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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Workshop HCP Human Centered Processes, February</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The effect of time pressure and task completion on the occurrence of cognitive lockup</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Tina Mioch (tina.mioch@tno.nl)</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Ernestina J. A. Schreuder</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>TNO Human Factors Research Institute</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>kampweg 5 Soesterberg, 3769 ZG</addr-line>
          <country country="NL">The Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>University of Utrecht, Department of Psychology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Heidelberglaan 1, Utrecht 3584 CS</addr-line>
          <country country="NL">The Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2011</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <fpage>0</fpage>
      <lpage>11</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Prior studies have suggested that time pressure and task completion play a role in the occurrence of cognitive lockup. However, supportive evidence is only partial. In this study, we conducted an experiment to investigate how both time pressure and task completion influence the occurrence of cognitive lockup, in order to better understand situations that could trigger the phenomenon. We found that if people have almost completed a task, the probability for cognitive lockup increases. We also found that the probability for cognitive lockup decreases, when people execute tasks for the second time. There was no effect of time pressure or an interaction effect found between task completion and time pressure. The results provide further support for the explanation that cognitive lockup up is the result of a decision making bias and that this bias could be triggered by the perception that a task is almost complete.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>This study is about an inescapable part of action,
something all human beings experience to a greater or
lesser extent: human error. Human errors can happen in
everyday situations with only limited consequences.
However, errors can also happen in high-performance
environments like in aviation, where they can have
tremendous effects and be life threatening. For instance,
when pilots forget to enable their landing gear when
landing and as a result crash. Hence, it is important to
investigate why human errors in aviation are made and
how errors can be avoided.</p>
      <p>
        In the past, several cognitive explanations and
theories have been proposed to understand why pilots
deviate from normative activities
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref29 ref5 ref6">(e.g. Wickens and
Hollands, 2000; Dekker, 2003)</xref>
        . The European project
HUMAN (www.human.aero) strives to pave a way for
making this knowledge readily available to designers of
new cockpit systems, in order to be able to design
cockpits that prevent pilots from making errors. They
identified cognitive lockup to be among the most relevant
mechanisms for modern and future cockpit human
machine interfaces. Cognitive lockup is the tendency to
deal with disturbances sequentially
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">(Moray and
Rotenberg, 1989)</xref>
        . As a result of cognitive lockup
operators are inclined to focus on the current task and are
reluctant to switch to another task, even if that task has a
higher priority
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">(Neerincx, 2003)</xref>
        . The following flight
incident illustrates the possible consequences of cognitive
lockup. During landing, the pilot of flight 401 of Eastern
Air Lines (1973) was warned about a problem with the
landing gear. To win time, the pilot canceled the landing,
set the plane in the autopilot mode and started solving the
problem with the landing gear. This problem fully
occupied the pilot and multiple warnings about a
decreasing altitude (a low-altitude alarm, a remark of the
air-traffic controller) were ignored. As a consequence, the
plane crashed, resulting in the death of most people on
board.
      </p>
      <p>
        Experimental studies exist where cognitive
lockup was manifested in the data
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref17 ref24">(Moray and Rotenberg,
1989; Kerstholt, Passenier, Houttuin and Schuffel, 1996)</xref>
        ,
however, an explanation for the occurrence of the
phenomenon was not given. The following literature
overview provides accounts for the occurrence of the
phenomenon.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Reduced situational awareness as trigger for cognitive lockup</title>
      <p>
        A popular concept
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Meij, 2004)</xref>
        is the idea that a reduced
situational awareness (SA) might cause cognitive lockup.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">Kerstholt and Passenier (2000)</xref>
        argued that if operators
become less aware of the actual situation, for instance,
due to automation, they may not be able to understand the
links between the various subsystems they have to
control. If operators lack the knowledge of the underlying
systems cognitive lockup is more likely to occur.
Kerstholt and Passenier suggested that knowledge of the
underlying systems is important in order to increase SA
and prevent cognitive lockup.
      </p>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">Jones and Endsley (1996)</xref>
        investigated flight
accidents caused by a reduced SA. They found that a
great part of the flight accidents was due to a failure to
monitor or observe relevant data that were clearly present
in the situation. This type of accidents could also have
been the result of cognitive lockup, as important tasks
were that were triggered while dealing with another
problem, were ignored. Therefore, it could be suggested
that cognitive lockup is triggered by a failure to monitor
the environment. However,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        found in his
study on cognitive lockup, that cognitive lockup could
not be explained by a neglect of environment. Hence, a
reduced SA and specifically the failure to monitor the
environment seem not to be an underlying mechanism of
cognitive lockup.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>High cognitive workload as explanation for cognitive lockup</title>
      <p>
        Cognitive workload refers to the information processing
demands imposed by the performance of cognitive tasks
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref15">(Johnson and Proctor, 2004)</xref>
        . In order to predict the
cognitive load of a specific task,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">Neerincx (2003)</xref>
        developed the cognitive task load (CTL) theory. This
theory proposed three underlying factors of cognitive task
load: (1) time occupied, (2) number of task set switches,
which is the number of active tasks in execution or
planned to do, and (3) level of information processing.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">Neerincx (2003)</xref>
        suggested that cognitive lockup would
occur when time occupied and the number of task set
switches are high. Grootjen, Neerincx and Veltman,
(2006) conducted experiments in order to validate the
CTL theory. In these real-life experiments participants
had to deal with emergencies that appeared on a ship.
