<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>An Agent Intentional Structure based on Cooperation Ontology</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Walid Chainbi ENIS B.P.W -</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>-Sfax- Tunisia E-mail: wchainbi@lycos.com</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>If multi-agent systems are to become widely accepted as a basis for large scale applications, adequate agent concepts will be essential. To address this issue, we show in this paper that agents need to have communication concepts and organization concepts. We argue that instead of the usual approach of starting from a set of intentional states, the intentional structure should be deduced in terms of interaction. To this end, we come up with ontologies related to communication and organization. Unlike most previous work, the presented study shows a new way to combine agent and ontology technologies. Indeed, ontologies have established themselves as a powerful tool to enable knowledge sharing, and a growing number of applications have benefited from the use of ontologies as a means to achieve semantic interoperability among heterogeneous, distributed systems. Ontologies are used in this paper as natural arguments to belief-goal-role agents. We illustrate the concepts by the well known prey/predator example.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;BDI agent</kwd>
        <kwd>communication</kwd>
        <kwd>organization</kwd>
        <kwd>intentional stance</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        Artificial intelligence (AI) has emphasized building "stand-alone
systems" that can solve problems with minimal help from other
systems (computer or human). These systems have traditionally
been brittle, in the sense that they fail miserably when presented
with problems even slightly outside of their range of expertise[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
Accordingly, the recent years have witnessed a large interest in
agent-oriented approaches to developing systems. With the
explosion of interest in intelligent agents and multi-agent systems,
a great many architectures have been developed. There is even
some debate about exactly what constitutes an agent in the agents
community (and more generally, the AI community).
      </p>
      <p>
        The purpose of this paper is to establish how these different
models stand in relation to each other and contemporary concepts
of agency, and in particular it presents a new approach which is
different from most known in AI field: while the
Belief-DesireIntention architecture draws its inspiration from the philosophical
theories of Bratman [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] who argues that intentions as well as
beliefs and desires play a significant and distinct role in practical
reasoning, the presented approach stresses the interaction aspect
to deduce the intentional structure of an agent.
      </p>
      <p>Actually, the conception of multi-agent systems covers many
meanings each referring to a peculiar trend in research. These
trends can be grouped in two standpoints: individual1 conception
and mass conception.</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>Individual conception :</title>
        <p>
          1 This term was used by Ferber in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          This point of view gathers all researchers who think that the
solution goes only through the formal representation of an agent
model [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ] (agents as intentional systems). Accordingly, this
consists in formalizing the mental state of an agent (its Beliefs, its
Desires, its Intentions). Ascribing mental propositions to a system
amounts to adopting what is commonly known as the intentional
stance. These intentional notions constitute abstractions that give
a familiar way of describing, explaining and predicting the
behaviour of complex systems. This familiarity is due mainly to
the fact that in popular psychology, the behaviour of a human
being is explained through the attribution of the so-called
propositions such as beliefs and desires. Most researchers work
along those lines including Shoham [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ], Georgeff and Rao [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ],
Cohen and Levesque [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ], Jennings and Wooldridge [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ].
In our opinion, the proposed theories mask cooperation which is
one of the main forces of multi-agent systems: we have the
impression that their agents are isolated. Although there are
situations where an agent can operate usefully by itself, the
increasing interconnection and networking of computers is
making such situations rare. Modern computing platforms and
information environments are distributed, large, open, and
heterogeneous. Computers are no longer stand-alone systems, but
become tightly connected both with each other and their users.
Mass conception :
this point of view gathers people who consider that we should first
think about interaction, then deduce the intentional structure of the
agents and not the contrary. It is based on the fact that multi-agent
systems interest lies effectively in the collective action and its
capacity to articulate the individual to the collective through the
intermediary of the cognitive agent structure. This mass
conception emphasizes the interaction structures (cooperation,
negotiation, action coordination, …) and the organizations that
follow from (roles, authority hierarchies, …).
        </p>
        <p>
          Unlike individual conception, this approach does not mask the
original aspect of multi-agent systems which is cooperation.
