The notion, concept, word of information is at the centre of much knowledge management research and practice. This paper offers a fresh approach to this central notion by questioning the often taken for granted linear relationship from data-to-information-to-knowledge. Relying on Heidegger's work Being and Time, as ontological base of the investigation, the paper presents a phenomenological account of the etymologies of data and information, tracing back their origins and evolution, as a way into the phenomena themselves. It is argued that it is not meaning what distinguishes data from information but rather an ongoing course of action in which one always and already is involved. This analysis, hopefully, opens up a sound alternative route for research the phenomenon of knowledge.
“Every inquiry is a seeking.
Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought.” Martin Heidegger (1962:24)
Action, data, information, knowledge, life and world are deeply inter-related notions, ideas, or
words, all of them mutually referring to each other. If one tries to give a brief explanation of
any of these words it is highly probable that one uses some of the other words of above to point
out the meaning one wants to state. In order rigorously to elucidate some of these connections,
namely between data and information – which nowadays are at the centre of much of the
management concerns – I will ground ontologically the analysis that follows on Heidegger's
phenomenological investigations into humanness, the remarkable Being and Time
These positions do not stand up to phenomenological scrutiny. In this paper I argue that this kind of classification is untenable because data is already meaningful. Nonetheless, a rigorous phenomenological account of the etymology of data and information indeed reveal subtle and potentially useful distinctions between the two phenomena under analysis. Those distinctions, hopefully, offer a sound alternative for research the phenomenon of knowledge. Possibly, this route is not as linear and easier to grasp as mainstream actual discourse; but it is no argument against a phenomenological route to observe that the path of questioning does not promise to deliver a clear and simple articulation of that which is. Cartwright (1983:53) noted that “[t]here is no reason to think that the principles that best organise will be true, nor that the principles that are true will organise much”; and Nietzsche (1968:273) commented: “The most strongly believed a priori “truths” are for me—provisional assumptions; e.g., the law of causality, a very well acquired habit of belief, so much a part of us that not to believe in it would destroy the race. But are they for that reason truth? What a conclusion!” Bearing this in mind, I submit that besides the rigour of the method of investigation followed and of the ontology on which the paper is based, the findings presented below rely their strength as well on the intuitiveness and self-evidence in which they might appear for those who are familiar with the phenomena of data and information.
The paper is structured as follows: first I very briefly review some of Heidegger’s (1962) arguments, establishing the primacy of action as ground. This is followed by the presentation of the findings of the phenomenological analysis of the etymology of data and information. Finally, the paper concludes by briefly elaborating on its empirical relevance.
Let me very briefly review some of Heidegger’s (1962) central findings. Being and Time tries to give an account of the world as it is, i.e., it tries do uncover the world as always and already previously experienced by us, before empiricism or intellectualism elaborate any explanations whatsoever. The world is instead of is not, and because we are always and already in the world, the beings we ourselves are, are revealed as beings-in-the-world. In-the-world we are experts in acting because action as such is primary.
Man is the kind of being whose Being, that is, whose essence, is an issue for himself. Thus, caring for ourselves and the world, we are essentially ahead of ourselves, always and already projecting into the future. In this projecting we are revealed as beings thrown into the world, because always with a past and a future in which we are to make something of ourselves. Thus, as a having been in-the-world, we care: things matter to us. As beings- in-the-world we are with-others. Most commonly we act, choose, think, live, mainly as they do it. Immersed in-the-world we always and already understand the world and ourselves. Intuitively, dealing with beings, we choose, abandon and fulfil the possibilities we open up for ourselves. The having-been that we are and the possibilities in which we are immersed shape ourselves, mould our dispositions, and as such they open specific possibilities for us in the future. The congruence that leads us to repeat what has worked is the instinctive behaviour to maintain ourselves as what we are for ourselves, that is, in mineness as projecting and explicitly or implicitly assuming possibilities for being in the future. Always involved we take stands, choose, and go along with others, on account of the throwness and the projections we are. Hence, in-the-world, as a projecting having-been, we are grounded in the future. It is the future, the possibilities for being in which we always and already are projecting ourselves that makes us the kind of beings we are. Thus, the future per se belongs to the essence of man. The future grounds the present and the past. In action we are primary directed towards the future; in this directedness we are again directed towards a successful adaptation to our environment, which is something accessed in our own terms, that is, according to our identity, or mineness in Heidegger’s (1962) phenomenological technical terminology.
