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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Journal of biomedical semantics
1 (2010) 10. doi:10.1186/2041</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1177/1750698010374287</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Towards a Semantic Representation of Memory Entities</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Soline Felice</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Frank Arnould</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Cassia Trojahn</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>INIST, CNRS</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Nancy</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="FR">France</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>IRIT, Université de Toulouse 2 Jean Jaurès</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Toulouse</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="FR">France</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Univ. Grenoble Alpes</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Inria, CNRS, Grenoble INP, LIG, Grenoble</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="FR">France</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>267</volume>
      <fpage>8</fpage>
      <lpage>9</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Diferent disciplines have been studying human memory and related issues for thousands of years. However, the definitions of the concepts relating to memory vary depending on the discipline or theory. In order to conciliate these variations and ambiguities, a solution is to formally define the concepts studied through ontologies. This paper presents Mem'Onto, a Memory Ontology which gather concepts related to memory, based on the Tulving's SPI model. This theory corresponds to a model of memory organisation and brings together various central elements of memory according to Tulving, whether in Memory Systems (e.g. Episodic Memory, Semantic Memory, Procedural Memory), in Mnesic Processes (e.g. Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) or in the level of consciousness of these subsystems during Retrieval (Implicit and Explicit). Mem'Onto is adapted from an existing ontology, CoTOn, a Cognitive Theory Ontology designed from a working memory use case.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;memory</kwd>
        <kwd>domain ontology</kwd>
        <kwd>FAIRness</kwd>
        <kwd>CoTOn</kwd>
        <kwd>UFO</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Memory is a concept that has been studied in various disciplines since Antiquity where it was the subject
of study by many philosophers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ] before neurocogniticians and psychologists [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4 ref5">3, 4, 5</xref>
        ] developed an
interest in it in the early 20th century.
      </p>
      <p>
        It refers to a cognitive mechanism that allows humans to acquire knowledge about the world, to
remember their personal experiences, and to imagine episodes in the future, influencing their identity
and interpersonal relationships [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. However, depending on the theory that studies memory, concepts
may have a common referent (i.e. ‘an entity in reality’ [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]) but diferent linguistic terms to refer to it, or
may share the same term corresponding to distinct notions. For example, in some schools of philosophy,
memory is considered necessarily true and reliable (a normative phenomenon), and constitutes itself a
form of knowledge [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] while it has a descriptive nature [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] according to psychology.
      </p>
      <p>
        Although several reflections have been carried out in those disciplines in the last years [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12 ref13">10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15</xref>
        ], there is a lack of conceptual formalisation of the memory concepts, which are the building blocks
of scientific theories, models and discourses. This hinders both intra- and interdisciplinary studies on the
topic. First, conceptual and terminological heterogeneities within the same community directly afect
the results of their scientific research. For example, it is hard to assess the benefits of working memory
training when there is no consensus definition of working memory among psychologists. Secondly,
conceptual and terminological problems afect the communication between diferent communities.
      </p>
      <p>This need for conciliate these variations and ambiguities appears to fall within the widely used
definition of an ontology as ‘a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualisation’ [ 16]. Thus, an
approach would be to exploit the knowledge representation capabilities of ontologies to accommodate
definitions and terms from diferent fields and theories, in order to propose a conceptual representation
that includes the diferent perspectives of the various memory sciences, thereby highlighting both their
diferences and their similarities.</p>
      <p>A close efort is the CoTOn ontology on working memory [ 17]. This ontology, aligned with the UFO
foundational ontology [18], represents concepts intended to describe the diferent parameters defining
a theory or a cognitive concept (e.g., Cognitive Concepts, Author or Cognitive Theory) while its
instances refer to their respective entities (e.g., Working memory, Baddeley &amp; Hitch or Multi-component
model). However, this representation is rather intended to focus on working memory (cognition)
and does not cover important aspects of memory such as the notion of process. Furthermore, for
representing models such as Tulving’s SPI model [19], a fine grain level of representation is required.</p>
      <p>This paper presents Mem’Onto, a Memory Ontology which gathers concepts related to memory. It
provides a first fine-grained representation that generalises CoTOn in order to be able to represent other
concepts than working memory ones. This generalisation aims at accommodating both a
cognitionoriented model and a psychology-oriented theory (Tulving’s SPI model). This theory corresponds to
a model of memory organisation and brings together various central elements of memory according
to Tulving, whether in Memory Systems (e.g. Episodic Memory, Semantic Memory, Procedural
Memory), in Mnesic Processes (e.g. Encoding, Storage, Retrieval) or in the level of consciousness of
these subsystems during Retrieval (e.g. Implicit and Explicit).</p>
      <p>The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main related work. Section 3
introduces the proposal model, its multi-level structure and its underlying model (CoTOn). Section 4
details how Mem’Onto has been implemented and Section 5 presents the evaluation of the ontology.
