evaluations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref9">4, 9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>This study reports survey results from 58 cybersecurity experts across several areas, including
finance, healthcare, and technology. Participants supplied both quantitative data and qualitative
insights, presenting a mixed-methods perspective on the degree of AI adoption, trust, and its
perceived transformative or disruptive impact. Principal themes explore partial integration, perceived
advantages of automation, apprehension regarding algorithmic bias, and ambiguity concerning
long-term employment implications.</p>
      <p>The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 analyses pertinent material regarding AI in
SOCs and organisational transformation. Section 3 defines the research method. Section 4 outlines
the findings. Section 5 examines issues within the context of broader cybersecurity and technical
advancements. Section 6 concludes the paper and explores potential study areas.</p>
      <p>In this paper, the term artificial intelligence is used in a focused sense to denote the application
of machine-learning techniques within security operations centres (for example, anomaly detection
and alert triage). It does not extend to generative models such as large language models, which pose
different opportunities and limitations and fall outside the scope of this study [23].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background and literature review</title>
      <p>
        The use of AI in cybersecurity has been growing rapidly in recent years, driven by the necessity to
navigate increasingly intricate threat landscapes. Multiple studies have evidenced the efficacy of
AIdriven tools—especially machine learning (ML) algorithms—in identifying malicious behaviour,
detecting anomalies, and enhancing response times [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref2 ref5">2, 5, 10, 21</xref>
        ]. These algorithms can analyse
extensive datasets at speeds that far surpass human capacities, making them ideal for tasks such as
log analysis, intrusion detection, and threat scoring [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        SOCs, serving as the frontline of enterprise defence, have increasingly embraced AI-driven
solutions to enhance their operations. SOC analysts are often overwhelmed by substantial quantities
of low-quality alerts, a significant portion of which yield false positives. This issue, known as alert
fatigue, is identified as a primary factor in analyst burnout and errors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. AI offers a promising
solution to mitigate these pressures by filtering alerts, prioritising those posing the highest risk, and
automating initial triage processes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref2">2, 11</xref>
        ]. As per Swimlane (2024) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], SOCs are increasingly
implementing AI co-pilots that assist, rather than replace, human analysts by focusing on actionable
threats.
      </p>
      <p>
        A significant portion of the academic literature has been focused on algorithmic efficacy,
frequently within the framework of benchmark datasets or controlled testing environments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref6">6, 12</xref>
        ].
Nonetheless, there is an absence of studies examining the practical implications of deploying AI in
active SOC environments. Research addressing implementation primarily emphasises technological
factors, with limited attention given to human and organisational impacts, including alterations in
work roles, trust in automation, and ethical accountability [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Mittelstadt et al. (2016) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] contend
that although AI might enhance operational effectiveness, it may also pose new problems if
openness and accountability are not included into its development and execution.
      </p>
      <p>
        Human–AI collaboration is a frequent topic in academic journals, with many researchers
proposing that AI should enhance rather than replace human decision-making [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. In this way,
analysts utilise AI-generated outputs as decision-support tools yet retain accountability for the final
conclusion. Even so, confidence in AI remains conditional. Gunning and Aha (2019) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] emphasise
that the absence of explainability across many AI systems, especially those utilising deep learning,
undermines user confidence and may result in underutilisation.
      </p>
      <p>
        In operational environments, professionals frequently depend on experience and context to
inform their decisions. The incorporation of AI necessitates both technological validation and
adherence with institutional rules, privacy constraints, and legal frameworks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. Organisations
implementing AI in SOCs must confront many challenges, which range from ethical considerations
to practical questions regarding the separation of human and machine responsibilities [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Recent industry surveys highlight a contradictory narrative: while AI is widely embraced,
training and organisational capabilities are insufficient compared to deployment. Darktrace (2022) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]
indicates that many analysts using AI tools claim inadequate or nonexistent training, resulting in
difficulties with interpretation and accountability in decision-making. The skills gap lowers
operational performance and heightens the risk of dependence on tools that users are unable to fully
understand.
      </p>
      <p>
        Literature indicates that the integration of AI is expected to transform the nature of cybersecurity
employment throughout time. Rather than eliminating jobs, AI is expected to shift human analysts'
focus towards higher-order cognitive tasks, including the examination of complex threats, data
contextualisation, and managing of automated systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref8">4, 8</xref>
        ]. This transition demands an update of
recruitment, training, and professional development strategies within the security industry.
