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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Formation of a conceptual model for cyber-physical monitoring of critical infrastructure environmental objects⋆</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vadym Chytulian</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Andrii Kolodiuk</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ivan Oleinikov</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Viktoriia Zhebka</string-name>
          <email>viktoria_zhebka@ukr.net</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Valeriia Balatska</string-name>
          <email>v.balatska@ldubgd.edu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Lviv State University of Life Safety</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>35 Kleparivska str., 79007 Lviv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>State University of Information and Communication Technologies</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>7 Solomenskaya str., 03110 Kyiv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>330</fpage>
      <lpage>341</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper presents a conceptual framework for developing distributed cyber-physical systems for environmental monitoring of water resources, addressing the challenges of corporate cybersecurity under the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The study analyzes the transformation of cyber threats targeting IoT-based ecological infrastructure and proposes a multilayered protection model combining blockchain technology, adaptive machine learning, and post-quantum cryptography. The proposed system ensures resistance to electromagnetic interference, maintains regional autonomy, and preserves critical monitoring functions even under partial infrastructure loss. The practical significance lies in applying the proposed approach to modernize Ukraine's water management systems and enhance their resilience under wartime conditions.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;cyber-physical systems</kwd>
        <kwd>information systems</kwd>
        <kwd>environmental monitoring</kwd>
        <kwd>IoT</kwd>
        <kwd>cybersecurity</kwd>
        <kwd>sustainability</kwd>
        <kwd>water resources</kwd>
        <kwd>critical infrastructure</kwd>
        <kwd>optimisation methods</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>The current stage of development of environmental monitoring systems in Ukraine is marked not
only by a paradigmatic transition from reactive to proactive approaches in water resource
management but also by the urgent need to adapt to the realities of the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian
war. The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, radically altered the
threat landscape for Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, including water supply systems and
environmental control networks.</p>
      <p>Problem statement. According to the forecasts of the United Nations, by 2030 the global
shortage of freshwater could reach up to 40% of total demand [1]. This alarming trend highlights
the necessity of developing innovative solutions for monitoring and protecting aquatic ecosystems.
In Ukraine, this issue is exacerbated by the systematic targeting of hydrotechnical infrastructure,
acts of environmental terrorism such as the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power
Plant, and the deliberate devastation of water supply systems in frontline regions.</p>
      <p>A theoretical analysis of the digital transformation of the water management sector under
martial law indicates the inevitability of integrating Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, artificial
intelligence (AI), and cloud computing into unified cyber-physical ecosystems capable of
maintaining functionality even under conditions of partial infrastructure degradation [2]. However,
this convergence of technologies during wartime introduces fundamentally new challenges in the
field of information security, necessitating a profound rethinking of traditional approaches to the
protection of critical infrastructure, particularly in the context of state-sponsored cyber threats.
A major challenge lies in designing cybersecurity systems for the corporate environments of water
management enterprises, which have become prime targets of adversarial cyberattacks during the
war [3]. These organizations face the dual task of maintaining operational continuity and
defending digital assets amid continuous hybrid warfare.</p>
      <p>Analysis of recent research and publications. Studies examining the evolution of cyber
threats to water supply infrastructure since the onset of the full-scale invasion demonstrate a
dramatic escalation in both the intensity and sophistication of attacks. Incident analyses from 2022
to 2024 confirm a shift from sporadic cybercriminal activities to systematic, state-coordinated
offensive campaigns [4]. Ukrainian researchers Petrenko A.S. and Korchenko O.H. emphasize the
extreme danger posed by Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) aimed at the long-term compromise
of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure [5]. These campaigns exhibit a high degree of technical
complexity, strategic coordination, and synchronization with kinetic military operations.</p>
      <p>Historically, environmental monitoring systems for water resources in Ukraine evolved from
discrete laboratory-based methods to automated control stations. However, the realities of
fullscale war have drastically altered the operational and resilience requirements of such systems.
