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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Building specific of zero trust architecture in hybrid</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Roman Syrotynskyi</string-name>
          <email>roman.m.syrotynskyi@lpnu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ivan Tyshyk</string-name>
          <email>ivan.y.tyshyk@lpnu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Аlona Desiatko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Lviv Polytechnic National University, Information Security Department</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>12 Stepan Bandera str., 79000 Lviv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>State University of Trade and Economics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>19 Kyoto str., 02156 Kyiv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>179</fpage>
      <lpage>190</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The popularity of hybrid infrastructures is growing rapidly. The reason is the ability to combine the advantages of local computing resources such as control, cost-effectiveness, compliance with regulatory requirements with the scalability, flexibility and high availability of cloud technologies. In such conditions, there is a need to provide a unified approach to information security that can cover both types of environments. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) is considered a modern and effective model that allows achieving a high level of access control, minimizing the risks of security breaches and ensuring the protection of critical resources regardless of their location. However, building ZTA in hybrid environments is accompanied by a number of challenges due to the heterogeneity of technologies, the lack of unified management tools, varying degrees of control over infrastructure components and the complexity of implementing unified authentication, authorization and monitoring policies. The article examines the key differences between the same type of local and hybrid infrastructures, in particular from the point of view of building a zero trust architecture. The specifics of integrating elements of local and cloud environments, which often have different mechanisms for user identification, session management, event logging, and access policy enforcement, are analyzed. A number of important architectural components and technologies are proposed that form the stack of components necessary for implementing ZTA in a hybrid environment. An analysis of the challenges of implementing Zero Trust architecture in a hybrid network infrastructure is also described. Taking into account the identified features, a phased plan for migrating hybrid infrastructures to Zero Trust architecture has been formed, which includes assessment and planning, architecture development, decision selection, and other important steps.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Zero Trust Architecture</kwd>
        <kwd>hybrid network environment</kwd>
        <kwd>LAN</kwd>
        <kwd>Cloud Infrastructure</kwd>
        <kwd>Integration</kwd>
        <kwd>compliance</kwd>
        <kwd>microsegmentation</kwd>
        <kwd>identity</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        A hybrid network environment in enterprise IT is an integrated network architecture that
combines on-premises data centers with cloud infrastructure (AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google
Cloud, etc.). This model allows companies to store mission-critical applications and sensitive data
in on-premises data centers, while leveraging the scalability, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of
cloud services [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2 ref3">1–3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>A hybrid</p>
      <p>
        network enables seamless communication between on-premises and cloud
applications, allowing enterprises to optimize performance, security, and resource allocation, as
well as guarantee business continuity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5 ref6">4–6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        An example of a hybrid network environment in an enterprise infrastructure would be the
Enterprise Data Center + AWS Cloud infrastructure. A large enterprise uses an on-premises data
center to store databases, legacy applications, and mission-critical workloads, while AWS cloud
resources use for scalable web applications, AI analytics, and backup storage. For example, a
financial company stores customer transaction data in an on-premises center for regulatory
compliance, while using AWS for big data analytics and AI fraud verification [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Another option for implementing a hybrid infrastructure is to implement Microsoft Azure
Hybrid Cloud for enterprise IT. In this case, on-premises Active Directory (AD) integrates with
Azure Active Directory (AAD) to provide single sign-on (SSO), identity management, and secure
access to cloud services. An example is an international company that uses on-premises AD to
authenticate employees, and also integrates Microsoft 365, Azure Virtual Desktop, and cloud
storage for remote access of employees [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7 ref8">7, 8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Differences between traditional and hybrid architectures</title>
      <p>Hybrid Information technology architecture combines the specifics of on-premises and cloud
architectures which translates into certain aspects that differ from both on-premises and cloud
options. Traditional on-premise architecture provides a high level of control and security, but limit
scalability and flexibility. The main characteristics of hybrid infrastructure are significantly
different from homogeneous ones. Their research was conducted based on published materials,
researches and own experience. The results are listed in Table 1.
