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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Authorization Control in Business Collaboration</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Daisy Daiqin He Supervised by Jian Yang</string-name>
          <email>jian@ics.mq.edu.au</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computing, Macquarie University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>North Ryde, NSW 2109</addr-line>
          <country country="AU">Australia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Authorization control has been well studied for years, and there are quite a few theories and techniques available for handling access control for a single or a centralized system. However unique and challenging security issues concerning business collaboration in the context of service oriented computing (SOC) have arisen due to the dynamic and loosely coupling nature of the environment in which business collaboration is conducted. In this paper, we discuss di erent authorization control issues in business collaboration and present an overview to our proposed PD-AC framework, which we believe it has laid a good foundation for future work in the area of policy consistency checking, policy negotiation, and security policy enforcement in business collaboration.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>access control</kwd>
        <kwd>security policy integration</kwd>
        <kwd>collaboration</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>Web services and Service Oriented Computing (SOC) provides infrastructural
support for cross-organization collaboration in distributed environments.
However security concerns become one of the main barriers that prevent widespread
adoption of this new technology. Each organization or business unit has its own
interest and security polices for de ning who has access right for speci c services
and how services can be used. In web services environment with complex
crossorganization collaborations, Di erent security challenges will arise with di erent
number of participants involved in collaboration.</p>
      <p>Access control is enforced in a single organization by using pre-de ned
authorization control polices. Common authorization control practices include
requester credential veri cations, role assignments and access decision makings.</p>
      <p>In collaborative business world, a service can be accessed by a party which can
pass it to other parties. We shall use some examples in health care to illustrate
some issues.</p>
      <p>Suppose a patient granted access right to a General Practitioner (GP) in a
medical centre on patient's health record. Since the physician is a member of
a research institute, he could also let researchers in this institute access to this
health record based on the security policy of the medical centre. However the
patient may not want the GP give access right to anyone on his health record
unless there is an emergency. How can we use security policies to control the
way in which information or service is propagated between organizations?</p>
      <p>Problem can also arise from service composition. For example, a medical
center allows the patients who hold an OSHC (overseas student health cover) to
book appointments on line for general inquiry and ultrasound exam based on its
policy. A radiology institute wants to collaborate with the medical center and
accepts on line bookings from the medical center. However, OSHC is not accepted
by the radiology institute's policy. It is challenge to decide which authorization
control policy they should follow if these two organizations collaborated in the
presence of this policy con ict.</p>
      <p>Moreover, organizations collaborate with each other in various ways.
Before organizations engage in collaboration, their authorization policies need to
be analyzed to decide the possibility of collaboration under the authorization
constraints de ned by each individual party. Therefore, we need to evaluate
consistencies of access policies of di erent organizations. Intuitively, the concept
of 'access policy consistency' is referred as that the access policies of di erent
organizations are con ict free, for the same service. And organizations are able
to collaborate in the intended way securely in terms of access control policies.</p>
      <p>To address these complex security policy issues, we need a framework that
can analyze, evaluate and integrate security policies if necessary for collaboration
purpose, based on which negotiation can be guided and security integrity can
be enforced. Security control in business collaboration should take individual
organization's access policy into account, as well as the type of the collaboration
which is referred as collaboration pattern in the paper.</p>
      <p>
        Access control issues in signle organization or signle domain have been well
studied [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3 ref5">5, 3, 2</xref>
        ]. Access control in collaborative environment has just started to
attract the attention of the research community [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], but little attention have been
given to consistency study between access control policies of di erent
collaboration participants, particularly in the context of Web Services. Furthermore, these
studies only focused on providing solutions to some aspects of security issues in
terms of: security policy speci cation, access control in distributed environment,
and access decision making. What is missing is a comprehensive analysis of: (1)
what security requirements really are in the context of business collaboration;
(2) security policies can be speci ed; (3) how security policy can be veri ed,
evaluated, and integrated for the purpose of business collaboration. No feasible
mechanisms can be developed for policy negotiation and enforcement without
this analysis.
