<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Computational Theory and Cognitive Assistant for Intelligence Analysis</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Gheorghe Tecuci, Dorin Marcu, Mihai Boicu, David Schum, Katherine Russell Learning Agents Center, Volgenau School of Engineering, George Mason University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Fairfax, VA 22032</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>- This paper presents elements of a computational theory of intelligence analysis and its implementation in a cognitive assistant. Following the framework of the scientific method, this theory provides computational models for essential analysis tasks: evidence marshaling for hypotheses generation, hypotheses-driven evidence collection, and hypotheses testing through multi-INT fusion. Many of these models have been implemented in a web-based cognitive assistant that not only assists an analyst in coping with the astonishing complexity of intelligence analysis, but it also learns from their joint analysis experience.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Intelligence analysis, scientific method, cognitive assitant,
evidence-based reasoning, mixed-initiative reasoning, discovery,
ontology, rules, learning, evidence collection, hypotheses testing
I.</p>
      <p>INTRODUCTION</p>
      <p>
        The purpose of Intelligence Analysis is to answer questions
arising in the decision-making process. Often stunningly
complex arguments, involving both imaginative and critical
reasoning, are necessary in order to establish and defend the
relevance, the believability, and the inferential force of
evidence with respect to the questions asked. The answers are
necessarily probabilistic in nature because evidence is always
incomplete (we can look for more, if we have time), usually
inconclusive (it is consistent with the truth of more than one
answer), frequently ambiguous (we cannot always determine
exactly what the evidence is telling us), commonly dissonant
(some of it favors one answer but other evidence favors other
answers), and has various degrees of believability shy of
perfection [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ]. Not only is this process highly complex, but it
often needs to be performed in a very short period of time.
      </p>
      <p>
        Given these characteristics of intelligence analysis, we
believe that it can be best performed through the
mixed-initiative integration of human imagination
and computer knowledge-based reasoning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. To
this purpose we are developing a Computational
Theory of Intelligence Analysis which is grounded
in the science of evidence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], artificial
intelligence, logic, and probability. This theory
provides computational models for essential
analysis tasks: evidence marshaling for hypotheses
generation, hypotheses-driven evidence collection,
and hypotheses testing through multi-INT fusion.
Many of these models have already been
implemented in the TIACRITIS web-based
cognitive assistant. The first version of TIACRITIS
was developed to help intelligence analysts learn
critical thinking skills for evidence-based reasoning, through a
hands-on approach, based on predefined analysis cases [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5">2, 5</xref>
        ].
That version has now been significantly extended with new
capabilities that allow intelligence analysts to formulate and
analyze their own hypotheses, and also to learn from the
performed analyses.
      </p>
      <p>This paper provides an overview of the current status of the
computational theory of intelligence analysis, and its
implementation in the extended version of TIACRITIS.</p>
      <p>II.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS CEASELESS DISCOVERY OF</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>EVIDENCE, HYPOTHESES, AND ARGUMENTS</title>
      <p>Within the framework of the scientific method, we view
intelligence analysis as ceaseless discovery of evidence,
hypotheses, and arguments in a non-stationary world. It
involves a collaborative process of evidence in search of
hypotheses, hypotheses in search of evidence, and evidentiary
testing of hypotheses (see Fig. 1). Through abductive
reasoning (which shows that something is possibly true) we
generate hypotheses from our observations; through deductive
reasoning (which shows that something is necessarily true) we
use our hypotheses to generate new lines of inquiry and
discover new evidence; and through inductive reasoning
(which shows that something is probably true) we test our
hypotheses with the discovered evidence. Therefore, in this
paper we will illustrate the discovery of evidence, hypotheses,
and arguments with an analysis example, and then we will
show how the same analysis is performed with TIACRITIS.</p>
      <p>In our analysis example, Mavis, a counterterrorism analyst,
reads in today’s Washington Post that a canister containing
cesium-137 is missing from the warehouse of the Company
XYZ in MD (see evidence E at the bottom-left of Fig. 2). The
question is: What hypothesis would explain this observation?</p>
      <p>Through imaginative reasoning, Mavis abductively infers
that a dirty bomb will be set off in the Washington, DC area.
