<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>AT</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The Topology of Common Belief?</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>David Pearce</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Levan Uridia</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Universidad Polite ́cnica de Madrid, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2012</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>15</volume>
      <fpage>15</fpage>
      <lpage>16</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>We study the modal logic K42C of common belief for normal agents. We study Kripke completeness and show that the logic has tree model property. As a main result we prove that K42C is the modal logic of all TD-intersection closed, bi-topological spaces with derived set interpretation of modalities. Based on the splitting translation we discuss connections with S42C, the logic of common knowledge.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1 Introduction</title>
      <p>
        In logics for knowledge representation and reasoning, the study of epistemic and
doxastic properties of agents with certain, intuitively acceptable, restrictions on their
knowledge and belief is a well-developed area. Smullyan [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] discusses various types of
agents based on properties of belief. In his terminology, an agent whose belief
satisfies the modal axiom (4) : 2p ! 22p, translated as ‘If the agent believes p, then
he believes that he believes p’, is called a normal agent. K4 is the modal logic which
formalizes the belief behavior of normal agents. This generalizes the classical doxastic
system KD45 in the same way as S4 generalizes the epistemic logic S5, by dropping
some restrictions on the properties of an agent.
      </p>
      <p>Agreement technologies is a newly emerging domain where iterative concepts of
belief and knowledge of agents are of special interest. To achieve successful
communication and agreement it is important for agents to reason about themselves and what
others know or believe. Among the more interesting cases are the notions of common
knowledge and common belief. We denote the operators for common knowledge and
common belief by CK and CB respectively. We have: CK ' iff ' is common knowledge
in the group K and CB ' iff ' is a common belief in the group B.</p>
      <p>
        Following the analysis of common knowledge as originally defined by Lewis [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ],
this concept has been extensively studied from various perspectives in philosophy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ],
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ], game theory [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], artificial intelligence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], modal logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] etc.
Theories of common belief are less well-developed though some approaches can be found
in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3,4,27</xref>
        ]. The present paper is devoted to a study of the common belief of normal
agents. Our aim is to extend two previous lines of work. Earlier, in [24,25,26] we have
examined several extensions of the modal logic wK4 that form interesting doxastic
logics different from KD45. Our main interests were related to the idea of minimal
belief, non-monotonic reasoning about beliefs, topological interpretations and in each
case the embedding relations between epistemic and doxastic logics, i.e. translations
between knowledge and belief operators. In this previous work we considered only single
agent systems. A second point of departure is provided by the work of van Benthem and
Sarenac [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], who showed how a topological semantics for logics of common
knowledge may be useful for modeling and distinguishing different concepts. A key idea here
is that the knowledge of different agents is represented by different topologies over a
set X. Various ways to merge that knowledge can be obtained via different modes of
combining logics and topological models. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] considers for example the fusion logic
S4 S4 and product topologies that are complete for the common knowledge logic
S42C of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        In light of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref16">16,13</xref>
        ] and our previous work several natural questions emerge that we
address here. In summary the main contributions of the paper are:
1. We define a logic K42C of common belief for normal agents and prove its
completeness for a Kripke, relational semantics. We show it has the finite model property and
the tree model property.
2. We study the topological semantics for K42C and show completeness for
intersection topologies. Specifically we show that K42C is the modal logic of all
TDintersection closed, bi-topological spaces with a derived set interpretation of
modalities.
3. Belief under the topological interpretation of K42C is understood via colimits and
common belief in terms of colimits in the intersection topology. From 2 we derive
a topological condition for common belief in terms of colimits that is very similar
to the corresponding condition that defines common knowledge in the modal
calculus and is discussed at some length in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
4. We show how the common knowledge logic S42C can be embedded in K42C via the
splitting translation that maps CK p into p ^ CB p.
1.1
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>Common belief and the topological interpretation</title>
        <p>
          As stated, we focus on the common belief of normal agents, and for ease of exposition
we restrict ourselves to the two agent case. We thus consider two agents whose
individual beliefs satisfy the axioms of K4. In other respects we adopt the main principles of
the logic of common knowledge, S42C. This can be seen as a formalization of the idea
that common knowledge is equivalent to an infinite conjunction of iterated individual
knowledge: ' ^ 21' ^ 22' ^ 2121' ^ 2122' ^ 2221' ^ 2222' ^ 212121' ^
212122'::. Later we shall see that a variation of this formula is ‘true’ for common
belief under the relational semantics. We shall also show that the topological semantics
for K42C is compatible with the idea of common belief as a fixpoint equilibrium, a
notion used by Barwise [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
          ] to describe common knowledge that can be captured by an
expression of the modal -calculus.
        </p>
        <p>
          Our approach to providing a topological semantics follows the work of Esakia [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
          ].