Cost structure</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Security</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Performance and latency</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Deployment Speed</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>Networking</title>
        <p>allocation of resources.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-5">
        <title>High capital expenditure (CapEx) on equipment, maintenance and IT personnel.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-6">
        <title>Workloads can be distributed between on-premises and cloud resources.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-7">
        <title>Reduced CapEx; operating cost</title>
        <p>model (OpEx) for cloud services.</p>
        <p>Perimeter security model; relies on Zero Trust model; Constant
firewalls and VPNs to protect the internal authentication and access control
network. between on-premises and cloud
resources.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-8">
        <title>Low latency for on-premises applications Performance may vary</title>
        <p>because all resources are physically depending on the network
connected. connection, but CDN and edge
computing in the cloud reduce
latency.</p>
        <p>Reliability and fault Requires separate disaster recovery (DR)
tolerance and backup solutions.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-9">
        <title>Maintenance and</title>
        <p>management</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-10">
        <title>Requires manual updates, patches, and monitoring by the internal IT team.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-11">
        <title>Built-in high availability with cloud-based DR solutions and automatic failover.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-12">
        <title>Cloud providers perform</title>
        <p>automated updates, monitoring,
and maintenance.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-13">
        <title>Slow deployment; Setting up new servers Fast deployment; Cloud</title>
        <p>and networks takes time. resources can be connected in a
few minutes.</p>
        <p>Uses traditional LAN/WAN architectures, Uses SD-WAN, VPN, Direct
often requires leased communication Connect, and cloud peering
channels for remote access. connections to integrate
onpremises and cloud
infrastructure.</p>
        <p>Areas of application The best option for companies that need
full control over the infrastructure (e.g.
banks, government agencies, legacy
applications).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-14">
        <title>The best option for businesses that need scalability, remote work, and cloud computing (e.g., SaaS companies, e-commerce).</title>
        <p>Thus, hybrid IT architectures make it possible to get the benefits of both on-premises and cloud
environments at the same time, however, since hybrid architecture is essentially a symbiosis of
onpremises and cloud, it is not without challenges that are characteristic of hybrid environments,
such as complexity, security boundaries, data flow management, integration issues, and others.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Zero Trust Architecture main principles and it’s value in hybrid infrastructures</title>
      <p>
        Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) is a modern cybersecurity concept that eliminates the concept of
default trust in networks. Unlike traditional security models that rely on perimeter protection, ZTA
assumes that no user, device, or network segment can be trusted by default—regardless of their
location or prior authentication [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. Instead, each access request is constantly confirmed, and
permissions are granted only within the required minimum [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12">10–12</xref>
        ].
ZTA is based on the principle of “never trust, always verify”, i.e. access control decisions are made
based on rigorous identity checks, device security assessments, and contextual risk analysis [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
This approach guarantees dynamic adaptation of security policies to changing threats.
      </p>
      <p>The core of the zero trust architecture is its basic principles, in addition to the principle of
“never trust, always verify”, these include the following:</p>
      <p>
        The principle of Least Privilege. This principle ensures that users, applications and devices
are given the minimum level of access necessary to perform their tasks. This reduces the attack
surface and limits the potential consequences of compromise [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. Compliance with the principle
should be carried out in all access control mechanisms, both in terms of granting administrative
access and in the management of network access by means of firewalls, etc. and the assignment of
network traffic can be added using certain techniques and tools to minimize the necessary
privileges. These include the following:



      </p>
      <p>Granular Access Control: ZTA applies role-based (RBAC) and attribute (ABAC) access
control to restrict user rights.
“just-in-time” access: Temporary permissions are granted only for the necessary time to
complete the task.</p>
      <p>Device and location restrictions: Access policies take into account device security and risk
factors such as geolocation.</p>
      <p>
        Assumed Breach approach. This principle of “hacking assumption” is based on the fact that
the network can already be compromised. Therefore, the organization not only protects itself from
external attacks, but also prepares for potential threats from the inside [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]. Ensuring the resilience
of the infrastructure to the compromise of some part of it is carried out through the
implementation of architectural measures and tools that ensure localization, detection and response
to future incidents.
      </p>
      <p>
        Microsegmentation: Splitting the network into isolated zones prevents lateral movement of
attackers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Continuous monitoring: Using behavioral analytics to detect abnormal activity.</p>
      <p>
        Incident preparedness: Automated threat response mechanisms such as Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) help to quickly eliminate compromise [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ].