      </p>
      <p>The rest of paper is organized as follows. We rst explain the basic elements
included in the security policy and relationship between these elements in Section
2. In Section 3 we identify and model di erent types of collaborations. In Section
4 we model and discuss security controls for di erent types of collaboration
in health care environment. We propose our framework in Section 5. Formal
de nition and of policies and rules are presented in Section 6. Related work is
discussed in Section 7. In Section 8, we give some concluding remarks and outline
future research directions.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Related Work</title>
      <p>
        A number of studies concentrated on authorization architecture [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref7">7, 4</xref>
        ]. Author in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] suggested a brokered architecture to build composite Web services according
to the speci ed security constraints. They used security matchmaker to nd right
collaboration partners who have compatible security policies, which is similar
to our research. However, it did not address the issue that inconsistencies and
con icts exist between security policies of prospective partner.
      </p>
      <p>
        A few of studies have touched policy level security issues, which focused on
identifying di erent security requirements and proposed speci cations for these
requirement. Trust-Serv[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] modeled access control processes in web services
using state machine and provides lifecycle management for policies. Ws-AC [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]
provides an adaptive system that is capable of asking users to re ne their
requests to comply with security policies. Again, all of them are concerned security
policies in a single organization and none of them addressed policy problems in
collaborative environment.
      </p>
      <p>
        There are few papers on Web service authorization control in the
collaborative environment. We are aware of the work presented by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], which presented a
framework for managing authorization policies for Web service compositions. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]
proposed an approach to security policy integration and con ict reconciliation.
But they neglected the fact that di erent types of collaboration a ect the way
the collaboration policy is developed as well as the requirements on collaborative
partner's authorization policy. An evaluation on collaborative partner's access
policy has to be carried out before the collaboration be established. Our work is
to ll in this gap. We believe this is the rst step toward con icts detection and
suitable collaboration partners discovery.
      </p>
      <p>In summary, none of these studies went deep into di erent types of
crossorganization collaboration, which could raise di erent requirements on access
control policy of prospective collaborative partners. Our goal is thus to provide
a framework that could identify types of cross-organization collaborations in
this context; de ne collaboration requirements in terms of security policy;
generate policy integration rules. Most importantly our work is in the context of
business collaboration which involves multiple organizations rather than simple
interaction between individual requester and single service provider.</p>
      <p>In this paper we present some of our initial results in modeling security
requirements and integrating security policies for business collaboration. We
believe this study is the rst step towards achieving an understanding of a secured
of business collaboration in terms of authorization control.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>The PD-AC Framework</title>
      <p>The core function of our PD-AC (Policy Driven Authorization Control)
framework is realized by a Policy Evaluation Engine, which is associated with every
organization that provides services in business collaboration, see Figure 1. Policy
Evaluation Engine is used to analyze the nature of collaboration, make access
decision, and nally generate the collaborative security policies. The proposed
framework consists of two components: request mediator and policy evaluation
engine. Upon receiving a request for a service, the request mediator rstly
identi es the type of requested service, which is a process that identify whether the
requested service is a collaborative service. If it is a simple service that does not
involve any collaboration, the mediator will perform normal access control
functions: looking up database, check which role in the database has the requested
privilege; compare requester's credential with security requirement; make access
decision.</p>
      <p>However, if it is a collaboration request (prospective collaboration partner),
the request mediator will pass the request to the Policy Evaluation Engine to
perform the following functions:
{ Identify requested collaboration type;
{ Evaluate requester's authorizaton policy according to policy requirements
for requested collaboration type;
{ Make collaboration decision;
{ Generate collaborative authorization policies for the collaborated service if
the requester if acceptable (from previous step);</p>
      <p>In the following subsections, we will discuss di erent types of collaboration
and policy evaluation engine in more detail.