Section 6 discusses some design choices and finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and presents the
perspectives for future work.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Related Work</title>
      <p>This section overviews the main related work on memory representation, from diferent levels of
representation and disciplines. Table ?? summarises such works.</p>
      <p>In cognition, hierarchical knowledge representation is one approach to representing cognitive
neuroscience through the prism of the field. Among those representations, the Cognitive Atlas [ 20, 21], is a
collaborative project aimed at developing a knowledge base that reflects current views in the field of
cognitive science. In particular, this knowledge base contains ‘concepts’ (915 entries) and ‘tasks’ (853
entries) which can be related to each other by is a part of and is a kind of relationships (and
their inverses) associated with a definition adopted by the cognitive neuroscience community. Among
the 24 memory-related concepts, we can find working memory, retrieval or primary memory for
example.</p>
      <p>A terminological resource with an in-depth interest in memory is the Thesaurus in Cognitive
Psychology of Human Memory [22]. This is a bilingual (French-English) terminological resource covering
concepts from the cognitive research on human memory (memory systems and processes, empirical
efects, memory disorders, study methods and measurements, theories and models). This thesaurus
contains 1459 concepts (e.g. causal theory of memory, semantic memory, hippocampus)
organized in the form of hierarchical (generic and specific terms), equivalence (synonyms) and associative
relationships, most of which are provided with a definition and bibliographic references. The
following properties specifying the semantic relationships are included: is diagnostic tool of, is
disorder of, is measure of, is study method of, is model of, is theory of and is
component of, and their inverses.</p>
      <p>The Mental Functioning Ontology [23] is a domain ontology that considers the ontological
representation of memory, dedicated to document mental diseases and grounded on BFO (Basic Formal
Ontology). This ontology is structured around 418 classes, 4 of which relate to memory. This ontology
considers the memories as a Mental Disposition, itself a sub-concept of Bodily Disposition realized
in a Mental Process. It is a procedural and disease-oriented representation, which deviates from our
representation of memory.</p>
      <p>Some ontologies consider the concept of memory from a behavioural sciences perspective. For
instance, the Behaviour Change Intervention Ontology (BCIO) [24] aims to provide a common conceptual
framework in the field of behavioral sciences and is built on the Basic Formal Ontology. This ontology
contains more than 1000 entities with 6 memory related concepts such as associative memory, iconic
memory or procedural memory.</p>
      <p>The Neurobehavior Ontology (NBO) [25] represents behavioral processes and phenotypes. Its
foundationnal ontology is BFO, and it is composed of more than 4,548 concepts. In particular, 42
concepts are directly related to memory (e.g. autobiographical memory, eidetic memory and
topographic memory).</p>
      <p>A more experimental oriented ontology is CogPo [26] that represents experimental cognitive
paradigms in the functional neuroimaging community. It does this by representing experimental
behavioral paradigm conditions and by contrasting experimental behavioral paradigm conditions. The
Cognitive Paradigm Ontology is a collection of 199 concepts, but none specifically around the concept
of memory.</p>
      <p>Finally, close to our work is CoTOn [17], a cognition ontology based on cognitive neuroscience
theories. It aims to represent objectifiable knowledge about observable entities in the experimental
setting, theory-dependent conceptualizations of latent cognitive concepts, and community-specific
use of the same linguistic terms for diferently defined cognitive concepts. It is based on UFO and
involves various models of working memory. This operational ontology contains 7 concepts of the
15 concepts present in their reference model, all designed with memory as the key entity. It also
include 1,712 instances from the Cognitive Atlas, as well as few concepts and their definitions, such as
Theory, Cognitive Concept, Task, Condition, and Indicator which are validated by the cognitive
neuroscience community.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Mem’Onto: A Memory Ontology</title>
      <p>For this first modelisation, the ontology is structured in four levels: (1) the top-level ontology (i.e. the
UFO), (2) the middle level ontology (i.e. an adaptation of the CoTOn), (3) the domain level ontology
and (4) the level of instances. Figure 1 depicts the diferent levels of Mem’Onto. In the following, the
purpose identification, ontology development processes and the ontology levels are detailed.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Purpose Identification</title>
        <p>The ontology presented here is adapted from the Cognitive Theory Ontology (CoTOn) as an initial
representation of memory concepts. As stated in Section 2, CoTOn aims to represent objectifiable
knowledge about the observable entities of the experimental setting and subsequently use it to annotate
neurocognitive datasets with domain-specific metadata. For the purpose, it focused on the representation
of cognitive concepts, their commonly used linguistic terms and objectifiable measurements. With the
working memory as its use-case, this representation does not cover important aspects of memory such
as the notion of process, required for modeling Tulving’s SPI model.</p>
        <p>Five models of working memory are defined, including the Multicomponent model and its components
(i.e. Central Executive, Episodic bufer, Phonological loop and Visuospatial sketchpad), all of which
could be considered as instances of the ontology, both the models themselves and their components. On
the one hand, this modelling does not accurately represent the hierarchical relations between mnemonic
entities. On the other hand, we consider instances to be the real-world manifestation of a given concept.