      </p>
      <p>In summary, though the technological effectiveness of AI in cybersecurity is widely recognised,
its organisational, ethical, and human implications remain inadequately understood. A notable gap
exists in research regarding practitioners' experiences and assessments of AI in their daily
operations, especially within high-pressure settings such as SOCs. This study bridges the gap through
exploring the perceptions of cybersecurity professionals, concentrating on trust, usability, and the
future of human roles in AI-enhanced security operations.</p>
      <p>
        Alongside enhancing detection capabilities, AI technologies have been suggested as a method for
strengthening threat intelligence aggregation. AI systems can discern previously unrecognised
patterns or correlations that human analysts might miss by utilising data from various internal and
external sources [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref5">5, 10, 15</xref>
        ]. These methods allow AI to uncover latent relationships or subtle
anomalies across diverse datasets that are not readily visible through manual analysis. This
functionality is particularly advantageous in advanced persistent threat (APT) situations, where
adept adversaries seek to avoid detection by assimilating into routine activities. The incorporation
of AI into threat intelligence platforms has demonstrated enhancements in detection latency and
expedited reaction times [16].
      </p>
      <p>
        The organisational context in which AI is implemented is equally crucial. Jalali and Kaiser (2018)
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] assert that institutional culture, leadership endorsement, and change management techniques
substantially influence the reception and utilisation of AI solutions. Organisations with a more
adaptable or agile security posture may adopt AI more effectively, whereas rigid hierarchical
organisations may face pushback, particularly from employees apprehensive about automation and
job security. These organisational issues must be evaluated concurrently with technical design and
implementation.
      </p>
      <p>
        The ethical and legal ramifications of AI in cybersecurity have garnered heightened scrutiny.
AIdriven surveillance systems can contest conventional standards on data privacy and consent [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ].
This has elicited demands for enhanced openness and explainability, not merely as a means of
fostering confidence, but as a legal obligation under regulations such as GDPR. Mittelstadt et al.
(2016) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] advocate for the integration of ethical issues into the AI tool development process,
assuring alignment with societal values and institutional responsibilities.
      </p>
      <p>
        Moreover, interdisciplinary research indicates that effective AI integration may be enhanced by
cross-functional teams consisting data scientists, cybersecurity experts, legal consultants, and
ethicists. This collaborative framework can foresee conflicts and ensure that technological decisions
correspond with operational and regulatory requirements [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref8">8, 14</xref>
        ]. Consequently, the successful
implementation of AI in SOCs is not merely a technology issue but a socio-technical one that
necessitates synchronised governance, communication, and a collective comprehension across
several domains.
      </p>
      <p>New policy frameworks, including the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act and the
NIST AI Risk Management Framework, are beginning to shape organisational governance of AI
use. These frameworks emphasise the significance of human oversight, robustness, and
transparency— principles that align closely with the issues arising from this study [17, 18]. Their focus on
'high-risk' systems emphasises the need for explainability in cybersecurity, particularly since
realtime decisions affect critical infrastructure.</p>
      <p>Research in related fields, such as finance and healthcare, shows similar trends. In healthcare, the
implementation of AI has enhanced diagnostic efficiency; however, issues of explainability and
clinician trust remain as limitations. These findings provide significant parallels to the SOC context,
where decisions must be rapid, reasonable, and made under pressure [19].</p>
      <p>While much of the foundational literature predates the rapid adoption of generative AI
technologies after 2022, these works remain central to understanding machine learning’s
operational role in SOCs. More recent literature has turned strongly toward generative AI and
LLM-based models and their vulnerabilities [24], but this layer is mostly beyond the operational
scope of SOC ML systems addressed in this paper.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Methodology</title>
      <p>This study employed a convergent mixed-methods design to investigate the use and perception of AI
within SOCs. The goal was to understand the current adoption of AI in cybersecurity processes, the
perceptions of professionals in the field, and whether its implementation is regarded as enhancing or
eroding human duties. A summary of the core research aims includes evaluating current AI
capabilities within SOCs, assessing practitioner trust in these tools, and understanding whether AI is
perceived as a complement to or replacement for human judgement. This methodological approach
enabled the triangulation of quantitative trends with rich qualitative insights, enhancing the study’s
ability to address its complex research questions.</p>
      <p>Respondents were asked about the role of “AI” in SOC operations without a technical definition
being imposed. While this provides authentic practitioner perspectives, it introduces interpretive
variability—some may conflate machine learning with broader notions of AI [23].</p>
      <p>
        A cross-sectional survey was chosen as the principal method for data collection. The survey
aimed to collect both quantitative and qualitative data through multiple-choice questions,
Likertscale responses, and open-ended prompts. This approach allowed the identification of statistical
