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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Heuristics: Cognitive Strategies for Decisions Under Constraint</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Timothy W. Coleman</string-name>
          <email>timothywcoleman@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>John Bittner</string-name>
          <email>john.h.bittner@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Basic Formal Ontology</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Heuristics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Bounded Rationality</addr-line>
          ,
          <institution>Medical Triage</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Decision Theory, Cognitive Architecture, Applied Ontology</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>National Center for Ontological Research</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>NY</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>SUNY University at Bufalo</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>NY</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>8</fpage>
      <lpage>9</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>This article introduces the Heuristic Decision Ontology, a formal ontological framework for modeling heuristics as Directive Information Content Entities (DICE) within the context of medical triage. Grounded in Basic Formal Ontology (BFO 2020) and aligned with the Common Core Ontologies (CCO 2.0), the Heuristic Decision Ontology classifies cognitive shortcuts as actionable specifications that prescribe life-critical decision behavior. This paper presents the ontology's structure, semantic commitments, class hierarchy, and demonstrates its application through medical triage scenarios. We conclude with a discussion of the ontology's extensibility and its contribution to transparent and consistent modeling of heuristic-based medical judgment.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>1Available at</kwd>
        <kwd>https</kwd>
        <kwd>//github</kwd>
        <kwd>com/TimothyWColeman/HeuristicOntology</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Imagine a medic in a mass-casualty scenario, racing against time to determine who needs care first and
foremost. Using the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) triage method, they tag an unconscious
but breathing patient as Red (needs urgent care), a vocal but stable patient as Yellow (can wait), and a
walking patient as Green (minor injuries) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. These snap decisions rely on heuristics – quick, practical
rules that cut through cognitive complexity by homing in on key signals. While the term ”cognitive” is
used throughout this paper, it refers to agent-neutral bounded reasoning strategies and does not imply
human-exclusive implementation. From Aristotle’s practical wisdom to modern triage rules, heuristics
help experts act fast when time and data are scarce. While procedural models of heuristics exist, no prior
work has provided a formally axiomatized, upper-ontology-aligned representation linking prescriptive
content to decision processes in medical triage [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">2, 3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Traditional clinical decision tools often stumble with messy, uncertain scenarios, relying on rigid
logic or stats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Our Heuristic Decision Ontology1, built on Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and the
Common Core Ontologies (CCO) frameworks, models heuristics as reusable, machine-readable rules
for triage and beyond, ready for smart systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6 ref7 ref8 ref9">5, 6, 7, 8, 9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Our ontology builds upon two foundational perspectives in cognitive science. The first is the
heuristics-and-biases framework developed by Tversky and Kahneman, which highlights systematic
biases that heuristics can produce under uncertainty [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. To illustrate, triage personnel might exhibit an
anchoring bias by sticking too closely to an initial impression of a patient’s condition, or an availability
bias by overestimating the severity of injuries that resemble recently encountered cases [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11">10, 11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The second is the ecological rationality framework advanced by Gigerenzer, which views heuristics
as adaptive strategies applied to specific environments and not as sources of errors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. Taken from
this vantage point, heuristics exploit the structure of the environment (e.g., the typical patterns of
Proceedings of the Joint Ontology Workshops (JOWO) - Episode XI: The Sicilian Summer under the Etna, co-located with the 15th
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      <p>ISSN1613-0073
injury severity in disasters) to yield adequate decision outcomes with limited resources. This aligns
with Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality [13]. In a triage scenario, a heuristic like ”treat the
quietest patients first” (on the assumption that the most critical patients may be silent or unconscious)
can be seen as ecologically rational: it works well given the environment of mass-casualty events, even
if it deviates from a fully deliberative medical evaluation [14].</p>
      <p>The Heuristic Decision Ontology bridges these two perspectives: one view sees heuristics as shortcuts
that often lead to mistakes, and the other identifies eficient strategies to enable good decisions under
constrained operating conditions – providing a firm foundation on which to ontologically represent
heuristics as they appear in daily life.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background</title>
      <p>
        Cognitive heuristics have been studied extensively in behavioral economics, decision theory, and
artificial intelligence (AI). Pioneering work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in the 1970s
introduced the heuristics and biases framework, which demonstrated that people often rely on mental
shortcuts such as the availability heuristic or representativeness heuristic when making judgments
under uncertainty [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. These shortcuts can lead to systematic deviations from normative models of
rationality; a phenomenon they termed cognitive bias. This work challenged the classical economic
assumption of fully rational agents and catalyzed a paradigm shift in understanding human judgment.