Studies by Ukrainian scientists reveal that the current stage of technological development is
characterized by the transition toward the concept of “Resilient Smart Water Bodies”, which
envisions the creation of self-adaptive monitoring ecosystems capable of maintaining functionality
even in scenarios involving the physical destruction of certain infrastructure components [6, 7].</p>
      <p>Theoretical analysis of wartime experience demonstrates that the next generation of
environmental monitoring systems must be grounded in the principles of graceful degradation,
autonomy, and distributed architecture. Distribution and decentralization have become critical
attributes, as centralized systems remain vulnerable to missile strikes and artillery shelling. This
shift toward distributed resilience represents not only a technological necessity but also a strategic
imperative for national security.</p>
      <p>Purpose of the article. The purpose of this study is to develop the conceptual foundations for the
construction of war-resilient cyber-physical systems for environmental monitoring of water
resources, capable of operating under the conditions of active military hostilities and complex,
state-level cyber threats.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Theoretical basis of the research</title>
      <p>The proposed conceptual model is based on the theory of complex adaptive systems, incorporating
the principles of military resilience and graceful degradation. The designed system represents a
multilevel hierarchical architecture, where each layer demonstrates an increased degree of
autonomy, ensuring flexibility and operational stability even under destabilizing external
influences.</p>
      <p>Ukrainian researcher V. A. Lakhno emphasizes in his works the importance of applying the
fuzzy set theory for modeling uncertainty in critical infrastructure systems [8]. Similarly, O.H.
Korchenko and H.I. Haidur developed methods of adaptive security management under
dynamically changing threat environments [9], which are particularly relevant for designing
resilient cyber-physical systems.</p>
      <p>The theoretical foundation of this study integrates multiple scientific disciplines. The use of
systems analysis provides insights into the structure and interaction of cyber-physical system
components, while operations research theory offers mathematical tools for optimizing the
allocation of security resources. Based on the theory of complex adaptive systems, the research
justifies the mechanisms of self-organization, adaptability, and robustness inherent in intelligent
systems. Additionally, the graph theory is employed to model sensor network topologies and
analyze their survivability, whereas probability theory supports risk evaluation and reliability
modeling under uncertainty.</p>
      <p>To adequately reflect the specific conditions of wartime, an extended methodology called
STRIDE-W has been developed. This framework builds upon the classical STRIDE model by
incorporating military threat factors, allowing comprehensive analysis of both traditional
cybersecurity risks—Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service,
Elevation of Privilege—and warfare-specific hazards, such as the physical destruction of
infrastructure, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) exposure, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks.
Thus, STRIDE-W serves as an integrated tool for assessing the resilience of information and
telecommunication systems within hybrid threat environments.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Research methodology</title>
      <p>The methodological framework integrates systems analysis, operations research, and complex
adaptive systems theory to model cyber-physical interactions, optimize resource allocation under
wartime conditions, and explain self-organization in adversarial environments.</p>
      <p>Graph-theoretic and probabilistic modeling assess network survivability, risk, and reliability,
while comparative simulations evaluate resilience across degradation and recovery phases.</p>
      <p>To reflect wartime realities, the STRIDE-W model extends STRIDE with parameters for physical
destruction, EMP, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks, supporting proactive defense design.</p>
      <p>Empirical data from 2022–2024, system benchmarks, and simulations under varying threat
levels inform metrics such as survivability, detection accuracy, MTTR, energy efficiency, and EMP
resilience.</p>
      <p>The study, conducted under the R&amp;D project “Development of adaptive cybersecurity systems
for critical infrastructure under hybrid warfare” (State Reg. No. 0124U000123) at Lviv Polytechnic
National University with support from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, included
collaboration with the State Agency of Water Resources.</p>
      <p>A digital twin simulated connectivity, latency, and energy behavior under STRIDE-W scenarios,
modeling redundancy via k-out-of-n and Markov processes to maintain functionality above critical
thresholds.</p>
      <p>Communication resilience relied on multi-path networking (IP/MPLS, NB-IoT/LoRaWAN,
satellite), event-driven failover, and Zero-Trust access, while post-quantum cryptography protected
