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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The N50 Logic</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jose Arrazola</string-name>
          <email>arrazola@fcfm.buap.mx</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mauricio Osorio</string-name>
          <email>osoriomauri@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Eduardo Ariza</string-name>
          <email>aveariza@hotmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Benemerita Universidad Autonoma de Puebla</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Universidad de las Americas - Puebla</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>We introduce a new 5-valued logic that we call N50 . This logic extends GLukG, a paraconsistent logic recently introduced [10]. We show that N50 is sound with respect to GLukG. GLukG paraconsistent logic has been investigated for a short period of time [5,10]. However, it has demonstrated important qualities for the study of other logics. It also has relevant attributes in knowledge representation [11]. Although, this work does not address this last point. On this paper, we investigate how to add a strong negation connective to GLukG logic. The logic that is of our interest is a 5-valued logic that is sound with respect to GLukG. In this case we use two kinds of negations, one is the strong negation represented by the symbol and the other one is the default negation represented by the : symbol. In the literature we can nd several logical extension, through a strong negation operator, but few of them are hardly paraconsistent logics satisfy a theorem of substitution, to see [3]. To summarize, the main contribution of the paper is the proposal of the paraconsistent 5-valued logic called N50 that satis es the following suitable properties: (1) It is a conservative extension of GLukG logic. (2) It satis es the substitution theorem. The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the general background needed for the paper including the de nition of GLukG logic. On Section 3 we present a Hilbert-style axiomatization for GLukG which is a slight variation of the one presented in [10]. On Section 4 we present Theorem 4, our main result, which establishes that our logic N50 is a conservative extension of Nelson's N5. Finally, on Section 5 we present our conclusions and we address the future work.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>meaning of such formulas in order to, nally, give a brief introduction to several
of the logics that are relevant for the results of our later sections.
2.1</p>
      <p>Syntax of formulas
We consider a formal (propositional) language built from: an enumerable set L
of elements called atoms (denoted a, b, c, . . . ); the binary connectives ^
(conjunction), _ (disjunction) and ! (implication); and the unary connective :
(negation). Formulas (denoted , , , . . . ) are constructed as usual by
combining these basic connectives together with the help of parentheses.</p>
      <p>We also use $ to abbreviate ( ! ) ^ ( ! ) and to abbreviate
! . It is useful to agree on some conventions to avoid the use of so many
parenthesis in writing formulas. This will make the reading of complicated
expressions easier. First, we may omit the outer pair of parenthesis of a formula.
Second, the connectives are ordered as follows: :; ^; _; !, and $, and
parentheses are eliminated according to the rule that, rst, : applies to the smallest
formula following it, then ^ is to connect the smallest formulas surrounding it,
and so on.</p>
      <p>A theory is just a set of formulas and, in this paper, we only consider nite
theories. Moreover, if T is a theory, we use the notation LT to stand for the set
of atoms that occur in the theory T , if T = f g we denote L . A literal l is
either an atom or the negation of an atom.
2.2</p>
      <p>Logic systems
We consider a logic simply as a set of formulas that, moreover, satis es the
following two properties: (i) is closed under modus ponens (i.e. if and !
are in the logic, then so is ) and (ii) is closed under substitution (i.e. if a formula
is in the logic, then any other formula obtained by replacing all occurrences
of an atom b in with another formula is still in the logic). The elements of a
logic are called theorems and the notation `X is used to state that the formula
is a theorem of X (i.e. 2 X). We say that a logic X is weaker than or equal
to a logic Y if X Y , similarly we say that X is stronger than or equal to Y if
Y X.</p>
      <p>Hilbert style proof systems There are many di erent approaches that have been
used to specify the meaning of logic formulas or, in other words, to de ne
logics. In Hilbert style proof systems, also known as axiomatic systems, a logic
is speci ed by giving a set of axioms (which is usually assumed to be closed
by substitution). This set of axioms speci es, so to speak, the `kernel' of the
logic. The actual logic is obtained when this `kernel' is closed with respect to
the inference rule of modus ponens. The notation `X F for provability of a logic
formula F in the logic X is usually extended within Hilbert style systems; given
a theory T , we use T `X F to denote the fact that the formula F can be derived