Notice that under the topological interpretation of 2 as a knowledge operator, eg.
in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ], 2' refers to the topological interior of the points assigned to '. In the case
of a doxastic logic like K4 the topological interpretation is different. It is perhaps
simpler to state it for the 3 operator. Following McKinsey and Tarski [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ], the idea is to
treat 3' as the derivative of the set ' in the topological space. Esakia showed that under
this interpretation wK4 is the modal logic of all topological spaces. K4 is an extension
of wK4 and is characterized in this semantics by the class of all TD-spaces [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
          ]. By
combining the ideas and results from [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ] and [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
          ], we obtain a derived set semantics
for the logic of common belief based on bi-topological spaces, where the modality for
common belief operates on the intersection of the two topologies. As a main result, we
can prove that K42C is sound and complete with respect to the special subclass of all
bi-topological TD-spaces.
2
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Logic of Common Belief</title>
      <p>
        We turn to the syntax and Kripke semantics of the logic K42C. The interpretation of
common belief operator CB on bi-relational Kripke frames is similar to the
interpretation of the common knowledge operator CK ; and is based on the notion of transitive
closure of a relation. In this section we show that the logic K42C is sound and complete
with respect to the class of all bi-relational transitive Kripke structures. The proof is a
slight modification of the completeness proof for the logic S42C given in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] therefore
we only sketch the essential parts where the difference shows up. Additionally we show
that every non-theorem of K42C can be falsified on an infinite, irreflexive, bi-transitive
tree.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1 Iterative common belief</title>
        <p>
          There are different notions of common belief [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
          ]. Let us mention common belief as
an infinite conjunction of nested beliefs and common belief as an equilibrium. Under
the former idea, a proposition p is a common belief of two agents if: agent-1 believes
that p and agent-2 two believes that p and agent-1 believes that agent-2 believes that p
and agent-2 believes that agent-1 believes that p etc., where all possible finite mixtures
occur. If we formalize this idea in a modal language with belief operators 21 and 22
for each agent respectively, then we arrive at the following concept of a common belief
operator C!.
        </p>
        <p>B</p>
        <p>C0 p = 21p ^ 22p;</p>
        <p>B
Cn+1p = 21CBnp ^ 22CBnp;</p>
        <p>B</p>
        <p>CB!p = Vn2! CBnp:
C! exactly formalizes the intuition behind the former idea of common belief. However,</p>
        <p>B
since CB! is an infinite intersection, it cannot be expressed as an ordinary formula of
modal logic and hence studied in the usual approaches to standard modal logic.
Nevertheless it turns out that we can capture the infinitary behavior of CB! in a finitary sense.
This idea is made more precise via the modal logic K42C.
2.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Syntax</title>
        <p>Throughout we work in the modal language LC with an infinite set P rop of
propositional letters and symbols ^; :; 21; 22; CB . The set of formulas F orm is constructed
in a standard way: P rop F orm. If ; 2 F orm then : ; ^ ; 21 ; 22 ; CB 2
F orm. We will use standard abbreviations for disjunction and implication, _
:(: ^ : ) and ! : _ .</p>
        <p>The axioms of the logic K42C are all classical tautologies, each box satisfies all
K4 axioms, ie. we have: (K) 2i(p ! q) ! (2ip ! 2iq), (4) 2ip ! 2i2ip, for
each i 2 f1; 2g and in addition we have the equilibrium axiom for the common belief
operator:</p>
        <p>(equi) : CB p $ 21p ^ 22p ^ 21CB p ^ 22CB p:</p>
        <p>The rules of inference are: Modus-Ponens, Substitution, Necessitation for 21 and
22 and the induction rule for the common belief operator:
(ind) : ` ' ! 21(' ^
` ' ! CB
) ^ 22(' ^
)
where ' and</p>
        <p>are arbitrary formulas of the language.
2.3</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Kripke Semantics</title>
        <p>The Kripke semantics for the modal logic K42C is provided by transitive, bi-relational
Kripke frames. The triple (W; R1; R2), with W an arbitrary set and Ri W W where
i 2 f1; 2g, is a bi-transitive Kripke frame if both R1 and R2 are transitive relations.
A quadruple (W; R1; R2; V ) is a bi-transitive Kripke model if (W; R1; R2) is a
bitransitive Kripke frame and V : P rop ! P (W ) is a valuation function. Observe that
we only have two relations, which give a semantics for 21 and 22. To interpret the
common belief operator, CB , we construct a new relation, which is a transitive closure
of the union of R1 and R2.</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-1">
          <title>Definition 1. The transitive closure R+ of a relation R is defined as the least transitive</title>
          <p>relation containing the relation R.</p>
          <p>Two points x and y are related by the transitive closure of the relation if there exists a
finite path hx1; ::; xni starting at x and ending at y.</p>
          <p>Definition 2. For a given bi-relational Kripke model M = (W; R1; R2; V ) the
satisfaction of a formula at a point w 2 W is defined inductively as follows:
w p iff w 2 V (p),
w ^ iff w and w ,
w : iff w 1 ,
w 2i' iff (8v)(wRiv ) v '),
w CB ' iff (8v)(w(R1 [ R2)+v ) v ').</p>
          <p>A formula is valid in a model M, in symbols M , if for every point w 2 W we
have w . is valid in a bi-relational frame F = (W; R1; R2), in symbols F ,
iff is valid in every model M = (F ; V ) based on the frame. is valid in a class of
bi-relational frames K if for every frame F 2 K we have F .</p>
          <p>Proposition 1. (Completeness) Modal logic K42C is sound and complete with respect
to the class of all finite, bi-transitive Kripke frames.</p>
          <p>
            Proof. (Sketch) The proof follows the pattern of [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
            ] for the logic S42C. The only
difference appears when defining the canonical relation which may not be just transitive
if defined in the same way as in [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
            ]. Therefore following [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
            ] we define the relations
R1 and R2 on W in the following way: For every maximal consistent sets of formulas
; 0 2 W we define Rx 0 iff (8 )(2x 2 ) 0 ` ^ 2x ), where x 2 f1; 2g.