all data.</p>
      <p>Detection models were validated using time-series cross-validation, ROC-AUC, F1, MTTR, and
MTTD metrics. Sensitivity and Bayesian analyses addressed uncertainty, including EMP and power
fluctuations.</p>
      <p>All experiments were reproducible, forming a closed research-to-deployment loop where
digital-twin results inform real-world implementation of resilient environmental monitoring
systems.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Research results</title>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Mathematical model of a cyber-physical system</title>
        <p>
          Within the operations-research framework, we develop a multi-objective model for optimal
allocation of security resources in an environmental-monitoring CPS, jointly reflecting technical,
organizational, and wartime uncertainty factors. The overall system security index is maximized by
objective function (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ):
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          )
        </p>
        <p>
          This expression aggregates the contribution of each component through importance weights
w i, reliability Ri, attack success probability P i, and wartime effectiveness E i. Intuitively, (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          )
increases the overall security level Z when (a) reliabilities of critical nodes improve; (b) the chance
of a successful attack decreases; and (c) countermeasures remain effective under battlefield
i
to the operational situation (power outages, link loss, logistics constraints). In short, (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ) “absorbs”
both structural properties and wartime effectiveness.
        </p>
        <p>
          Realism is enforced by budgetary and timing constraints that bound the rollout of defenses. The
financial constraint (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ) is:
        </p>
        <p>
          where C i is the full “protection cost” of component i(procurement, integration, operations) and
B the available budget. Operationally, (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ) is portfolio planning under a fixed cost ceiling. For
wartime stress scenarios, maintain a separate “emergency budget” for rapid
re-connection/replaceand-go actions.
        </p>
        <p>
          The time constraint (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ) is:
where T i is the deployment/activation time of safeguards for component i , and T the deadline.
This barrier excludes strategies that cannot be made operational within the decision window. For
critical assets, use staged planning (minimal viable protection by t 1, full capability by t 2).
        </p>
        <p>
          The key stochastic element is the P imodel, describing how the set of defenses reduces baseline
vulnerability while accounting for battlefield factors. Expression (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ) is:
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          )
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          )
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          )
where P 0iis the pre-defense attack success probability for i ; e j the effectiveness of defense j ;
x i j its application (0/1 or fraction); and W the wartime multiplier (typically 1.5–3.0).
Interpretation: in peacetime W → 1; under shelling, prolonged power loss, or active APT
campaigns, W increases, inflating residual risk even after defenses are in place. Calibrate e j from
incident histories and red-team tests; calibrate W from the operational picture (DDoS frequency,
packet loss, physical damage). In sensitivity analysis, test “worst-day” settings with W near its
upper bound to eliminate brittle configurations.
        </p>
        <p>
          System survivability under war describes how long minimum required functionality can be
preserved amid combined cyber and physical stressors. Function (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ) definesS ( t ), the probability of
“keeping the system afloat” at timet :
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          )
where Ri ( t )are time profiles of reliability for component classes; k i redundancy levels; A ( t )
adaptability; and V ( t ) resistance to wartime impacts (shielding, alternate communications, local
power buffers, etc.). Practically, if redundancy is sufficient and adaptability swiftly retunes
configurations to new conditions,S ( t ) can increase even with partial infrastructure loss.
The dynamics of adaptability are formalized by Equation (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ):
        </p>
        <p>
          where A0 is the starting capacity to reconfigure; α the degradation rate (wear-out, fatigue,
information noise); β the learning intensity; and E ( t ) accumulated response experience. In
applying (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ), aim to: (a) minimize α via maintenance and model rotation; (b) raise β through
accelerated patch cycles and federated/edge learning; and (c) accumulate E ( t )as playbooks and
reusable artifacts (signatures, behavior vectors).