from the axioms of the logic and the formulas contained in T by a sequence
of applications of modus ponens1. Recall that, in all these de nitions, the
logic connectives are parameterized by some underlying logic, e.g. the expression
`X (F1 ^ ^ Fn) ! F actually stands for `X (F1 ^X ^X Fn) !X F .</p>
      <p>
        C! logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] is de ned by the following set of axioms:
      </p>
      <p>
        Pos1
Pos2
Pos3
Pos4
Pos5
Pos6
Pos7
Pos8
C!1
C!2
a ! (b ! a)
(a ! (b ! c)) ! ((a ! b) ! (a ! c))
a ^ b ! a
a ^ b ! b
a ! (b ! (a ^ b))
a ! (a _ b)
b ! (a _ b)
(a ! c) ! ((b ! c) ! (a _ b ! c))
a _ :a
::a ! a
Note that the rst 8 axioms somewhat constraint the meaning of the !, ^ and
_ connectives to match our usual intuition. It is a well known result that in any
logic satisfying axioms Pos1 and Pos2, and with modus ponens as its unique
inference rule, the Deduction Theorem holds [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Multivalued logics An alternative way to de ne the semantics for a logic is by the
use of truth values and interpretations. Multivalued logics generalize the idea of
using truth tables that are used to determine the validity of formulas in classical
logic. The core of a multivalued logic is its domain of values D, where some of
such values are special and identi ed as designated. Logic connectives (e.g. ^,
_, !, :) are then introduced as operators over D according to the particular
de nition of the logic.</p>
      <p>An interpretation is a function I : L ! D that maps atoms to elements in the
domain. The application of I is then extended to arbitrary formulas by mapping
rst the atoms to values in D, and then evaluating the resulting expression in
terms of the connectives of the logic (which are de ned over D). A formula is
said to be a tautology if, for every possible interpretation, the formula evaluates
to a designated value. The most simple example of a multivalued logic is classical
logic where: D = f0; 1g, 1 is the unique designated value, and connectives are
de ned through the usual basic truth tables. If X is any logic, we write j=X to
denote that is a tautology in the logic X. We say that is a logical consequence
of a set of formulas = f'1; '2; : : : ; 'ng (denoted by j=X ) if V ! is a
tautology, where V stands for '1 ^ '2 ^ : : : ^ 'n.</p>
      <p>Note that in a multivalued logic, so that it can truly be a logic, the implication
connective has to satisfy the following property: for every value x 2 D, if there
is a designated value y 2 D such that y ! x is designated, then x must also be
a designated value. This restriction enforces the validity of modus ponens in the
logic. The inference rule of substitution holds without further conditions because
of the functional nature of interpretations and how they are evaluated.</p>
      <p>Given a theory T , we de ne the negation of the theory :T as f:F j F 2 T g
(the negation symbol is parameterized with respect to some given logic). For
1 We drop the subscript X in `X when the given logic is clear from the context.
any pair of theories T and U , we use T `X U to state that T `X F for every
formula F 2 U .
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Axiomatization of GLukG</title>
      <p>
        We present the Hilbert-style axiomatization of GLukG that is a slight
(equivalent) variant of the one presented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. This logic has three primitive logical
connectives, namely GL := f!; ^; :g. GLukG-formulas (or GL-formulas) are
formulas built from these connectives in the standard form. We also have three
de ned connectives:
      </p>
      <p>GLukG Logic has all the axioms of C! logic plus the following:
:=
:= (( ! ) ! ) ^ (( ! ) !</p>
      <p>! (: ^ :: ).
:= ( ! ) ^ ( ! ).</p>
      <p>).
(: ! : ) $ (:: ! :: )
::( ! ) $ (( ! ) ^ (::
::( ^ ) $ (:: ^ :: )
( ^ : ) ! ( ! )
! :: ))
1.
2.
3.</p>
      <p>_
$
E1
E2
E3</p>
      <p>E4</p>
      <p>
        Note that Classical logic is obtained from GLukG by adding to the list of
axioms any of the following formulas: !:: ; !(: ! ); (: !: )!( ! ).
It is shown in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. On the other hand, ! : is a theorem in GLukG the \
" connective is called strong negation. Some experimental work as well as the
experience with answer set programming suggested to consider a more useful
negation connective for NMR that we will introduce in the following section. See
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] to understand this point in the context of ASP.
      </p>
      <p>
        Theorem 1 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]). For every formula
theorem in GLukG.
      </p>
      <p>In this paper we consider the standard substitution, here represented with
the usual notation: '[ =p] will denote the formula that results from substituting
the formula for the atom p, wherever it occurs in '. Recall the recursive
de nition: if ' is atomic, then '[ =p] is when ' equals p, and ' otherwise.
Inductively, if ' is a formula '1#'2, for any binary connective #. Then '[ =p]
will be '1[ =p]#'2[ =p]. Finally, if ' is a formula of the form :'1, then '[ =p]
is :'1[ =p].