          </p>
          <p>According to proposition 1 every non-theorem of K42C is falsified on a finite,
bitransitive frame. The following theorem shows that every non-theorem of K42C can be
falsified on a frame (W t; R1t; R2t; V t), where for each k 2 f1; 2g the pair (W t; Rkt) is
a transitive tree.</p>
          <p>Definition 3. A frame (W; R) is called a tree if:
1) it is rooted, ie. there is a unique point (the root) r 2 W such that for every v 2 W it
holds that v 6= r ) rR+v,
2) every element distinct from r has a unique immediate predecessor; that is, for every
v 6= r there is a unique v0 such that v0Rv and for every v00 we have that v00Rv ) v00Rv0,
3) R is acyclic; that is, for every v 2 W it is not the case that vR+v.</p>
          <p>If in addition R is transitive, ie. R = R+, then (W; R) is called a transitive tree.
Theorem 1. The modal logic K42C has tree model property.</p>
          <p>
            Proof. (Sketch) We start with a bi-relational countermodel M = (W; R1; R2; V ) for
the formula '. The proof follows a standard unravelling technique [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
            ]. As a result we
get a model Mt = (W t; R1t; R2t; V t), where (W t; Rkt) is a tree for each k 2 f1; 2g and
the valuation V t is defined by reflecting the valuation V of the original countermodel
M. Additionally Mt 1 ' as far as M is a bounded morphic image of Mt and the
bounded morphism extends between models Mt = (W t; R1t; R2t; (R1t [ R2t)+; V t)
and M = (W; R1; R2; (R1 [ R2)+; V ).
          </p>
          <p>Note 1. Observe that the relation (R1t [ R2t)+ does not contain cycles and in particular
it is irreflexive.</p>
          <p>The mains reason for introducing K42C was to mimic the infinitary operator CB! by
finitary CB . Though we cannot claim that on a logical level CB and CB! are equivalent,
we can establish a semantical equivalence, in particular on Kripke structures.
Theorem 2. For any transitive bi-relational Kripke model M
point w: M; w CB ' iff M; w CB! :
Proof. The proof follows easily from Definitions 1 and 2.
= (W; R1; R2; V ) and
2.4</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>Common belief as equilibrium</title>
        <p>
          We mentioned that common belief can also be understood as an equilibrium concept1.
On Kripke structures the equilibrium conception coincides with common belief by
infinite iteration, while in general the equilibrium conception has a much closer connection
1 For the remainder of this section and later on for Theorem 9 we assume some familiarity with
the modal -calculus. Lack of space hinders a fuller treatment, however for more details on
the modal -calculus we refer to [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ][part 3, chapter 4]; see also the discussion in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ].
to the logic K42C. It can be formalized in the modal -calculus in the following way:
        </p>
        <p>C ' = :p(21' ^ 22' ^ 21p ^ 22p):
The greatest fixpoint is defined as the fixpoint of a descending approximation
sequence defined over the ordinals. Denote by j'j the truth set of ' in the appropriate
model M where evaluation occurs:
jC0'j = j21' ^ 22'j;
jCk+1'j = j21' ^ 22' ^ 21Ck' ^ 22Ck'j;
jC 'j = j T
k&lt;</p>
        <p>Ck'j, for
a limit ordinal.</p>
        <p>We obtain jC 'j = jC 'j, where is a least ordinal for which the approximation
procedure halts: ie. jC 'j = jC +1'j. Halting is guaranteed because the occurrence of
the propositional variable p in operator F (p), where F (p) = 21'^22'^21p^22p, is
positive. Hence by the Knaster-Tarski theorem the sequence will always reach a greatest
fixpoint. Then the semantics of the operator C is defined in the following way:</p>
        <p>M; w C ' iff w 2 jC 'j
In general this procedure may take more than ! steps, but in case of Kripke structures
the situation is simpler. The following property relates the different operators on Kripke
models.</p>
        <p>Theorem 3. For every bi-relational Kripke model M = (W; R1; R2; V ) and a point
w 2 W the following condition holds: M; w CB! ' iff M; w C '.
Proof. Observe that we can rewrite C! ' = 21' ^ 22' ^ 2121' ^ 2122' ^ 2221' ^</p>
        <p>
          B
2222'^212121'^212122'::: in the following way: 21'^22'^21(21'^22')^
22(21' ^ 22') ^ ::. Hence jCB! 'j = jC! 'j. It is known that on Kripke structures
stabilization process does not need more than ! steps [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ] i.e. jC 'j = jC! 'j. Hence
w C ' iff w CB! '
        </p>
        <p>It follows that on transitive bi-relational Kripke structures the three operators CB ; CB!
and C coincide.