However, no matter how imaginative or important this
hypothesis is, no one will take it seriously unless Mavis and her
cognitive assistant, TIACRITIS, are able to justify it. So they
develop the chain of abductive inferences shown in the left
hand side of Fig. 2. We have evidence that the cesium-137
canister is missing (E). Therefore it is possible that it is indeed
missing (H1). It is possible that it was stolen (H2). It is possible
that it was stolen by someone associated with a terrorist
organization (H3). It is possible that the terrorist organization
will use the cesium-137 canister to build a dirty bomb (H4). It
is possible that the dirty bomb will be set off in the
Washington, DC area (H5).</p>
      <p>But these are not the only hypotheses that explain E. Just
because there is evidence that the cesium-137 canister is
missing does not mean that it is indeed missing. At issue here is
the believability of the source of this information. Thus an
alternative hypothesis is that the cesium-137 canister is not
missing (H’1). But let us assume that it is missing. Then it is
possible that it was stolen (H2). But it is also possible that it
was misplaced (H’2), or maybe it was used in a project at the
XYZ Company (H”2). But let us suppose that it was stolen
(H2). Then it is possible that it was stolen by someone
associated with a terrorist organization (H3). But it is also
possible that it was stolen by a competitor (H’3), or maybe it
was stolen by an employee (H”3), and so on. This is the process
of evidence in search of hypotheses that would explain it.</p>
      <p>The analyst and TIACRITIS need to assess each of these
hypotheses before they can conclude that a dirty bomb will be
set off in the Washington, DC area. During this process, they
would also need to discover who will set off the dirty bomb,
and where and when it would be set off.</p>
      <p>Starting with H1, each hypothesis is deductively put to
work to guide the collection of additional evidence (see the
blue tree in the middle of Fig. 2). Assuming that the
cesium137 canister is indeed missing (H1), what other things should
be observable? Which are the necessary conditions for an
object to be reported as missing from a warehouse? It was in
the warehouse (H11), it is no longer there (H12), and no one has
checked it out (H13). This leads Mavis to contact Ralph, the
supervisor of the warehouse, who reports that the cesium-137
canister is registered as being in the warehouse, that no one at
the XYZ Company had checked it out, but it is not located
anywhere in the hazardous materials locker. He also indicates
that the lock on the hazardous materials locker appears to have
been forced (see bottom right of Fig. 2). Ralph’s testimony
provides several items of evidence which are relevant for the
hypotheses H11, H12, and H13. This is hypothesis in search of
evidence that guides the analyst in collecting new evidence.</p>
      <p>Mavis and TIACRITIS have now collected more relevant
evidence, and the question is: What is the likelihood that the
cesium-137 canister is missing, based on the available
evidence? To answer this question, they build a Wigmorean
probabilistic inference network that shows how the evidence is
fused through an argument that establishes its relevance, its
believability, and its inferential force on the intermediate
hypotheses H11, H12, and H13 and on the top-level hypothesis
H. They conclude that it is very likely the cesium-137 canister
is missing (see the green tree in the right hand side of Fig. 2).</p>
      <p>Now, some of the newly discovered items of evidence may
trigger new hypotheses, or the refinement of the current
hypotheses. Therefore these processes of evidence in search of
hypotheses, hypotheses in search of evidence, and evidentiary
testing of hypotheses, take place at the same time, and in
response to one another, as indicated by the arrows at the
bottom of Fig. 2. For example, during her investigation of the
security camera of the XYZ warehouse, Mavis discovers a
video segment showing a person loading a container into a
UHaul panel truck. Therefore the hypothesis H2 is refined to “the
cesium-137 canister was stolen with the U-Haul panel truck”
(see the left part of Fig. 2).</p>