3.1</p>
      <p>
        Multivalued logic
It is very important to note that GLukG can also be presented as a multivalued
logic. Such presentation is given in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], where GLukG is called G03. In this form it
is de ned through a 3-valued logic with truth values in the domain D = f0; 1; 2g
where 2 is the designated value. The evaluation function of the logic connectives
is then de ned as follows: x ^ y = min(x; y); x _ y = max(x; y); and the : and !
connectives are de ned according to the truth tables given in Table 1. We write
j= to denote that the formula is a tautology, namely that evaluates to 2
(the designated value) for every valuation. We say that is a logical consequence
of a set of formulas = f'1; '2; : : : ; 'ng (denoted by j= ) if V ! is a
tautology, where V stands for '1 ^ '2 ^ : : : ^ 'n.
      </p>
      <p>In this paper we keep the notion G03 to refer to multivalued logic just de ned
and we use the notion GLukG to refer as the Hilbert system de ned at the
beginning of this section.</p>
      <p>
        Theorem 2 (Substitution theorem for G03-logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]). Let , and be
GL-formulas and let p be an atom. If $ is a tautology in G03 then [ =p] $
[ =p] is a tautology in G03.
      </p>
      <p>
        Corollary 1 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]). Let , and be GL-formulas and let p be an atom. If
$ is a theorem in GLukG then [ =p] $ [ =p] is a theorem in GLukG.
4
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Main Results</title>
      <p>We present N 50, a 5-valued logic. We will use the set of values f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g.
Valid formulas evaluate to 2. The connectives ^ and _ correspond to the min
and max functions in the usual way. For the other connectives, the associated
truth tables are as follows:</p>
      <p>We have de ned 5 logical connectives, namely Nc := f!; ^; _; :; g. N
formulas are built from these set of connectives. If always evaluates to the
designated value then it is called a tautology.</p>
      <p>Remark 1. Observed the following:
1: j=
2: j=
3: j=
4: j=
5: j=
6: j=
( ! ) $
( ^ )$
( _ )$
$ :
: $ :: :
! : :
^
_
^
:
:
:
7: j= :
8: j=
9: 2
10: 2
11: 2 :
12: 2 :</p>
      <p>! ((:
! ((:
! ((:
! ((:
! ((:
! ((:</p>
      <p>! ) !
! ) ! : ):
! ) ! ):
! ) ! :
! ) ! :
! )!
):
):
):
):</p>
      <p>
        What is important about this remark is that these formulae have the same
structure than those theorems of Nelson introduced previously in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] for the
construction of extensions, with strong negation, of intuitionistic logic; In fact,
formulae 1 6 show the classical-like behavior of strong negation, in particular,
formula 6 honors the adjective strong.
      </p>
      <p>Theorem 3. Given and two formulae, then:
1. If and ! are tautologies, then is also a tautology.</p>
      <p>2. If is a tautology, then :: is also a tautology.</p>
      <p>Proof. The proof of 1 is straightforward; If and ! are tautologies, then
they always evaluate to the designated value and, looking at the implication
table given for N50 , we see that (since evaluates to 2) there is only one case
in which ! evaluates to 2, and it is precisely when evaluates to 2. This
concludes the proof of 1.</p>
      <p>To prove 2, we see that if also evaluates to 2.</p>
      <p>evaluates to 2, then ::</p>
      <p>
        Note: N50 logic is in some way similar to N5 logic (see [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] for more information
on N5). The only di erence is that in N5, :1 = 1, but in N50 , :1 = 2. Moreover,
with N50 logic we can express N5 logic.
      </p>
      <p>Theorem 4. N50 logic can express N5 logic.</p>
      <p>Proof. It su ces to see that we can express the constant ? of N5 by the formula
:a ^ ::a of N50 , where a is any formula. Hence, we can also express the :
formula of N5 by ! ? in N50 .</p>
      <p>Lemma 1. Let I be an interpretation (based on G03). Let JI be an interpretation
(based on N50 ) de ned for every atom a as follows:</p>
      <p>Then, for every GL-formula ,</p>
      <p>JI (a) =
JI ( ) =</p>
      <p>I(a) if I(a) &gt; 0</p>
      <p>2 otherwise
I( ) if I( ) &gt; 0
&lt; 0 otherwise
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number n of ocurrences of !; ^; _; :; :
if n = 0, is just an atom a, the proof is followed by de nition of JI . Assume
now that lemma holds for all j n.</p>
      <p>Case 1. is : . Then has fewer than n connectives.
1a. 0 &lt; I( ) then I( ) = 2, hence I( ) = 1 or I( ) = 0. If I( ) = 1, by inductive
hypothesis, we have that JI ( ) = I( ) = 1 so JI ( ) = JI (: ) = 2 = I( ):
1b. I( ) = 0, this subcase is analogous to subcase 1a.</p>
      <p>Case 2. is ! . Then and have fewer than n connectives.