For example, the concept of episodic memory refers to the notion of episodic memory and its instances
would be Endel Tulving’s episodic memory (during his lifetime) or Cassia Trojahn’s episodic memory.</p>
        <p>In order to explicit the representation needs, a set of competency questions have been defined
(concepts in bold, instances in italics and the relations in typewriter):
• CQ1: What are the Cognitive Memory Systems defined in the SPI Model?
• CQ2: Which Author created the Theory SPI Model?
• CQ3: What Tulving consider as a Mnesic Process?
• CQ4: What is the Awareness Form of memory expression of the Retrieval Process for the</p>
        <p>Episodic Memory as part of the SPI Model of Tulving (in 1995)?
• CQ5: What are the Linguistic Term of the PRS Memory for Tulving?</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Ontology Development Process</title>
        <p>With a view of re-using an existing ontology, we investigated existing methodologies, and set our
sights on NeOn. The NeOn methodology suggests guidelines for diferent processes and activities
described functionally, procedurally and empirically, in order to develop reproducible ontological
models. They provide scenarios adapted to the diferent types of resources to be integrated into the
ontology, depending on the ontology’s design stages. Scenario 4 considers the reuse and reengineering
of ontological resources at the ontology conceptualization stage, which corresponds to our application
of CoTOn. In Scenario 3, we drew on Ontology Reuse Statement which aimed to reuse parts of a defined
ontology when the latter has not been designed for the intended task.</p>
        <p>The reuse process is divided into 4 activities: Ontology Statement Search, Ontology Statement
Assessment, Ontology Statement Selection, Ontology Statement Integration and Check Local Inconsistencies.
Following the process steps, we have determined in our source ontology (CoTOn) that the statements
will either be deleted (because they no longer meet the objectives of our ontology) or reengineered
(between the three possibilities: be reused as they are, reengineered or merged). For the statements
we kept, we had three other technical options: import ontology statements, copy ontology statements
and establish mappings with ontology statements. We chose to copy the ontology statements (e.g. the
Author and the Linguistic Term concepts) in order to avoid potential side efects, notably that
other elements could have an impact on the ontology created. Likewise, we have replicated the
statements adapted from CoTOn (e.g. the Theory and the Concept concepts (derived from the Cognitive
Theory and the Cognitive Concept concepts from CoTOn)). The following section details the
concepts adopted and/or modified from CoTOn.</p>
        <p>The ontology development process was conducted between the three authors of this paper including
a specialist in memory terminology, but will be reviewed by memory experts at a later stage.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.3. Adaptations from CoTOn</title>
        <p>CoTOn’s purpose is to provide a framework for the representation of objectivable and experimental
cognitive entities. Adaptations have been performed to ensure that our ontology meets our objectives.