They found that when all three factors were high people
experienced cognitive overload; they did not know what
to do. However, no evidence of cognitive lockup was
found. Furthermore,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">Grootjen et al. (2006)</xref>
        found that in
the overload situation, participants switched much more
between tasks than in the optimal strategy. This result is
likely to indicate that a high workload does not influence
the occurrence of cognitive lockup.
      </p>
      <p>
        In the same vein,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        investigated
whether a lack of cognitive resources could be an
explanation for cognitive lockup. He argued that tasks
that require a more complex diagnosis process are
expected to demand more cognitive resources and thus
cause a higher cognitive workload and might cause
cognitive lockup. He found, however, that the level of
complexity of information processing did not affect the
degree of cognitive lockup. Hence,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        indicated
that cognitive lockup is not caused by the fact that people
lack the cognitive resources to switch. This result
underscores that it is likely that a high workload does not
cause cognitive lockup.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Too high switching costs as explanation for cognitive lockup</title>
      <p>
        When people switch between tasks, people are slower
and less accurate than when they repeat tasks
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref23">(Jersild,
1927; Monsell, 2003)</xref>
        and these switching costs have
been attributed to a variety of processes.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">Pashler (1994)</xref>
        suggested that switching costs arise because of a
cognitive bottleneck to process or select information.
This means that when a cognitive process is devoted to a
primary task, this process can not start for a second task.
This second task has to wait, yielding switching costs.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">Schumacher (1999)</xref>
        and Meyer and Kieras (1997a,
1997b) argued that switching costs arise due to an
executive control mechanism. They proposed a class of
adaptive executive control models in which it is assumed
that people have flexible control over the course of
secondary task processing stages. They argued that the
fact that switching costs arise is not due to a cognitive
bottleneck but is rather optional and strategic. The
reconfiguration to another task takes time and thus,
switching costs arise.
      </p>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        proposed that people might decide
to stick to their current task because the switching costs
that accompany task switching are perceived as too high.
He found that cognitive lockup was reduced when it was
obvious that the benefits of a switch to another task were
higher than the costs of a switch. He argued that the
participants were biased in their decision-making process,
as the costs of switching to another task had to be
disproportionally low before participants decided to
abandon the current task. Although the results showed
that the tendency for cognitive lockup was considerably
reduced when the costs to switch were low, the tendency
for cognitive lockup was still present. Therefore, Meij
suggested that besides switching costs, other factors that
trigger cognitive lockup are involved.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>A decision making bias as trigger for cognitive lockup</title>
      <p>
        A decision making bias refers to the fact that decision
making can be influenced by a prejudice or 'one-sided'
perspective. A bias can be unconscious or conscious in
awareness.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        believed that cognitive lockup is
due to a decision making bias. When dealing with a task
people decide to switch or not to switch to another task
when triggered. This decision might be biased due to for
instance a misperception of expected benefits. As a
result, people could decide not to deal with an additional
more urgent task until the ongoing task is dealt with. To
find out whether cognitive lockup results from a decision
making bias,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        conducted several experiments
with a fire control task. In this task participants had to
extinguish fires on a ship in a computer simulation. When
a fire appeared the participants had to detect the fire by
clicking on the fire. After detection, participants had to
extinguish the fire by selecting the right treatment. He
used this task because in his first experiment he
successfully demonstrated that cognitive lockup could be
found using this task.
      </p>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        proposed that both task completion
and prior investments, such as money, time and effort,
might bias the decision to switch to another task. Meij
found that when prior investments are high and the task
was near completion (high task completion), the
probability for cognitive lockup increased. Remarkably,
he also found that when prior investments are high and
task completion is low, people have the tendency to
abandon their task. Hence, the probability for cognitive
lockup decreased. Meij argued that in the high prior
investments condition perceived time pressure may be
higher than in the low prior investments condition. This
is because the available time in relation to invested time
is lower in the high prior investments condition.
Therefore, he attributed the effect of prior investments to
the perception of time pressure. He suggested that when
time pressure is perceived as high and the ongoing task is
almost completed, people are more likely to stick to the
ongoing task than in situations where time pressure is
high and the ongoing task needs considerable activities in
order to complete it. Thus, the results of Meij’s
experiments (2004) are likely to indicate that cognitive
lockup is due to a decision making bias. This decision
making bias seems to be triggered when time pressure
and task completion are high.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Current study: the effect of time pressure and task completion on cognitive lockup</title>
      <p>
        From the literature overview it seems that cognitive
lockup is the result of a biased (un)conscious decision to
focus on the current task and ignore others. Time
pressure and task completion seem to influence this
biased decision. The aim of this study is to investigate
how both time pressure and task completion influence the
occurrence of cognitive lockup. Therefore, this study
extends the results found by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        . Furthermore,
the aim is to identify critical situations in cockpit
environments that allow for designing cockpit systems
that help pilots avoid critical situations and decrease the
probability for cognitive lockup. In the following
subsections we translate the research question into
hypotheses.