2a. 0 &lt; I( ) then I( ) = 1 or I( ) = 2.
i) Assume 1 = I( ), so I( ) = 2 and I( ) = 1. By inductive hypothesis, JI ( ) =
I( ) = 2 and JI ( ) = I( ) = 1 thus JI ( ) = 1 = I( ).
ii) If I( ) = 2 is worked analogously the previous subcase.
2b. I( ) = 0, we have by inductive hypothesis 0 &lt; I( ) = JI ( ) and I( ) =
JI ( ) &lt; 0, so JI ( ) &lt; 0.</p>
      <p>Case 3. is ^ . Then and have fewer than n connectives.
3a. 0 &lt; I( ) then by inductive hypothesis 0 &lt; I( ) = minfI( ); I( )g =
minfJI ( ); JI ( )g = JI ( ).
3b. I( ) 0 is similar to subcase 3a.</p>
      <p>Finally, the case is _ is proved analogously.</p>
      <p>A very important result is that N50 logic is a conservative extension of G03
logic, as the following theorem shows.</p>
      <p>Theorem 5. For every GL-formula , is a tautology in N50 i
in G03.
is a tautology
Proof. Suppose that is a tautology in G03, then by Theorem 1, is a theorem
in GLukG. We proceed by induction on the length of the proof of . The base
case is immediate from the fact that all GLukG axioms are tautologies in N50 .
We suppose that any proposition, that has a proof with at most n steps, satis es
the induction hypothesis.</p>
      <p>Let be a proposition whose proof requires exactly n steps and let be
B1; : : : ; Bn, a proof of . We are done if Bn = is a GLukG axiom. If is
a Modus Ponens consequence, then by Theorem 3, if and ! are
tautologies, then is tautology. This observation and the inductive hypothesis nish
the proof.</p>
      <p>For the other implication we suppose that is not a tautology in G03, then
there exists an interpretation I (based on G03) such that I( ) 6= 2. By Lemma
1, there exists JI , an interpretation based on N50 , such that JI ( ) 6= 2. Hence,
is not a tautology of N50 , as desired.
4.1</p>
      <p>Substitution
A particular feature of our N50 logic is that the symbol $ does not de ne a
congruential relation on formulas, note that it can be the case that $ is a
tautology, but $ doesn't. A particular example is the following: Take
1 to be (a ! b) and 2 to be a^ b. Clearly 1 $ 2 is a tautology, but
1$ 2 does not (take I(a) = I(b) = 1). This property also holds in N5.</p>
      <p>Thus, when we refer to equivalence of formulas, we will have to be more
precise and make some particular considerations. The term weak equivalence
will mean that $ is a tautology. There is a stronger notion of equivalence
of N-formulas, which we will call N50 -equivalence, and it holds when both $
and $ are tautologies. For this purpose, we de ne a new connective ,.
We write , to denote the formula: ( $ ) ^ ( $ ). The reader can
easily verify that $ is a tautology i for every valuation v, v( ) &gt; 0 implies
v( ) = v( ), while , is a tautology i for every valuation v, v( ) = v( ).
This can be seen in the following truth tables:
Theorem 6 (Basic Substitution theorem). Let ,
and let p be an atom. If , is a tautology then [ =p]$</p>
      <p>Proof. If , is tautology then for every v, an N -valuation, v( ) = v( ) (see
the comments at the end of the previous paragraph). Therefore, v( [ =p]) =
[ =p]) so, v( [ =p] $ [ =p]) = 2.</p>
      <p>To be able to apply standard substitution we require N50 -equivalence of
formulas to hold. However, in certain cases this condition may be too strong. We
are also interested in the particular cases where weak equivalence of formulas
su ces for substituting. The rst such case is when substitution is not done
inside the scope of a symbol.</p>
      <p>Lemma 2. Let , and be N-formulas and let p be an atom such that p
does not occur in within the scope of a symbol. If $ is a tautology then
[ =p] $ [ =p] is a tautology.</p>
      <p>Proof. It is of high importance to remember (see the comments at the end of
the rst paragraph) that: $ is a tautology i for every valuation v, v( ) &gt; 0
implies v( ) = v( ). By structural induction:
Base case:</p>
      <p>If = q, q an atom, we have:
[ =p] $
[ =p] =</p>
      <p>$
(q $ q if p 6= q
if p = q; (hypothesis)
therefore it is a tautology.</p>
      <p>We suppose that the inductive case is satis ed:
If = :'</p>
      <p>By inductive hypothesis, for every N05-valuation, '[ =p] $ '[ =p] is a
tautology. If 0 &lt; v('[ =p]) then v(:'[ =p]) = v(:'[ =p]), therefore [ =p] $ [ =p]
is a tautology.</p>
      <p>Remark 2. If v('1)
0 and v('2)</p>
      <p>0 implies v('1 ! '2) = 2
If = '1 ^ '2</p>
      <p>Suppose that 0 &lt; v(('1^'2)[ =p]) then, 0 &lt; minfv('i[ =p])gi=1;2: Hence, by
the inductive hypothesis v( i[ =p]) = v( i[ =p]) for i = 1; 2. Then v( [ =p]) =
minfv('i[ =p])gi=1;2 = minfv('i[ =p])gi=1;2 = v( [ =p]). Therefore [ =p] $
[ =p] is a tautology.