trends and in-depth respondent perspectives, illustrating the intricate and complex nature of the
issue under investigation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The survey comprised 40 questions, logically organised into sections addressing demographics,
organisational context, current use of AI tools, perceived advantages and disadvantages, trust in AI
systems, ethical considerations, and expectations of future changes to SOC roles. Adaptive logic was
utilised to present specific questions conditionally, dependent upon prior responses; for instance,
enquiries on problems with implementation were presented solely to respondents who
acknowledged AI utilisation within the company they work for. This rationale reduced fatigue and
ensured the relevance of questions to all participants.</p>
      <p>Participant recruitment was carried out using professional networking platforms, primarily via
LinkedIn. The survey link was disseminated through cybersecurity-oriented discussion forums and
direct engagement within the researcher's professional network. This opportunity sampling
approach, while pragmatic, presents some inherent limitations around generalisability. A total of 61
replies were gathered; of these, 58 were considered legitimate for analysis after excluding three due
to insufficient consent. All eligible participants verified their active engagement in
cybersecurityrelated positions.</p>
      <p>Participants spanned many different industries, including banking, healthcare, technology, and
government. The majority of participants had more than five years of experience in cybersecurity,
holding roles such as analysts, engineers, CISOs, and policy consultants. The size of organisations
varied significantly, with a significant number of individuals employed by large companies
(exceeding 1,000 people), while others worked in small-to-medium enterprises or start-ups. This
diversity offered broad understanding across several operational contexts.</p>
      <p>
        The University of Portsmouth provided ethical approval for the study. Informed consent was
obtained before the start of the survey, and participants were made aware of their right to withdraw
at any point before submission. The survey was entirely anonymous—no personal data was
gathered, and IP addresses were not recorded. Data was securely stored in accordance with
University and GDPR regulations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistical techniques. Frequencies and
percentages were calculated for closed-response questions to identify patterns in adoption, training,
and attitudes towards AI. Charts and tables were employed to illustrate essential findings. A
thematic analysis methodology was used for the qualitative data, implementing an inductive coding
approach. Narrative answers were analysed for common concepts and grouped into themes such as
'trust and transparency', 'alert fatigue', 'AI as co-pilot', and 'training and role evolution'.</p>
      <p>This technique enabled the researcher to summarise the narrative content into significant
findings consistent with the study's aims [20].</p>
      <p>Thematic analysis followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) [20] six-phase framework, comprising:
- Familiarisation with the data
- Generation of initial codes
- Searching for themes
- Reviewing themes
- Defining and naming themes
- Producing the report</p>
      <p>This systematic process enabled the identification of emergent issues that were not directly
captured by the quantitative measures, enriching the overall interpretation.</p>
      <p>This study had several constraints. Utilising convenience sampling through professional
networks has potential selection bias and limits the generalisability of the findings. In addition, the
cross-sectional design captures observations at one specific moment in time, which may not reflect
evolving perceptions as AI adoption continues. Nevertheless, the results provide significant
practitioner focused insights and establish a basis for subsequent, more specific research.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Results</title>
      <p>The study responses offer an in-depth assessment of the perception and utilisation of AI within the
cybersecurity sector, especially in regard to SOC environments. The study identified recurring
themes in both quantitative trends and qualitative narratives. Participants had diverse experiences
with AI technologies; however, the majority expressed cautious optimism about their potential to
enhance threat detection, prioritise alerts, and reduce workload.</p>
      <p>Among the 58 valid responses, 68% reported that their organisation currently uses at least one
AIdriven technology in cybersecurity operations. Typical uses included behavioural analytics, log
analysis, natural language processing (NLP) for report generation and enrichment, and anomaly
detection. Among those not already using AI, 64.5% indicated that their organisation intends to
begin using such technologies in the future.</p>
      <p>Participants were asked about particular AI applications. The primary applications included:
- Detection and triage of threats (82%)
- Analysis of network traffic (71%)
- Behavioural pattern identification (64%)
- Phishing detection and response (49%)
- Automated ticketing and response processes (37%)</p>
      <p>Qualitative responses corroborated these findings, with numerous individuals expressing how AI
helps with handling alert volume and prioritising the most critical incidents. One participant
remarked, “AI has assisted in reducing the noise. We no longer spend hours on false positives—we
focus on what matters.” Another noted, “We used to get swamped, now AI helps weed out the
nonissues before we even log in.” The issue of efficiency and reduced cognitive load was prevalent across
the dataset.</p>
      <p>A significant observation was the effect of AI on alert fatigue. 84% of participants indicated the
success of AI in filtering or reducing irrelevant alerts. Several participants provided clear
endorsements of the effect AI has had, including: “My team has stopped burning out every week—AI
filters out 80% of the junk now.” and “It’s the only thing keeping us from drowning in alerts.”