      </p>
      <p>
        The Principle of Explicit Verification. Zero Trust requires constant authentication and
authorization of each access request, even if the user or device has already been verified previously
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. Ensuring access verification is carried out by next-generation firewalls using additional
information that is collected and transmitted to make a decision on granting network access.
Technologies that can be used:
      </p>
      <p>Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Uses multiple identification factors, such as biometrics
and hardware tokens.</p>
      <p>Checking the status of the device: Before granting access, the system checks that the device
meets security standards.</p>
      <p>
        Adaptive access: Access policies change dynamically based on behavioral analysis and risk
levels [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19 ref20">19, 20</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The value of zero trust in securing hybrid environments. Hybrid environments combining
onpremises data centers and cloud services pose complex security challenges because they involve a
variety of access points and multi-domain systems. ZTA is essential to protect them because:
</p>
      <p>
        Reduces security risks in the cloud: Guarantees the security of AWS, Azure, and Google
Cloud, through strict access control and encryption mechanisms [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21 ref22">21, 22</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Ensures remote work security: With the Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) model and hybrid
workplaces, ZTA provides continuous authentication [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Minimizes risks from insider attacks: With the assumption of compromise, ZTA prevents
unauthorized access even from internal users [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Typical features of hybrid network architecture within the Zero</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Trust concept</title>
      <p>
        Hybrid network architectures operating on the principles of the Zero Trust Framework (ZTF)
inherit security mechanisms from both on-premises and cloud environments. Their essence and
method of implementation are similar to those used in non-hybrid environments. For example, the
principle of Least Privilege Access (LPA). ZTF implements strict access control based on role-based
(RBAC) and attribute (ABAC) policies to minimize access rights of users, devices, and applications
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. This prevents attackers from moving laterally in the event of a network compromise.
      </p>
      <p>Multi-factor authentication (MFA) and identity verification. Constant authentication using
MFA, biometrics, or hardware tokens ensures that no entity is trusted by default.</p>
      <p>
        Another fundamental security mechanism in ZTA is micro-segmentation. Micro-segmentation
is necessary to isolate network resources. Its security value lies in dividing the network into
isolated segments, which limits the spread of attacks and reduces the impact of compromise [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
        ].
This works on both cloud and local networks. What different infrastructures have in common is
the need for continuous monitoring and behavioral analytics. Real-time monitoring and AI threat
analysis allow you to adapt to variable attacks. And automated response mechanisms block
suspicious devices and accounts [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Most of the security mechanisms used in building a zero-trust architecture are common in
onpremises infrastructures, cloud environments, as well as their hybrid combinations. However, in a
zero-trust architecture, there are unique challenges and solutions that are unique to hybrid
environments, due to the specifics of such infrastructure and additional complexities arising from
the combination of different systems and the need for unified management. Such features specific
to hybrid architectures include the following:</p>
      <p>
        Integration of Hybrid Identity and Access Management (IAM). Since hybrid environments must
authenticate users in on-premises and cloud services, this leads to identity fragmentation.
Fragmented identity creates the need to solve the problem of integration and unification of identity
management tools. An example of a solution is using Federated Identity Management (FIM) to
combine on-premises Active Directory (AD) with Azure AD, AWS IAM, or Google Cloud Identity
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. To meet the requirements of Zero Trust verification, it is advisable to use Single Sign-On
(SSO), which applies to all hybrid resources. One of the options of federated identity management
might be ADFS based implementation. Example ofADFS integrated authentication process is
described in Figure 2. It includes 6 major steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
      </p>
      <p>User login to authentication portal
User authenticated
Receive SAML response SAML
Post the SAML response to sign-in
Receive temp credentials</p>
      <p>Redirect to AWS Console</p>
      <p>In this implementation scenario SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is used to
authenticate users in local AD Identity store using ADFS 3.0 solution during connection to AWS
cloud. Such approaches are required to solve the problem of integration and unification of identity
management tools in hybrid infrastructures.</p>
      <p>
        SD-WAN &amp; Direct Cloud Peering (SD-WAN &amp; Direct Cloud Peering) is another example of a
security mechanism unique to hybrid infrastructures. Traditional VPN-based security models
struggle to provide dynamic security in hybrid cloud connections. Lack of flexibility, compatibility
and performance do not allow them to be used effectively between different platforms. Potential
solutions could be Software-Defined WAN (SD-WAN) integration to create encrypted tunnels
between on-premises infrastructure and cloud services [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
        ], as well as private communication
channels (AWS Direct Connect, Azure ExpressRoute), which provide low latency and high security
between on-premises and cloud systems.