        </p>
        <p>
          Another critical marker is graceful degradation. The coefficient (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ) is:
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          )
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          )
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          )
(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          )
with F min and F max the functionality bounds; λ the service-shedding speed; μ the recovery
tempo; and R rate ( t )the instantaneous “back-to-service” rate. In wartime, F min is deliberately kept
around ≈ 0.3−0.5to guarantee critical services (contamination detection, emergency alerts) despite
up to ~70% node or channel loss. If λ ≫ μ , the system “falls off a cliff”; if μ is high thanks to power
reserves, backup links, and local analytics, degradation remains controlled and short.
        </p>
        <p>
          Portfolio-level security management uses the integrated risk (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ):
where qi is the likelihood of threat i , Lithe expected loss, and M i mitigation effectiveness
(reducing impact). In practice, (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ) serves as a top-level KPI tied back to constraints (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          )–(
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ): a 1%
reduction in integrated risk under fixed B and T quantifies the “price of security” in money and
days.
        </p>
        <p>
          The wartime risk multiplier (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ) refines (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ) by incorporating spatio-temporal proximity to
hostilities:
        </p>
        <p>
          where Proximity is proximity to the combat zone (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0-1</xref>
          ), Infrastructure_damage is the level of
infrastructure damage (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0-1</xref>
          ), Cyber_intensity is the intensity of cyber threats (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0-1</xref>
          ), k ₁, k ₂, and k ₃
are calibrated coefficients
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Conceptual architecture of a military-adapted system</title>
        <p>The conceptual architecture of the war-adapted system follows a layered design in which the
strategic tier acts as the top control plane for policy, prioritization, and inter-agency coordination.
Geographical dispersion of data centers across international, national, and regional tiers mitigates
correlated failure from kinetic attacks. International DCs hosted in friendly countries (e.g., Poland,
Romania) provide continuity and remote control options if national infrastructure is severely
compromised. National facilities are distributed across multiple Ukrainian regions to avoid
simultaneous impact, while regional compute centers are engineered for elevated autonomy and
quasi-offline operation, sustaining minimum essential services even when inter-regional links are
impaired. In the diagram corresponding to Figure 5.1, this appears as a cascade from policy and
orchestration down to the edge domains where first-line decisions are taken.</p>
        <p>The fog/edge tier is the keystone of survivability. Hardened edge servers in secured district sites
perform pre-processing, noise filtering, and local decision-making without mandatory connectivity
to upper tiers. Mobile stations packaged as vehicle or container units can be deployed within hours
to backfill coverage gaps and replace lost static nodes. Fortified nodes feature EMP shielding,
redundant power, and guaranteed autonomy up to 72 hours. To preserve service under network
degradation, automated failover policies reconfigure routes and switch to satellite or microwave
links; non-essential functions are temporarily shed so that priority flows—contamination detection,
emergency alerts, asset health telemetry—remain available.</p>
        <p>The sensing periphery is realized as a redundant mesh with high-density IoT sensors across
water bodies, providing alternate telemetry paths and compensating for node loss. Collector drones
operate in hard-to-reach or hazardous areas, including near active conflict zones, while
autonomous stations with solar power and batteries can run for weeks without upstream
connectivity, buffering data and transmitting opportunistically. Model and configuration updates
are orchestrated in tiers: regional centers fan out packages to the edge, and edge infrastructure
propagates them to sensors with awareness of link quality and energy budgets, keeping algorithms
up to date without interrupting service.</p>
        <p>A security subsystem spans every layer. Post-quantum cryptography protects long-horizon
channels and storage; Zero Trust principles remove implicit trust by enforcing
microsegmentation, least privilege, and per-interaction verification; adaptive ML blends behavioral
analytics with cross-layer event correlation to surface emerging threats in time. Under wartime
stress, this integration supports fast service restore targets (30–60 seconds to a safe degraded
mode), 72+ hours of autonomy for hardened nodes, reduced energy consumption via edge