A logical and equiprimordial feature of being- in-the-world, as ontological ground, is an
assumption that action is primary; that it precedes reflection. This primacy of action has its
oldest claims in Heraclitus’ thesis of a forever changing reality. Action is that which always
and already is. We are always and already acting within our own history against the
background of temporality: we are action in structural terms. Being- in-the-world is essential to
who we are. It is important to note that this being-in
The English wo rd action has its origins in the Middle English –acioun. This comes from the
Old French -ation, which in its turn comes from the Latin -ation, -atio, actio, actiônis, which
meant action or process (MW), “a putting in motion; a doing, performing, acting, action, act”
The way the world is self- evident is first revealed as we live in the world—as we are already
going on in our dealings in and with the world. World, firstly and primordially, reveals itself in
the background practices in which we dwell. Being-there is an embodied understanding of the
world in-the-world. The modes of being we encounter in the world—the ready-to-hand, that is,
the transparency of an thing while we use it, and the present-at-hand, that is, the thing as we
analyse it and look at it—are founded upon an always and already unfolding acting-
in-theworld
Having been thrown, we are always and already taking a stand in the process of having been—
“I take action”
Having Heidegger’s (1962) ontology as a background, the paper presents below a
phenomenological account of the etymologies of data and information. The origins of both
words, and the ways in which their meanings have evolved up to now, are rich enough for us to
pay close attention. In a Heideggerian manner
This kind of phenomenological work shares some concerns with linguistic analysis, but goes
beyond it. What is at stake here is the recalling of the relationships of our experiencing of the
phenomena, that is, bringing back the things, as things themselves
The current meaning of information can be synthesised as: “what is told; news” (OPDT:388). The English word information, a noun, was coined in the 14th century (MW) and has come to have two connected meanings. One refers to the communication of something, for instance an event, a fact, a story—“the communication or reception of knowledge or intelligence” (MW). The other meaning points to the gathering of data—“knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or instruction: intelligence, news, facts, data” or “a signal or character (as in a communication system or computer) representing data” (MW).
The essence of the phenomenon of information, according to
Form has been an English word since the 13th century. It has its origins in the Middle English forme, which in its turn has its roots in that Latin word forma (MW). Form has nowadays a plurality of meanings. Amongst the most used and relevant for our purpose, are the following: “the shape and structure of something as distinguished from its material”; “a prescribed and set order of words”, “a manner or style of performing or accomplishing according to recognized standards of technique”, “an orderly method of arrangement (as in the presentation of ideas)”, “a manner of coordinating elements”. In its transitive sense, ‘to form’ means “to give a particular shape to”, “to model by instruction and discipline”, “to arrange in order”. The intransitive sense ‘to take form’ means to “come into existence” (MW).
This tracing back of some original meanings of the word information discloses the notion of a
thing, or idea, or indeed a person, that receives a form, a shaping, or a contour. The Latin word
informare, from the verb in-formo
At this point, the question of how, and by whom, this form is achieved should be addressed.
The answer lies in the way the Latin word informare includes the Latin in. In is a Latin
preposition akin to the Sanskrit an and to the Greek en. It means “within, on, upon, among, at,
into, to, towards”. It “denotes either rest or motion within or into a place or thing”
The in of information thus means that a form, a shaping, a contour, is imposed on a thing, an
idea, or a person; this person, either myself or other one, is shaped in that he, she or I am/is
informed. In a deeper sense, a form or contour is imposed on a difference. This difference,
distinguished from the environment by a person, is brought in/into who imposes those same
contours or that form; the person who captures the difference is the entity that is the in. It is the
human being who, while perturbed by a distinction, brings the new element that was
distinguished “within [the ] limits” (MW) he himself is. A form derived from within is therefore
imposed on a distinction. These limits are thus bounded by throwness. Information is the
bringing forth of the sense of a distinction, through a process that is, strictly speaking,
dependent and determined by the very own terms of myself, by mineness. The limits are the
context on the grounds of which a new element comes to be distinguished and gets a first
sense. To grasp this phenomenon fully, I examine now the etymology of the word data.
Data has been part of the English language since the 17th century. It comes from the Latin,
where it was the plural of datum (MW), which means what is given: “to give, offer, convey,
offer, donate, furnish”
The Portuguese language, for example, still preserves this characteristic of something given in the word data. The word data is translated in Portuguese as dados, which is also a form of the verb dar—meaning to give. Data is not only something given, but it is essentially given. It is something we access, obtain, get without effort; data comes to us, as something given: “data is plentiful and easily available” (H. A. Gleason, Jr., quoted in MW). Data is the difference a being distinguishes from its environment as such. As beings- in-the-world we are always and already immersed in data.
Nowadays, with the worldwide spread of IT devices, this given-ness of data supports its utilisation as “factual information (as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation” (MV). This factual information, “information in numerical form that can be digitally transmitted or processed” (ibid.), is thus that which is given – data. As such, this kind of data also is part of our dealing- ness in-the-world.