      </p>
      <p>
        Time pressure. Time pressure is the perception that time
is scarce. According to
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">Beevis (1999)</xref>
        people experience
time pressure when the time required to execute tasks is
more than 70% of the total time available for the tasks.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">Beevis (1999)</xref>
        suggested that people experience high time
pressure when 85% of the available time is required to
execute the tasks. In this case performance is often
impaired in that some tasks are not (well) executed. Other
researchers
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref15 ref19 ref4 ref6">(e.g. van der Kleij, 2009; De Dreu, 2003;
Durham et al., 2000; Karau and Kelly, 1992; Kelly and
Loving, 2004)</xref>
        indicated the following consequences of
time pressure. At the individual level, time pressure leads
to (1) faster performance rates, because people stop
considering multiple alternatives, (2) lower performance
quality, due to the engagement in superficial rather than
thorough and systematic processing of information, and
(3) more heuristic information processing, as a result of
refraining from critical probing of a given seemingly
adequate solution or judgment. At group level, increasing
levels of time pressure narrows team members’ focus on
a limited range of task-salient cues in both team
interaction patterns and team task performance. This
narrow focus of attention that often manifests as a
restricted information exchange is due to a filtering
process
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Kelly and Loving, 2004)</xref>
        . Groups working under
time pressure attend to all of the information available
but then selectively discuss only information that seems
especially relevant
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Kelly and Loving, 2004)</xref>
        . They also
found that under high time pressure group members see
task completion as their main interaction objective, and
the group attempts to reach consensus and complete the
task as quickly as possible, but at the sacrifice of quality.
Groups under mild or no time pressure can, in contrast,
consider a wider set of task features, devote their
resources to performing on the task as well as possible,
and tend to employ more effortful systematic information
processing that gives serious considerations to all
possible alternative solutions for a task
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Kelly and
Loving, 2004)</xref>
        . Interestingly,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">DeDonno and Demaree
(2008)</xref>
        found that the mere perception of time pressure as
well as real time pressure impair performance.
      </p>
      <p>
        Thus, time pressure can trigger heuristic information
processing that make people focus on an ongoing task
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref15 ref19 ref4 ref6">(van der Kleij, 2009; De Dreu, 2003; Durham et al.,
2000; Karau and Kelly, 1992; Kelly and Loving, 2004)</xref>
        .
As a result, time pressure might influence the tendency to
stick to the ongoing task and influence the occurrence of
cognitive lockup. However, in situations where time
pressure1 was high
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">Grootjen et al. (2006)</xref>
        found a high
cognitive workload, but they found no relation to
cognitive lockup. Therefore, we expect that the effect of
time pressure alone is not strong enough to capture
people in their current task. We propose the following
hypothesis:
1.
      </p>
      <p>
        Time pressure has no effect on cognitive lockup.
That means, in case people deal with a task, and
another more urgent task is triggered, people
switch to the more urgent task just as often under
time pressure as when there is no time pressure.
Task completion. Task completion literature
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref13 ref16 ref2 ref29 ref7">(Garland
and Colon, 1993; Boehne and Paese, 2000; Humphrey
S.E., Moon, H., Conlon, D.E., Hofmann D.A., 2004)</xref>
        shows that people have the tendency to complete a task
even if it is economically unwise to do so. Garland and
Colon (1993) and
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">Boehne and Paese (2000)</xref>
        found that
this tendency is strongest when 90% of the task is
completed compared to 10% or 50% completion of a
task.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        found an effect of task completion on
cognitive lockup. People tend to complete a task when
they are almost finished (high task completion) even
when a more urgent task is triggered. We expect that the
results of
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        are replicated in this study.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
2.
      </p>
      <p>Task completion has an effect on cognitive
lockup.</p>
      <p>When task completion is high, the probability
for cognitive lockup increases.
That means, in case people deal with a task, and
another more urgent task is triggered, people
tend to stick to the current task, when they have
almost completed this task.</p>
      <p>
        When task completion is low, the probability for
cognitive lockup decreases. That means, in case
people deal with a task, and another more urgent
task is triggered, people tend to switch to the
more urgent task when the first task is not nearly
completed.
1 In the research of
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">Grootjen et al. (2006)</xref>
        time pressure was
high when the percentage of the available time for a task that
people are occupied with the task was high.
Interaction between time pressure and task
completion.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        suggested that when task
completion and time pressure are high the tendency for
cognitive lockup increases. When time pressure is high
but task completion is low, the tendency for cognitive
lockup decreases. In fact, he investigated the interaction
effect between prior investments and task completion and
attributed the effect of prior investments to the perception
of time pressure. Thus, Meij never investigated the effect
of time pressure and task completion. Therefore, in this
study, we test whether high time pressure and high task
completion indeed increase the probability for cognitive
lockup and that high time pressure and low task
completion decrease this probability, as suggested by
Meij. We propose the following hypotheses.
