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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Distributed Access Control Management in Federated Identity Systems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Manuel Gil Perez</string-name>
          <email>mgilperez@um.es</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gabriel Lopez</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Antonio F. Gomez Skarmeta</string-name>
          <email>skarmeta@um.es</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Alberto Sicre Vara-De-Rey</string-name>
          <email>alberto.sicre@atosresearch.eu</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Aljosa Pasic</string-name>
          <email>aljosa.pasic@atosresearch.eu</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>ATOS Origin</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Albarracin 25, 28037 Madrid</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Departamento de Ingenier a de la Informacion y las Comunicaciones University of Murcia</institution>
          ,
          <country country="ES">Spain</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Identity federation provides a powerful way for managing sensible information of its users. However, as the number of members increases, the management of the policies de ned by the federation is becoming more and more complex. In this paper, we present a mechanism to manage this complexity by means of the administrative delegation. This allows administrators of an institution to delegate part of these policies to other users, who also will have more knowledge within the scope where these policies will be enforced. This proposal also introduces a way for shortening the added complexity that supposes the introduction of this new sort of policies to users without deep knowledge in the policy management area.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>administrative delegation</kwd>
        <kwd>delegation policies</kwd>
        <kwd>access control</kwd>
        <kwd>distributed authorization</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>As the number of members of an institution increases, new institutions join the
same federation, or the policies de ned in a federation change due to the highly
dynamic nature of this sort of systems, the management of their policies becomes
more and more complex. This is mainly due to the great amount of policies that
should be managed, such as access control policies, privacy policies, or validation
policies based on LoA (Level of Assurance), among others.</p>
      <p>
        In order to reduce this complexity, the system administrator of an institution
can delegate to third parties, called delegates, the management of a subset of the
system policies. Thus, we are not only distributing the management of those
policies to other people, but also they are being delegated to those who have
more knowledge in the application area where they will be used. This process,
where the administrator transfers the management of a subset of policies to a
delegated person, is commonly known as administrative delegation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The introduction of this new sort of policies supposes a new value-added
service for the current identity systems, but also presents some drawbacks that
have to be treated suitably:
{ The number of policies to manage increases, so that the system administrator
will have to manage both the policies that already existed previously (access
control policies to services and resources, privacy policies, etc.) and this new
sort of policies.
{ The delegates are usually users with no knowledge in the policy management,
access control languages such as XACML, etc. Therefore, we will have to
make easier to these people the generation and management of this new sort
of policies, and make it as easy and intuitive as possible.</p>
      <p>As we can see, even though the workload of the administrator is reduced,
and considerably distributed among several delegates, the policy management
(including the administrative ones) will also be more complex. Therefore, it is
not enough to de ne policies for the administrative delegation, but also it will
be necessary to de ne an infrastructure that can manage these policies, thereby
helping, mainly to the delegates, to carry out these tasks.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Application Scenario</title>
      <p>As application example of the administrative delegation in real environments,
let us suppose a scenario where the administrator of an institution delegates to
all heads of department the policies about granting access to those people under
their supervision. These heads of department will have more knowledge about
their own employees than the system administrator. In this scenario, the system
administrator will be able to delegate in each head of department the de nition
of which employees will have access to the network, as well as the connection
schedule according to their workday; that information is perfectly known by each
head of department.</p>
      <p>In this example scenario we can see the use of the administrative delegation,
where we are avoiding that the system administrator has to create access control
policies on a set of people that he (probably) does not know. In this case, each
head of department, once the system administrator authorizes him as a delegate,
will be the person in charge of controlling the access to the network of his
employees by creating the needed access policies with the adequate information.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Delegation Policy Management</title>
      <p>
        As a solution to the problems previously commented, we have included in this
work a set of new components to the Segur@-DAMe identity federation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] for
managing the complete life cycle of these new policies. We have also de ned
a mechanism by which we allow generating a set of templates (Web forms) to
help delegates to perform these administrative tasks in a simple and intuitive
way. These templates are automatically generated by the infrastructure from the
administrative delegation policies created by the system administrator.
      </p>
      <p>
        To this end, our infrastructure makes use of XACML 3.0 (eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], which includes in its speci cation new advanced
features for the de nition of delegation policies. These changes have been made
to allow any person of an institution, who owns a certain privilege, to delegate
it to another person.
      </p>
      <p>In this sense, XACML 3.0 de nes a new element, called PolicyIssuer, to
indicate who has issued a given policy. With this element, the system can identify
and verify whether the corresponding issuer is valid to delegate the enclosed
privilege just before the policy is used. A policy with no issuer element is
considered as trusted and, therefore, will be managed by the PDP (Policy Decision
Point ) as a traditional policy.
&lt;Policy&gt;
&lt;Target&gt;
...
&lt;AttributeDesignator AttributeId="resource-id"</p>
      <p>Category="...:delegated:...:resource"/&gt;
&lt;AttributeValue&gt;Network&lt;/AttributeValue&gt;
...
&lt;AttributeDesignator AttributeId="action-id"</p>
      <p>Category="...:delegated:...:action"/&gt;
&lt;AttributeValue&gt;Access&lt;/AttributeValue&gt;
...
&lt;AttributeDesignator Category="...:delegate"</p>
      <p>AttributeId="schacPersonalPosition"/&gt;
&lt;AttributeValue&gt;Head Department&lt;/AttributeValue&gt;
...
&lt;/Target&gt;
&lt;Rule Effect="Permit"/&gt;
...
&lt;/Policy&gt;</p>
      <p>Administrative Policy
(generated by the administrator)</p>
      <p>Access Control Policy
(generated by the system from the information</p>
      <p>
        typed by the delegate in the Web form)
As we have commented before, the main goal of our infrastructure is to
provide delegates with an easy and intuitive way for creating the access
control policies for which they are responsible. For this purpose, we make use of
a PMT (Policy Management Tool ) which is capable of parsing administrative
policies and extracting the information necessary to generate the corresponding
templates in an automatic fashion. The PMT will then make use of XSL
transformations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] to carry out this task, taking as input the administrative policy
generated by the administrator. The rest of information that cannot be directly
found in that policy is requested to the delegate as input elds in the template.
      </p>
      <p>Fig. 1 depicts this process, in a schematic way, for: 1) generating the
templates (Web forms) from the administrative policy created by the system
administrator (top of the image); and 2) generating the nal access control policies
from some pieces of the administrative policy and the information provided by
the delegate in the Web form (right-hand size of the image). Both processes are
automatically carried out by making use of the XSL transformations mentioned
above.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>As we have seen throughout this paper, we have presented a new way for
managing the administrative delegation in which system administrators or any
institution, belong to the same identity federation, can delegate part of their work
to third parties. With the help of this system, the policy management is being
distributed to those people who have more knowledge than the system
administrator on the scope where those policies will be applied later.</p>
      <p>To this end, our infrastructure is capable of automatically generating a set
of templates (or Web forms) from the administrative policies created by the
administrators. These delegates, who have (probably) no idea about how to
create policies, will be able to ll in these templates in an easy and intuitive
way.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Acknowledgment</title>
      <p>This work has been funded by the CENIT Segur@ (Seguridad y Con anza en
la Sociedad de la Informacion) project. Authors would also like to thank the
Funding Program for Research Groups of Excellence with code 04552/GERM/06
granted by the Fundacion Seneca.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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</article>