      </p>
      <p>
        Data flow management and encryption in a hybrid environment. A task that, like the previous
ones, requires certain solutions that are not found outside of hybrid infrastructures built on a
zerotrust architecture. We are talking about hybrid networks that require unified encryption standards
when transferring data between on-premises and cloud infrastructure. Current research and
recommendations suggest the use of end-to-end encryption (E2EE) using TLS 1.3 and AES-256 for
all hybrid data streams [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
        ]. To control the movement of confidential data through local storage
and cloud services, it is recommended to use Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASB).
      </p>
      <p>
        Threat detection and automated response in a hybrid network. The difficulty lies in the fact that
hybrid architectures increase the attack surface, which makes centralized defense difficult. Many of
the already existing approaches and tools are not flexible enough and do not fully cover the need
for analytics and response in different environments at the same time. Zero Trust-based security
orchestration, which can detect and isolate potential threats in the cloud and on-premises
infrastructure in real-time, can help with the solution [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
        ]. And the use of SIEM systems will allow
integrating event logs from on-premises and cloud resources, providing automated response to
threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The need to comply with safety standards and policies in hybrid environments. According to
regulatory requirements, hybrid architectures must provide uniform regulatory compliance for
onpremises and cloud environments. Thus, common rules must be followed by different
infrastructures built on different platforms. Zero Trust Policy Automation can help with the
arrangement of rules that must comply with security standards. The use of the Tool will allow the
management and maintenance of uniform rules for PCI-DSS, NIST, GDPR, HIPAA, and other
standards that may be necessary.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>5. Architectural Components and Technologies</title>
      <p>Building a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) in hybrid environments that combine on-premises and
cloud infrastructures involves several critical architectural components and technologies that
ensure both security and operational efficiency.
Identity and Access Management (IAM): IAM is a fundamental component of ZTA that enforces
identity verification and policy-based access control. Technologies such as Single Sign-On (SSO),
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and identity federation (e.g., SAML, OAuth, OpenID Connect)
provide secure, identity-centric access management in hybrid environments. Centralized identity
providers (IdPs) such as Azure Active Directory, Okta, or Ping Identity ensure consistent identity
governance and seamless integration.</p>
      <p>Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): PEPs dynamically apply access decisions defined by policy
engines. This includes network firewalls, gateways, software-defined perimeter (SDP) solutions,
and microsegmentation technologies. Solutions such as VMware NSX, Cisco ACI, Palo Alto Prisma,
AWS Security Groups, Azure Network Security Groups, or Cloudflare Access enforce resource
access in both on-premises and cloud environments.</p>
      <p>Policy Decision Point (PDP): PDPs evaluate access requests based on identity, context, resource
sensitivity, and predefined security policies. Technologies implementing PDPs include Zero Trust
policy engines (e.g., OPA—Open Policy Agent), centralized policy management platforms, and
identity-aware proxies (IAPs) offered by major cloud providers.</p>
      <p>Microsegmentation and Network Isolation: Fine-grained network isolation technologies, such as
VMware NSX, Cisco ACI, or cloud-native network segmentation services (AWS VPC, Azure VNets,
GCP VPC), limit lateral movement and reduce the attack surface. Microsegmentation strengthens
the ZTA model by enabling precise, context-aware control of communications between resources.</p>
      <p>Continuous Monitoring and Visibility: Tools for continuous monitoring and visibility—including
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems such as Splunk, Azure Sentinel,
Elastic Stack, Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) platforms, and endpoint detection and
response (EDR/XDR) solutions—provide real-time threat detection, analytics, and auditing essential
to maintaining trust.</p>
      <p>Secure Connectivity and Encryption: Encrypted communication through VPNs (IPsec,
WireGuard), TLS/SSL, and dedicated cloud connectivity services (AWS Direct Connect, Azure
ExpressRoute, Google Cloud Interconnect) ensures confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged
between on-premises and cloud infrastructures.</p>
      <p>Automation and Orchestration: Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) and automation tools such as
