=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=None
|storemode=property
|title=Risk-driven Security Testing versus Test-driven Security Risk Analysis
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-834/paper1_essosds2012.pdf
|volume=Vol-834
}}
==Risk-driven Security Testing versus Test-driven Security Risk Analysis==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-834/paper1_essosds2012.pdf
First Doctoral Symposium on
Engineering Secure Software und Systems
Risk-driven Security Testing versus Test-driven
Security Risk Analysis ⋆
Gencer Erdogan1,2
Supervised by: Ketil Stølen1,2
1
Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, PO Box 1080 Blindern, N-0316
Oslo, Norway
2
Department for Networked Systems and Services, SINTEF ICT, PO Box 124
Blindern, N-0314 Oslo, Norway
{gencer.erdogan,ketil.stolen}@sintef.no
Abstract. It is important to clearly distinguish the combinations of se-
curity testing and security risk analysis depending on whether it is viewed
from a security testing perspective or a security risk analysis perspective.
The main focus in the former view is security testing in which test objec-
tives are to be achieved, while the main focus in the latter view is security
risk analysis with the aim to fulfill risk acceptance criteria. The litera-
ture’s lack of addressing this distinction is accompanied with the lack of
addressing two immediate problems within this context, namely the gap
between high-level security risk analysis models and low-level security
test cases, and the consideration of investable effort. We present initial
ideas for methods that address these problems followed by an industrial
case study evaluation in which we have gathered interesting results.
Keywords: Security risk analysis, Security testing
1 Introduction
Security testing is a process to determine that an information system protects
data and maintains functionality as intended [1]. Security risk analysis is a spe-
cialized risk analysis approach in which information security risk is associated
with the potential that threats will exploit vulnerabilities of an information asset,
or group of information assets, and thereby cause harm to an organization [2].
The literature collectively refers to the combinations of security testing and
security risk analysis as risk-based security testing. It is, however, important to
make a clear distinction between such combinations depending on whether it is
viewed from (A) a security testing perspective, or (B) a security risk analysis
perspective. In (A) the main focus is security testing in which test objectives are
to be achieved while risk analysis is used as a means to make security testing
⋆
This work has been conducted as a part of the DIAMONDS (201579/S10) project
funded by the Research Council of Norway, as well as a part of the NESSoS net-
work of excellence funded by the European Commission within the 7th Framework
Programme.
ESSoS-DS 2012 Feb 15, 2012
First Doctoral Symposium on
Engineering Secure Software und Systems
more effective. We name this approach Risk-driven Security Testing (RST). In
(B) the main focus is security risk analysis with the aim to fulfill risk acceptance
criteria while security testing is used as a means to develop and/or validate
risk models. We name this approach Test-driven Security Risk Analysis (TSR).
Furthermore, we address two key challenges within both RST and TSR. The
first challenge is to bridge the gap between high-level security risk models and
low-level security test cases, while the second challenge is to make sure that the
investable effort is correctly reflected in RST and TSR. As an initial evaluation of
our proposed methods for RST and TSR, we have carried out an industrial case
study evaluation of a TSR based approach in which we have gathered interesting
results.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 outlines the research objectives
followed by a brief description of the research method, Sect. 3 gives an overview
of the work done to date, Sect. 4 presents preliminary results from an industrial
case study in which a TSR approach was tried out, and Sect. 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Research Objectives and Research Method
Security risk analysis models are often at a high-level of abstraction (e.g. business
level), while security test cases are at a low-level of abstraction (e.g. implementa-
tion level), and the challenge in RST is to identify the most important security
test cases, while the challenge in TSR is to identify an accurate security risk
model of the target of evaluation.
These challenges are important to address in order to define exactly what to
test, produce only the necessary security test cases and to obtain an accurate
security risk model. The two first points provide the security testers with an
indication for when to terminate the security testing process, i.e. to limit the
scope of the security testing process. The necessity to limit the scope of the
security testing process is due to the fact that security is often constrained
by cost and time – one example from the industry is the author’s personal
experience of conducting security testing in a European organization [3]. It is
therefore essential to take the effort available for conducting an RST or a TSR
into account.
The author seeks to address the particular task of developing an industrial
guideline for effort dependent risk-driven security testing and test-driven security
risk analysis. The initial research question is the following:
– What is a good industrial guideline for effort dependent risk-driven security
testing and test-driven security risk analysis?
The research work will adopt an iterative incremental approach where the in-
dustrial partners provide industrial case studies on RST and TSR. There will,
in total, be carried out six case studies. In this light, the research process will
be conducted using the Technology Research Method [4] which is an iterative
incremental research method.