Automation was widely described as having enhanced daily work rhythms and reduced the
emotional strain associated with operating in a high-pressure SOC environment.</p>
      <p>
        Notwithstanding the practical advantages, confidence in AI systems remains uncertain. Only 19%
of participants indicated a high degree of trust in AI recommendations. 34% expressed partial trust,
frequently referencing apprehensions over transparency or 'black-box' results. One respondent
stated, “We use AI to flag issues, but a human still needs to verify. It’s useful, but we don’t let it run
unattended.” Another noted, “I trust it for correlation, not for action. It’s good at patterns, bad at
context.” This viewpoint corresponds with the broad academic research cautioning against excessive
dependence on opaque systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6,7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        When it comes to role evolution, numerous participants characterised AI as facilitating a
transformation in duties. Activities including log review, initial triage, and fundamental correlation
were characterised as progressively automated. This enabled analysts to concentrate more on
investigative and decision-making activities. One participant commented, “We spend less time
grinding through tickets and more time hunting threats now.” Another expressed, “I’ve shifted from
doing routine work to actually analysing complex behaviour.” A prevalent expression in story answers
was “AI as co-pilot”—a notion highlighting enhancement rather than substitution. This reflects
recent discoveries that AI can enhance, rather than eradicate, the function of human analysts [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref8">4, 8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Training and skill deficiencies were also significant. Fifty-seven percent of respondents indicated
that they had not had formal training in AI, despite their organisation implementing such
capabilities. This inconsistency was identified as a significant obstacle to successful adoption, with
participants advocating for more accessible education specifically designed for cybersecurity
professionals. It was observed, “The instruments exist, yet individuals lack the knowledge to utilise them
effectively. That is where errors occur.” Another participant noted, “I’ve got access to powerful tools, but
no idea how they work—training has not caught up.”</p>
      <p>
        Nearly half of the participants expressed ethical concerns. Concerns included the methods of data
collection and processing, as well as overarching questions on accountability for AI-generated
choices. Many of the participants expressed concerns over privacy and the possibility of AI systems
producing false positives as a result of biased training data [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. Several quotes illustrated this
unease:
“We have no way to audit what data it learned from—so how can we be sure it’s fair?” and “It flagged
a VIP for phishing based on bad training inputs—it caused chaos.”
      </p>
      <p>Thematic examination of open-ended replies yielded five key recurring themes:
1. Alert fatigue: AI mitigates alert frequency and cognitive strain. “We went from 500 daily
alerts to 50—most of which now matter.”
2. Trust and transparency: Significant emphasis on explanation and human supervision. “If I
can’t see why it flagged something, I don’t act on it.”
3. Workflow transformation: Transition from technical triage to strategic analysis. “I spend
less time being a log-monkey and more time being an analyst.”
4. Training deficiencies: Insufficient organisational support for skill enhancement. “Tools are
great—but we’re flying blind on how to use them properly.”