Terraform, Ansible, Chef, Puppet, or Kubernetes enable consistent deployment, enforcement, and
scaling of Zero Trust policies across hybrid infrastructures.</p>
      <p>Together, these integrated components and technologies form an identity-driven security stack
that dynamically enforces Zero Trust principles in complex hybrid infrastructures. Their
effectiveness depends not only on individual functional capabilities but also on their ability to
operate as a unified system with consistent policy logic based on identity, access context, and
continuous risk analysis.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>6. Implementing Zero Trust Architecture in Hybrid Network</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Infrastructure challenges</title>
      <p>The implementation and operation of Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) in hybrid IT infrastructures
that integrate cloud services and on-premises resources poses significant challenges related to
network architecture and network access management. These challenges arise primarily due to the
complexity and diversity of hybrid environments, which require comprehensive strategies to
ensure effective security implementation.</p>
      <p>One of the main architectural challenges is the inherent complexity of hybrid network
topologies. Traditional on-premises infrastructures are often rigid and static, if compare with
dynamic, highly flexible nature of cloud platforms. This inconsistency creates significant barriers to
the development of uniform, consistent network designs and the application of consistent security
policies in both environments. In addition, legacy infrastructure often lacks built-in compatibility
with modern zero-trust principles, requiring large-scale upgrades or even replacements to support
features such as micro-segmentation and dynamic policy enforcement.
Microsegmentation itself, a fundamental principle of ZTA, creates another notable difficulty.
Creating accurate micro-segments in mixed cloud and on-premises environments requires detailed
planning and advanced technical capabilities. The diversity and distributed nature of resources
further increase efforts needed to maintain segmentation boundaries and consistent policy
application. This complexity can affect performance, such as increasing latency, due to the constant
monitoring and verification of real-time network traffic flows, which can negatively impact the
user experience and responsiveness of applications.</p>
      <p>An important prerequisite for successful ZTA is to achieve unified visibility of all network
resources. Hybrid environments typically suffer from fragmented monitoring systems and isolated
logging solutions, making it difficult to try to gain a consistent understanding of network activities
and threats. Without integrated visibility, it becomes significantly more difficult to detect potential
security incidents or anomalous behavior and respond to them quickly.</p>
      <p>When it comes to network access management, centralized identity and access management
(IAM) is especially problematic in hybrid setups. Maintaining consistent, unified IAM policies
becomes complex when identities and access controls span on-premises Active Directory services,
multiple cloud IAM providers, and various third-party solutions. This complexity often leads to
policy fragmentation, inconsistencies, and potential security vulnerabilities as the management of
authentication, authorization, and user roles across heterogeneous platforms becomes more
demanding.</p>
      <p>Continuous identity verification—the cornerstone of the Zero Trust approach—also poses
significant operational challenges. Implementing real-time persistent authentication and trust
verification requires sophisticated technical tools and can be resource-intensive, especially when
legacy systems are involved. Additionally, balancing strict security measures, such as always-on
authentication and granular access control, with convenience and performance for users remains
an ongoing challenge.</p>
      <p>Further complicating the issue is the compatibility between suppliers’ solutions. Organizations
often rely on products from multiple vendors, including firewalls, Zero Trust Network Access
(ZTNA) solutions, cloud access security brokers (CASBs), and software-defined wide area networks
(SD-WANs). Integrating these diverse solutions into a consistent Zero Trust strategy requires
careful vendor selection and significant integration efforts to avoid creating gaps or inconsistencies
in security policies.</p>
      <p>Compliance and regulatory requirements add another layer of complexity. Consistently
adhering to stringent regulatory requirements and compliance standards across cloud and
onpremises environments requires meticulous attention to policy development, enforcement, and
audit readiness.</p>
      <p>Finally, the human factor should not be underestimated. The shift to zero trust from traditional
perimeter-based security marks a fundamental cultural shift. Organizational resistance, skills gaps