3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Topological Semantics</title>
      <p>
        The idea of a derived set topological semantics originates with the McKinsey-Tarski
paper [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. This idea was taken further in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ]. The following works contain some
important results in this direction: [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. The derived set topological semantics
for K42C is provided by the class of all bi-topological spaces. In the same way, as it is
done in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] for the common knowledge operator, we interpret the common belief
operator on the intersection topology. On the other hand, different from CK , for which the
semantics is given using interior of the intersection of the two topologies, we provide
the semantics of CB ' as a set of all colimits of j'j in the intersection topology. As a
main result we prove the soundness and completeness of the logic K42C with respect
to the class of all TD-intersection closed, bi-topological spaces where each topology
satisfies the TD separation axiom. We start with the basic definitions.
      </p>
      <p>Definition 4. A pair (X; ) is called a topological space if X is a set and
collection of subsets of X with the following properties:
1) X; ? 2 ,
2) A; B 2 implies A \ B 2 ,
3) Ai 2 implies S Ai 2 .</p>
      <p>Elements of are called opens or open sets of the topological space.
Definition 5. A topological space (X; ) is called an Alexandroff space if an arbitrary
intersection of opens is open, that is Ai 2 implies T Ai 2 . (X; ) is called a
TD-space if every point x 2 X can be represented as an intersection of some open set
A and some closed set B.</p>
      <p>
        We now define the colimit operator (or the set of all colimit points [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]) of a set
in a topological space. This is needed to give the semantics of modal formulas in an
arbitrary topological space.
      </p>
      <p>Definition 6. Given a topological space (X; ) and a set A X we will say that
x 2 X is a colimit point of A if there exists an open neighborhood Ux of x such that
Ux fxg A. The set of all colimit points of A will be denoted by (A) and will be
called the colimit set of A.</p>
      <p>The colimit set provides a semantics for the box modality, consequently the semantics
for diamond is provided by the dual of the colimit set, which is called the derived set.
The derived set of A is denoted by der(A). So we have (A) = X der(X A).
Below we list some properties of the colimit operator.</p>
      <p>
        Fact 4 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref23">11,23</xref>
        ] For a given topological space (X; ) the following properties hold:
1) Int(A) = (A) \ A (A), where Int denotes the interior operator,
2) (X) = X and (A \ B) = (A) \ (B),
3) If is a Td-space then (A) (A),
4) If 1 2 then 1(A) 2(A) where i, i 2 f1; 2g is a colimit operator of the
corresponding topology i.
      </p>
      <p>
        The following links TD-spaces and irreflexive transitive relational structures. This
result is a special case of a more general correspondence between weakly-transitive and
irreflexive relational structures and all Alexandroff spaces [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Fact 5 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ]) There is a one-to-one correspondence between Alexandroff, TD-spaces
and transitive, irreflexive relational structures.
      </p>
      <p>Let us briefly describe the correspondence. We first introduce the downset operator.
Let (X; R) be a Kripke frame. The downset operator R 1 is defined in the following
way: for any A X we set R 1(A) := fxj(9y)(y 2 A ^ xRy)g. Now if we are
given an irreflexive, transitive order (X; R) it is possible to prove that the downset
operator R 1 satisfies all the properties of the topological derivative operator for
TDspaces. Hence we get a TD-space (X; R), where R is the topology obtained from
the derivative operator R 1. Conversely with every Alexandroff TD-space (X; ), one
can associate an irreflexive and transitive relational structure (X; R ), where xR y
iff x 2 der(fyg). Moreover we have that (X; R ) is homeomorphic to (X; ) and
(X; R R ) is order isomorphic to (X; R).</p>
      <p>
        Fact 6 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ] The set A is open in (X; R) iff x 2 A implies that the implication
(xRy ) y 2 A) holds for every y 2 X.
      </p>
      <p>This correspondence can be directly generalized to Kripke frames with more than one
transitive and irreflexive relation. Of course then we will have one Alexandroff
TDspace for each irreflexive and transitive order. Below we prove the proposition which
builds a bridge between Kripke and topological semantics for K42C.</p>
      <p>Proposition 2. If R1 and R2 are two irreflexive and transitive orders on X and (R1 [
R2)+ is also irreflexive and transitive, then R2 .
(R1[R2)+ =</p>
      <p>R1 \
Before starting the proof, observe that (R1 [ R2)+ may not be irreflexive even if both
R1 and R2 are. For example: Let X = fx; yg and R1 = f(x; y)g and R2 = f(y; x)g
then (R1 [ R2)+ = f(x; y); (y; x); (x; x); (y; y)g. On the topological side this example
shows that TD-spaces do not form a lattice. That is why in Proposition 2 we require
(R1 [ R2)+ to be a irreflexive and transitive.</p>
      <p>Proof. Assume that A 2 (R1[R2)+ . By Fact 6 this means that if x 2 A then for every
y such that x(R1 [ R2)+y it holds that y 2 A. Since Ri (R1 [ R2)+ for each
i 2 f1; 2g, it holds that xR1y ) y 2 A and xR2y ) y 2 A for every y 2 X. Hence
A 2 1 \ 2 according to Fact 6.</p>
      <p>Conversely assume A 2 1 \ 2. This means that x 2 A ) (x(R1 [ R2)y )
y 2 A). Now take arbitrary y such that x(R1 [ R2)+y. By definition this means that
there is a (R1 [ R2)-path hx1; x2; ::xni starting at x going to y. But this means that each
member of this path is in A because A is open in the intersection of the two topologies.