Kahneman later elaborated this perspective into the dual-system theory of cognition, distinguishing
between System 1: fast, automatic, heuristic-driven processes and System 2: slow, deliberate, and
rule-based reasoning [15].
      </p>
      <p>
        While Tversky and Kahneman viewed heuristics as a sort of mental shortcut that assisted people in
making decisions quickly, they focused more on how these shortcuts lead to predictable mistakes. In
turn, they viewed heuristics as a simplification of judgment at the cost of accuracy. In contrast, Gerd
Gigerenzer and colleagues advanced a complementary yet critical perspective. Gigerenzer argued that
heuristics shouldn’t be seen as shortcomings in human thinking, but rather strategies of eficiency
that often lead to good outcomes. They should be perceived as tools that are applicable to specific
environments. Through the ecological rationality framework, they argued that heuristics should not
be viewed primarily as sources of error, but rather as adaptive strategies that work well in specific
environments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. According to this view, heuristics exploit the structure of the environment to
produce good-enough decisions with limited information and computational efort, which aligns with
Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality [14, 16]. This approach suggests that the success of
a heuristic depends not on its adherence to formal logic, but on its fit to the structure of the task
environment.
      </p>
      <p>These two perspectives are not entirely at odds with one another. Rather, it is important to see
them as diferent sides of how heuristics work. In one, there is a focus on the risks associated with
employing shortcuts. In the other view, attention is drawn to the practical value of those shortcuts in
the real-world when information and time are constrained. Taken holistically, these perspectives help
provide insight into how people manage complexity.</p>
      <p>Our approach builds on this shared perspective by treating heuristics as formally representable
entities that serve to prescribe behavior under operating constraints. The Heuristic Decision Ontology
is a domain-specific ontology that captures common and well-defined cognitive approaches, aligning
with McCafrey and Wright’s pluralist framework for cognition [ 17].</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. A Pluralist Approach to Prescriptive Heuristics</title>
        <p>The Heuristic Decision Ontology aligns strongly with this pluralist vision by ofering a domain-specific
ontological structure for cognitive heuristics. In this way, it supports the pluralist agenda that McCafrey
and Wright promote, contributing a specialized yet formally rigorous characterization of what heuristics
are. It transforms heuristics from loosely defined psychological tendencies into computationally
actionable entities that can be queried, reused, and embedded in intelligent systems. The ontology
characterizes existing and well-known heuristics while remaining extensible to incorporate and define
new heuristics that emerge.</p>
        <p>
          We align the Heuristic Decision Ontology to Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) 2020 [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ], an ISO/IEC
21838-2 [18] standard, and the Common Core Ontologies (CCO 2.0) [19], to promote interoperability
with other ontologies already in use in healthcare, defense, and AI domains [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. BFO is a
domainindependent upper-level ontology based on realist principles that distinguishes between continuants
(entities that persist through time, e.g., a person or an instruction) and occurrents (events or processes
that unfold over time, e.g., a triage assessment process) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. BFO provides a consistent scafold for
integrating diverse domain models and ensures that our representation of heuristics can co-exist
with other ontologies. CCO is a widely used extension of BFO for representing domains of defense,
intelligence, and manufacturing, among others.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Heuristics as Information Content Entities</title>
        <p>Within this framework, the Heuristic Decision Ontology represents a heuristic as a Directive Information
Content Entity (DICE), which is a specific kind of Information Content Entity (ICE). ICEs are classified
as generically dependent continuants (GDC) in BFO, meaning they depend on some independent
continuant to exist, but not on any specific one. For example, a GDC such as a heuristic instruction can
be concretized in diferent media, such as a manual, a digital display, or a spoken utterance, without its
identity depending on any particular bearer. While GDCs are often concretized in material entities, they
can also be borne by other types of independent continuants, such as sites, depending on context and
formal constraints [19]. An ICE is defined by the fact that it is ”about” something [ 19]. In our case, a
heuristic (as a DICE) holds prescriptive content that lays the groundwork for an approach that an agent,
such as a person or system, should carry out in a decision-making process. A DICE is specifically about
a process and prescribes how that process should occur [19]. Examples of DICEs in general include
control instructions, clinical guidelines, or protocols; any informational entity that prescribes actions
rather than merely describing facts.</p>
        <p>This paper uses the CCO 2.0 class DICE, which is defined as an ICE that prescribes some entity, such
as an action or behavior [19]. While CCO builds on the general category of directive entities found
in the Information Artifact Ontology (IAO), it introduces additional subclass distinctions that make
it well-suited for modeling formal procedures, regulatory constraints, and operational rules. These
distinctions support the aim of representing heuristics as structured, prescriptive content that can guide
action in constrained decision-making contexts.</p>
        <p>This raises an important distinction. While a best practice may also prescribe actions, it difers from
a heuristic in scope and purpose. A best practice is typically based on evidence or consensus and is
intended to work well under standard or optimal conditions. In contrast, a heuristic is used precisely
when conditions are not optimal, when time, information, or cognitive bandwidth is limited. Heuristics
are not necessarily the best choice in theory; they are the workable choice in practice under constraint.