Cooperation is often presented as one of the key concepts which
differentiates multi-agent systems from other related disciplines
such as distributed computing, object-oriented systems, and expert
systems [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Our approach is in keeping with the latter standpoint. Indeed,
starting from the study of cooperation in multi-agent systems [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ],
we have identified the underlying concepts of an agent. These
concepts consist of beliefs and goals as communication concepts
and roles as concepts related to organization.
        </p>
        <p>We support the idea that communication as well as organization
are mainstays of cooperation.</p>
        <p>In this paper, we use a two steps approach:
- Conceptualization which consists in focusing our attention
on the system structures that seems relevant to the problem to
be solved. Then, describing informally those structures in a
language called conceptualization language.
- formal specification which consists in the formalization of
the conceptualization. This definition is consistent with the
usage of ontology .</p>
        <p>This approach is applied for communication as well as
organization.</p>
        <p>This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we present
an ontology for communication. Section 3 provides an
organization ontology. Section 4 identifies the agent concepts. We
illustrate our work with the well known prey/predator problem.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. COMMUNICATION ONTOLOGY</title>
      <p>
        Although communication is not universally assumed in
multiagent systems research, we argue that it is fundamental to the
everyday process of cooperation. Communication in multi-agent
systems as for human beings, is the basis of interaction and social
organization. Communication consists of a set of psychological
and physical processes relating the sender to the addressee(s) in
order to reach some goals [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]2. This definition emphasize three
underlying dimensions to communication: physical dimension,
psychological dimension, and social dimension. The physical
dimension deals with all the required physical means to support
communication such as: physical connections. The psychological
dimension takes mainly into account mental factors which can be
in the beginning or in the end of the communicative action.
Finally, the social dimension deals with the set of conventions
adopted as a guiding line by a group e.g., communication
protocols.
      </p>
      <p>
        The goal of this section is to derive the underlying concepts to a
communication model appropriate to multi-agent systems.
Let C be a communication model. C is based on speech act
theory[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]: the communications are defined as operators which
can change the mental state of agents [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>2.1 Beliefs</title>
      <p>In more traditional AI terms, an agent's beliefs are its knowledge.
Beliefs change due to the external environment of the agent, his
communication with the others and his proper reasoning. Beliefs
are acquired through perception, communication, deduction, and
prediction.</p>
      <p>The concept of belief is an essential element of C. Indeed, beliefs
can be a subset of the propositions that agents exchange.
Generally, communication depends on the beliefs and the
application domain.</p>
      <p>Example 1.
- In the prey/predator problem, the prey's position on the grid
is a predator’s belief. Whenever the prey gets into the
perception field of a predator (hence he believes knowing its
position), he communicates this information to the other
predators.
- A communication can be due to the fact that a predator
believes not knowing the prey's position. In this case, he
sends a request to his colleagues asking for the prey's
position.
2 We adopt this definition because we think that it is appropriate
to multi-agent systems problematics.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>2.2 Goals</title>
      <p>A goal is an underlying concept to the psychological level of a
communication. It refers to a potential state of the world to which
the agent belongs. The achievement of a goal is at the beginning
of an agent behaviour (including his communicative actions). A
goal may be local or global and can be expressed in terms of the
agent beliefs.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Example 2.</title>
        <p>For a predator, getting closer to a prey from the southern side is a
local goal which helps reaching the global goal consisting in the
capture of the prey. This local goal can be expressed in terms of
the following beliefs: the prey's position and the predator's
position on the grid.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>2.3 Actions</title>
      <p>As previously stated, a communication is defined as a speech act
and a-fortiori as an action. Accordingly, an action is the basic
element of a communication model. Actions are interactions
between an agent and the external world. An agent can perform at
a point of time one of the following actions:
- physical actions are interactions between agents and the
spatial environment,
- communicative actions are interactions between agents. They
can be emission or reception actions,
- private actions are internal functions of an agent. They
correspond to an agent exploiting its internal computational
resources, and
- decision action can generate communicative, physical and
private actions. A decision action can also update the agent's
beliefs. We assume that the agent's goals are modified only
after a negotiation with the other agents.</p>
      <p>The actions to execute are determined by the resolution methods
and communication protocols.</p>
      <p>We denote by APH the set of physical actions, APR the set of
private actions, ACO the set of communicative actions such that
ACO = ACOE ∪ ACOR where ACOE is the set of emission
actions and ACOR is the set of reception actions, τ a decision
action, which an agent can execute.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Example 3.</title>
        <p>
          - In the prey/predator game, moving on the grid is a physical
action.