      </p>
      <p>There is an interaction effect between task
completion and time pressure on cognitive
lockup.</p>
      <p>When time pressure is high and task completion
is high, the probability for cognitive lockup is
highest compared to all other conditions. That
means, in case people deal with a task, and
another more urgent task is triggered, people
tend to finish the first task before switching to
the more urgent when they feel time pressure
and have almost completed the first task.</p>
      <p>When time pressure is high and task completion
is low, the probability for cognitive lockup is
lowest compared to all other conditions. That
means, in case people deal with a task, and
another more urgent task is triggered, people
tend to switch to the urgent task before
executing the first task when they feel time
pressure, but still need to complete many stages
to complete the first task.</p>
      <p>
        This study extends the study conducted by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        as
we expect to provide further evidence for the explanation
that cognitive lockup is caused by a decision making
bias, and that this bias could be triggered by time
pressure and task completion.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Method</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Participants</title>
      <p>The experiment counted 46 participants. The participants
consisted of:
• TNO trainees/employees (15)
• students of the University of Utrecht (20)
• (ex)members of the Hockey Club Rotterdam (6)
• other (5)
All participants were experienced computer users and
most of them were highly educated. They were all
between the age of 18 and 35 years old. Psychology
students received course credits for participation in the
experiment. All participants could win 20 Euro when
they had the highest score in the experiment.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Apparatus and material</title>
      <p>The experiment included two laptop computers with
headphones. Java software was installed on the
computers to run the experimental task and a training
session. Before the experiment, participants received a
hardcopy manual printed on paper with A4 format.
During the experiment, participants could use a
questiontree (see Figure 2) printed on paper with A4 format for
reference purposes.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Procedure</title>
      <p>The experiment was conducted at TNO in a computer
room, at the University of Utrecht in a laboratory, and in
a private setting with the use of laptops. The experiment
took ca. 30 minutes per participant: 15 minutes for a
training (including test scenarios) and 15 minutes for the
experiment.</p>
      <p>The participants received an information letter
upfront the training and an informed consent document
after the training. The aim of the training was to
familiarize the participants with the experimental task.
The training involved reading the training manual, which
was accompanied by a verbal instruction and executing
test scenarios on the computer. After the training the
participants were asked whether they felt comfortable
with performing the task. If so, the experiment was
started. If not, questions could be asked and the test
scenarios could be done again until the participant was
comfortable with executing the task</p>
      <p>
        The experimental task was a computer
simulation in which participants had to fight fires on a
ship. The fire-fighting software was chosen because
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij
(2004)</xref>
        already demonstrated that with this fire-fighting
task cognitive lockup could be found.
      </p>
      <p>Experimental task. In the experimental task participants
had to fight fires on a ship. Two types of fires existed:
• normal fires, which were indicated by a red
triangle
• urgent fires, which fires were indicated by a blue
triangle in a yellow background
Next to the fire type, fires had specific features. For
example, a fire could be an oil fire, a fire could be life
threatening, injured people could be involved, and/or
smoke could trouble the sight of the firemen. Therefore,
each fire required a specific action based on the fire’s
specific features. To find out the fire specifics,
participants could ask four predefined questions. These
questions appeared as buttons on the screen. To ask a
question, participants had to press the question button.
Figure 1 shows the screen that was visible to the
participants once a fire was present. When a question was
asked, the system closed for four seconds to answer the
question with Y (Yes) or N (No) for a normal fire. In case
of an urgent fire the system closed for one second to
answer the question. This was because an urgent fire was
more dangerous for the ship and needed quick handling.
Please note that when the system was closed nothing
could be done. Based on the answers generated by the
system, participants could select the appropriate action to
extinguish the fire. Figure 2 shows the question-tree
which indicates the appropriate action. Seven predefined
actions could be chosen. The action buttons also appeared
on the bottom of the screen, once a fire was present (see
Figure 1). An appropriate action extinguished the fire; a
wrong action shut down the system for seven seconds.
Thereafter, a new action could be selected, if time
allowed it.</p>
      <p>Participants knew how much time they had to
extinguish the first fire, as this was indicated by the timer
at the bottom of the screen. The time to stop a second fire
was not indicated. This was done to make the decision to
switch to the second fire similar for the different test
scenarios (see scenarios). In case the time available
would be shown for the second fire as well as,
participants could depend their decision to switch on the
time available for both fires. In the high task completion
condition relatively little time would be left for the first
fire and therefore relatively more time would be left to
extinguish the second fire, which would give the
incentive to finish the first fire. In the low task
completion condition relatively much time would be left
to extinguish the first fire, and relatively less time would
be left to extinguish the second fire. This would give the
incentive to switch to the second fire. As a result the
switch incentives in these situations would not be
comparable. This problem was solved by not showing the
time available for the second fire.</p>
      <p>If participants extinguished a fire in time they
could win points. However, if they did not extinguish the
fire in time, points were deducted and a burn down was
the result (see Table 1). This was done to emphasize the
fact that an urgent fire was more urgent than a normal
fire, as more points could be won or lost by respectively
extinguishing or missing an urgent fire. If one fire burned
down, another fire could still be extinguished if time
allowed it.</p>
      <p>In the test scenarios (see scenarios) the second
fire was always an urgent fire. The time was set in such a
way that if a participant finished the first fire before
switching to the urgent fire, the urgent fire would burn
down. This was also done to emphasize the fact that an
urgent fire was urgent. If it was not handled quickly it
burned down. This also meant that if participants suffered
from cognitive lockup (finishing the first fire instead of
extinguishing the urgent fire first), they would have had a
lower score than participants who did not suffer cognitive
lockup. To ensure the motivation of the participants a
reward of 20 Euro was promised to the participant with
the highest score. Participants only saw their score at the
end of the experiment.