Hence y 2 A and hence A 2 (R1[R2)+</p>
      <p>Next we give a definition of the satisfaction relation of modal formulas in the
derived set topological semantics. Observe that this definition is given in a standard modal
language ie., without the common belief operator. Recall that a topological model is a
tuple M = (W; ; V ) where V : P rop ! P (W ) is a valuation function.
Definition 7. The satisfaction of a modal formula in a topological model M = (W; ; V )
at a point w 2 W is defined in the following way:
– M; w p iff w 2 V (p),
– Boolean cases are standard,
– M; w 2' iff w 2 (V (')), where is a colimit operator of .</p>
      <p>
        Fact 7 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ] The correspondence mentioned in the Fact 5 preserves the truth of modal
formulas, ie. (W; R; V ); x iff (W; R; V ); x .
      </p>
      <p>Note that in Fact 7, the symbol on the left hand side denotes the satisfaction
relation on Kripke models, while on the right hand side it denotes the satisfaction
relation on topological frames in the derived set semantics. Now we extend the satisfaction
relation to the language with the common belief operator.</p>
      <p>Definition 8. The satisfaction of a modal formula on a bi-topological model M =
(W; 1; 2; V ) at a point w 2 W is defined in the following way:
M; w p iff w 2 V (p),
M; w ^ iff M; w and M; w ,
M; w : iff M; w 1 ,
M; w 2i' iff w 2 i(V (')), where i is a colimit operator of i, i 2 f1; 2g,
M; w CB ' iff w 2 1^2(V (')), where 1^2 is a colimit operator in 1 \ 2:</p>
      <p>As an immediate corollary of the proposition 2 and a many-modal version of the
Fact 7, we get the following proposition.</p>
      <p>Proposition 3. If R1 and R2 are two irreflexive and transitive orders and (R1 [ R2)+
is also topological then for every formula in K42C the following holds:
(W; R1; R2; V ); x
iff (W; R1 ; R2 ; V ); x
.</p>
      <p>Now it is clear that we can reduce the topological completeness problem to Kripke
completeness if for every non-theorem K42C 6` ' we can find a bi-relational topological
counter-model (W; R1; R2; V ) with (R1 [ R2)+ being also a topological relation.</p>
      <p>1 \
Definition 9. The triple (X; 1; 2) is a TD-intersection closed bi-topological space
if each of the topologies 1, 2 and 2, satisfies the TD-separation axiom.
Theorem 8. K42C is sound and complete with respect to the class of all TD-intersection
closed, bi-topological, Alexandroff spaces.</p>
      <p>Proof. (Soundness) Take an arbitrary TD-intersection closed, bi-topological model M =
(X; 1; 2; V ). From 2) and 3) of Fact 4 it follows that K4-axioms are valid for each
box. Let us show that at each point x 2 X, the equilibrium axiom is satisfied.
Assume that M; x CB p. Hence by Definition 8 we have x 2 1^2jpj. By 4) of Fact 4
we get x 2 1jpj and x 2 2jpj. By 3) we have 1^2jpj 1^2 1^2jpj 1 1^2jpj.
Analogously 1^2jpj 2 1^2jpj. Hence we have x 21p ^ 22p ^ 21CB p ^ 22CB p:</p>
      <p>For the other direction assume that x 2 1 1^2jpj \ 1jpj \ 2 1^2jpj \ 2jpj. By
2) of Fact 4 we get x 2 1( 1^2jpj \ jpj) \ 2( 1^2jpj \ jpj). By 1) of Fact 4 we
conclude x 2 1(Int1^2jpj)\ 2(Int1^2jpj), where Int1^2 denotes the interior operator
in the intersection topology. By definition of colimit there exists Ux1 2 1 such that
x 2 Ux1 and Ux1 fxg Int1^2jpj and there exists Ux2 2 2 such that x 2 Ux2
and Ux2 fxg Int1^2jpj. Hence (Ux1 [ Ux2) fxg Int1^2jpj. Let us show that
Int1^2jpj [ fxg is open in 1 \ 2. Since Ux1 2 1 and Int1^2jpj 2 1 we have
Ux1 [ Int1^2jpj = Int1^2jpj [ fxg 2 1. Analogously we show that Int1^2jpj [ fxg 2
2. Hence x 2 1^2jpj.</p>
      <p>Let us show that the induction rule is valid in the class of all TD-intersection
closed bi-topological spaces. The proof goes by contraposition. Assume not ` p !
