ooperation neither initiative an ahieve the neessary majority and the result an objetive Left would vote (Yes,No) and Right would vote (No,Yes). Without would be (No,No), although both partiipants agree that (Yes,Yes) would have been a better option. This result is known in game theory as the Prisoners deision ould be derived through a mathematial ounting sheme. Under suh Dilemma [5℄. Figure 2 shows the dilemma in matrix form.
Yes Yes Initiative A Initiative B No No unarbitrated voting leads to a suboptimal (No,No) deision.
Fig. 2. Soial dilemma in a vote on two independent initiatives: Left would be happiest with (Yes,No), while Right favors (No,Yes). Both ould be satised with a (Yes,Yes) result, but preferene numbers to the four mutually exlusive hoies (No,No), (No,Yes), In pratial politis the optimal solution requires a benevolent member of (Yes,No), and (Yes,Yes) as shown in gure 3. All ommon variations of the ConLooking at our simple example one might rightfully objet that there must have been someone to ome up with a voting sheme that eliits the interdesoures to sustain suh arbitration eorts, or it even ontrasts self seleted grasspendene between the two initiatives. Many suh shemes are subsumed under through a small number of delegated representatives who an build suient the Condoret voting system whih requires the partiipants to assign ordinal parliament who arbitrates between Left and Right. This job an only be done roots demorati priniples. With an inreasing number of deisions that have doret vote an solve this simple problem [4℄. Suh overarhing voting shemes to be made, more and more arbitration opportunities will be lost and group satisfation dereases. trust in eah other. Internet based ativist groups usually do not have the re2 Right: (No, Yes) Right: (Yes,Yes) Left: (Yes, No) Result: (No, No) Result: (Yes, No) Left: (Yes, Yes) Result: (No,Yes) Result: (Yes, Yes) Fig. 1. Ballot paper with two non-exlusive hoies exponentially with the number of involved deisions. are feasible for a small number of learly interlinked issues, but eort Fig. 5. Separated voting favors both initiatives. Only 10% are satised, while 90% omplain about wasted resoures. strain group resoures, when ombined.
Fig. 4. A possible vote distribution for two hoies that are not stritly exlusive but unduly results.
Suppose two initiatives, A and B, are ompletely independent in terms of ral resoures. Only 10% of the eletorate think that it makes sense to implement phenomenologial eet, but both deplete the group’s limited nanial or natufor the group. Figure 4 shows the distribution of voters and gure 5 shows the both measures, while 90% think that only one of the suggested measures an be implemented in a sustainable fashion. Yet, under these tight onditions separated demorati voting an lead to exatly this highly unsatisfatory outome separately on seemingly unonneted issues. This time initiative A and B are not tehnially exluding eah other, but they ompete for some sort of limited resoure that makes in impratial to implement both, A and B. automatially reah the pareto optimal solution for the group, if it is applied This seond example will again demonstrate that demorati voting does not pro ontra Initiative B 55% 45% Initiative A 55% 45% pro A ontra A pro B 10% 45% ontra B 45% 0% Fig. 3. A Condoret vote ould solve the soial dilemma for two hoies, but beomes impra(No, Yes) 4th 1st tial for a larger number of seemingly independent deisions. (Yes, No) 1st 4th (No, No) 3rd 3rd (Yes, Yes) 2nd 2nd Choies for initiatives A, B Left’s preferenes Right’s preferenes voting system is speially designed for the internet and is not appliable to The internet voting system is a voting system primarily designed to help solving paper based voting. only possible by utilizing the unique features of an interative omputational able and onsistent in terms of its result. At its downside it does not enfore a The internet voting system is more akin to ooperative and interative game nal winner if the voters preferene orders are irular. the soial dilemma. It is to be played interatively and requires all votes to be Thus, a huge number of potential outomes have to be evaluated, whih is publily viewable during the voting phase. initiatives, the voting system must onsider all open deisions simultaneously. take simultaneous and ne grained judgments in a huge number of politial Sine oniting positions an only be resolved by arbitrations over multiple play than to lassial voting. Many strategy games prove that it is possible to elds. This potential must be exploited to nd widely agreed preferene orders. platform without the restritions of a physial ballot sheet. Hene, the internet The results will be more fuzzy in terms of absolute valuations, but more agreegrassroots organizations always break apart quikly.