5. Ethical and data-related issues: Concerns regarding fairness, accountability, and privacy.
“I worry more about the AI’s bias than the hacker’s.”</p>
      <p>While most respondents regarded AI as beneficial, several emphasised the necessity of careful
adoption, ongoing human supervision, and investment in training and ethical governance. These
observations reinforce the notion that AI's function in SOCs should be perceived not as a substitute
technology, but as an integral component of a broader transition towards enhanced decision-making
and flexible operational frameworks.</p>
      <p>When asked about the impact of AI on their work, 62% of respondents indicated a significant
alteration in their regular routines. This encompassed less time allocated to initial triage and greater
involvement in strategic investigation activities. Participants from larger businesses were more
inclined to indicate extensive AI integration, whereas individuals in smaller enterprises reported
restricted deployment, frequently attributing this to budgetary or skill limitations. A respondent
remarked, “We have some AI capability, but without a dedicated team to maintain and tune the
models, it’s underutilised.”</p>
      <p>
        Some professionals expressed unease about the speed of AI-generated answers, voicing concerns
that automation would implement containment measures bereft of adequate human context. About
29% of respondents indicated that their organisation restricts AI's autonomous actions to low-impact
situations, maintaining human oversight over important response decisions. This indicates an
increasing interest in human-centred AI deployment models that reconcile responsiveness with
responsibility [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A consistent feature in qualitative replies was the variation in trust levels based on the type of AI
application. AI technologies utilised for log correlation and enrichment received better trust ratings
compared to those producing event severity scores or risk evaluations. Participants stressed the need
for transparency and the provision of contextual evidence to substantiate AI choices. One
participant remarked, “If the system provides a recommendation without an explanation, I do not act on
it.” This substantiates findings in the literature that explainability is not solely a technical attribute
but an essential condition for operational confidence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The survey revealed that organisations with advanced AI integration exhibited a more robust
culture of collaboration between analysts and AI developers. These teams frequently functioned
within a feedback loop, utilising human observations to enhance the system's models and settings.
This reciprocal relationship enhanced both trust and performance. These techniques are akin to
Development, Security, and Operations (DevSecOps) models, wherein the continuous incorporation
of feedback into automation pipelines is regarded as a best practice [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. While some recent literature
proposes the evolution toward AI/Machine Learning Security Operations (AI/MLSecOps) as an
emerging discipline, this research found no explicit implementation under that specific term.
      </p>
      <p>Variations in responses between industries were also seen. Government and critical
infrastructure professionals indicated that the approval processes for AI deployment have become more
stringent, frequently including the involvement of legal or compliance teams. The respondents
were more inclined to identify regulatory and reputational problems as obstacles to automation. At
the same time, private sector representatives emphasised the importance of cost-efficiency and
productivity enhancements, with one analyst remarking, “Automation is our sole avenue to
scalability, but we must guarantee it does not inflict more harm than good.” These disparities show the
impact of institutional priorities and limitations on AI implementation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Discussion</title>
      <p>
        This study's findings reinforce key themes in the broader cybersecurity literature while offering
novel, practitioner-focused insights into the impact of AI integration in SOCs. Although previous
research has established the technical effectiveness of AI in threat detection and automation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5">2, 5</xref>
        ],
the study contributes to the growing literature exploring the practical consequences for human
roles, organisational workflows, and trust dynamics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The findings suggest that AI is regarded favourably regarding efficiency and efficacy. This
corresponds with studies indicating that AI solutions might mitigate warning fatigue and allow
analysts to prioritise significant situations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref9">3, 9</xref>
        ]. The conditional character of faith in AI, as
indicated by most respondents, reflects wider apprehensions over the opacity of algorithmic systems
and the potential for misclassification [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. In practice, numerous organisations appear to have
embraced a human-in-the-loop methodology, wherein AI technologies function as decision-support
instruments rather than independent agents. This hybrid model posits that the most efficacious
cybersecurity measures integrate automation with human discernment [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        This study highlighted the role of explainability in cultivating trust. Participants expressed
reluctance to depend on AI recommendations unless they understood the decision-making process.
The problem has been extensively examined in artificial intelligence circles, especially with
blackbox models and the constraints of deep learning systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. Within the context of SOCs, where
fast and defensible decisions are crucial, the capacity to scrutinise AI reasoning exceeds mere
technicalities, emerging as a practical and ethical obligation.