computation, and resilient update logistics even amid link disruptions.</p>
        <p>Post-quantum cryptography is based on the use of cryptographic algorithms that remain secure
even in the presence of an adversary's quantum computing capabilities. Such algorithms ensure
long-term confidentiality and data integrity, neutralising the threat of information decryption by
future quantum systems. Their implementation is a key element in building a resilient
cryptographic infrastructure in critical cyber-physical systems.</p>
        <p>Zero Trust architecture is based on the principle of ‘trust no one by default’. Every access
request—regardless of its source, location, or user status—undergoes authentication, authorisation,
and security context verification. This approach minimises the risk of unauthorised intrusion into
the internal network and provides flexible access control in dynamic threat environments.</p>
        <p>Adaptive Machine Learning is used to continuously analyse system behaviour, traffic and
security events. It is capable of independently updating models, detecting new, previously
unknown types of anomalies or attacks. This allows the system to respond to threats in real time
without requiring manual intervention.</p>
        <p>In a military context, these approaches are of critical importance. Systems must be capable of
countering state-level APT (Advanced Persistent Threats) attacks, remaining operational when
exposed to electromagnetic pulses (EMP) caused by nuclear or high-frequency explosions, and
ensuring graceful degradation of functions in the event of physical damage or destruction of
infrastructure components.</p>
        <p>Together, these technologies form a multi-component defence architecture that combines
cryptographic resilience, behavioural analytics and flexible adaptation to military-critical
conditions, ensuring the continuity of cyber-physical environmental monitoring systems even in
emergency situations</p>
        <p>Counteraction to APT attacks is implemented through a multi-layered monitoring system,
behavioral analysis of users and processes, and coordination with national cybersecurity agencies.
This ensures early anomaly detection and reduces the likelihood of prolonged hidden intrusions.</p>
        <p>Protection against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats is achieved by shielding critical
components, using protected cables and specialized filters, which guarantees operational stability
even under strong external electromagnetic influences. Graceful degradation allows the system to
maintain essential operations even if up to 70% of hardware or software components become
unavailable.</p>
        <p>During regular operation, IoT sensors continuously collect water quality data and transmit it in
encrypted form to fog nodes using post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Each data transmission
undergoes automatic integrity and authenticity verification. Fog nodes perform preliminary
analytics using local AI/ML modules, enabling fast detection of anomalies and potentially
hazardous events. Processed and aggregated data are then sent to the cloud platform via secure
VPN tunnels with additional encryption layers. In the cloud, global AI/ML models are continuously
retrained using global datasets to produce updated threat detection models, which are securely
distributed back to the fog nodes and sensors through protected update channels.</p>
        <p>The security subsystem continuously analyzes network traffic, device behavior, and
intercomponent communications to identify cyber threats or potential acts of warfare. When suspicious
activity is detected, a multi-tier verification process is triggered, correlating the incident with
intelligence data and geopolitical context. If certain nodes are confirmed as compromised, the
system automatically isolates them while preserving critical data for forensic investigation. The
network then self-reconfigures, activating backup communication channels, redistributing loads
among functional nodes, and restoring operational resilience of the system.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. System survivability assessment model</title>
        <p>The system survivability model reflects a continuous cycle of adaptation to threats, preservation of
critical functions, and gradual restoration of operational capability under wartime conditions. The
initial state is defined by full system functionality, where all components operate in normal mode,
ensuring maximum measurement accuracy and reliable data transmission. During operation, the
system is exposed to cyberattacks, physical damage, and environmental disruptions, which require
rapid detection, response, and adaptation [10].</p>
        <p>Attack detection operates through a multi-layered framework combining network traffic
monitoring (IDS/IPS), behavioral analytics via machine learning, event correlation through OSINT,
and intelligence from national agencies. When anomalies are detected, compromised nodes are
isolated, post-quantum encryption is applied, communication switches to secure backup channels,
and alerts are sent via independent paths [11, 12].</p>
        <p>Effective mitigation ensures threat neutralization without loss of critical functions; afterward,
the system verifies integrity, performs audits, retrains detection models, and gradually restores