If suh a demorati system with independent votes on independent politial issues governs a politial state at least a nanial solution an be found easily: are never found in the industry on any signiant sale and it is the reason, why Charge future generation. However, for small groups as well as for prot oriented businesses this is not an option. That is why grassroots demorati priniples an example for voting weights that ould be alloated in a vote on two initiatives. -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 a) Independent b) Cumulative ) The internet 1 (1, 1) 1 1 voting voting voting system Fig. 6. Comparison of possible vote distributions in dierent voting systems. A marker shows 5 ) The internet voting system uses a limited radial voting weight. The system any side of the debate leads to a full vote assigned in the orresponding diretion.
All ahievable vote ombinations are shown in the graph.
S wants (Yes,No). Due to dierent priorities assigned by eah partiipant the a) If partiipants an vote on both initiatives independently an assoiated just gain the same fration in a minor issue. votes at all. Why give up a fration of a vote in a major issue, when one an allows maximum total inuene, if the vote is spread evenly on both initiatives.
At the same time, the system allows higher inuene on one initiative, if more resulting sum has a slight tendeny towards (no,no). As will be disussed in more detail, any two partiipants an overome the soial dilemma and ooperate to is applied to non-politial topis, suh as ustomer satisfation, it is usually possible to assign frational weights. In a politial struggle, however, hardly anyone voting weight between -1 and 1 an our on both axes. If suh a voting system is plotted on the x-axis, while the seond weight is plotted against the y-axis. voting weight onto dierent initiatives. Under suh a voting system it an make Figure 6 ompares the possible vote distributions of dierent voting systems sense to split a vote onto dierent initiatives. If, however, one initiative is seen positions on two initiatives. P favors (Yes,Yes), Q (No,Yes), R (No,No), and system that makes it optimal to orretly reveal relative preferenes. would deliberately limit their potential inuene. Hene, slight onvitions for in a vote with two initiatives. The voting weight assigned to the rst initiative as onsiderable more important than the other, partiipants would hardly split Figure 7 shows a possible voting strategy. Four partiipants have ontrary weight is assigned to it. As disussed in more detail below, this is the only voting b) In a umulative voting system partiipants an distribute a limited total m X vpi p=1 rational individuals [2℄, whih allows us to derive a number of strategi properties maximize her utility and, assuming rational behavior, votes aordingly. the satisfation that partiipant gets from the results. Naturally, wants to p p of the disussed voting system. We onsider a utility funtion that measures up The utilitarian approah provides a mathematial framework for the behavior of world observations. Few seonds spent on signing a petition are met with hours hardly pays the bills. Dediated interest groups also prot from the large status gained by representing their members in speialized issues.
The high exhange value of the rst marginal vote is onsistent with real of ampaigning eorts, while a full time ommitment to a politial movement votes from any other initiative. Here, she deides to ut bak on The question j. Assuming partiipant intends to alloate some voting weight to a new p vote swapping deal. Suh deals are extremely important in the quest for solving with someone who has mathing ore priniples. the soial dilemma. Naturally, you would prefer to enter suh a ooperative deal on by one marginal unit. As indiated previously the answer is zero. i initiative Due to the limited overall voting weight has to withdraw some i. p now is how muh weight must be subtrated from in order to inrease her vote j other initiatives.
This property also has strong impliations for ooperative voting strategies.
Any topi you feel almost indierent about an serve as a valuable asset in a slightest onvition. for whih both partiipants an inrease their utility. ǫ weight. Exluding these two speial ases there always exists a delegation weight This mutual delegation is almost always beneial for both sides. There It is not possible to ooperate further. Seond, and have exatly opposing p q preferenes Both sides disagree on all initiatives with equal preferene vp = −vq. preferenes on all initiatives, i.e. Maximum ooperation is ahieved. vp = vq. are only two exeptions. First, and already have equal opinions and equal p q