      <p>Having concluded that the cesium-137 canister is missing,
Mavis and TIACRITIS now have to establish whether the
cesium-137 canister was stolen with a truck (H1), misplaced
(H’1), or used in some project (H”1). Each of these hypotheses
is put to work to guide the collection of relevant evidence
which is then used to assess it, as illustrated in Fig. 3.</p>
      <p>Assuming that the cesium-137 canister was stolen with a
truck (H2), what other things should be observable? The
current evidence suggests the following scenario of how the
cesium-137 might been stolen: The truck entered the company,
the canister was stolen from the locker, the canister was loaded
into the truck, and the truck left with the canister (see the blue
tree in the right side of Fig. 3). Such scenarios have enormous
heuristic value in advancing the investigation because they
consist of mixtures of what is taken to be factual and what is
conjectural. Conjecture is necessary in order to fill in natural
gaps left by the absence of evidence. Each such conjecture
opens up a new avenue of investigation, and the discovery of
additional evidence, if the scenario turns out to be true. In this
case, for instance, Mavis is led to check whether the truck
entered the XYZ parking area. She investigates the record of
the security guard and discovers that a panel truck bearing
Maryland license plate number MDC-578 was in the XYZ
parking area the day before it was discovered that the
cesium137 canister was missing (see the bottom of Fig. 3).</p>
      <p>Fusing all the discovered evidence, Mavis and TIACRITIS
conclude that it is very likely that the cesium-137 canister was
stolen with the MDC-678 truck. However, they now need to
also assess H’2 and H”2. They do not find any relevant
evidence for H’2. In searching for evidence relevant to H”2,
Mavis contacts Grace, the Vice President for Operations at
XYZ. Grace tells Mavis that no one at the XYZ Company had
checked the canister out for work on any project. She says that
the XYZ Company has other projects involving hazardous
materials but none that involves the use of cesium-137. As a
result, it is concluded to be very unlikely that the cesium-137
canister was used in a project at the XYZ Company.</p>
      <p>Through such spiral hybrid reasoning, where abductions,
deductions, and inductions feed on each other in recursive
calls, Mavis and TIACRITIS continuously generate and update
intermediate alternative hypotheses, use these hypotheses to
guide the collection of relevant evidence, and use the evidence
to test these hypotheses, until the likelihood of the top-level
hypothesis is assessed. At the same time, TIACRITIS learns
reasoning patterns from the analyst, and becomes increasingly
more knowledgeable, as will be illustrated in Section IV.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>III. HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS THROUGH</title>
      <p>PROBLEM REDUCTION AND SOLUTION SYNTHESIS</p>
      <p>
        The analyst and TIACRITIS analyze hypotheses by
employing a general divide and conquer approach, called
problem reduction and solution synthesis, which combines the
deductive and inductive reasoning trees, as shown in the right
hand side of Fig. 3. This approach is grounded in the problem
reduction representations developed in artificial intelligence
[68], and in the argument construction methods provided by the
noted jurist John H. Wigmore [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], the philosopher of science
Stephen Toulmin [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], and the evidence professor David
Schum [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. In this approach, which is illustrated in Fig. 4, the
problem of assessing a complex hypothesis H is successively
reduced to the assessment of simpler and simpler hypotheses,
down to the level of elementary hypotheses. Then these
elementary hypotheses (e.g., H2) are assessed based on the
available evidence. Finally, the solutions of these assessments
are successively combined, from bottom-up, to obtain the
solution of the top level hypothesis assessment.
      </p>
      <p>In Fig. 4 the assessment of the hypothesis H is reduced to
the assessment of three simpler hypotheses, H1, H2, and H3.