This analysis raises a question about whether it points to recognition that the notions, the
distinctions, of data and information are synonymous. The answer is both yes and no. I stress
that a distinction is always a distinction for someone; someone already immersed in a whole of
references
Data is the kind of difference whose fundamental meaning relies on its given- ness. It is the difference that is given as such. Analysed from this perspective, data does not necessarily affect the current behaviour of a person, from the point of view of an observer or self-observer. Data is strictly that which is given. Taking into account the above description of information, data thus can be said to be decontextualised information, that is, information that does not inform the particular course of action in which the person already is involved. On the other hand, information is the kind of difference whose fundamental meaning relies on its forming nature. It is the difference formed inwardly in a meaningful manner that affects the current behaviour of the person as testified from the perspective of an observer or selfobserver. Information is thus mainly that which is formed. So, from an ex post perspective, data is fundamentally given and information is fundamentally formed. These notions arise against the grounding criterion of action. The difference is formally indicated as information or as data in terms of the course of action in which a manager, for example, is involved. The manager’s goals are thus the guiding criterion that enables one to distinguish the characteristics, value, and uses of data and information.
With these distinctions in mind, I will conclude this etymological discussion by clarifying the
notion of meaning already touched upon in the above argument. In our always and already
involvement in the world, entities show up to us already referring one to another. Their
showing up is essentially their referentiality. Differences are the showing up of something as
something
That something has meaning indicates a relationship between it and another something. This relationship is disclosed in terms of our involvement whole. It is our involvement whole, the world of references and involvements that we are, that gives meaning to what we distinguish. For a distinction to be a distinction, therefore, it must already have meaning. Data as it is distinguished already is meaningful. Its meaningfulness, that is, its sense, is precisely that which enables the operation of distinction. “Everything has meaning” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:xx), because to be distinguished is precisely to enter the grounds of meaning. Meaning is the references and assignments of a distinction; it is the sense that a distinction has to have in order to be a distinction.
Meaning is already there in-the-world, and we cannot decide on what such and suc h means or
does not mean to us. “Meaning is that wherein the understandability of something maintains
itself—even of something which does not come into view explicitly and thematically”
(ibid.:370-1). So, there is no meaningless data. “Just as we do not see pure meaningless sense
data which then must be interpreted, so we do not hear pure meaningless sounds”
In-the-world, information is thus the realisation of the meaningfulness of data in a situation. It is an action-based making present of the sense of the distinctions within the referential whole in which we dwell. By making present data, a manager-in-the-world, in a situation, within a projection he himself is, opens possibilities that make sense for who he is, as a having-been. He uses data to perform some activity because that data informs his actions; as this data is relied on in action, it can be referred to as information. The making present of data receives its meaning from the taking up of a possibility for action. Data shows up as the right data for the relevant course of action; for the course of action that is meaningful for the manager. Information thus receives its meaning from the primordial understanding man is of himself or herself in- the-world: a ceaseless chooser, on accounts of what he or she has been and what he or she is projecting himself or herself to be, taking informed action.
This analysis is supported by a further twist in the etymology of the word information. To the Latin words in and forma, the English word information joined the suffix -ation, whose etymology I analysed above. Action is the meaning pointed to by joining the suffix -ation to the expressions in and form; this in-form-ation indicates an action that informs. This action that informs has its fundamental meaning in that action as such in the ground on the basis of which data informs. Data informs us, thus being information, because action is the ground. Information is what it is because it is primary destined to action, that is, to inform our ongoing action in-the-world. So, information gets the meaning from and is directed to action. Action is therefore the initial criterion for a distinction to be distinguished. It provides the grounding that makes it possible to distinguish something as something. To conclude, information can be formally indicated as data grasped from the action nature of the situation. It is the action-ation of data by myself.
This paper does not look for definitions. That is neither the aim nor the possibility of phenomenology. In the phenomenological manner of investigation this paper is focused on uncovering the essential contours of the phenomena data and information.
According to the ontology on which this investigation is based the most important impact of
this findings is the potentiality of their very readiness-to-hand
The paper points out the relevance of the course of action in which a manager, for example, already is involved. This means that new opportunities, threats, or intelligence do not rely mainly on the kind of data a manager comes across, but instead they rely on the manager’s already set kind of goals. From here there are many implications one can draw for management, either on training and education, on marketing and innovation, on team work and group routines, on consultancy and outsourcing, on strategy and change, and so forth. Still, being ontologically consistent, I stress that these implications would emerge mainly and fundamentally from action and in action. ANSI - American National Standard for Information Systems (1990) Dictionary for Information
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