That diference is essential to how we model Heuristic Instruction as a DICE specifically designed to
enable decision-making under pressure, not to maximize outcomes across all contexts.</p>
        <p>
          Heuristics exist independently of any one person’s mind [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. For example, the rule ”If the patient is
not breathing, open their airway; if they still do not breathe, tag Black (deceased)” is a heuristic rule in
triage protocols. This rule exists as an informational entity. The medic may have internalized the rule
into their mind by reading it in a triage manual, and it prescribes how they act in a specific situation. It
is not just a habit in a medic’s mind; it is an objective piece of content that can be communicated, stored,
and analyzed. Thus, in the Heuristic Decision Ontology each specific heuristic (e.g., the Recognition
Heuristic or Availability Heuristic) is identified as an instance of the class Heuristic Instruction, which
is a subclass of DICE.
        </p>
        <p>Additionally, it is important to note that we are not using the term ”heuristic” in its broadest
computational sense. While heuristic algorithms like greedy search or hill climbing are common in
computer science, our focus here is narrower. We are concerned with heuristics that act as prescriptive
strategies: rules or procedures that guide agents in making decisions under conditions of constraint.
By ”cognitive,” we mean that the heuristic plays a role in structuring decision behavior, whether in a
person or in an artificial system designed to operate under bounded rationality. Our intention is not
to model every kind of heuristic used in optimization or search problems, but rather those that can
be formally represented as DICE, specifically the kind that can be interpreted, applied, and evaluated
within a process of decision-making.</p>
        <p>Ontologically, a DICE is a kind of Information Content Entity that is about one or more processes.
In the case of a heuristic, the content prescribes how a decision-making process should unfold under
constraints. When an agent engages in such a process, their behavior may be guided by the DICE,
even if the DICE is stored externally (e.g., in a manual) or internally (e.g., as a memory trace). It is
important to note that while DICEs can guide or structure behavior, they are not realized in the BFO
sense. Realization pertains to realizable entities like dispositions or roles, whereas directive content
provides prescriptive structure without being instantiated through realization.</p>
        <p>We can think of this decision-making process as one where an agent evaluates diferent options
and picks a course of action. The directive content in the heuristic may include rules, criteria, or
suggestions that shape and mold how an agent thinks and/or acts. It could also involve prioritizing
certain information or evidence or using a heuristic approach when there is uncertainty.</p>
        <p>In the Heuristic Decision Ontology, the heuristic’s directive content is like a field manual or playbook
for how an agent makes decisions. It lays the foundational rules, ideas, preferences, or biases that
influence decisions. Specifically, this is captured as a Heuristic Instruction, a kind of DICE that shapes a
Heuristic Decision-Making Process. It is designed to support an agent, for example, during a medical
triage scenario when eficient choices are complicated, information is limited, and cognitive resources
are constrained.</p>
        <p>
          Under BFO’s realism, heuristics unify biases (epistemic deviations) and adaptations (environmental
ifts) as DICE universals. Biases, such as availability leading to judgmental errors [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ], and
adaptations, such as recency fitting constrained environments [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ], are instantiated as DICE particulars
prescribing decision processes. This unification occurs because DICE, as universals, represent
prescriptive content that can deviate epistemically (bias) or fit ecologically (adaptation) under bounded
rationality [13]. Heuristic Instruction subClassOf DICE and prescribes some (Heuristic-Guided Process
and (deviates_from some NormativeDecisionMakingProcess or exploits_structure_of some
EnvironmentalStructure)), allowing instances to exhibit either deviation or adaptation depending on context
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7, 19</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>2.3. Procedural Models</title>
        <p>Several existing cognitive architectures and eforts have addressed heuristics at a procedural or
descriptive level. In this section, we briefly review their contributions and limitations in relation to our
proposed ontological framework. Unlike previous approaches that implement heuristics, the Heuristic
Decision Ontology treats them as semantically structured entities. Specifically, cognitive architectures,
a computer-based model that mimics how people think and act, have sought to implement heuristics
procedurally but rarely make them semantic entities, as seen in ACT-R [20] and Soar [21]. Both