The middle hypothesis H2 is assessed based on the available
evidence. As indicated in Fig. 4, one has to consider both
favoring evidence and disfavoring evidence. In this example
there are two items of favoring evidence, E1 and E2. Therefore
one has to assess to what extent each of them favors the
hypothesis H2. This requires the assessment of the relevance
and believability of E1, and of its inferential force on H2.</p>
      <p>The relevance answers the question: So what? How does
this item of evidence bears on what we are trying to prove or
disprove? The believability answers the question: Can we
believe what this item of evidence is telling it? The inferential
force or weight answers the question: How strong is this item
of relevant evidence in favoring or disfavoring various
alternative hypotheses we are entertaining?</p>
      <p>
        As indicated before, all these assessments are probabilistic
and, in our research, we have considered symbolic probabilities
with names that are similar to those from the US National
Intelligence Council’s standard estimative language. For
example, as shown in the table from the left side of Fig. 4,
indicating that a hypothesis is “likely” is equivalent to saying
that its probability of being true is between 0.55 and 0.75. Of
course, the actual symbolic probabilities and the associated
intervals from Fig. 4 are just examples. A user may decide to
use other names for symbolic probabilities, as well as other
associated intervals, as discussed by Kent [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] and Weiss [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>In this example let us assume the following solutions for
the relevance and the believability of E1: “If we believe E1 then
H2 is almost certain” and “It is likely that E1 is true.” These
assessments need to be composed to assess the inferential force
of E1 on H2. TIACRITIS uses the “minimum” composition
function, because an item of evidence needs to be both very
relevant and very believable to convince us that the hypothesis
is true. As a result, the assessed the inferential force of E1 on
H2 is: “Based on E1 it is likely that H2 is true.” The inferential
force of E2 on H2 is similarly assessed by TIACRITIS as
almost certain. Then TIACRITIS composes the inferential
force of E1 on H2 with the inferential force of E2 on H2, by
using the “maximum” function because it is enough to be
convinced by one item of evidence that the hypothesis is true.
As a result, TIACRITIS assesses the following inferential force
of the favoring evidence (i.e. both E1 and E2) on H2: “Based
on the favoring evidence it is almost certain that H2 is true.”
Through a similar process TIACRITIS assesses the inferential
force of the disfavoring evidence on H2, and then the
likelihood of H2 based on both the favoring and the disfavoring
evidence. H1 and H3 are assessed in a similar way as very
likely and likely, respectively. Then the assessments of H1, H2,
and H3 are combined by TIACRITIS through a function
selected by the analyst, such as minimum (all three hypotheses
required to be true), maximum (one hypothesis required to be
true), average, or weighted sum, into the assessment of the top
level hypothesis H.</p>
      <p>
        TIACRITIS is able to significantly help the analyst because
it has a lot of knowledge about evidence. This includes an
ontology of evidence, a fragment of which is shown in the
bottom-right part of Fig. 4. This ontology distinguishes
between different types of tangible and testimonial evidence.
For each such type, TIACRITIS automatically employs a
specific believability assessment procedure. For instance, in the
case of an item of demonstrative tangible evidence which is a
representation or image of a tangible thing (e.g., the record of
the security camera in Fig. 2), its believability depends on its
authenticity, accuracy, and reliability. Also, the believability of
unequivocal testimonial evidence based upon direct
observation (such as Ralph’s testimony in Fig. 2) depends on
source’s competence and credibility. Competence depends on
access and understandability, while credibility depends on
veracity, objectivity, and observational sensitivity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>This knowledge allows TIACRITIS to automatically reduce
the assessment of complex hypotheses to the assessment of the
relevance and believability credentials of evidence, as well as
to automatically compose these assessments, once they are
made by the analyst.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>IV. ILLUSTRATION OF THE USE OF TIACRITIS</title>
      <p>TIACRITIS allows its users to formulate hypotheses,
develop argumentation structures to assess them, collect
evidence, associate evidence to elementary hypotheses, assess
and justify the relevance and the believability of evidence,
make assumptions with respect to certain sub-hypotheses,
select the composition functions for determining the inferential
force of evidence, and assess the hypotheses. We will illustrate
these capabilities with the example of assessing the hypothesis
H2 and its argumentation structure from the right side of Fig. 3.</p>
      <p>Using TIACRITIS, the analyst formulates the hypothesis
analysis problem in English and selects its instances, as shown
in the top part of Fig. 5. Selecting the instances allows
TIACRITIS to learn the following general hypothesis analysis
pattern: “Assess whether a ?O1 was stolen from the ?O2 with
the ?O3.”</p>
      <p>Figure 4. Evidence-based hypothesis analysis through reduction and synthesis.</p>
      <p>As previously described, the analyst and TIACRITIS then
reduce this hypothesis analysis problem to simpler and simpler
problems, down to the level of elementary hypothesis analysis
problems to be solved based on evidence. Notice that each
hypothesis analysis problem in Fig. 5 is followed by a
question/answer pair which guides its reduction to simpler
problems. Thus the top level problem is reduced to two
subproblems. The second subproblem is further reduced to four
subproblems, based on the scenario discussed in Section II and
illustrated in Fig. 3. Some of these reduction steps may be
suggested by TIACRITIS, if it has encountered similar steps in
past analyses.</p>
      <p>Next the analyst will directly assess the elementary
hypotheses based on relevant evidence, as discussed below.