normal operation. If full mitigation is impossible, graceful degradation mode maintains essential
monitoring, alerts, and analytics while non-critical services are suspended and energy-saving
protocols activated [13–16].</p>
        <p>A critical state arises when functionality drops below 30% due to loss of over 70% of sensors,
compromise of core security systems, or physical destruction of nodes. The system then enters
emergency mode—local nodes operate autonomously, power reserves are engaged, and
communication continues via satellite or radio. Recovery involves gradual reintegration and
integrity validation of restored components [17–19].</p>
        <p>Under wartime conditions, federated “guerrilla learning” enables decentralized model training
directly on nodes, synchronizing only via secure links. Optimized for intermittent connectivity and
high latency, these algorithms use differential privacy and allow prolonged autonomous operation
without central servers [20, 21].</p>
        <p>System survivability is strengthened through automatic reconfiguration and self-organization,
redistributing workloads, rebuilding network topologies, and activating redundant resources. Each
node stores metadata for all configurations and can trigger reorganization independently. This
ensures continuity of critical monitoring and high resilience of cyber-physical systems amid hybrid
and wartime disruptions [22].</p>
        <p>The warfare-adapted cyber-physical architecture shows major improvements in resilience,
survivability, and recovery compared to centralized systems. A distributed mesh topology ensures
functionality despite node losses by automatically reconfiguring routes and redistributing critical
tasks, eliminating single points of failure and maintaining environmental monitoring during
warfare or communication loss [23].</p>
        <p>Threat detection accuracy reaches 99.5–99.9% through multi-agent behavioral analysis that
integrates diverse machine learning models and correlates network, temporal, and OSINT
indicators for proactive attack prediction.</p>
        <p>Incident recovery time drops from 2–24 hours to 30–60 seconds thanks to autonomous
reconfiguration, redundant routing, and localized decision-making modules. System autonomy
increases 18–36× via decentralized control, distributed power networks, and backup energy
sources, supporting long-term operation without central coordination.</p>
        <p>Energy efficiency rises by about 40% due to adaptive routing, intelligent power management,
and low-power operational states. Scalability evolves from linear to exponential: each new node
self-integrates into the mesh, expanding functionality and ensuring stability even under
fragmentation.</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-3-1">
          <title>Characteristic</title>
          <p>Network Topology
Control Model
Cryptography
Attack Resilience
Recovery Time
Power Consumption
Threat Detection Accuracy
Operational Autonomy
Scalability
EMP Resistance
Graceful Degradation
Deployment Cost
Operational Expenditures
100% (baseline)
100% (baseline)
2–24 hours
Standard
85–95%
2–4 hours
Linear
None
Absent</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-3-2">
          <title>Conventional</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-3-3">
          <title>Architecture</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-3-4">
          <title>Warfare-adapted Architecture</title>
          <p>Centralized / Hierarchical</p>
          <p>Distributed Mesh Topology
Centralized
RSA, AES (256-bit)</p>
          <p>Decentralized with Consensus</p>
          <p>Post-Quantum Algorithms (PQC)
Conventional Cyber Threats</p>
          <p>APT and Kinetic Attacks
30–60 seconds
Optimized (−40%)
99.5–99.9%
Up to 72 hours
Exponential
Protected up to 50 kV/m
Up to 50% node loss without
failure
150–180%
80–90%</p>
          <p>Thus, the warfare-adapted architecture achieves superior resilience, flexibility, and efficiency
through post-quantum cryptography, Zero Trust access, adaptive machine learning, and
selfhealing mechanisms that ensure cyber-physical system continuity in high-risk combat
environments.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4.4. Prospects for practical implementation</title>
        <p>The deployment of the warfare-adapted cyber-physical monitoring system follows a phased
strategy that addresses wartime constraints, limited resources, and elevated security demands.</p>
        <p>Phase one develops and validates core components—post-quantum cryptography, adaptive
MLbased threat prediction, and self-reconfiguring protocols ensuring survivability under failures and
disconnections.</p>
        <p>Phase two pilots the system at key water-management sites, testing resilience, automated
incident response, and OSINT-based coordination with civil defense, followed by gradual
geographic scaling.</p>
        <p>Phase three expands to nationwide implementation during post-war reconstruction, aligning
with ISO/IEC 27001, NIST SP 800-207 (Zero Trust), and NATO cybersecurity frameworks to enable
trusted cross-border environmental data exchange.</p>
        <p>Technological requirements include secure links with allies for backup data hosting, access to
advanced cryptographic tools, and deployment of military-grade IoT infrastructure.