successfully operationalize heuristics as rules to simulate bounded rationality and task-specific strategies
but lack structure for semantic reasoning or interoperability.</p>
        <p>Poldrack and Yarkoni identify two core challenges in cognitive neuroscience: first, the dificulty of
isolating well-defined cognitive functions, and second, the lack of structured mappings between mental
constructs, behavior, and neural data [22]. To address this, they call for the development of formal
cognitive ontologies that can clarify conceptual boundaries and enable integration across experimental
paradigms. The Cognitive Atlas [23] is a taxonomy for classifying cognitive functions but lacks a formal
top-level ontology like BFO, axiomatization, and support for reasoning. There is a need for rigorously
axiomatized cognitive ontologies that clarify conceptual boundaries while enabling computational
interoperability and formal inference.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Ontology Structure and Class Hierarchy</title>
      <p>The Heuristic Decision Ontology was designed for semantic interoperability, axiomatic rigor, and
machine reasoning over boundedly rational decision strategies. Development combined competency
questions with reuse of existing ontologies The purpose was to ensure alignment with upper-level
ontologies like BFO and CCO and support modeling heuristic decision strategies in computational
terms.</p>
      <p>To begin, several competency questions were formulated to define the scope of the ontology and
to clarify what kinds of queries it should be able to answer. These included: What kinds of heuristic
decision strategies are relevant in time-constrained decision-making? How can we represent the relationship
between a heuristic and the process that it informs? What distinguishes a heuristic-guided decision process
from one based on intentional deliberation? These types of questions served as guideposts throughout
the design process to ensure that modeling decisions remained fully grounded in the ultimate use cases.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Types of Heuristic Instruction</title>
        <p>At the center of the Heuristic Decision Ontology is the class Heuristic Instruction - a DICE that prescribes:
a decision-making procedure intended to reduce cognitive efort under conditions of uncertainty or
limited resources. Heuristic Instructions are prescriptive content about how one should decide under
such conditions. For example, in the mass-casualty triage scenario introduced earlier, the medic’s
behavior followed such a decision strategy, resulting in the associated triage procedure.</p>
        <p>The Heuristic Decision Ontology introduces four subclasses of Heuristic Instruction, representing
families of heuristics characterizing distinct ways of guiding decision processes, as displayed in Figure 1
and described in Table 1.</p>
        <p>The four major subclasses are: Decision Simplification Heuristic, Exploratory Heuristic, Social
Heuristic, and Temporal Heuristic. Each of these contains specific heuristic types, such as Availability
Heuristic (Decision Simplification), Curiosity Heuristic (Exploratory), Authority Heuristic (Social),
Recency Heuristic (Temporal), etc.</p>
        <p>A Decision Simplification Heuristic may assist a medic to home in on what is in front of them. For
example, using the Availability Heuristic to flag a patient with chest pain as urgent because the medic
remembers a recent case where a patient had similar symptoms and had a heart attack. This heuristic is
all about leaning on what’s easily recalled, making a call, while cutting through the noise to make a
fast, eficient decision in chaos.</p>
        <p>The Exploratory Heuristic nudges an agent to try something of the beaten path when the usual
playbook of options doesn’t fit. Returning to the medic in the mass-casualty scene, the Curiosity
Heuristic may push the medic to check an unconscious patient’s odd symptoms like weird pupil
reactions rather than just running through the standard vitals for triage evaluation. In this example, it
is about chasing new clues when the situation is already murky, and the medic doesn’t have a clear
path forward.</p>
        <p>A Social Heuristic comes into play when an agent is low on information and looking for direction
from what others are doing. In the context of the medic, operating in a high-pressure mass-casualty
event, the medic could notice that a seasoned colleague’s approach seemed to be the go-to that all other
medics were following. The Heuristic Social Proof may convince them to follow suit because if it is
good enough for medics, it is probably solid enough to implement. It becomes a mental shortcut that
takes stock in the wisdom of crowds and the group to make a decisive, reliable choice.</p>
        <p>The Temporal Heuristic hinges on when information becomes available to the agent. For example,
the Recency Heuristic might lead a medic to focus on the patients they just checked, especially one that
suddenly looks worse, over others that they saw earlier. The freshest case feels like the most pressing,
so this heuristic simplifies things by prioritizing what’s most recent.