The main goal of this experiment was to investigate how
time pressure and task completion influence the
occurrence of cognitive lockup. In order to enhance the
sensitiveness to find cognitive lockup, we operationalized
cognitive lockup in two ways. In the first definition
cognitive lockup was only found when participants did
not switch to the urgent fire, when dealing with the first
fire. In the second definition cognitive lockup was found
when participants significantly delayed their switch to the
urgent fire. Therefore, the second analysis was more
sensitive to find cognitive lockup than the first analysis.</p>
      <p>Cognitive lockup 1 was defined as completing the
first fire before extinguishing the second more urgent
fire. Cognitive lockup 1 was measured as the mean
percentage of scenarios in which cognitive lockup
occur.</p>
      <p>
        Cognitive lockup 2 was defined as delayed switching
to the second more urgent task once presented, while
executing a first task. Cognitive lockup 2 was
measured as the action time to switch to the urgent
fire, once present (a significantly delayed action time
indicates cognitive lockup).
1)
2)
In order to investigate the influence of time pressure and
task completion on cognitive lockup, time pressure and
task completion were manipulated within-subjects.
Task completion. Task completion was defined as the
percentage of the total number of stages of a task that
have been completed. People have the tendency to stick
to their current task when 90% or more of the total stages
of a task have been completed
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref2 ref29 ref7">(Boehne and Pease, 2000;
Garland and Colon, 1993)</xref>
        . We investigated whether
people refrain from switching to an urgent second task,
when they have almost completed a first task. Therefore,
task completion was manipulated by the onset of the
urgent fire. The onset depended on the number of
questions that had been asked in order to extinguish the
first fire. In the high task completion condition the urgent
fire appeared after three questions had been asked. In this
condition task completion of the first task was 75%, as
75% of the total stages of the task had been completed
(three questions answered out of four). This percentage
was chosen because this was the pre-final stage for
extinguishing the first fire, and closest to 90% task
completion as mentioned by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">Boehne and Pease (2000)</xref>
        and Garland and Colon (1993). In the low task
completion condition the urgent fire appeared after one
question had been asked. In this case task completion was
25%, as 25% of the total stages of the first task had been
completed (one question answered out of four).
Time pressure. Time pressure was defined as the
percentage of the available time to execute a task that is
required to execute the task. People experience time
pressure when 70% or more of the available time is
required for the task
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Beevis, 1999)</xref>
        . People experience
high time pressure when 85% of the available time is
required for the task
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Beevis, 1999)</xref>
        . The average time to
fight a fire depended on the number of questions that had
to be asked to extinguish a fire. Based on the pilot results
it appeared that for a normal fire the time required to
extinguish a fire based on four questions was 22,1
seconds; based on three questions this was 18,6 seconds
and based on two questions this was 14,3 seconds. We
investigated whether time pressure on a first task would
refrain people from switching to a second more urgent
task. Therefore, time pressure was manipulated. This was
achieved by increasing or decreasing the time available
for fighting the first fire.
      </p>
      <p>In the high time pressure condition the available
time to extinguish the first fire was 25 seconds for fires
that needed four questions and 20 seconds for fires that
needed three questions. Fires that needed two questions
were not present in the test scenarios (see scenarios). In
this way time pressure was ≥ 88%, as 88% or more of the
available time was required for the task. As a result, in
the high time pressure and high task completion scenario
the available time to extinguish the first fire was almost
over when the urgent fire appeared. Therefore,
participants had to choose for the urgent fire at the cost of
a burn down of the first fire in this condition. Thus, they
could never obtain the total payoff of four points in this
scenario. They could also choose to extinguish the first
fire first, but in that case the urgent fire would burn down
as explained before.</p>
      <p>In the low time pressure condition the available
time to extinguish the first fire was 55 seconds for all
fires. In this condition time pressure was ≤ 40%, as 40%
or less of the available time was required for the task.
The available time of 55 seconds was chosen because
perceived time pressure of the first fire could be
influenced by the appearance of the second more urgent
fire. To make sure that participants would perceive little
time pressure in the low time pressure condition, 55
seconds allowed the participants to start with the first
fire, and when the urgent fire appeared to switch to the
urgent fire and once the urgent fire was extinguished, to
switch to the first fire again and extinguish the first fire.
Thus, in the low time pressure scenarios the maximum
score of four points could be obtained. Table 2
summarizes the test conditions in terms of task
completion and time pressure.