To represent the theoretical vision of Tulving’s SPI model, we propose a multi-level representation
containing the diferent levels of granularity of our ontology. The statements adapted from CoTOn are
at the middle level ontology. Here, we will detail the reuses and adaptations of the CoTOn model, and
explain our specific additions made at this level in Section 3.4.2.</p>
        <p>The models presented in CoTOn depended significantly on the experiments carried out prior to their
development. Hence this ontology includes the concepts of Cognitive Subject, Cognitive Task, Task
Condition and Indicator into their modelling. Given that we aimed to model the diferent theories of
memory, there was no need for experimentally related notions, we decided not to include these four
concepts in our ontology. Additionally, we have removed the word Cognitive from the other concepts
(i.e. Cognitive Concept and Cognitive Theory) in order to emphasise the multi-domain aspect of our
ontology. These concepts can be found in Figure2. To summarize, the concepts included are Person,
Scientist, Scientific Community, Terminological Usage, Creator, Author, Artifact, Linguistic
Term and Agent, the only concept kept from CoTOn in our Top Level of ontology.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>3.4. Ontology Levels</title>
        <sec id="sec-3-4-1">
          <title>3.4.1. Top-Level Ontology</title>
          <p>As stated before, CoTOn is grounded in the Unified Foundation Ontology (UFO) [ 18]. We assume that
the top-level ontological distinctions used in CoTOn are the same for us. We invite the reader to refer
to their paper to obtain their (and by extension, our) distinctions. In particular, CoTOn integrates
the notion of Agent from which the Person type inherits. The Agent class (‘substantial that creates
actions, perceives events and to which we can ascribe mental states’) [27] comes from the UFO-C
ontology and is a subclass of the Substantial class (‘Independent Endurants’ [18]) itself a subclass of
the Endurant class (‘individuals that exist in time with all their parts’). We have also included the
concept of memory processes into our modeling. After investigating existing UFO concepts, we settled
on UFO-B’s definition of events (‘entities composed of temporal parts that occur over time’) and decided
to add this concept to our modeling, as its definition is consistent with Tulving’s view of processes, as
further detailed below.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-4-2">
          <title>3.4.2. Middle Level Ontology</title>
          <p>The concepts removed, adapted and kept unchanged from CoTOn are detailed in Section 3.3. The
concept Process, which has been added, is a sub-concept and inherits the properties of Event (Figure 2).
We have also introduced the isProcessOf relation to highlight the Process working with a given
Concept (in the context of the SPI model, a Cognitive Memory System).</p>
          <p>This Middle-level ontology is intended to be more general and adaptable to diferent domains,
conceptualizations and theories of memory.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-4-3">
          <title>3.4.3. Domain Specific Level</title>
          <p>In CoTOn, the second level was the instantiation level, where the diferent models, the tasks and
indicators were considered as instances. In our representation, we decide to model that diferently,
following a better distinction between A-Box and T-Box (Figure 3). For example, in CoTON, the
instances of the Theory concept, which are working memory models, including the Early decomposition
model, the Embedded-process model, the Modal model and the Multicomponent model would also be
considered as sub-concepts of Mnesic model, the sub-concept of Theory. Those sub-concepts from
the representation of the adaptation of CoTOn (i.e. the middle level of our ontology) are represented in
the domain specific level. This level is the link between the conceptual level in the vision of CoTOn and
the instantiation level. In contrast to our middle level ontology, our domain specific level is specialized
in memory and has been developed using the organisation of memory model of Tulving from 1995 as a
use case.</p>
          <p>Hence, this level contains three main concepts that emerged from the conceptualisation of Tulving’s
SPI model: Mnesic model (detailed in the above example), Cognitive memory system and Mnesic
process. From the Cognitive memory system concept derives the following 5 sub-concepts: Episodic
memory, Primary memory, Semantic memory, Procedural memory and PRS memory.</p>
          <p>All concepts and sub-concepts coming from Cognitive Memory System are linked to the
subconcept of the corresponding Mnesic model (here, the SPI model). Another main concept of the
domain specific level is Mnesic process, coming from the Process concept of the middle level. Tulving
considers mnesic processes to be the mechanisms of acquisition, storage, and retrieval of information,
as opposed to memory systems. Therefore, we add the 3 process of remembering as sub-concepts of
Mnesic process: Encoding, Storage and Retrieval.</p>
          <p>A further aspect of Tulving’s model [19] we have represented here is the level of consciousness during
the Retrieval process. This quality characterising the Retrieval process is called Awareness
Expression Form of Memory in our representation, after Tulving who called it ‘forms of expression
of memory’ in order to distinguish them from memory systems. We have added the term ‘Awareness’
in order to clarify the notion of awareness or lack of awareness of the event and to avoid confusing
it with the notion of consciousness, which is much debated in the community. This quality is binary
and can take on two distinct values: Implicit Memory (‘expression of what the individual has learned
without necessarily remembering how, when, or where the learning occurred’) or Explicit Memory.</p>
          <p>Additionally, each of the 5 memory subsystems defined by Tulving have either an Implicit Memory
or an Explicit Memory value. The memory subsystems with an Implicit Memory Awareness
Expression Form of Memory are PRS Memory, Procedural Memory and Semantic Memory.