- informing another predator is a communicative action.
Concerning the actions execution, an agent use an interaction
paradigm (e.g. an agenda). The interaction paradigm implicitly
defines the metaphors used by the agents to interact and cooperate
among each other [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>2.4 Message</title>
      <p>In the definition of communication, three dimensions have been
distinguished among which the psychological dimension (whose
concepts are beliefs, goals, and actions) and the physical
dimension (which support communication). The transition step
between the afore mentioned dimensions is message production.
In a multi-agent universe, a message is a specification of a speech
act to which we can add the physical processes of communication
which support message transmission. Practically, a message can
be considered as a four attributes structure: elocution force,
propositional content, sender, and routing. Figure 1 represent an
example of this structure according to the prey/predator problem.</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>Force : inform</title>
        <sec id="sec-6-1-1">
          <title>Propositional content : the position of the prey is (x0, y0)</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-6-1-2">
          <title>Sender : predator 1</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-6-1-3">
          <title>Routing : predator 2</title>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>3. ORGANIZATION ONTOLOGY</title>
      <p>
        Whenever we have to deal with task distribution and well-knit
interaction between agents in a multi-agent system, the basic
problem is an organizational issue i.e. deciding who will do what
and when [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Organization in animal or human societies deals with task
distribution and work division according to the proper skills of
each agent member. Next, we draw the key concepts related to
organization. An organizational model defines how to dispatch the
tasks between cooperative agents and their possible relations.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>3.1 The problem</title>
      <p>A problem is defined by a set of tasks. Each task can be optional
or compulsory according to the resolution strategy (see § 3.4). A
task is an ordered set of actions which allows to reach a goal.</p>
      <p>Definition 3.1 [A problem]
Let T={t1, t2, …, ti, …, tn} be a set of tasks defining the
problem to be solved,</p>
      <p>TC: a restriction of T to compulsory tasks, and</p>
      <p>TO: a restriction of T to optional tasks, and</p>
      <p>T = T C ∪ TO and TC ∩ TO = ∅ .</p>
      <p>The distinction between compulsory tasks and optional ones can
be justified by the fact that it is a better way to simulate the
reality.</p>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>Example 4.</title>
        <p>The prey/predator problem includes the following compulsory
tasks: "follow the prey", "communicate the prey’s position once it
is seen". To this set, we can add the following optional tasks:
"communicate the predator's position at each step", or
"communicate the distance covered by the predator".</p>
        <p>3.2 Role
In a cooperation framework, it is necessary to define the
respective roles that the agents play in a resolution process. The
role characterizes the responsibilities which would be attributed
to an agent i.e., the tasks he is charged with. An agent's role is
defined by a subset of compulsory tasks and a subset of optional
tasks.</p>
        <p>Definition 3.2 [An agent role]
Let a be an agent, TCa be the compulsory tasks of a, TOa
be the optional tasks of a. The role of the agent a is
defined by ra such that: ra = &lt; TCa, T Oa &gt;.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>3.3 Cooperation mode</title>
      <p>
        The concept of cooperation mode has been previously stated in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. A cooperation mode specify the responsabilities attributed to
the partners taking part in a collective activity. A cooperation
mode is defined by an n-uplet representing the respective roles of
the agents.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-9-1">
        <title>Example 5.</title>
        <p>In the prey/predator game, once the prey's position is known by all
the predators, the cooperation mode related to this situation is:
&lt;"surround the prey from the south", "surround the prey from the
north", "surround the prey from the east", "surround the prey from
the west"&gt;.</p>
        <p>The relevance of a cooperation mode is measured by the
cooperation strategy which will be described in the following
paragraph.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>3.4 Cooperation strategy</title>
      <p>In a distributed problem solving, each agent member of the
system is able to process a set of tasks by applying some
resolution methods within his competences.</p>
      <p>Agent competences can be complementary or redundant. For the
same tasks, an agent may be more competent than another (he
puts into practice a resolution method more efficaciously). For
other tasks, the agents can have different methods but there is no
way to determine a priori which method is the most efficient.