Scenarios. The experiment consisted of 25 scenarios.
The scenarios included 8 test scenarios (2 times all test
conditions) and 17 irrelevant scenarios. The irrelevant
scenarios were designed in order to accomplish
uncertainty, so the participants would not understand the
test scenarios. The test scenarios can be described as
follows:
1. In the scenario where time pressure was low and task
completion was low, participants had 55 seconds to
fight the first fire. The urgent fire appeared when
they had asked one question of the first fire. The
urgent fire needed to be extinguished in 17 seconds.
If participants decided to extinguish the first fire
first, the available time allowed participants to start
with the urgent fire, after they had extinguished the
first fire, but they would never be able to extinguish
it. In this way the participants would not be
demotivated, which would be the case when the
urgent fire had already burned down, while still
fighting the first fire.
2. In the scenario where time pressure was low and task
completion was high, participants had 55 seconds to
fight the first fire. The urgent fire appeared when
they had asked three questions of the first fire. The
urgent fire needed to be extinguished in 13 seconds.
In this way it was impossible to extinguish the first
fire first, and afterwards extinguish the urgent fire.
3. In the scenario where time pressure was high and
task completion was low, participants had 20
seconds to fight the first fire. This was because the
first fire could be extinguished after three questions.
The urgent fire appeared when they had asked one
before the participants switched to the more urgent
second fire.
question of the first fire. Like scenario 1, the urgent
fire needed to be extinguished in 17 seconds.
4. In the scenario where time pressure was high and
task completion was high, participants had 25
seconds to fight the first fire. This was because the
first fire could only be extinguished after four
questions. The urgent fire appeared when they had
asked three questions of the first fire. Like scenario 2
the urgent fire needed to be extinguished in 13
seconds.</p>
      <p>The scenarios (test and irrelevant scenarios) were
presented in random order to avoid order effects. Only
the test scenarios were analyzed.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>Statistical design</title>
      <p>The experimental design was a repeated measures design,
as each test condition consisted of two scenarios. Thus,
the participants received all test conditions twice.
Therefore, we used a 2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA
with attempts, time pressure and task completion as
factors to analyze the data.</p>
      <p>Before the experiment was executed, we
conducted a power analysis in order to examine the
number of participants needed for the experimental
design. The power analysis for a factorial ANOVA
suggested a sample size (N) of 45 to achieve a power of
0.80 for detecting a medium effect size (0.26) and alpha
set at 0.05. Hence, this design required a sample size of
45 participants to be able to conduct further statistical
analysis. Based on this result, 46 participants were
recruited.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>Results</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>Sample data</title>
      <p>In the experiment 46 cases with two repeated measures
were recorded. Three records were removed as one
participant did not follow the experiment instruction
correctly and pressed action buttons without asking
questions. Therefore, this data could not be analyzed as
the urgent fire was not triggered. Table 3 shows the
number of valid records per test condition.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-14">
      <title>Cognitive lockup 1</title>
      <p>Number of records
Attempt 1 Attempt 2
-10
Time Pressure</p>
      <p>Low</p>
      <p>High
Low High</p>
      <p>Task Completion</p>
      <p>The main effect of task completion on CL1 was
significant, F(1,44) = 36.857, p &lt; .001. This means that
the percentage of scenarios in which CL1 was found was
significantly higher in the high condition (Mean = 43%)
compared to the low condition (Mean = 11%). In other
words when participants had almost extinguished the first
fire (one question to go to find out the correct action)
more people finished the first fire before switching to the
urgent fire than when the participants still had three
questions to go to find out the correct action. There was
no effect of time pressure or an interaction effect found
between task completion and time pressure on CL1.
Next to these results, a significant main effect was found
for the factor attempts (not shown in Figure 3). The
participants received all test conditions twice. The results
show that the mean percentage of scenarios in which CL1
was found was significantly higher in the first attempt
(Mean = 34%) compared to the second attempt (Mean =
21%) F(1,44) = 10.203 p &lt; .003. This indicates a learning
effect.</p>
      <p>Figure 4 shows the results for attempt 1 and 2
separately. For both attempt 1 and 2, a significant main
effect for task completion was found F(1,44 ) = 26.362, p
&lt; .001 and F(1,44) = 24.750, p &lt; .001, respectively. No
effect was found for time pressure. In addition, no
interaction effect between time pressure and task
completion was found.</p>
      <p>ATTEMPT: 1</p>
      <p>ATTEMPT: 2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-15">
      <title>Cognitive lockup 2</title>
      <p>The main effect of task completion on CL2 was
significant, F(1,44) = 15.182, p &lt; .001. This means that
the participants needed more time to switch to the urgent
fire in the high condition (Mean = 5,9 seconds) compared
to the low condition (Mean = 4,1 seconds). In other
words, when participants had already asked three
questions of the first fire, it took significantly longer to
switch to the urgent fire compared to the situation where
they had only asked one question. The average time to
‘switch’ to the first fire, once it was present, was 1,1
second. There was no effect of time pressure or an
interaction effect found between task completion and
time pressure on CL2. Next to these results, a significant
main effect was found for the factor attempt (not shown
in Figure 5). The participants received all test conditions
twice. The results show that it took longer to switch to
the urgent fire in the first attempt (Mean = 5,8 seconds)
compared to the second attempt (Mean = 4,1 seconds;
F(1,44) = 15,444 p &lt; .001). This indicates a learning
effect.</p>
      <p>Time Pressure</p>
      <p>Low
High
Low High
Task Completion</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-16">
      <title>General Discussions</title>
      <p>
        The main goal of this experiment was to investigate how
both time pressure and task completion influence the
occurrence of cognitive lockup. Firstly, we hypothesized
that time pressure alone would not have an effect on
cognitive lockup (hypothesis 1). The results of the
experiment support this hypothesis. In case people deal
with a task, and another more urgent task is triggered,
people switch to the more urgent task just as often and
just as fast under time pressure as when there is no time
pressure. This result implies that although time pressure
can trigger heuristic information processing and thereby
influence decision making
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref15 ref19 ref4 ref6">(e.g. van der Kleij, 2009; De
Dreu, 2003; Durham et al., 2000; Karau and Kelly, 1992;
Kelly and Loving, 2004)</xref>
        , people are able to assess the
priority of different tasks while dealing with a task, and
switch to the most important task if necessary. They are
not captured in their current task when facing time
pressure.