Conversely, the memory subsystems with an Awareness Expression Form of Memory of type
Explicit Memory are Primary Memory and Episodic Memory. We cannot infer the type of
Awareness Expression Form of Memory of the Long-Term Memory and Declarative Memory as
they contain the Semantic Memory and the Episodic Memory, each having diferent Awareness
Expression Form of Memory.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-4-4">
          <title>3.4.4. Instances Level</title>
          <p>CoTOn considers instances as first-order types, individuals forming neurocognitive data sets. Given
that, the instantiation level is composed of the instances of our ontology (i.e. the members of a class
also called individuals or objects). Here, there is for example the member of the class Author which
can be Tulving, Baddeley, Hitch, etc.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Implementation</title>
      <p>Figure 4 presents a fragment of the ontology metadata and metrics. Mem’Onto has 34 classes, 1
object property, and 24 annotation properties. Each ontology entity was annotated with a definition
(skos:definition) and a bibliographic citation (terms:bibliographicCitation).</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Class Elicitation</title>
        <p>In addition to the conceptual model presented, we provide a first version of a digital ontology 1 expressed
in OWL (the Web Ontology Language) [28] and provided in a turtle file (MemOnto.ttl).</p>
        <p>As explained in Section 3, Mem’Onto was developed to match UFO. In the model presented in Figure
1, the orange section corresponds to the UFO concepts that have been included in Mem’Onto in order
to highlight the links with concepts at other levels of our ontology. Furthermore, they have not been
integrated into our functional ontology so that UFO and Mem’Onto can be loaded together in Protege
without interfering with each other. It is therefore possible to import both; one simply needs to recreate
the hierarchical relationships between the Agent and Event concepts from UFO and the Person and
Process concepts respectively, as the Mem’Onto concepts are typed to be compliant with UFO.</p>
        <p>From our model, a portion of the concepts have been implemented within the ontology, using Protégé.
Among them, the concepts belonging to our Middle level ontology (CoTOn adapted) are: Author,
Theory, Concept, Linguistic Term and Process.</p>
        <p>We also introduce concepts from the domain specific level of Mem’Onto. Among them, the Cognitive
Memory Systems are a subclass of Concept, with the systems cited in Tulving’s paper: Procedural
Memory, PRS Memory, Semantic Memory, Primary Memory, Episodic Memory, Declarative
Memory and Long-Term Memory. The Mnesic Process, a subclass of Process are Encoding,
Storage and Retrieval. We have considered as Linguistic Terms (a concept from CoTOn) what
Tulving called ‘Other terms’ which are synonyms of the Cognitive Memory System (for example,
Procedural memory can also be referred to as Nondeclarative memory). This class could have been
expressed in labels as annotation property, but we followed CoTOn’s modeling on this point which was
motivated by the need to limit the list of selectable terms to a predefined range of options, given that
they imported the linguistic terms commonly used for cognitive concepts from the Cognitive Atlas.
The Mnesic Model class has been added as a subclass of Theory and a parent class of the SPI Model.
