In this paper I disuss logic in the pragmatic apporach of (Brandom, 2008). I consider differnt logical consequence relations (classical, intuitionistic and linear) and I will argue that the formal treatment proposed by Brandom, even if I believe it provides powerful intuions and an interesting framework on logic in general, doesn't allow to state properly the relationship between differnt logics. I propose an alternative account of the elaboration of logical vocabuilaries not based on incompatibility semantics, rather on a particular notion of interaction, which I claim is implicit in the practice of giving and asking for reasons, which allows to state the relationship between differnt logics in terms of differnt aspects of the inferential practice.
The analytic pragmatism proposed by Brandom, which states that we should “look at what it is to use locutions as expressing meanings – that is, at what one must do in order to count as saying what the vocabulary lets the practitioners express” (Brandom 2008, p. 9) opens an interesting point of view on foundational issues in logic. In this paper, I will analyze the relationship between the use of a certain logical vo cabulary and the inferring (prelogical) practiceorabilities from which, following Brandom's approach, the logical vocabulary may be elaborated.
My thesis is that different logical vocabularies are related to different aspects of in ferential practice and that inferences codified by different logics, such as classical, intuitionistic and linear logic, say something important on the prelogical practice it self. In Section 2, I briefly present the approach to logic in (Brandom, 2008): I dis cuss incompatibilty semantics and some consequence of the fact that incompatibility is not apt to represent properly intuitionistic (and linear) consequence relation. In Section 3, after presenting some reasons to consider linear logic a good framework to place the comparison between inferential practices, I propose an alternative approach to incompatibility relations. This treatment provides an interpretation of linear logic in terms of discursive practice and, since in linear logic one can express classical and intuitionistic logic, it will provide a framework to define an articulation of the notion of inferential practice that can account also for classical and intuitionistic conse quence relations, besides linear consequence. 2
As Brandom summarizes (p. 136), we can see how logic is related to discursive prac tice, the practice of giving and asking for reasons, and in which sense the use of logi cal vocabulary can be justified. Starting from the practice of giving and asking for reasons, one argues that they are sufficient for the practice of deploying basic normative vocabulary, in particular the deontic modal vocabulary of 'commitment' and 'entitlement'; then one uses that as pragmatic metavocabulary that specifies how to deploy the concept of incompatibil ity, which is interpreted as constitutively modal notion; then one can use this as se mantic metavocabulary in which to define a consequence relation of incompatibility entailment; on the basis of the relation of incompatibilityentailment, one then de fines a logical vocabulary. I will focus on the relationship between incompatibility relations and (logical) conse quence relations one can define in this setting. If we take a closer look at the formal theory Brandom develops, we see that it is com mitted with the assumption that classical logic, at propositional level, is the logic of incompatibility: “we have seen that any standard incompatibility relation has a logic whose nonmodal vocabulary behaves classically” (p. 139). Moreover, it turns out in general that all the inferential practice the notion of incom patibility can express or justify are more or less those that can be explicated by means of classical consequence relation.
The reason is that incompatibility relations can define only “standard” consequence relations, where a standard consequence relation is defined by two properties: gen eral transitivity and defeasibility. Consider intuitionistic consequence relation. The first condition is equivalent to cut rule in sequent calculus, and it is of course sat isfied by intuitionistic logic.
This is not the case for defeasibility, which states intuitively that if a proposition B is not a consequence of a proposition A, then there is something that yields an absur dity, when added to B but not when added to A.
The reason why intuitionistic logic doesn't satisfy defeasibility is that it requires to be able to find a witness also for the badness of an inference (see p. 137 and 165173). In intuitionistic logic, a witness of good inference form A to B is always given in a natu ral way, it is the proof of B given A. But the fact that A doesn't follow form B, in intu itionistic logic means in general that there is no witness, no proofs of B given A. This is the constructive, or epistemic, character of intuitionistic logic: we don't have good reasons for what we don't know. Since intuitionistic inference cannot be fully represented by incompatibility relations, the relationship between classical and intuitionistic logic cannot be stated in terms of pragmatically mediated semantic relations. I claim that their relation has a special interest for semantics since, as Dummett points out, classical and intuitionistic logic provide two different theories of mean ing, with different key concepts: the first one defines meaning in terms of truth con ditions, while the second one gives a characterization of meaning in terms of proof, or reasons. Assuming classical logic as the vocabulary related to propositional inferential prac tice, we are implicitly assuming that practical inferences represented by conditionals which differs from classical logic conditional are in some sense derived. If one con sider what I may call intuitionistic practice of inferring, according to which we reject arguments by contradiction, the only way we have to explicate those inferential prac tices is by saying that intuitionistic inference doesn't behave like classical one and find reasons for this divergence (for example arguing that there are not enough defea sors, see p. 173).