A Directive Information Content Entity that prescribes a procedure for
decisionmaking characterized by the selective restriction of informational inputs,
evaluative criteria, or processing operations, to enable execution of decisions under
constraints such as limited time, incomplete data, or reduced capacity.</p>
        <p>A heuristic instruction that prescribes a procedure for reducing the complexity
of a judgment or conclusion by focusing on readily available, representative, or
pre-selected information, especially under conditions of time pressure, cognitive
load, or incomplete data.</p>
        <p>A heuristic instruction that prescribes a procedure for selecting novel,
unfamiliar, or varied options in order to seek information, stimulation, or potential
reward, especially under conditions of habituation, monotony, or curiosity.</p>
        <p>A heuristic instruction that prescribes a judgment or decision-making procedure
in which an individual defers to, imitates, or aligns with the observable behavior,
expressed choices, or inferred preferences of other individuals, particularly
when personal information is sparse or uncertainty is high.</p>
        <p>A heuristic instruction that prescribes basing a judgment or choice on the
informational input processed most proximally to the moment of decision,
under the assumption that this input is more relevant, accurate, or salient,
particularly under conditions of limited memory, attentional constraint, or
pressure to decide quickly.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Types of Heuristic-Guided Process</title>
        <p>Complementing the representation of heuristics as informational entities, the ontology defines the
class Heuristic-Guided Process, a BFO:process (an occurrent). This is a decision-making process that is
structured, simplified, or otherwise directed by a corresponding Heuristic Instruction.</p>
        <p>This class is crucial for modeling not only the content of heuristics but how they shape behavior. In
other words, whenever an agent is using a heuristic to decide, that ongoing activity can be typed as a
Heuristic-Guided Process. For example, a medic performing field triage rapidly under time pressure, if
we recognize they are following heuristic rules, can be said to be engaging in a Heuristic-Guided Triage
Process.</p>
        <p>
          Heuristic-Guided Process serves as a bridge between the prescriptive nature of the heuristic (the
content) and the dynamic, time-based nature of decision-making behavior (the process). These processes
typically occur when an agent acts in accordance with a heuristic under conditions such as uncertainty,
time pressure, or limited cognitive capacity, although heuristics may also be applied in routine, habitual,
or training contexts where such constraints are not present. Each such process instance can be
understood as the behavioral manifestation of a specific heuristic strategy, enacted in a constrained
decision environment [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">14, 16, 12</xref>
          ]. This framing aligns well with the concept of bounded rationality:
the process is what bounded rational decision-making looks like in action, and the heuristic is the ”rule”
that bounds the rationality [16].