Organizationally, the approach demands specialist training, updated cybersecurity regulations, and
interagency coordination mechanisms.</p>
        <p>In the long term, the system evolves into a national environmental intelligence platform
integrated with cybersecurity infrastructure, providing predictive analytics for environmental and
technogenic risks in real time.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Limitations and risks under wartime conditions</title>
      <p>The implementation of warfare-adapted cyber-physical environmental monitoring systems
encounters technological, organizational, economic, and geopolitical constraints that critically
influence their effectiveness and security under wartime conditions.</p>
      <p>Technologically, post-quantum cryptography increases computational load and energy use by
15–20%, while damaged communication infrastructure limits bandwidth and delays critical data
transfer, requiring adaptive compression and traffic prioritization. Integration with legacy or
degraded systems demands compatibility protocols and secure data adapters, while hardware
supply chain integrity must be ensured through certification and audits.</p>
      <p>Economically, deployment costs and personnel training needs are substantial, compounded by
the necessity to comply with international cybersecurity regulations.</p>
      <p>Key risks include potential flaws in post-quantum algorithms, insider threats, and targeted
attacks on R&amp;D centers. Geopolitical tensions further amplify cyber conflict risks involving state
and non-state actors.</p>
      <p>Mitigating these challenges requires a comprehensive resilience and information security
strategy tailored to the realities of wartime critical infrastructure operations.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>The study demonstrates that distributing capabilities across international, national, and regional
data centers, and pushing analytics to hardened edge nodes, eliminates single points of failure and
reduces correlated outages. Even when a significant fraction of nodes or links are lost, the system
preserves minimum essential functions such as contamination detection and emergency alerting.
Formal criteria for survivability, adaptability, and graceful degradation, together with an
operations-research model that includes a wartime risk multiplier, provide a practical decision
frame for allocating protection budgets and rollout time within real constraints.</p>
      <p>Security embedded across all layers—post-quantum cryptography for long-horizon
confidentiality and integrity, Zero Trust for least-privilege and per-request verification, and
adaptive ML for behavioral detection—raises threat-detection accuracy toward ~99.5–99.9%,
compresses recovery to about 30–60 seconds in a safe degraded mode, and cuts energy
consumption by roughly 40% through edge processing and adaptive power control. Hardened sites
sustain 72+ hours of autonomous operation and retain secure update logistics even during link
failovers; EMP resilience and multipath communications further stabilize service continuity in
contested environments.</p>
      <p>Practically, the architecture enables phased modernization of existing water-management
systems and sets a pathway for post-war scaling and cross-border data integration. Limitations
include deployment cost, PQC overhead and legacy interoperability, and dependence on
connectivity quality near the front. Future work should emphasize field validation of the digital
twin, standardization of security profiles for war-adapted IoT, full life-cycle economic analysis, and
joint procedures with partners for early warning, segment isolation, and rapid recovery. Overall,
the proposed approach offers a credible, industry-ready blueprint for resilient environmental
monitoring that remains observable, controllable, and secure under sustained wartime pressure.
Declaration on Generative AI
While preparing this work, the authors used the AI programs Grammarly Pro to correct text
grammar and Strike Plagiarism to search for possible plagiarism. After using this tool, the authors
reviewed and edited the content as needed and took full responsibility for the publication’s content.</p>
    </sec>
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