The analyst may associate any number of search criteria
with elementary hypotheses which are then used by
TIACRITIS to search for evidence in various repositories,
as illustrated in Fig. 6. The top part of this figure shows an
elementary hypothesis for which there is no evidence. The
bottom part shows a search criteria defined by the analyst,
to guide TIACRITIS in searching for relevant evidence on
the Internet with BING, GOOGLE, or YAHOO (other
search engines and repositories can be added).</p>
      <p>The analyst may easily define new items of evidence and
may associate them with the hypotheses they favor or disfavor,
as illustrated in Fig. 7. The top part of this figure is the
description of the evidence item EVD-002-Ralph: Ralph’s
testimony that the cesium-137 canister is registered as being in
the XYZ warehouse. The analyst has selected its type as
unequivocal testimonial evidence based upon direct
observation. Then the analyst indicated that this item of
evidence favors the hypothesis “the cesium-137 canister was in
the XYZ warehouse before being reported as missing,” as
shown in the middle part of Fig. 8.</p>
      <p>As a result, TIACRITIS automatically generated the
corresponding evidence-based analysis, as shown in Fig. 8.
Notice that it considered both favoring and disfavoring
evidence, and included EVD-002-Ralph as favoring evidence
for which the analyst needs to assess the relevance and the
believability. Because EVD-002-Ralph is unequivocal
testimonial evidence based upon direct observation, its believability
depends on Ralph’s competence and credibility. Competence
depends on access and understandability, while credibility
depends on veracity, objectivity, and observational sensitivity.</p>
      <p>The analyst has assessed the relevance of EVD-002-Ralph
as certain and the believability of Ralph as almost certain. Then
TIACRITIS has combined these assessments into an inferential
force of almost certain, and has computed the likelihood of the
corresponding elementary hypothesis.</p>
      <p>Notice that although TIACRITIS has provided a detailed
believability analysis, the user may drill down into this analysis
at the desired level and, in this case, decided to assess directly
the believability of Ralph, rather than
assessing lower level believability
credentials, such as veracity. This is
referred to as an assumption.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>After all the elementary hypotheses</title>
      <p>have been assessed, either based on
evidence or by making assumptions, the
user has to select the solution
composition functions (e.g., min, max,
average, or weighted sum) to be used by
TIACRITIS when assessing the
likelihoods of the intermediary
hypotheses and of the top level
hypothesis, as shown in Fig. 9.</p>
      <p>TIACRITIS not only supports the
analyst in hypotheses analysis, but it
also continuously learns to facilitate the
analysis of new hypotheses. Consider,
for examples, the new hypothesis
analyses problem from the top of Fig.
10. TIACRITIS suggests a reduction based on a pattern learned
from the analysis in Fig. 5. It also suggests the question for
another assessment strategy to be defined by the analyst. Of
course, the more TIACRITIS learns, the more useful its
suggestions.</p>
      <p>TIACRITIS is an operational web-based system, and is
available for education and analysis (see Fig. 11). It includes
modules from the Disciple Learning Agent Shell, as well as
modules that implement the current version of the
computational theory of intelligence analysis. Its use is
supported by three textbooks and numerous case studies:
• “Introduction to Intelligence Analysis: A Hands-on</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Approach with TIACRITIS” teaches basic knowledge</title>
      <p>
        about the properties, uses, and marshaling of evidence to
show students how to collect evidence and test
hypotheses by assessing the relevance, the believability,
and the inferential force of evidence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
• “A Practicum in Evidence Marshaling and Argument
Construction with TIACRITIS” teaches advanced
strategies for organizing and combining analyst’s
thoughts and evidence to construct complex arguments
from masses of evidence (in preparation).