        </p>
        <p>To capture the diversity of heuristic-influenced behaviors, we provide a range of named subclasses
under Heuristic-Guided Process, each corresponding to a particular heuristic and thereby capturing a
semantically distinct decision pattern. We further refine the classification by introducing an intermediate
notion of a Heuristic Decision-Making Process, which is a Heuristic-Guided Process that specifically
results in a decision outcome (as opposed to perhaps some other behavior). Under this, we categorize
by the family of heuristics influencing it, such as Decision Simplification Process.</p>
        <p>This hierarchical structure links the informational heuristics to behavior patterns in a formal,
queryable way. Definitions incorporate relational ’prescribed by’ to link processes to their directive
heuristics. Table 2 illustrates core process classes.</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-2-1">
          <title>Label</title>
          <p>Heuristic-Guided Process
Heuristic Decision-Making
Process</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-2-2">
          <title>Definition</title>
          <p>A process prescribed by some heuristic instruction, characterized
by simplified procedures for evaluation, selection, or action under
conditions involving limited informational engagement, constrained
time, or bounded capacity.</p>
          <p>A heuristic-guided process prescribed by some heuristic instructions
that culminates in a selection among alternative courses of action
or outcomes, based on comparison criteria that are limited in scope,
number, or complexity.</p>
          <p>Continued on next page</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-2-3">
          <title>Label</title>
          <p>Decision Simplification
Process
Anchoring-Based Decision
Process
Availability-Based Decision
Process
Default Efect Decision
Process
Efort-Based Decision
Process
A heuristic decision-making process prescribed by some heuristic
instruction that reduces the complexity of a judgment or conclusion
by focusing on readily available, representative, or pre-selected
information, especially under conditions of time pressure, cognitive load,
and/or incomplete data.</p>
          <p>A decision simplification process prescribed by some heuristic
instructions that specifies or recommends the use of an initial reference
value to structure subsequent evaluation or selection.</p>
          <p>A decision simplification process prescribed by some heuristic
instructions that prioritizes options that have been previously encountered
over those not recognized or recalled.</p>
          <p>A decision simplification process prescribed by some heuristic
instructions that results in the selection of a pre-specified option when
no alternative is explicitly selected.</p>
          <p>A decision simplification process prescribed by some heuristic
instructions that restricts evaluation by prioritizing options requiring
fewer observable or procedural steps to assess, acquire, or execute.</p>
          <p>Recognition Decision Pro- A decision simplification process prescribed by some heuristic
instruccess tions that prioritizes selection of a candidate encountered or accessed
earlier in the process over candidates for which no such access event
has occurred.</p>
          <p>Representativeness Decision
Process</p>
          <p>A decision simplification process prescribed by some heuristic
instructions that evaluates the similarity between a case and a category
prototype, using that similarity to estimate probability or category
membership.</p>
          <p>A Heuristic-Guided Process is what happens when someone tackles a task with a streamlined
approach because they’re short on time, limited information, or mental bandwidth. A medic in a triage
tent working through a flood of injured patients can’t evaluate every detail, so they follow a quick,
simplified method to decide to prioritize help first. While such strategies are often associated with
human cognition, the ontology is designed to accommodate both human and artificial agents acting
under comparable constraints. The ontology calls this a process shaped by Heuristic Instructions.</p>
          <p>The Heuristic Decision-Making Process is a specific kind of Heuristic-Guided Process where the
endgame is picking one option from a set of possibilities. It’s prescribed by those Heuristic Instructions,
which keep the decision focused by limiting what is considered. A parallel would be a medic deciding
whether to send a patient to surgery or stabilize them on-site. They might use a heuristic to narrow
down the choice, like focusing only on vital signs and injury type, making a call quickly under pressure.</p>
          <p>A Decision Simplification Process takes this idea further by deliberately cutting down the noise. It’s
a Heuristic Decision-Making Process that’s all about making complex choices manageable. For a medic
triaging a victim, this might mean zeroing in on just a couple of key symptoms, like breathing trouble
or heavy bleeding with the idea of keeping things simple.</p>
          <p>An Anchoring-Based Decision Process is when that simplification hinges on a starting point that
shapes everything else. The heuristic tells the agent or system to hold onto an initial value or idea and
build a decision around it. Imagine a medic estimating how much fluid a dehydrated patient needs, and
they might anchor on a standard amount they learned in training rather than calculating from scratch.
That anchor keeps the decision quick and structured.</p>
          <p>The Availability-Based Decision Process is focused on what’s fresh or at the forefront of the mind.