Accordingly, to select an agent to achieve a task, the resolution
context should be taken into account. Hence, a dynamic
distribution of tasks seems to be more appropriate than a static
distribution. If the abilities of the agents are redundant, then they
can play the same role. In this case, an agent should be selected to
accomplish each role. According to the context, we can specify
different indications concerning the way the choice is done: for
example, in the case of system-human cooperation, we can
indicate that the user must play all the decision roles even if the
system is competent to accomplish such roles.</p>
      <p>We call a cooperation strategy, a process which determines the
appropriate cooperation mode to a given situation. In this case, we
talk about dynamic organization3.</p>
      <sec id="sec-10-1">
        <title>Example 6.</title>
        <p>In the prey/predator game, a cooperation mode where an agent’s
role is "getting closer to a prey from the north" can be substituted
for a cooperation mode where the same agent play the following
role: "getting closer to a prey from the east". It is because of the
respective positions of the predators on the grid, that the
cooperation strategy administer this transition in cooperation
mode.</p>
        <p>
          In order to guarantee the coherence of an organizational model,
some properties should be verified. We don’t address those
properties in this paper, but we think that they are closely related
to the application domain.
3 Mike Wooldridge &amp; al., support the idea of dynamic
organization when they talk about reactive or on-fly cooperation
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>4. AGENT CONCEPTS</title>
      <p>
        Cooperation is perhaps the paradigm example of social activity in
both real and artificial social systems; it is certainly the best
studied process in multi-agent systems research [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>A conceptualization of cooperation has been presented so far.
Indeed, two aspects have been mentioned as mainstays of
cooperation: communication and organization. Concerning
communication, the terminology includes the concepts of beliefs,
goals, actions and a message. Organization is dynamic because of
the concept of cooperation strategy.</p>
      <p>Obviously, an organizational structure in which roles
distribution is dynamic increase communication cost, but can give
better results for some complex problems. A static structure
doesn't cope with the environment hazards and limits the possible
configurations that can occur in the resolution process4.
Multi-agent systems put into practice a set of techniques and
concepts allowing some concrete (e.g. robots) or abstract
(software) entities called "agents" to cooperate according to some
cooperation modes. By focusing on interaction and individual
satisfaction, multi-agent systems ban thinking in a centralized or
global way5. Hence, we keep from our previous study the
following concepts for an agent: beliefs and goals as
communication concepts and roles as concepts related to
organization.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>5. CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>The agent metaphor comes packaged with a number of powerful
psychological abstractions such as Beliefs, Desires, and
Intentions. The work presented explores a particular type of
rational agent: a Belief-Goal-Role agent. This making up of the
intentional structure of an agent was subject to argumentation in
this paper. The development of an ontology for cooperation has
ended in identifying beliefs, goals as communication concepts and
roles as organization concepts. Unlike most previous work, the
presented study shows a new way to combine agent and ontology
technologies. Indeed, ontologies have established themselves as a
powerful tool to enable knowledge sharing, and a growing number
of applications have benefited from the use of ontologies as a
means to achieve semantic interoperability among heterogeneous,
distributed systems. Ontologies are used in this paper as natural
arguments to belief-goal-role agents.</p>
      <p>Finally, we think that the study presented in this paper open new
perspectives on the realization of agent systems. The ontology
developed for communication as well as for organization draws its
inspiration from the widely recognized fact that interaction is the
most important single characteristic of complex systems. Many
researchers believe that in future, computation itself will be
understood chiefly as a process of interaction.
4 In certain kinds of problems, a static structure may be more
appropriate than a dynamic one. Such discussion is beyond the
scope of this paper; it can be addressed apart in another study with
more details. Generally, and according to the essence of
multiagent systems, a dynamic structure can respond better to
complexity.