CB q. This means that for some TD-intersection closed, bi-topological model M =
(X; 1; 2; V ) and a point x 2 X it holds that: x p while x 1 CB q. We want
to show that not ` p ! 21(p ^ q) ^ 22(p ^ q). It suffices to find a TD-intersection
closed bi-topological model which falsifies the formula. For such a model one could
take M0 = (X; 1 \ 2; 1 \ 2; V ). Indeed as (X; 1; 2; V ) is TD-intersection
closed, the topology 1 \ 2 satisfies the TD-separation axiom. Besides since in M0
both topologies are the same, their intersection is also 1 \ 2 and hence again is a
TD-space. Now it is immediate that M0; x 1 p ! 21(p ^ q) ^ 22(p ^ q). This is
because by construction of M0 we have M0; x 1 2iq iff M; x 1 CB q for every x 2 X
and i 2 f1; 2g.</p>
      <p>(Completeness) Assume K42C 6` '. According to Theorem 1 there exist a tree
model M t = (W t; R1t; R2t; V ) which falsifies '. We know that (R1[R2)+ is irreflexive
and transitive order (see Note 1). By applying Proposition 3 we get that the formula ' is
falsified in the corresponding bi-topological model (W t; R1t ; R2t ; V ), which is
TDintersection closed because of Fact 5, Proposition 2 and Note 1.</p>
      <p>We can now show how the semantical definition of common belief CB ' as a colimit
of the intersection topology meshes with the general equilibrium concept: on
topological models the two operators CB and C coincide.</p>
      <p>Theorem 9. For every bi-topological model M = (X; 1; 2; V ) and an arbitrary
formula ' the following equality holds: :p( 1(j'j) \ 2(j'j) \ 1(p) \ 2(p)) =
Proof. That 1^2(j'j) is a fixpoint of the operator F (p) = 1(j'j) \ 2(j'j) \ 1(p) \
2(p) follows from the soundness proof of the equilibrium axiom, see Theorem 8. Now
let us show that 1^2(j'j) is the greatest fixpoint of F (p). Take an arbitrary fixpoint
B of the operator F (p). That B is a fixpoint immediately implies that B 1(j'j) \
2(j'j) \ 1(B) \ 2(B). By 1) of Fact 4 we have B Inti(B) = i(B) \ B for
each i 2 f1; 2g. Hence B = Int1^2(B) where Int1^2 is the interior operator in the
intersection topology of the two topologies. Now let us show that for every x 2 B the
set fxg [ (B \ j'j) is open in the intersection of the two topologies. Take an arbitrary
point y 2 fxg [ (B \ j'j). Since y 2 B 1(j'j) we know that there exists an open
neighborhood Uy1 2 1 of y such that Uy1 fyg j'j. This means that B \ Uy1 2 1
and B \Uy1 fxg[(B \j'j). This means that for every point y 2 fxg[(B \j'j) there
is an open neighborhood B \ Uy1 2 1 of y such that B \ Uy1 fxg [ (B \ j'j) hence
fxg [ (B \ j'j) 2 1: In exactly the same way we show that fxg [ (B \ j'j) 2 2.
Hence fxg [ (B \ j'j) 2 1 \ 2. This means that x 2 1^2(j'j) since there exists an
open neighborhood U1^2 = fxg [ (B \ j'j) 2 1 \ 2 with U1^2 fxg 2 j'j.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>From Belief to Knowledge</title>
      <p>In this section we discuss the connection between the logics of common knowledge
S42C and common belief K42C. This connection generalizes the existing splitting
translation between S4-logics and K4-logics. As a result we obtain a validity preserving
translation from S42C formulas to K42C formulas in which common knowledge is
expressed in terms of common belief.</p>
      <p>Definition 10. The normal modal logic S42C is defined in a modal language with
infinite set of propositional letters p; q; r:: and connectives _; ^; :; 21; 22; CK , where the
formulas are constructed in a standard way.</p>
      <p>The axioms are all classical tautologies, each box satisfies all S4 axioms and in
addition we have equilibrium axiom for common knowledge operator:
(equi) : CK p $ p ^ 21CK p ^ 22CK p</p>
      <p>The rules of inference are: Modus-ponens, Substitution, Necessitation for 21 and
22 and the induction rule:</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Definition 11. The reflexive, transitive closure R? of a relation R</title>
        <p>in the following way: R? = R+ [ f(w; w)jw 2 W g:</p>
        <p>The satisfaction of formulas is definition in the following way.</p>
        <p>W</p>
        <p>W is defined
Definition 12. For a given bi-relational Kripke model M = (W; R1; R2; V ) the
satisfaction of a formula at a point w 2 W is defined inductively as follows:
w p iff w 2 V (p),
w ^ iff w and w ,
w : iff w 1 ,
w 2i' iff (8v)(wRiv ) v '),
w CK ' iff (8v)(w(R1 [ R2)?v ) v ').</p>
        <p>
          Fact 10 [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ] The modal logic S42C is sound and complete with respect to the class of
all finite, reflexive, bi-transitive Kripke frames.