The heuristic pushes one to prioritize options you’ve seen before over unfamiliar ones. In triage, a
medic might flag a patient with chest pain as critical because they just dealt with a heart attack case
last week. The Availability Heuristic makes them lean on that recent memory, speeding up the call
when constraints are imposed.</p>
          <p>A Default Efect Decision Process happens when the heuristic nudges an agent or system towards
a pre-set option if it doesn’t actively choose something else. It’s like a medic defaulting to a ”Green”
triage tag for a patient who seems stable unless clear red flags are evident. The Default Efect Heuristic
essentially sets that baseline to keep decisions moving without overthinking every case.</p>
          <p>The Efort-Based Decision Process is all about picking the path of least resistance. The heuristic tells
an agent or system to choose options that take less work to figure out or to implement. For example, a
medic might choose to stabilize a patient with a splint over arranging immediate surgery because it’s
quicker and simpler to execute, prescribed by an Efort Heuristic that favors a less intensive solution.</p>
          <p>A Recognition Heuristic Decision Process is when an agent or system picks something familiar over
the unknown. In a triage scenario, a medic might prioritize a patient with symptoms they recognize
from past cases like a specific kind of burn over one with vague, unfamiliar complaints. The Recognition
Heuristic makes that call faster by betting on what’s known.</p>
          <p>The Representativeness Decision Process is about judging something by how much it matches a
typical example. The heuristic has an agent or system compare a case to a mental template to guess its
category or likelihood. A medic might see a young patient with fever and rash and think ”measles”
because it fits the classic picture they know, prescribed by a Representativeness Heuristic. This process
simplifies triage by slotting the patient into a familiar category without exhaustive tests.</p>
          <p>By distinguishing between the informational structure of heuristics and the occurrent processes
they influence, the ontology provides a modular and precise representation of boundedly rational
decision-making. Though the focus is on medical triage, the pattern is general and can be applied across
domains (e.g., interface design, autonomous vehicle decision-making, etc.), illustrating the ontology’s
cross-domain applicability. In the triage context, this structure allows us to formally represent scenarios
like ”a triage decision was made based on availability bias” as an individual of Availability-Based
Decision Process – a subclass of Decision Simplification Process – linked to the Availability Heuristic.
This opens the door for systems to perform audits (Was the decision process type appropriate?) and
integration with clinical data.</p>
          <p>Building on the earlier medical triage scenario where heuristics are demonstrated with a first
responder, we can articulate a decision model using the Heuristic Decision Ontology. A medical responder
encounters a patient experiencing chest pain and shortness of breath. The medic recalled a recent
patient who deteriorated and had a heart attack. Based on this recollection (availability heuristic), the
medic immediately classifies the current patient as high priority.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.3. Exemplar Explanation</title>
        <p>The specific decision (AvailabilityHeuristicDecision123) represents the medical triage event. The
Availability Heuristic prescribed the decision, because the medic recalled a recent similar case of Person
124 and their rapid deterioration due to a heart attack. Details of the patient’s clinical presentation are
included (”chest pain, shortness of breath, and severe pallor”). The medic made the decision using the
Availability Heuristic, assigning the patient as Immediate Priority (Red) due to concerns that they may
rapidly deteriorate similarly.</p>
        <p>These foundational modeling elements provide a coherent typology of heuristic strategies and
their behavioral manifestations, enabling systems to perform basic classification, validation, and
typechecking. For example, the Availability Heuristic is a subclass of Decision Simplification Heuristic, which
is a subclass of Heuristic Instruction, and each corresponding behavioral manifestation is modeled as a
subclass of Heuristic-Guided Process. Structuring the ontology this way helps keep diferent cognitive
strategies distinct, reusable, and easy to apply across diferent systems.</p>
        <p>The Heuristic Decision Ontology ofers a formal ontological framework for a specific and
underrepresented class of cognitive heuristics. In contrast to procedural or descriptive approaches like ACT-R and
Soar, which simulate heuristics but do not define them semantically, the Heuristic Decision Ontology
models heuristics as DICE that are both prescriptive and computationally actionable. This ontology
helps clarify how decisions unfold and makes it easier to follow the logic behind them. It also improves
compatibility across systems by giving them a shared way to evaluate decision-making. As a result, it
brings abstracted decision theories closer to real-world use in AI and cognitive systems.</p>
        <p>One way to improve the ontology further will be to add more detailed properties. These would help
with classifying the heuristics further and more precisely to make it simpler to connect with other
ontologies. For example, in a connected knowledge graph, one could show how an agent applies a
specific heuristic during a process. This would allow for a clear, traceable link from the informational
directive to the behavior it informs. On top of that, one could also add values for confidence level,
response time, or cognitive load to support more detailed reasoning about how decision strategies work