Then, the Awareness Expression Form of Memory is the last class represented in our model. The
Implicit Memory and Explicit Memory correspond to its subclasses.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Contextual Requirement</title>
        <p>Most relations between classes, are implemented as annotation properties, as OWL’s object properties
are dedicated to linking instances. Among the relations we implement are characterizes, creates,
defines, isLinguisticTermOf and isProcessOf. These properties do not fully allow to represent
all the competency questions. CQ3-5 can not be answered with mere binary relations. In order to
represent the contextual links between a process (always Retrieval in the SPI Model), an Awareness
Expression Form of Memory and a Cognitive Memory System, we required ways to express n-ary
statements. In our ontology, CQ3 and CQ5 are tackled by using Standard Reification. This appears to
be adequate as we aim to represent a context for a single triple, respectively about the subtyping in
CQ3 and isLinguisticTermOf in CQ5. CQ4 however, is less intuitively represented using Standard
1An aplha release of Mem’Onto is available via https://gitlab.com/sfsoline.felice/memonto
A colloquial name used by the cognitive neuro- Primary Memory, Short-term
sccoimenmceuncoitmymusuinngit yit)(atnoddbeynoetxeteCnosniocne,ptthse[1s7c]ientific Memory, Working Memory
An occurrent entity that exists in time by occurring
or happening, has temporal parts, and always de- Mnesic Process, Encoding
pends on some (at least one) material entity. [30]
Reification. As it involves a relation between three entities, the whole being held true only within the
context of a certain theory, a n-ary relation seems more fitting. We introduce the Model_Relation class,
which is the class of n-ary relation nodes between a Cognitive_Memory_Systems, one of the Process
it involves, and the Awareness Expression Form of Memory this process has according to a certain
theory, as is done in the SPI Model framework. Instances of this class are represented using blank nodes
linking the three classes mentioned above. They are linked to these nodes by relationships (in the form of
annotation properties) asAwarenessExpressionForm, linkedToProcess and memoryComponent.
The mnesic model within which this relation is described using the holdsTrue (here, the SPI Model).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Evaluation</title>
      <p>A first evaluation of the ontology consisted in verifying that the ontology is able to cover the defined
competency questions. For that, the corresponding SPARQL queries have been written and tested
(Table 3).</p>
      <p>Since the class Theory has the type Kind (‘Functional Complex, i.e., a whole that has parts contributing
in diferent ways for its functionality’, [ 31]), we considered the class Mnesic Model to be a subkind,
given that it is part of the Theory class. The SPI Model was also considered to be a subkind as it
inherits from Mnesic Model and therefore from Theory.</p>
      <p>Cognitive Memory System has also been considered as a kind inheriting from the Concept
class. Its sub-concepts are thus all subkind (e.g. Declarative Memory, Primary Memory).</p>
      <p>UFO-B’s Event class been considered as a kind, so the Process and Mnesic Process classes were
considered subkinds. The three Mnesic Process Encoding, Storage and Retrieval were considered
as phases, because they only have exactly one identity provider and in this conceptualisation they
represent a disjoint and complete set.</p>
      <p>Awareness Expression Form of Memory has been considered a quality due to its nature as an
intrinsic property having a structured value, yet NonPerceivable because it cannot be directly measured
by an instrument, such as money. Its sub-classes are Implicit Memory and Explicit Memory, which
are themselves Phases, also considered as a disjoint and complete whole (according to Tulving, we
cannot retrieve memories with both explicit and implicit awareness of their acquirement).</p>
      <p>Alongside the typing of the additional concepts, we have added relations to ensure that our formal
representation reflects Tulving’s perspective. Among these, which are all found in Mem’Onto, we have
the defines relationship, which was already used in CoTOn to bound a concept to the theoretical
framework to which it belongs. By converting instances of Theory and Concept into sub-concepts, we
have at the same time transposed this relationship to the latter. For example, Episodic Memory and
Semantic Memory define the SPI Model, in a compositional relationship with this Mnesic Model
because each sub-concept of the Concept class can only be interpreted within the framework of its
theory and therefore depends on it.</p>
      <p>Following this, we adopted the transitive is part of relationship between Semantic Memory and
Episodic Memory with the Declarative Memory, as well as between Declarative Memory and
LongTerm Memory. Indeed, it was clearly accepted in the literature at the time that semantic and episodic
memory were categorised together as declarative, itself associated with long-term memory.[32, 33]</p>
      <p>We then introduced that Awarness Expression Form of Memory characterizes the Mnesic
Process Retrieval. This same concept Awarness Expression Form of Memory has as children
the classes Implicit Memory and Explicit Memory, which are themselves linked by our relation is
Awareness Expression Form of Memory to the respective Cognitive Memory Systems.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Discussion</title>
      <p>In our modelling, we made various choices that are specific to memory studies. First of all, our priority
was to reuse as much as possible CoTOn, and to do so, we decided to keep the top-level ontology UFO.