      </p>
      <p>We should mention that in the high time
pressure and high task completion condition there was an
incentive to extinguish the normal fire first, before
switching to the urgent fire. As a result, this incentive
stimulated the chance to find cognitive lockup. The
incentive existed because a choice had to be made
between the normal fire and the urgent fire. While
dealing with the normal fire, participants could see that if
they switched to the urgent fire, they would miss the
normal fire. However, if they extinguished the normal
fire, there was only a chance that they would miss the
urgent fire. The participants did not know that the
maximum number of points could never be obtained, as
they would indeed miss the urgent fire, when they
extinguished the normal fire first. Participants with a risk
avoiding strategy would switch to the urgent fire as this
fire could be missed if they did not switch immediately
(two points versus minus two points). However,
participants that were very confident with extinguishing
the fires and who had a risky result maximizing strategy
could try to extinguish both fires instead of one (four
points versus two points). They would extinguish the
normal fire first. In this way, there was an incentive to
finish the normal fire first in the high task completion and
high time pressure condition. While this incentive was
present, nevertheless participants decided to switch to the
urgent fire in the high time pressure and high task
completion condition as often as in the low time pressure
and high task completion condition. This underscores our
finding that time pressure has no influence on the
occurrence of cognitive lockup.</p>
      <p>
        Furthermore, we should notice that we used a
static time deadline to manipulate time pressure. Other
ways exist to induce time pressure. For example, a more
dynamic task can be used in which deadlines evolve with
different speed. This type of dynamic time pressure might
have different effects on performance
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">(Kerstholt and
Willems, 1993)</xref>
        . As a consequence, the results of this
study only apply to settings in which time pressure is
induced by a static deadline. Further research is needed to
analyze the effect on behavior when time pressure is
dynamic.
      </p>
      <p>Secondly, we hypothesized that task completion
would have an effect on cognitive lockup (hypothesis 2).
The results of the experiment support this hypothesis.
The results show that there is a main effect of task
completion on cognitive lockup (CL1 and CL2). People
that have almost completed a task tend to finish this task
even when a more urgent task is triggered. In other
words, when task completion is high the probability for
cognitive lockup increases (hypotheses 2a). People that
still need to complete many stages before a task is
completed tend to switch to the more urgent task, when
triggered. Thus, when task completion is low the
probability for cognitive lockup decreases (hypotheses
2b). These results were found despite a learning effect.
We found that cognitive lockup was less present during
the second attempt of a test scenario compared to the first
attempt. We believe that this was due to a learning effect.
People learned from the feedback they received in the
first attempt of a scenario, and if needed they changed
their strategy in the second attempt. However, the task
completion effect remained significant in the second
attempt. Thus, although participants lost points when they
completed the first fire and as a result missed the urgent
fire in the first attempt of the high task completion
scenario, they did not change their strategy when the
scenario was executed again.</p>
      <p>It could be argued that the participants might not
have perceived the urge of the urgent fires and as a result
stayed with the normal fires. Although the urgent fires
had a very different icon, behaved differently (system
closure of one second instead of four after a button had
been pressed) and generated more (less) points when
extinguished (burned down) than normal fires, the
categorization might not have been meaningful enough
for the participants. However, participants showed in the
high time pressure and high task completion condition, in
which they had to choose between the urgent and normal
fire, that they switched to the urgent fire as often as in the
low time pressure and high task completion condition.
Such behavior would not have been expected when
categorization and consequences were not clear.</p>
      <p>
        This study replicates the results of
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        as he also found an effect of task completion on cognitive
lockup. Furthermore, this finding extends the results
reported by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">Boehne and Pease (2000)</xref>
        and Garland and
Colon (1993). In their experiments they found the
tendency to complete a task when the task has already
been completed for 90%. The present study shows that
this tendency is already present when a task has been
completed for 75%. In our experimental setup this was
achieved when three task stages had been completed out
of a maximum number of four stages. It could be argued
that participants perceived a higher task completion
percentage as only one stage was still required to
complete the task.