• “Modeling Violent Extremists with TIACRITIS”
teaches an evidence-based methodology for
investigating, comprehending, and anticipating the
behavior of violent extremists in the war on terror [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>One main direction of follow-on work is further
development of the computational theory and its
implementation in TIACRITIS. This includes the development of
computational models for evidence marshaling guided by
magnets which are powerful heuristics supporting the analysts
in hypotheses generation from masses of evidence. Future
research also includes the development of more powerful
methods for the learning
and reuse of analytic
expertise, for hypotheses
generation through</p>
      <p>mixed-initiative
abduction, for
collaborative analysis,
for automatic report
generation, and for
decision-making under
uncertainty which
integrates the
computational theory.</p>
      <p>Although the focus of the
current work was on mixed-initiative analysis involving
analysts, TIACRITIS and the theory it is built on can be
extended to persistent surveillance and interpretation of
dynamic environments by autonomous agents.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Schum</surname>
            <given-names>D.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2001</year>
          ).
          <source>The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning</source>
          , Northwestern University Press.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tecuci</surname>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Schum</surname>
            <given-names>D.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Boicu</surname>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Marcu</surname>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2010</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Introduction to Intelligence Analysis: A Hands-on Approach with TIACRITIS, 220 pages</article-title>
          , George Mason University, new edition
          <year>2011</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tecuci</surname>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Boicu</surname>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Cox</surname>
            <given-names>M.T.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2007</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Seven Aspects of Mixedinitiative Reasoning: An Introduction to the Special Issue on Mixedinitiative Assistants</article-title>
          .
          <source>AI Magazine</source>
          <volume>28</volume>
          (
          <issue>2</issue>
          ),
          <fpage>11</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>18</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Schum</surname>
            <given-names>D.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2009</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Science of Evidence: Contributions from Law and Probability</article-title>
          .
          <source>Law Probab Risk</source>
          <volume>8</volume>
          ,
          <fpage>197</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>231</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tecuci</surname>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Boicu</surname>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Marcu</surname>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Schum</surname>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hamilton</surname>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2010</year>
          ).
          <article-title>TIACRITIS System and Textbook: Learning Intelligence Analysis through Practice</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in Proc of the 5th Int. Conf. on Semantic Technologies for Intelligence</source>
          , Defense, and Security - STIDS,
          <fpage>108</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>115</lpage>
          , Fairfax, VA.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Nilsson</surname>
            <given-names>N.J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1971</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Problem Solving Methods in Artificial Intelligence</article-title>
          . NY:
          <string-name>
            <surname>McGraw-Hill</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tecuci</surname>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1988</year>
          ).
          <article-title>DISCIPLE: A Theory, Methodology and System for Learning Expert Knowledge</article-title>
          . Thèse de Docteur en Science, University of ParisSouth, France.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tecuci</surname>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1998</year>
          ).
          <source>Building Intelligent Agents: An Apprenticeship Multistrategy Learning Theory, Methodology, Tool and Case Studies</source>
          , San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Wigmore</surname>
            <given-names>J.H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1937</year>
          ).
          <source>The Science of Judicial Proof</source>
          . Boston, MA: Little,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Brown</surname>
          </string-name>
          &amp; Co.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Toulmin</surname>
            <given-names>S.E.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1963</year>
          ).
          <source>The Uses of Argument</source>
          . Cambridge University Press.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kent</surname>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1994</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Words of Estimated Probability</article-title>
          , in Steury D.P., ed.,
          <source>Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays</source>
          ,
          <article-title>Center for the Study of Intelligence</article-title>
          , CIA, Washington, DC.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Weiss</surname>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2008</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence</article-title>
          and Other Professions,
          <source>International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence</source>
          ,
          <volume>21</volume>
          (
          <issue>1</issue>
          ),
          <fpage>57</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>85</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Boicu</surname>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tecuci</surname>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Marcu</surname>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Schum</surname>
            <given-names>D.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Coughlin</surname>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2011</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Modeling Violent Extremists with TIACRITIS, 203 pages</article-title>
          , George Mason University,
          <year>2011</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>