        </p>
        <p>Definition 13. Consider the following function from the set of formulas in S42C to the
set of formulas in K4C.</p>
        <p>2
Sp(p) = p for every propositional letter p,
Sp(: _ ) = :Sp( ) _ Sp( ),
Sp(2i ) = 2iSp( ) ^ Sp( ),
Sp(CK ) = CB Sp( ) ^ Sp( ).</p>
        <p>Theorem 11. `S42C ' iff `K42C Sp(').</p>
        <p>Proof. We prove the theorem by a semantical argument using the Kripke completeness
results, see Proposition 1 and Fact 10. Let us first show by induction on the length
of formula that for every bi-relational Kripke model M = (W; R1; R2; V ) and every
w 2 W the following holds:
(a)</p>
        <p>M? = (W; R1?; R2?; V ); w
' iff M+ = (W; R1+; R2+; V ); w</p>
        <p>The only nonstandard case is when ' = CK . Assume M?; w CK . By the
definition of (R1 [ R2)? this means that M?; w and for every w0 such that
w(R1 [ R2)?w0, we have M?; w0 . Now by the induction hypotheses we have
that M+; w and M+; w0 . Since w0 was arbitrary (R1 [ R2)? successor of w
we have M+; w CB . This is because (R1 [ R2)? (R1 [ R2)+. Hence we get
M+; w CB ^ . The converse direction follows by the same argument.</p>
        <p>Now assume `S42C '. By fact 10 this means that ' is valid in every reflexive and
transitive, bi-relational model. Take arbitrary transitive, bi-relational model M. Then
by assumption we have M? '. Hence by (a) we have that M Sp('). As M was
arbitrary transitive, bi-relational model from Proposition 1 we get that `K42C Sp(').
Conversely assume `K4C Sp('). Then by Proposition 1, Sp(') is valid in the class of
2
all transitive, bi-relational models. Take arbitrary reflexive and transitive, bi-relational
model N . Then N Sp(') because N = N +. So by (a) we have that N ? '.
Now as N was reflexive and transitive, N ? = N , hence N '. Sinse N was arbitrary
reflexive and transitive, bi-relational model, by Fact 10 we have `S42C '.
5</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>
        Our main aim in this paper has been to extend the work of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] on topological semantics
for common knowledge by interpreting a common belief operator on the intersection of
two topologies in a bi-topological model. In particular we considered a logic K42C of
common belief for normal agents, first under a Kripke, relational semantics, showing it
to have the finite model property and the tree model property. We then showed that K4C
2
is the modal logic of all TD-intersection closed, bi-topological spaces with a derived set
interpretation of modalities and we saw how the common knowledge logic S42C can be
embedded in K42C via the splitting translation that maps CK p into p ^ CB p.
      </p>
      <p>While preparing the final draft of this work, we came across the article [27] by
Lismont and Mongin. This paper treats several logics of common belief including one that
is equivalent to K42C. Besides a relational semantics, the authors also consider a more
general neighborhood semantics and discuss the equilibrium conception of common
belief in this setting. While the semantics and methods of [27] are formally different to
ours, there are obvious similarities. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, a
detailed comparison of our topological approach with the neighborhood systems of [27]
would be a worthwhile exercise for the future. Another direction for future work is to
look for concrete topological structures which would fully capture the behavior of the
logic K42C or some of it’s extensions.
6</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The authors are grateful to anonymous reviewers whose comments helped to improve
the readability of the paper. This research has been partially supported by the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Innovation through the AT project CSD2007-0022 and
MCICINN project TiN2009-14562-CO5.
24. David Pearce and Levan Uridia., Minimal Knowledge and Belief via Minimal Topology. In T.</p>
      <p>Janhunen, I. Niemela (eds), Logics in Artificial Intelligence, Proc. JELIA 2010, LNAI 6341,
Springer, pp. 273-285, 2010.
25. David Pearce and Levan Uridia., The Godel and the Splitting Translations. In G. Brewka, V.</p>
      <p>Marek &amp; M. Truszczynski (eds), Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Studies in Logic, pp. 335-360,
Vol. 31, College Publications, 2011.
26. David Pearce and Levan Uridia., An Approach to Minimal Belief via Objective Belief. In T.</p>
      <p>Walsh (ed), Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
IJCAI 11, pp. 1045-1050, 2011.
27. Luc Lismont and Philippe Mongin., On the Logic of Common Belief and Common
Knowledge. Theory and Decision, pp. 75–106, Vol. 37, 1994.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          1.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Patrick</given-names>
            <surname>Blackburn</surname>
          </string-name>
          and Johan van Benthem and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Frank</given-names>
            <surname>Wolter</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <source>Handbook of Modal Logic. Elsevier Science &amp; Technology</source>
          ,
          <year>2006</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          2.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Johan</surname>
            <given-names>Van Benthem.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games.
          <source>International Game Theory Review</source>
          . pp.
          <fpage>13</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>45</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>9</volume>
          ,
          <year>2007</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          3.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Robert</given-names>
            <surname>Stalnaker</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <source>Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy</source>
          ,
          <fpage>5</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>6</lpage>
          , pp.
          <fpage>701</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>721</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>25</volume>
          ,
          <year>2001</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          4.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Andreas</given-names>
            <surname>Herzig and Tiago De</surname>
          </string-name>
          Lima and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Emiliano</given-names>
            <surname>Lorini</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <source>On the Dynamics of Institutional Agreements. Synthese</source>
          , pp.