5 Accordingly, it is forbidden to talk about cooperation mode (see
section 3) whenever we talk about agent systems.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>6. REFERENCES</title>
      <sec id="sec-13-1">
        <title>Programming.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-13-2">
        <title>Artificial</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Ferber</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Les systèmes multi-agents: un apercu général</article-title>
          .
          <source>T.S.I,</source>
          Volume
          <volume>16</volume>
          ,
          <year>1997</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Durfee</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>E.H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>The Distributed Artificial Intelligence Melting Pot</article-title>
          .
          <source>IEEE Trans. On SMC</source>
          , Vol.
          <volume>21</volume>
          , No 6,
          <string-name>
            <surname>November</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>1991</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Bratman</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>M.E.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Plans</surname>
            , and
            <given-names>Practical</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Reasons</surname>
          </string-name>
          . Harvard university press, Cambridge, MA,
          <year>1987</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Shoham</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>Y</given-names>
          </string-name>
          . Agent intelligence,
          <volume>60</volume>
          (
          <issue>1</issue>
          ),
          <year>1993</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Bandinelli</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Di</given-names>
            <surname>Nitto</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>E.</given-names>
            , and
            <surname>Fuggetta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>A.</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Supporting cooperation in the SPADE-1 environment</article-title>
          .
          <source>IEEE trans. On Software engineering</source>
          , Vol.
          <volume>22</volume>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>No</surname>
            <given-names>12</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>December 1996</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Konolige</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Nilson</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Multiple agent planning systems</article-title>
          .
          <source>AAA'80</source>
          , pp
          <fpage>138</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>142</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Anzieu</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Martin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.Y.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>La dynamique des groupes restreints</article-title>
          . Ed. puf,
          <year>1968</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Rao</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and Georgeff,
          <string-name>
            <surname>M.P.</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>An abstract architecture for rational agents</article-title>
          . In R. Fikes and e. Sandwall editors,
          <source>Proceedings of Knowledge Representation And Reasoning (KR&amp;R-91)</source>
          , page
          <fpage>473</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>484</lpage>
          . Morgan Kauffmann Publishers: San Mateo, CA,
          <year>April 1991</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Soubie</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kacem</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Modèles de cooperation homme/système intelligent</article-title>
          . Systèmes coopératifs : de la modélisation à la conception, ed. Octares,
          <volume>994</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Cohen</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>P.R.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Levsque</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H.J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Intention is choice with commitment</article-title>
          .
          <source>Artificial Intelligence</source>
          ,
          <volume>42</volume>
          , pp.
          <fpage>213</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>261</lpage>
          ,
          <year>1990</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Wooldridge</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jennings</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Agent theories, Architectures, and Languages: A Survey</article-title>
          .
          <source>LNAI 890</source>
          , Springer-Verlag,
          <year>1994</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Chainbi</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>W.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Cooperation in Multi-agent Systems</article-title>
          .
          <source>Internal report</source>
          , Fseg-Sfax,
          <year>April 1997</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Gasser</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Distribution and Coordination of Tasks Among Intelligent Agents</article-title>
          .
          <source>Scandinavian conference on artificial intelligence (SCAI'88)</source>
          , pp
          <fpage>189</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>192</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          [14]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Wooldridge</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Haddadi</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Making it up as they go along: A Theory of Reactive Cooperation</article-title>
          .
          <source>LNAI 1441</source>
          , Springer-Verlag,
          <year>June 1998</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          [15]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D</given-names>
            <surname>'Inverno</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            , and
            <surname>Luck</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            , and
            <surname>Wooldridge</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M. Cooperation</given-names>
            <surname>Structures</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <source>IJCAI-97</source>
          , Nagoya, Japan,
          <year>August 1997</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          [16]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Doran</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.E.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Franklin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jennigs</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.R.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Norman</surname>
          </string-name>
          , T.J.
          <article-title>On cooperation in multi-agent systems</article-title>
          .
          <source>The Knowledge Engineering Review</source>
          ,
          <volume>12</volume>
          (
          <issue>3</issue>
          ),
          <fpage>309</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>314</lpage>
          ,
          <year>1997</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref17">
        <mixed-citation>
          [17]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Austin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>How to do things with words</article-title>
          . Oxford University Press,
          <year>1962</year>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>