among IT staff, and the need for intensive training and education make it even more difficult to
successfully implement and operate ZTA in hybrid network environments. Thus, effective
implementation requires not only technical solutions, but also significant investments in
organizational alignment, communication and continuous learning.</p>
      <p>Addressing these interconnected challenges requires thoughtful planning, careful architecture
design, strategic vendor selection, and ongoing cross-functional collaboration to ensure the
successful implementation and sustainability of the zero-trust architecture in hybrid IT
infrastructures.</p>
      <p>Implementing Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) in hybrid networks that combine on-premises
data centers and cloud services creates unique challenges. The reason is mainly the increased
diversity of infrastructure elements of different origins, as well as the need for their integration and
shared management in compliance with the principles of zero trust. The following are key
problems and effective solutions supported by research.</p>
      <p>Building a hybrid infrastructure for enterprise needs makes it possible to take advantage of
different platforms and formats, but the opposite side of the coin is the need to support a wider
number of technologies, as well as new challenges that manifest themselves when migrating to
ZTA—zero trust architecture. Migration to ZTA in a hybrid environment is more complex than in
traditional on-premises infrastructure. However the successful implementation of ZTA in hybrid
infrastructure ensures sustainable security, scalability, and control over today’s digital risks.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>7. Hybrid infrastructure migration to Zero Trust Architecture recommendations</title>
      <p>Migrating a hybrid infrastructure to a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) is not a one-time event but a
structured and iterative transformation. This process requires careful preparation, gradual
implementation, and continuous optimization to ensure that both on-premises and cloud
environments remain secure and operationally efficient. Each stage of migration builds upon the
previous one, addressing organizational, technological, and human factors. A clear roadmap helps
to minimize risks, avoid common pitfalls, and ensure alignment with business goals. Figure 3
represent sequence of main stories in process of migration of infrastructure. The following
migration plan outlines the key stages, providing a practical framework for enterprises seeking to
modernize their security posture.</p>
      <sec id="sec-9-1">
        <title>Stage 1: Assessment and planning</title>
        <p>At this stage, it is necessary to conduct a full assessment of the existing IT infrastructure,
including hardware and software resources, identities, applications, as well as data flows in both
on-premises and cloud environments. It is important to determine the current state of
cybersecurity, identify existing gaps, and clarify compliance requirements (compliance with
regulatory standards).</p>
        <p>The next step is to formulate clear security goals that align with the business objectives and
principles of the Zero Trust architecture. It is important to form a step-by-step roadmap,
identifying priority resources and applications with the highest risks.</p>
        <p>It is also necessary to provide management support and agree on an action plan between IT,
security and compliance departments. This involves regular communication about the expected
benefits and necessary changes in the organization's culture.</p>
        <p>Stage 2: Architecture development and solution selection</p>
        <p>In the second stage, a Zero Trust reference architecture should be created, which will provide
unified approaches to cybersecurity in a hybrid environment. It should take into account the
integration of on-premises and cloud resources, include centralized identity management (IAM),
micro-segmentation, and network access policies.</p>
        <p>Next, you need to evaluate the solutions available on the market, such as Zero Trust Network
Access (ZTNA), Cloud Service Access Protection Brokers (CASBs), IAM solutions, and
microsegmentation tools. It is important to test these solutions as part of Proof of Concept projects,
verifying that they meet security, performance, and infrastructure compatibility requirements.</p>
        <p>Phase 3: Implementation of Centralized Identity Management (IAM)</p>
        <p>This stage involves the creation of a single IAM system that integrates on-premises services (for
example, Active Directory) with cloud solutions (Azure AD, Okta, AWS IAM). It is important to
implement multi-factor authentication (MFA), single sign-on (SSO), and Conditional Access.</p>
        <p>The use of tools for continuous identity verification and adaptive authentication will help
implement the principle of continuous access control based on the analysis of user behavior risks.