      </p>
      <p>These results imply that the perception that a
task is almost competed could lead to critical situations
when another more urgent task is triggered. This urgent
task might be ignored as a result of cognitive lockup. In
order to avoid cognitive lockup we believe that the
tendency to complete a task when it is almost completed
should be broken. For instance, this might be done by
altering the perception that a task is almost completed or
by unlearning this tendency. Further research is needed to
investigate how to break the tendency to complete a task
when it has almost been completed and a more urgent
task is triggered.</p>
      <p>
        Finally, according to the results of
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        we hypothesized that there would be an interaction effect
between time pressure and task completion (hypothesis
3). The results do not support this hypothesis as the
interaction effect between time pressure and task
completion on cognitive lockup (CL1 and CL2) was not
significant. The result implies that time pressure does not
enhance the task completion effect, as expected. Thus,
when task completion is high the probability for
cognitive lockup is not increased when people face time
pressure. The present study shows that the interaction
effect found by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">Meij (2004)</xref>
        between prior investments
and task completion on cognitive lockup cannot be
explained by the perception of time pressure when prior
investments are high, as he suggested. An alternative
explanation cannot be given as prior investments were
not investigated in this experiment. Further research
should be done to find an explanation for the effect of
prior investments on cognitive lockup and why this factor
interacts with task completion.
      </p>
      <p>The results of this study provide further support
for the explanation that cognitive lockup up is the result
of a decision making bias and that this bias could be
triggered by the perception that a task is almost
completed. This has important implications for the
designs of cockpits, as it indicates that decision support
tools seem more important in reducing the probability for
cognitive lockup than, for example, tools that reduce
cognitive workload. The decision support tool should
assist pilots to focus on the most urgent task. However, a
critical situation exists when the pilot has almost
completed a task and a more urgent task is triggered. The
decision support tool might be ignored, as a result of
cognitive lockup. To avoid critical situations it is
important that this decision support tool also helps pilots
to break the tendency to complete a task when it is almost
finished and another more urgent task is triggered. In this
way pilots can act appropriately and deal with the most
urgent task.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-17">
      <title>Training</title>
      <p>
        Although the experimental design was not specifically
built to investigate an effect of training, a significant
learning effect was found. Participants showed less
cognitive lockup (CL1 and CL2) the second time they
executed the test scenarios, compared to the first time. As
mentioned before, we believe that participants learned
from the feedback they received in the first attempt of a
scenario. When participants decided to stick to the first
fire, it resulted in a burn down of the urgent fire. Their
payoff in that scenario would have been minus two. As
participants executed the test scenarios twice, they
adjusted their strategy in order to improve their payoff.
This finding supports the results reported by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">Kerstholt
and Passenier (2000)</xref>
        . They suggested that if people
understood the underlying system, cognitive lockup was
less likely to occur. Training might therefore be a factor
that influences cognitive lockup as it increases the
knowledge of a system and thereby reduces the
probability for cognitive lockup. For the design of
cockpits this implies that the decision to automate
processes should be done carefully. This is because
automation might decrease the understanding of
underlying systems as operators are not involved
anymore in the normal process
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref16 ref29 ref29">(Wickens and Hollands,
2000; Kerstholt and Passenier, 2000)</xref>
        . As a result, the
likelihood for cognitive lockup might increase. Further
research should be done to provide evidence for the
suggested effect of training on the occurrence of
cognitive lockup.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-18">
      <title>Task domain and participants</title>
      <p>
        It can be argued that the experiment was conducted in a
specific task domain (fire-fighting task) and with a
specific set of participants and that generalizing the
results should be done carefully. We assume that
cognitive lockup is a general cognitive mechanism or
heuristic that is domain independent and can happen to
every human being. This assumption is based on the fact
that heuristics that are used to solve well defined
problems are general-purpose or domain independent
heuristics, in that they can be applied to a wide range of
situations or domains and do not involve specific
capabilities
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Groom, 2002)</xref>
        . Well defined problems are
well specified and the knowledge required to find the
solution is present in the instructions given, e.g. a puzzle
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Groom, 2002)</xref>
        . The fire fighting task used in this
experiment can be regarded as a well defined problem.
As cognitive lockup was found in this problem solving
setting, cognitive lockup is assumed to be a general
purpose heuristic. This implies that although the results
are obtained in a fire-fighting domain, they can be
applied to any other domain. The same applies for the
sample that has been used. The participants of the
experiment were Dutch, between 18-32 years old and
most of them were highly educated. As we assume that
cognitive lockup does not depend on specific capabilities,
we suggest that the results from this sample can be
applied to human beings in general.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-19">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The work described in this paper is funded by the
European Commission in the 7th Framework Programme,
Transportation under the number FP7 – 211988.
CEUR Proceedings 4th Workshop HCP Human Centered Processes, February 10-11, 2011
74</p>
    </sec>
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