3.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Business Collaboration Patterns</title>
        <p>
          Business collaborations consist of complex relationships and interactions among
organizations. Authorization policies of all participate organizations need be
carefully considered and evaluated. Our analyze shows that di erent
collaboration types a ects the requirements on collaborative partner's authorization
policy. We have conclude four di erent ways of collaboration between
organizations and provided simple examples in Health Care domain [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Simple Access (SA): it depicts the most simplest `request service - provide
service' scenario that involves two organizations.</p>
        <p>Composite Services. The Composite Service we discuss here is referring to
the service that is based on the integration of multi-service providers. Two
di erent cases are identi ed in service composition:
1. Composite service with agent (CSWA): Multiple numbers of service
providers provide their services through an centralized agent, i.e. health
insurance company and health service providers.
2. Joined service without an agent (JSOA): Two organizations
involving in a peer-to-peer collaboration and provide a joined service by
integrating their business processes or integrating part of their business
processes together to form a new service directly without any agent.
Service Outsourcing (SO): As the result of globalization, Outsourcing
and o shore Outsourcing has become a popular trend in many industries,
SO depicts collaboration relationship between outsourcer and outsourcees.
Service Propagation (SP): it depicts collaborations that involving
multiple organizations and `forward' privilege could be passed from one
organization to another organization.
3.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Policy Evluation Engine</title>
        <p>
          Authorization policy of prospective partners are compared and evaluated in
Policy Evaluation Engine to determine the suitability for requested collaboration
pattern. Before we can compare and evaluate policies from di erent
organizations, we need to understand all the necessary elements and their relationships for
a generic authorization policy. Therefore, an authorization policy model is
proposed to specify authorization policy in an individual organization. We base our
policy model on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ] and encoded the model
in Description Logic. The main entities in the model are roles, credentials,
privileges, obligations and provisions[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]. Policies from two di erent organizations can
be compared by combining them into a single model.
        </p>
        <p>
          Three categorizes of inconsistencies have been discussed in our work: role,
credential and privilege inconsistencies[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ]. Each category consists of several
inconsistency types. We use a Description Logic reasoner (an automated proof
engine) to analyse the inconsistencies in policies. We encode the inconsistency
tests as concepts and relations in our model. Individual policies expressed
using the model can then be combined and tested. Given a combined policy, with
the roles and privileges of the two organisations suitably related, a reasoner will
prove that the tests are either satis able or unsatis able and these results can be
analysed to check if they satisfy the requirements for the particular
collaboration. Since the tests are part of the general model, so they can be expressed once,
proven to encode the required meaning and used to testing any two policies.
        </p>
        <p>
          We have identi ed several cross-organization collaboration patterns, di
erent collaboration pattern can result in di erent requirements for authorization
policies of prospect collaborative partners. The requirements we discussed in our
work are basic requirements that must be satis ed by the prospect partner to be
considered for requested collaboration. Policy requirements for di erent
collaboration patterns are analyzed. Inconsistencies are discussed for each collaboration
pattern[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ]. Depends on the collaboration pattern, some of the inconsistencies
are acceptable, some of them needs further negotiation and some of
inconsistencies lead to reject.
4
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>In this paper, we proposed an authorization conrol framework for business
collaboration. Our analyze shows that di erent ways of collaboration could a ects
the requirements on authorization policy of collaborative partner. The proposed
framework use a policy evaluation engine to analyze collaboration suitability
of prospective partners for requested collaboration pattern from authorization
policy perspective. In our previous work, we have concluded di erent business
collaboration patterns and discussed di erent requirements for the prospective
partner's authorization policies in the collaboration. An description logic based
authorization policy model has been proposed to specify the authorization
policy of an individual organization. Inconsistencies between authorization policies
from di erent collaboration participants are identi ed and classi ed based on the
model, based on which the collaboration possibility are analyzed. In the future
we intend to extend this work to incorporate the following:
{ Context constraints that a ect access control.
{ Inconsistencies that caused by role hierarchies and separation of duty.
{ Collaboration access control policy requriements from business transaction
and process perspective.</p>
    </sec>
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