      </p>
      <p>
        A notable finding relates to the evolution of analyst roles. Although some respondents voiced
concern about automation possibly resulting in redundancy, the majority characterised it as a
transition in responsibilities rather than a loss of employment. Analysts dedicate less time to
lowvalue, repetitive tasks and expanding their focus on investigation, contextual analysis, and incident
coordination. This is consistent with studies in cybersecurity and related areas, suggesting that AI is
more likely to enhance rather than replace human knowledge [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref8">4, 8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The lack of formal AI training in many organisations constitutes an important cause for concern.
According to Darktrace (2022) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] and supported by study participants, the absence of established
training hinders adoption and heightens the potential of misuse or excessive dependence on AI
systems. Organisations must engage in training programs that combine both technical operations
and the development of critical thinking around AI limitations and ethical use. This mirrors
broader industry conversations around the increasing necessity for AI literacy among
cybersecurity experts [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Ethical considerations continue to be a significant problem. Participants expressed concerns
regarding data privacy, the equity of AI-based flagging systems, and the absence of explicit
accountability in instances of failure. These apprehensions align with ethical critiques in the
literature, asserting that inadequately controlled AI systems can replicate or exacerbate existing
prejudices [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. In high-stakes contexts like SOCs, where AI outputs influence real-time choices, the
consequences of
inaccuracy are significantly elevated. Ethical governance systems must consequently adapt with AI
implementation to guarantee appropriate utilisation.
      </p>
      <p>
        These findings also indicate a wider trend within the IT sector, where AI integration is
instigating changes in professional roles, regulatory policies, and organisational culture. In sectors such as
healthcare and finance, which are marked by significant risk and regulatory scrutiny, AI has
shown the capacity to assist experts without replacing them, conditional upon the establishment of
suitable governance and oversight frameworks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. The cybersecurity sector seems to be pursuing
a comparable path.
      </p>
      <p>This study supports the argument that AI may serve as a strong facilitator in cybersecurity,
especially within SOC environments. Despite this, its success hinges not only on the ability of
technology but also on the manner of its implementation, governance, and understanding by the
human professionals who depend on it. Subsequent research ought to investigate these dynamics
more thoroughly, including employing longitudinal studies or ethnographic methodologies to better
understand the impact of AI on daily operations over time.</p>
      <p>
        A notable aspect emerging from this study is the need to distinguish between technical trust and
operational trust. Although an AI tool may exhibit technical precision in identifying abnormalities,
confidence is not completely established unless operators comprehend and endorse its judgements
within the operational framework. This notion, occasionally termed 'situated trust', has been
examined in associated fields such as autonomous vehicles and healthcare AI, and is now gaining
prominence in cybersecurity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. Professionals in SOCs need not only operational systems but also
systems whose outputs they can substantiate during internal evaluations or post-incident
assessments.
      </p>
      <p>
        Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the effective incorporation of AI into SOCs depends not
only on tools but also necessitates cultural and structural modifications. Participants from
businesses with integrated security and development teams shown a higher likelihood of expressing
satisfaction with their AI solutions. These settings facilitate the interdisciplinary collaboration
essential for refining and evolving AI outputs based on analyst comments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. In contrast, isolated
environments exhibited less trust and less successful execution.
      </p>
      <p>
        The influence of leadership in moulding perceptions of AI emerged as another significant insight.
Organisations in which top leaders actively advocated for AI adoption, allocated resources for
training, and positioned automation as an auxiliary tool rather than a substitute, saw diminished
apprehensions around job displacement. This corresponds with change management research that
underscores the importance of clear communication and psychological safety in the adoption of
technological transition [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>In addition to these organisational and ethical considerations, it is important to reflect on the
technical limitations of applying machine learning in SOC environments. These systems can be
resource-intensive to train, fine-tune, and integrate effectively, and they may remain susceptible to
bias or data drift over time. Moreover, ML-based tools are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and
model manipulation [22], requiring additional safeguards beyond traditional engineering controls.