under specific operational constraints.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Properties and Reasoning Support</title>
      <p>To enhance semantic expressivity and support richer modeling of heuristic-driven behavior, these
properties enable queries such as identifying when a process both deviates from normative procedure
and exploits environmental constraints. A set of object and data properties is proposed for future
integration into the Heuristic Decision Ontology.</p>
      <p>These properties, consistent with CCO 2.0 patterns, support unification of biases and adaptations
relationally, enabling inference like an Availability-Based Decision Process deviates_from a
NormativeDecisionProcess but exploits_structure_of a mass-casualty EnvironmentalStructure. They are
intended to enable semantic linkages between heuristic specifications, decision processes, contextual
triggers, and behavioral outcomes that facilitate inference, validation, and simulation across intelligent
systems and cognitive architectures.</p>
      <p>prescribed by
guides_behavior
has_intended_outcome
is_applied_to
deviates_from
exploits_structure_of
Domain
process</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Heuristics in Cognitive Science and AI</title>
      <p>The Heuristic Decision Ontology, designed to be compatible with BFO 2020 and CCO 2.0, represents
heuristics as DICE linked by formal relations (e.g., prescribes, has input, has participant, and has
output) to processes, situations, and outcomes. This structure, grounded in BFO’s realist foundation,
enables computational systems to perform semantic inference, validate decision strategies, and simulate
heuristic behavior in agent-based models and cognitive architectures.</p>
      <p>One important avenue for future development involves clarifying the boundaries between heuristics
and other adjacent constructs, such as habits, protocols, or intuitions. While the ontology treats
heuristics as directive, context-sensitive decision strategies, there may be cases where a frequently
repeated heuristic becomes routine and indistinguishable from a habit. Similarly, context matters, and it
plays a decisive role in whether a behavior qualifies as a heuristic: what is applied as a heuristic in one
situation or in one domain (e.g., emergency triage) may not be appropriate or applicable in another (e.g.,
deliberative policy processes and planning). These ambiguities raise ontological challenges, as formal
class definitions aim for clear categorical boundaries that real-world strategies do not always respect.
Further empirical grounding, scenario-modeling, and community feedback will be critical in refining
the typology of heuristics and resolving such gray areas. The ontology is designed with this in mind
and is constructed with modular extensibility to accommodate precisely such iterative refinements over
time.</p>
      <p>
        The ontology’s current scope focuses primarily on classification and representational clarity; it
does not yet define Shapes Constraint Language (SHACL) constraints, closed-world validations, or
domain-specific axiomatizations required for deployment in production-grade AI environments or
high-assurance decision support systems. This paper also acknowledges that the typology of heuristics
introduced, including Decision Simplification, Exploratory, Social, and Temporal – while grounded in
cognitive science literature, is neither exhaustive nor fully canonical [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref12">10, 12</xref>
        ]. Additional cognitive
families may be needed to accommodate specialized domains such as military decision-making, consumer
behavior, or clinical diagnostics.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusion and Outlook</title>
      <p>
        The Heuristic Decision Ontology ofers a semantically structured and extensible framework for
representing heuristic cognition in both human and artificial systems. Developed in alignment with BFO
2020 and structurally compatible with CCO 2.0, it models heuristics as DICE that prescribe cognitively
simplified strategies under bounded conditions such as uncertainty, time pressure, and limited
information. What distinguishes the Heuristic Decision Ontology is its ability to represent not only the
structure of heuristics but also their behavioral manifestation through Heuristic-Guided Processes.
This ontological separation between prescriptive information entities and occurrent decision behaviors
allows for precise modeling of the interaction between cognitive shortcuts and real-world action. It
supports bidirectional reasoning between heuristics and the processes they prescribe, enabling traceable,
auditable, and ethically transparent modeling of decision logic across application domains. Ultimately,
under BFO realism, the ontology unifies heuristics as DICE universals, reconciling biases as epistemic
deviations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] and adaptations as environmental fits [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], instantiated in prescriptive processes for
constrained decisions via relational patterns that capture contextual deviation or exploitation
without reifying qualities or dispositions. By formally linking prescriptive informational entities to their
behavioral manifestations, this work advances cognitive ontology methodology beyond taxonomic
enumeration to computationally actionable decision modeling.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The authors extend their gratitude to Barry Smith and John Beverley for critical feedback on early drafts
of this work.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this work, the author(s) used ChatGPT to paraphrase and reword. After using
this tool/service, the author(s) reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility
for the publication’s content.
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