ESSoS-DS 2012 Feb 15, 2012
First Doctoral Symposium on
Engineering Secure Software und Systems
3 Current Work
Figure 1 presents the steps in RST and TSR. The steps for security testing are
in line with the steps presented in the Standard for Software Component Test-
ing [6], which is also one of the building blocks in the upcoming new international
standard for software testing - ISO/IEC 29119 [7]. The steps for security risk
analysis are in line with the steps presented in ISO 31000 [8].
In RST security testing is supported by security risk assessment in order
to make security testing more effective. The aim is to focus the security testing
process to carry out security tests on the most important parts of the system
under test, and to execute only the most important security test cases. RST
provides two alternatives to achieve this aim. The first alternative (Step 3)
achieves this by first directing the identified security test model from Step 2 as
input to Step 3. Based on this input, risks concerning the system under test
are identified, estimated and evaluated in Step 3. The output of Step 3 is a risk
evaluation matrix that contains a list of prioritized risks of the system under
test. The risk evaluation matrix is finally used as a basis for generating and
prioritizing security test cases in Step 4. The second alternative (Step 5)
achieves this by first directing the identified security test cases from Step 4 as
input to Step 5. Based on this input, risks addressed by the security test cases
are identified, estimated and evaluated in Step 5. The output of Step 5 is a risk
evaluation matrix that contains a list of prioritized risks of the system under
test. The risk evaluation matrix is finally used as a basis for eliciting the most
important security test cases to be executed in Step 6. The dashed rectangles
that surrounds Step 3 and 5 indicate that the security testing process can be
supported by either Step 3 or Step 5 when conducting the RST method.
In TSR security risk analysis is supported by security testing in order to
develop and/or validate risk models. The aim is to strengthen the correctness
of the security risk analysis models. TSR provides two alternatives to achieve
this aim. The first alternative (Step 2 and 3) supports the development of
risk models by identifying potential risks. This is achieved by first directing the
system model and the identified assets of the target of evaluation from Step 1
as input to Step 2. Based on this input, security test cases are generated and
prioritized in Step 2. The identified security test cases are then executed in Step
3. Finally, the security testing results are used as a basis for identifying potential
risks which are used as an input to Step 4. The second alternative (Step 5
and 6) supports the validation of risk models by first identifying security tests
that explore the risks and then validating the risk model based on the security
testing results. This is achieved by first directing the risk evaluation matrix from
Step 4 as input to Step 5. Based on this input, security test cases are generated
and prioritized in Step 5. The identified security test cases are then executed in
Step 6. Finally, the security testing results are used as a basis for validating and
updating the security risk analysis models. The dashed rectangles that surrounds
Step 2 and 3 and Step 5 and 6 indicate that the security risk analysis process can
be supported by security testing for either developing risk models or validating
risk models, or both when conducting the TSR method.
ESSoS-DS 2012 Feb 15, 2012
First Doctoral Symposium on
Engineering Secure Software und Systems
Risk-driven Security Testing (RST) Test-driven Security Risk Analysis (TSR)
Security Testing Security Risk Analysis Security Testing
Security Risk Assessment
Security Risk Assessment Security Testing
Fig. 1. The steps in Risk-driven Security Testing and Test-driven Security Risk Anal-
ysis.
4 Case Study
We have carried out an industrial case study using a TSR based approach. In
particular, we carried out the alternative for validating the risk model, i.e. step
1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the TSR approach, as explained in Sect. 3. The target system
analyzed was a multilingual, web-based e-business application, which serves as
the backbone for the system owner’s business goals and is used by a large amount
of users every day. The case study was carried out in a period of four months in
form of meetings and security testing sessions. The presented results are limited
to the experiences obtained in the case study due to confidentiality reasons.
Table 1 outlines the process undergone during the case study. The first col-
umn specifies the meeting sequence (SRA denotes a security risk analysis meet-
ing, while ST denotes a security testing meeting). The second column lists the
participants (C denotes participants from the customer organization, while A
denotes participants from the analysis team). The third column describes the
contents and achievements in each meeting. Finally, the fourth column shows
the approximate time spent (in man-hours) for each meeting. The time spent on
work before and after the meetings is not included in the table.
Security risk analysis was conducted using the CORAS approach [5]. The
process of identifying security tests was carried out by first using the risk evalu-
ation matrix with identified risks as a starting point. Then, the threat scenarios
that lead up to a risk that needed to be treated were systematically identified as
testable or not testable. Furthermore, the identified testable threat scenarios were
prioritized based on their individual effort for realizing the risk. Finally, secu-
ESSoS-DS 2012 Feb 15, 2012
First Doctoral Symposium on
Engineering Secure Software und Systems
Table 1. The process undergone during the case study
Meeting Participants Contents Hours
1 - SRA C:One domain expert. A:The an- Defining the goals, context, tar- 2
alyst. Two domain experts. get, focus and scope of the SRA.