Such limitations highlight the need for ongoing monitoring and adaptation when deploying AI in
operational settings.</p>
      <p>These findings endorse a socio-technical framework for cybersecurity innovation. AI tools are
inadequate for achieving transformational value without institutional commitment, ethical
safeguards, and continuous education. Policymakers, technology providers, and security executives
must collaborate to guarantee that AI implementations enhance performance while preserving
professional integrity, user trust, and accountability.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The purpose of this study was to investigate the integration of AI into SOC settings, with an
emphasis on how practitioners view the technology's benefits, drawbacks, and effects on their jobs.
Based on 58 cybersecurity experts' survey answers, it provides a practitioner-led viewpoint that
enhances the body of research that has mostly concentrated on technological efficacy.</p>
      <p>While recent discourse has centred heavily on generative AI models such as large language
models, this study has deliberately focused on applied machine learning in SOC environments.
These systems differ fundamentally from generative AI in both purpose and limitation, and
separating the two is important for a balanced understanding [23, 24].</p>
      <p>
        The results show that there is broad interest in using AI-driven automation to solve important
operational issues including information overload, ineffective triage, and alert fatigue. Many
businesses are already seeing real benefits from AI, especially in the areas of incident prioritisation,
anomaly detection, and false positive filtering. Rather than eliminating jobs, participants uniformly
defined AI as a productivity boost. This supports growing opinions that AI may best complement
human decision-making in cybersecurity by enhancing it rather than taking the place of analysts [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        However, the report also identifies significant obstacles to successful integration. The three most
important ones are explainability, skills preparedness, and trust. In particular, when the reasoning
behind judgements is unclear, many respondents expressed low or conditional trust in AI outputs.
This is in line with more general worries expressed in the literature about the ethical ramifications
of opaque decision-making systems and the "black box" aspect of some AI models [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref6">6, 13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Additionally, the results indicate a substantial training gap. More than half of the participants
had not received any formal training on how to utilise or interpret AI systems, despite the growing
reliance on AI. There is a real risk associated with this mismatch between the application of
technology and human preparation. Businesses that ignore this gap risk undermining the return on
their AI investments and losing out on an opportunity to strengthen the autonomy of their
security teams. Another important realisation has to do with ethical accountability and governance. As
AI systems become more extensively used, organisations need to think about not only what these
tools can do, but also how they can do it—and how they fit in with institutional values, privacy
laws, and fairness standards. According to Razavi et al. (2023) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], problems including prejudice,
false positives, and data misuse highlight the necessity of strong monitoring procedures, ongoing
validation, and inclusive policy creation.
      </p>
      <p>At the same time, it is important to acknowledge technical limitations alongside practitioner
perceptions. Machine learning models require significant resources to train and integrate, may be
vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and are prone to bias or data drift over time [22]. These
issues underline the need for continuous monitoring, model validation, and safeguards to ensure
resilience in operational settings.</p>
      <p>By presenting the lived reality of AI deployment in SOCs and offering empirical evidence of both
enthusiasm and caution, this study adds to the scholarly and professional conversation. It supports
the idea that effective AI integration is as much a technical as it is a human and organisational
challenge. Organisations need to invest in ethical governance, change management techniques, and
staff development in addition to implementing cutting-edge solutions.</p>
      <p>Of course, there are restrictions. Obtaining the sample through professional networking sites
may have resulted in an over-representation of professionals who are more online. Additionally,
the results were recorded at a single moment in time and are restricted to self-reported
impressions. However, it provides a useful starting point for future research, particularly in examining
how perceptions change as AI technologies become more integrated into security systems.</p>
      <p>This study concludes that AI is simplifying workflows, moving analyst roles towards
highervalue tasks, and changing the SOC environment in quantifiable ways. However, how it is applied,
regulated, and comprehended has a big impact on its efficacy and morality. Although AI will not
take the role of cybersecurity experts, those who can work with AI, comprehend its limitations,
and challenge its results will be the most successful in the field going forward.</p>
      <p>Lastly, this work suggests more cross-disciplinary studies on the governance mechanisms of AI
in SOCs. Working together, cybersecurity, law, ethics, and policy may create well-balanced
frameworks that protect public trust and professional integrity while fostering innovation. Security
executives will face the challenge of staying both technically grounded and ethically flexible as AI
develops. While future debates are likely to focus increasingly on generative AI [24], this paper
contributes by clarifying the distinct role of machine learning in SOC operations and the
sociotechnical considerations that accompany its adoption.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>The author(s) have not employed any generative AI tools.
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