Since, as Brandom proves, standard consequence relations are precisely those that can be obtained by means of incompatibility relations (see p. 138) and that no incom patibility relation can define a nonstandard consequence relation, we are able to jus tify only those inferential practices which can be stated more or less in terms of clas sical logic. Moreover, even if nonclassical inferences could cleverly be explicated by means of some complicated modal logic construction (which is also justified in Brandom's ap proach) that would not be grounded in any inferential practice defined by Brandom. So for example there is no way to justify causal inferences in a pragmatic way. Let's consider a toy example of causality. Assuming the notion of incompatibility Brandom axiomatizes, one can prove the following (see p. 128):
(1)
This is a famous example proposed by Girard, in order to explicate the meaning of
linear logic connectives. As an example of (1), we can consider a drinks dispenser:
“if I insert a coin, I get a coffee”, “If I insert a coin, I get a tee”, then “if I insert a
coin, I get a coffee and a tee”. As Girard argues, assuming (1) as inference pattern
amount to forget any causal relations between premises and conclusions of an infer
ence since, briefly speaking, interpreting propositions as events, we do not make dis
tinction between one occurrence of an event or any number of occurrences1
Therefore, since the notion of incompatibility is not suitable to represent conse
quence relations which are well codified as intuitionistic reasoning, I claim that the
notion of incompatibility as stated by means of general transitivity and defeasibility,
is not adequate to produce a logical vocabulary which explicates good reasoning that
are performed in the inferential practice.
1 See
I briefly recall some features of linear logic which shows how linear logic could be a considered a good choice to state the relationship between different inferential prac tices. Linear logic has been introduced in (Girard 1986) as a resource conscious logic in which we can keep track of the use of hypotheses in a deduction. Form a proof theoretical point of view, if we consider sequent calculus, a special attention should be devoted to its structural rules of weakening, contraction and exchange2. The point of view introduced by linear logic in proof theory may be saying that structural side almost determine the logical side. Consider a sequent of the form ¡ ⊢ ¢, if we take contraction and weakening at a global level both on the right and on the left of the sequent symbol, when we define propositional connectives, they will behave classically.
As Gentzen somehow surprisingly proved, intuitionistic logic may be obtained form classical sequent calculus simply restricting sequents on the right to be one single formula. That is enough to reject, for instance, the provability of excluded middle. This may be interpreted as a quite extreme rejection of structural rules on the right. Linear logic doesn't assume structural rules at a global level, rather one is allowed to perform weakening and contraction just in a controlled way. The rejection of structural rules at a global level has strong consequences on the form of the logical connectives we can define. Briefly, it entails that we have two kinds of conjunction, and by duality, two types of disjunction: the reason is that we cannot identify anymore the additive presentation of the rule of conjunction (which identifies the contexts) with its multiplicative presentation (which make copies of the context):
if ¡ ⊢ A and ¡ ⊢ B , then ¡ ⊢ A and B if ¡ ⊢ A and ¡ ⊢ B , then ¡, ¡ ⊢ A and B (2) (3) The two formulation are equivalent if we assume contraction and weakening. According to the rejection of structural rules at global level, in linear logic there are two distinct conjunctions: an additive conjunction denoted “&” (“with”) and a multi plicative conjunction “⊗” (“times”).
The expressive power of classical (and intuitionistic) logic is retrieved by means of a controlled treatment of structural rules, which is achieved by means of exponentials, 2 For reasons of space I cannot present here a detailed overview of linear logic, I refer to (Gi rard 2006). denoted by !A and ?A. Those connectives, briefly speaking, allows structural rules on the left and on the right side of the sequent respectively.
By means of exponentials, one can translate classical and intuitionistic logic into lin ear logic, and this translation, besides preserving provability, allows to see the rela tionship between classical, intuitionistic and linear proofs. It is therefore apt to state the properties of how the inferential practice is performed.