2 - SRA C:One domain expert. One devel- Defining the goals, context, tar- 3
oper. A:The analyst. The secre- get, focus and scope of the SRA.
tary. One domain expert.
3 - SRA C:One domain expert. A:The an- Concretizing the scope, assets and 6
alyst. The secretary. risk evaluation criteria of the
SRA.
4 - SRA C:One domain expert. A:The an- Identifying and evaluating risks. 6
alyst. The secretary.
5 - SRA / C:One domain expert. A:The an- Identifying security tests. 6
ST alyst. The secretary.
6 - ST A:The analyst. The secretary. Implementing security tests. 8
7 - ST A:The analyst. The secretary. Executing security tests. 6
8 - ST A:The analyst. The secretary. Executing security tests. 6
9 - SRA C:One domain expert. One devel- Validating and updating the risk 2
oper. A:The analyst. The secre- model based on the security test-
tary. ing results. Suggesting treatments
for security tests that failed.
rity tests were identified for the prioritized testable threat scenarios. A testable
threat scenario, in this context, is simply a threat scenario that is possible to
test at the software level.
Table 2 presents the overall TSR results obtained in the case study. The
leftmost column specifies the information security assets taken into consideration
during the security risk analysis process. The row named Common denotes the
number of security risk analysis elements that are common for all assets. The
topmost row specifies the number of security risk analysis elements: R denotes
the number of risks, TS denotes the number of threat scenarios, RT denotes the
number of tested risks, TST denotes the number of tested threat scenarios (the
tested threat scenarios that addressed confidentiality also addressed integrity
and are therefore not counted two times in the total sum), R Upd. denotes
the number of updated risks based on the security testing results and TS Upd.
denotes the number of updated threat scenarios based on the security testing
results.
A total number of 31 risks and 43 threat scenarios were identified during the
risk assessment, and from these, 11 risks and 7 threat scenarios were tested.
Approximately 80% of the identified security tests that explored these risks
and threat scenarios uncovered some form of security vulnerability. This is an
indication that the risk model contributed to identify relevant security tests.
Furthermore, the security testing results helped us to validate and update the
risk model; approximately 20% of all risks and 14% of all threat scenarios had
ESSoS-DS 2012 Feb 15, 2012
First Doctoral Symposium on
Engineering Secure Software und Systems
Table 2. Test-driven Security Risk Analysis results
```
``
SRA
``elements
Assets ``` R TS RT TST R Upd. TS Upd.
`
Confidentiality of information 8 2 5 5* 3 0
Integrity of information 8 7 5 5* 3 1
Availability of information 11 13 1 2 0 0
Accountability of information 4 6 0 0 0 0
Common 0 15 0 0 0 5
Total 31 43 11 7 6 6
to be adjusted, with respect to likelihood values, based on the security testing
results.
5 Conclusion
The combinations of security risk analysis and security testing must be clearly
distinguished depending on whether it is viewed from a security testing per-
spective (RST), or a security risk analysis perspective (TSR). Additionally, the
immediate challenges that need to be addressed in these approaches are: (1) the
gap between high-level security risk analysis results and low-level security test
cases, and (2) the correct reflection of investable effort. An industrial case study
evaluation of a TSR based approach showed how security testing can be used as
a significant means to validate and update the risk model – i.e. approximately
20% of all risks and 14% of all threat scenarios had to be adjusted, with respect
to likelihood values, based on the security testing results.
References
1. The Committee on National Security Systems: National Information Assurance (IA)
Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009, 2010.
2. ISO/IEC 27005:2011(E): Information technology - Security techniques - Information
security risk management.
3. Erdogan, G., Meland, P.H., Mathieson, D.: Security Testing in Agile Web Applica-
tion Development - A Case Study Using the EAST Methodology. In Proceedings of
XP’2010. pp.14–27, 2010.
4. Solheim, I., Stølen. K.: Technology research explained. SINTEF Report, A313. Tech-
nical report, SINTEF Information and Communication Technology, 2007.
5. Lund, M.S., Solhaug, B., Stølen, K.: Model-Driven Risk Analysis: The CORAS
Approach. Springer, 2011.
6. British Computer Society Specialist Interest Group in Software Testing: BS 7925-2
Software testing. Software component testing, 1998.
7. Working Group 26 (WG26) of the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC7 Software and Systems Engi-
neering committee. http://www.softwaretestingstandard.org/ Last date accessed
2012-02-07.
8. International Organization for Standardization: ISO 31000 Risk management - Prin-
ciples and guidelines, 2009.
ESSoS-DS 2012 Feb 15, 2012