= '1 ! '2</p>
      <p>Remember that by inductive hypothesis we have '1[ =p] $ '1[ =p] and
'2[ =p] $ '2[ =p] are tautologies.</p>
      <p>Suppose that 0 &lt; v( [ =p]) = v('1[ =p] ! '2[ =p]).</p>
      <p>We have two cases in which we can apply the inductive hypothesis:
1. v('1[ =p]) &gt; 0 then by inductive hypothesis, we have v('1[ =p]) = v('1[ =p]),
then 0 &lt; v('2[ =p]), again by inductive hypothesis v('2[ =p]) = v('2[ =p]),
therefore v('1[ =p] ! '2[ =p]) = v('1[ =p] ! '2[ =p]).
2. v('2[ =p]) &gt; 0 then v('2[ =p]) = v('2[ =p]). Since '1[ =p] $ '1[ =p]
and '2[ =p] $ '2[ =p] are tautologies, then we have that both '1[ =p]
and '1[ =p] are negative or null (not necessarily in the same case). Finally
v('1[ =p] ! '2[ =p]) = v('1[ =p] ! '2[ =p]).
4.2</p>
      <p>Standard form
We present the notion of a standard form of a formula.</p>
      <p>De nition 1. We de ne the function S: N-formulae ! N-formulae as follows:
If a is an atom and ' is an N-formula, then</p>
      <p>S(a) = a;
S(:a) = :a;
S( a) = a;
S( : ) = S(:: );
S(: ) = :S( );</p>
      <p>S( ! ) = S( ) ! S( );
S( ^ ) = S( ) ^ S( );
S( ( ! )) = S( ) ^ S(
S( ( ^ )) = S( ) _ S(
S( ) = S( ):
);
);
De nition 2 (Standard Form). An N-formula ' is said to be in standard
form if S(') = '</p>
      <p>Intuitively a formula is in standard form if it has all occurrences of the
connective just in front of an atom.</p>
      <p>Example 1. Take the formula ' := (a ! :b)^
S(') := a ^ b^ c.
c. Then its standard form is
Lemma 3. For any N-formula ', ' is a tautology in N50 i S(') is a tautology
in N50 .</p>
      <p>Proof. By structural induction:
Base case: It is vacuously true.</p>
      <p>We suppose that the inductive case is satis ed:</p>
      <p>= :' is a tautology i ' evaluates to
sis, 2 = :S(') = S( ).</p>
      <p>2; 1; 0 or 1 i , by inductive
hypothe= '1 ^ '2 is a tautology i '1 and '2 have the same value, by inductive
hypothesis, S( ) = S('1) ^ S('2) is tautology.</p>
      <p>If = '1 ! '2 is tautology, we have two cases:
1.- if '1 has any of the values 2; 1 or 0 then by inductive hypothesis also
S('1) the same value; hence it does not matter the value of value S('2) and
S( ) = S('1 ! '2) = S('1) ! S('2) is a tautology, and reciprocally
2.- if the value of '1 is 1 or 2 then '2 has the same value, respectively; hence,
by the inductive hypothesis we have S( ) is tautology.</p>
      <p>If = ' is a tautology then by remark 1 and the inductive hypothesis we have
that S( ) is a tautology.</p>
      <p>Finally, if = :' is a tautology, then S( ) = S( :') = S(::') = S('),
but :' ! ' is a tautology, then ' is tautology, hence by inductive hypothesis
S(') is a tautology.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusions and Future Work</title>
      <p>We introduce a family of paraconsistent logics extended by a strong
paraconsistent negation operator. We study one particular logic, that we call N50 , and
we show that it is sound with respect to N-GLukG. For future work one can
consider the formal construction of non-monotonic semantics based on N50 . This
seems to be an easy task thanks to the experience of the construction of the
answer set semantics based on N5 logic.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
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