This choice is debatable, particularly in regard that processes are more detailed in other ontologies
such as BFO or DOLCE. The mapping of our ontology to UFO is not rigid and we plan to change our
foundation ontologies if needed. In addition, we have chosen to integrate the Mnesic Processes under
this term, because we relied on the work of Tulving to propose a first version of an ontology of episodic
memory and, as a result, wanted to use his terms as much as possible. Nevertheless, the term Process
refers to two distinct concepts in this research:
• the memory process (called mnesic process by Tulving and by extension, in our ontology) which
refers to ‘a process that realizes a memory disposition’ [22].</p>
      <p>• the ontological process which refers in UFO to a variable embodiment of ordinary events [34].</p>
      <p>In Mem’Onto, we consider the concept Mnesic Process to be what we define as a memory process,
which inherits the concept Process from our middle-level ontology, which we consider to be an
ontological process.</p>
      <p>According to UFO-B, the concepts from which Mnesic Process could inherit are Event and
Process [34]. To decide which concepts to adopt, we have relied on Stout’s distinction to which
‘an event is something that happened/will happen, while a process is something that is/was/will be
happening or occurring’ [35]. Therefore, we have chosen not to type the ‘Process’ concept as an event
into our ontology in order to avoid confusion with the event experienced and recalled by the participant.
In UFO-B [36], events are considered to be individuals that may be composed of temporal parts, giving
as examples the sinking of the Titanic or a football game. An event composed of at least two events
is considered a complex event. As for processes, they are considered complex events, with examples
such as chemical processes. Following UFO’s terminology, we have considered our mnesic processes as
processes that themselves inherit events. To give an example, ‘I learned to ride a bike when I was about
6 years old’, and this skill was integrated into my working memory through the encoding process. It has
since been stored and is retrieved every time I ride a bike again. During these three processes, diferent
brain activation’s and cognitive sub-processes are involved, each of which can be characterized as a
complex event (the event of my encoding when learning to ride a bike is considered here to be on the
same level as the sinking of the Titanic).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Conclusion and Future work</title>
      <p>Memory is a concept that is studied in diferent disciplines within diferent theories and yet is represented
in a wide diversity of ways. Researchers between diferent memory sciences refer sometimes to the
same concepts, while at other times they use the same linguistic term to designate diferent concepts.
This happens between disciplines but also within disciplines, between theories themselves.</p>
      <p>In order to bring out these consensuses and disensuses, we provide in this paper a first multi-level
representation of mnesic concepts based on a model of memory organisation according to Tulving from
1995.</p>
      <p>Four hierarchical ontological levels are modelled in this representation: (1) the concepts linked to our
top-level ontology, UFO, (2) the cognitive meta-concepts adapted from the CoTOn ontology linking the
philosophical concepts of our top-level ontology to the mnesic concepts, (3) the domain level ontology
including cognitive memory systems, the mnesic model and mnesic processes, and (4) the instantiation
level.</p>
      <p>We have adapted the ontology described with CoTOn based on working memory. Tulving’s SPI
model served as a use-case and it allowed us to integrate the mnesic processes and the link he makes
between them and the cognitive memory systems. In particular, we formalised the link between how
the encoding of the event during retrieval, which can occur implicitly or explicitly depending on the
memory system involved, and to which we refer with Awareness Expression of Memory. Based on this
representation, we derived a model and implemented a first operational version of it in Protégé.</p>
      <p>In future work, we intend to extend and adapt this ontology to other models, but also to integrate a
versioning of theories in order to track their evolution, and then expand it to other memory disciplines.</p>
      <p>A verification-action step by memory experts in psychology and neurocognition will be implemented
later. Another perspective of this work is the addition of contextualization to distinguish mnesic
models as cognitive representations from mnesic models as theories, themselves considered within the
framework of an author, a year and a movement.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This research was funded by the Occitanie Region and the Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès through
grant N°23003132.</p>
      <p>We would also like to thank William Charles for his invaluable help with ontology implementation
and for peer reviewing this paper prior to submission. And finally, a special thank you to Anna
Ravenschlag for the valuable work she has done in publishing CoTOn, and for her proofreading and
exchanges on our project.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Disclaimer</title>
      <p>This paper focuses on the representation of episodic memory theories and concepts. However, by
working on some of Tulving’s work, we are only representing one facet of the studies on memory,
focusing solely on studies on adult humans with no apparent pathologies.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>The author(s) have not employed any Generative AI tools.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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