It is also necessary to regularly audit access policies, avoiding fragmentation and ensuring
relevance.</p>
        <p>Stage 4: Micro-segmentation and access control at the network level.</p>
        <p>Conduct a gradual micro-segmentation of the network, starting with the most critical
applications and services. This will allow you to create isolated network segments, managing them
using software-defined networks (SDN).Traditional perimeter firewall rules should be gradually
replaced by access policies at the application and service level, providing dynamic access control to
resources. While it is important to make identity management and monitoring unified, it is
proposed to make access control at the network level distributed, this approach will provide several
advantages, namely:



</p>
        <p>Systemic risk reduction: Disruption in one segment or environment is less likely to
immediately affect others, providing resilience.</p>
        <p>Increased fault tolerance and fault tolerance: Distributed systems can more effectively
isolate and contain threats, preventing massive failures.</p>
        <p>Advanced Protection: Distributed architecture is inherently consistent with the principles
of multi-layered security.
simplification and reduction of the cost of ZTA implementation due to the absence of the
need to develop integration solutions</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-2">
        <title>Stage 5: Unified security monitoring and analytics system</title>
        <p>At this stage, a centralized monitoring system is created, covering both cloud and on-premises
infrastructures. Logging systems should be integrated, as well as solutions such as SIEM (Security
Event Monitoring), SOAR (Incident Response Automation), and User Behavior Analytics (UBA). In
addition, incident response procedures must be implemented and continuously improved by
conducting training simulations for the team on a regular basis.</p>
        <p>Stage 6: Full-scale deployment and optimization.</p>
        <p>Gradually scale the implementation of the Zero Trust architecture to other resources, services,
and users according to the initially developed plan. It is important to constantly analyze the
effectiveness of the policies in place, improving them in accordance with changes in the
environment and threats. Regularly review and update the architecture to meet new technologies,
regulatory requirements, and business needs.</p>
        <p>Stage 7: Organizational support and training of staff</p>
        <p>It is equally important to conduct regular trainings for IT staff and users, which will help create
an understanding of the principles of Zero Trust and teach them how to apply them in practice.</p>
        <p>It is necessary to organize systematic information work aimed at changing the corporate culture
regarding security, as well as to constantly maintain cross-functional cooperation.</p>
        <p>Implementation using the proposed milestones will allow organizations to move to a Zero Trust
model in a structured manner, ensure consistent improvements in cybersecurity, and achieve the
necessary flexibility and resilience of their hybrid IT infrastructure.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>8. Conclusions</title>
      <p>Implementing Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) in hybrid network environments that combine
onpremises infrastructure and cloud services is significantly different from classic scenarios using
only on-premises or exclusively cloud infrastructure. Hybrid solutions are characterized by a
significantly higher complexity of the network architecture, which arises from the need to combine
legacy, rigid systems with flexible and dynamic cloud resources. In such conditions, it is much
more difficult to provide single visibility, centralized identity management, and consistent access
control. Unlike classic architectures, hybrid networks require continuous access verification and
real-time monitoring require much more powerful and integrated tools than when using
homogeneous environments. Additional difficulties arise from the need to ensure compatibility of
solutions from different manufacturers and compliance with regulatory requirements specific to
different platforms.</p>
      <p>Hybrid environments are also characterized by higher operating costs and a more difficult
balance between high security and user performance. Thus, the successful implementation of ZTA
in hybrid infrastructures largely depends on careful architectural planning, strategic selection of
compatible technologies, and effective organizational support, which makes it more
resourceintensive compared to classic scenarios.</p>
      <p>The study accomplished next tasks:




identified key differences between traditional and hybrid architectures
specified features of hybrid network architectures within the Zero Trust concept
investigated possible architectural components and technologies
formed hybrid infrastructure migration to ZTA recommendations</p>
      <p>Prospects for further research may include studying the issues of network access control in
zero-trust architecture and possible resolutions development.</p>
      <p>Declaration on Generative AI
While preparing this work, the authors used the AI programs Grammarly Pro to correct text
grammar and Strike Plagiarism to search for possible plagiarism. After using this tool, the authors
reviewed and edited the content as needed and took full responsibility for the publication’s content.</p>
    </sec>
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