As an example, we can consider the inference (1). In classical sequent calculus can be stated as follows3: if A ⊢ B and A ⊢ C , then A ⊢ B ∧ C
if !A ⊢ B and !A ⊢ C , then !A ⊢ B ∧ C (4) (5) That shows in which sense the classical inference (1) forgets any causal relation be tween premises and conclusions: “!” means that we can make any number of copies of A (by weakening). If we consider the toy causal relation we saw between the event of inserting an euro in a machine and the event of getting a coffee, that would amount saying that a single coin is the cause of any number of coffees or, symmetrically, that any number of coins is the cause of getting one single coffee. As linear logic provides an analysis of proofs, it is interesting to view linear logic not as an alternative logic, but as a prooftheoretical analysis of logic itself, which shows how we can perform a sort of decomposition of classical and intuitionistic reasoning. I would like to stress here that the decomposition is performed in terms of proofs, in terms ways of using hypothesis in the inferential practice. In the next paragraph I sketch an interpretation of linear logic semantics which aims to show how it may be related at least to some intuitions on the practice of giving and asking for reasons4. 3 I use the classical symbol for conjunction since in this case the two conjunction of linear logic collapse in the classical meaning of and, since we are licensing structural rules. 4 The interpretation I propose would of course require a closer comparison with the notions of commitment and entitlement that Brandom analyzes investigating the practice of giving and asking for reasons. Here I just sketch how it works, to show that it can account for intuitionis tic as well as classical consequence relation. The intuition behind this interpretation is that there is interaction, between players in volved in the practice of giving and asking for reasons, when there is a form of agree ment between what counts as a reason for accepting A and what counts as a reason for rejecting A. It intuitively means that two opponents at least agree that they are challenging concerning a same issue, that they are playing the same game5. The idea is that we are going to interpret propositions as a sort of well behaved sets of actions that may count as reasons. Start with a commutative monoid (M, ∙, 1), the elements of the monoid are inter preted as actions that may count as reasons. The multiplication of the monoid repre sents a concatenation of such actions, one may imagine in a discursive practice or game. The unit 1 of the monoid represents a sort of actions with changes nothing: given any action p, performing 1, doesn't matter: p1 = p. One defines the following operation on subsets of the monoid, let X, Y ⊂ M, X ⊸ Y = {m : ∀ x ∈ X mx ∈ Y }. A phase space is given by a commutative monoid together with the choice of a pole ⊥ ⊂ M. Then one defines negation of a subset of X, ∼ X as X ⊸ ⊥ = {y : ∀ x ∈ X yx ∈ ⊥}. Negation allows to define directions: if A is a set of reason for, then ∼A is a set of reason against. The pole represents what we may call a set of actions that count as reasons for and against at the same time. Using negation, it is possible to define facts, as subsets of M such that X = ∼ ∼ X. The meaning of facts is sometimes explained intuitively saying that a fact is a set of elements that pass the same test.
In the interpretation I am proposing, facts are those sets of reasons on which the form of agreement I suggested holds. More precisely, facts are sets of reasons A such that a reason against a reason against A is a reason for A. If we look at this property in terms of games with two opponent which are engaged in a dialogue, that simply means that the two players are playing the same game6: 5 It is important to remark that in this interpretation there is no content before interaction: the fact that a proposition may have a content depend on the fact that it shows this form of inter action. Of course, this is a very strong claim which is not justified here. It could be considered as strong form of pragmatism where actions are primitives and propositions are derived. The interesting point is that we can define logical vocabularies assuming just the form of agree ment defined by the notion of fact, which I believe is not a demanding condition for a discur sive practice. 6 There is an interpretation of linear logic in terms of game semantics which is compatible with the one I presented here. The reason why I didn't defined linear logic in terms of games is that it would require a longer exposition of prooftheoretical aspects of linear logic. In that in terpretation formula are games, while a proof of formula A is a winning strategy for the game A. In this interpretation, there is also the possibility of considering strategies for a formula, they would correspond to paraproofs of that formula, or non logical proof of a given formula. consider a proposition A, my move against my opponent's move is a move in the same game, we are still playing the game A. Not all sets of actions have this property, when it holds, we can speak of proposi tions, so the intended interpretation of propositions is given by facts. Among the properties that hods in this structure, one has that for any subset X ⊂ M, one can consider the smallest fact containing X given by ∼ ∼ X . So one can prove for example that M and ⊥ are fact. Moreover, one can define the The phase semantics is sound and complete respects linear logic sequent calculus. Therefore, if we state the practice which is sufficient in order to count as deploying a logical vocabulary in the terms I sketched, we can justify linear inferences; then, us ing the translation of classical and intuitionistic logic in linear logic, we can also jus tify classical and intuitionistic inferences. Looking at which kind of actions that count as reasons are required for the translation of classical and intuitionistic formula in linear logic, we can see how the inferential practice on reasons is articulated. 7 Technically, ! A is interpreted as the fact obtained from the intersection of the reasons for A with the set of the idempotents of the monoid (the element m in M, such that mm = m).
I argued that the incompatibility semantics is not apt to represent the variety of infer ences which is interesting to consider at work in our inferential practice. We saw then how it is possible to justify in terms of inferential practice, in terms of giving and asking for reasons, a different practice from which we can elaborate linear logic. Then, I sketched how to state the relationship between classical, intuitionistic and lin ear reasoning, proposing therefore a more complex articulation of the notion of infer ential practice itself. Of course, the approach I presented is just sketched and many more arguments should be provided. I believe however that it is worthy to investigate in this direction, since, in particular it would provide philosophical foundation of the purely interactive account of logic given by some recent developments of linear logic. This foundation would be grounded in a notion of interaction which lays already in our discursive practice, as one can realize adopting the point of view of Brandom's analysis.