          <fpage>321</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>355</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>171</volume>
          (
          <issue>2</issue>
          ),
          <year>2009</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          5.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Patrick</given-names>
            <surname>Blackburn</surname>
          </string-name>
          and Maarten de Rijke and Yde Venema.,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Modal</given-names>
            <surname>Logic</surname>
          </string-name>
          . Cambridge University Press (
          <year>2001</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          6.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Joel</surname>
            <given-names>Lucero-Bryan.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>The</surname>
            d-Logic of Rational Numbers:
            <given-names>A New</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Proof. Studia</surname>
          </string-name>
          Logica - An
          <source>International Journal for Symbolic Logic - SLOGICA</source>
          , Vol.
          <volume>97</volume>
          (
          <issue>2</issue>
          ), pp.
          <fpage>265</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>295</lpage>
          ,
          <year>2011</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          7.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>David</given-names>
            <surname>Gabelaia</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Topological</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Algebraic and
          <article-title>Spati-temporal Semantics for Multidimentional Modal Logics</article-title>
          .,
          <source>PHD thesis</source>
          , Kings college, London,
          <year>2004</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          8.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Valentin</given-names>
            <surname>Shehtman</surname>
          </string-name>
          ., Derived Sets in Euclidean Spaces and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Modal</given-names>
            <surname>Logic</surname>
          </string-name>
          ., University of Amsterdam, X-1990-
          <volume>05</volume>
          ,
          <year>1990</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          9.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M. J.</given-names>
            <surname>Fischer</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R. E.</given-names>
            <surname>Ladner</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Propositional Dynamic Logic of Regular Programs</article-title>
          .
          <source>Journal of Computer Sciences</source>
          , pp.
          <fpage>194</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>211</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>18</volume>
          ,
          <year>1979</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          10.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Raymond</given-names>
            <surname>Smullyan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ., Logicians Who Reason About Themselves. San Francisco (CA)
          <article-title>Proceedings of the conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge</article-title>
          , pp.
          <fpage>341</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>352</lpage>
          , Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc,
          <year>1986</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          11.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Rysxard</given-names>
            <surname>Engelking</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>General</given-names>
            <surname>Topology</surname>
          </string-name>
          . Taylor &amp; Francis,
          <year>1977</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          12.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jon</surname>
            <given-names>McKinsey</given-names>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Alfred</given-names>
            <surname>Tarski</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <source>The Algebra of Topology. Annals of Mathematics</source>
          , pp.
          <fpage>141</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>191</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>45</volume>
          ,
          <year>1944</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          13.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Johan Van</surname>
            Benthem and
            <given-names>Darko</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sarenac</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <source>The Geometry of Knowledge. Aspects of universal logic</source>
          , pp.
          <fpage>1</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>31</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>17</volume>
          of Travaux Log.,
          <year>2004</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          14.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Nick</given-names>
            <surname>Bezhanishvili</surname>
          </string-name>
          and Wiebe van der Hoek.,
          <article-title>Structures for Epistemic Logic (Survey).</article-title>
          , In publication.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          15.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Robert</given-names>
            <surname>Aumann</surname>
          </string-name>
          ., Agreeing to Disagree.
          <source>Annals of Statistics</source>
          , Vol.
          <volume>4</volume>
          ,
          <year>1976</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          16.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Ronald</given-names>
            <surname>Fagin</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Joseph Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Halpern</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Yoram</given-names>
            <surname>Moses</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Moshe Y. Vardi.</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Reasoning about Knowledge</source>
          . MIT Press,
          <year>1995</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref17">
        <mixed-citation>
          17.
          <article-title>Alexandru Baltag and Lawrence S. Moss and Slawomir Solecki.,The Logic of Public Announcements, Common Knowledge, and Private Suspicions</article-title>
          .
          <source>In Proc. TARK'98</source>
          , Morgan Kaufmann,
          <year>1998</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref18">
        <mixed-citation>
          18.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Alexandru</given-names>
            <surname>Baltag</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Sonja</given-names>
            <surname>Smets</surname>
          </string-name>
          ., Group Belief Dynamics Under Iterated Revision:
          <article-title>Fixed Points and Cycles of Joint Upgrades</article-title>
          . TARK, pp.
          <fpage>41</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>50</lpage>
          ,
          <year>2009</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref19">
        <mixed-citation>
          19.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>David</given-names>
            <surname>Lewis</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Convention</surname>
            :
            <given-names>A Philosophical</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Study</surname>
          </string-name>
          . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
          <year>1969</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref20">
        <mixed-citation>
          20.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Jon</given-names>
            <surname>Barwise</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <source>Three Views of Common Knowledge. Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge</source>
          , Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, pp.
          <fpage>365</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>378</lpage>
          ,
          <year>1988</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref21">
        <mixed-citation>
          21.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Guram</given-names>
            <surname>Bezhanishvil</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Leo</given-names>
            <surname>Esakia</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <surname>David Gabelaia.</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Some Results on Modal Axiomatization and Definability for Topological Spaces. Studia Logica</source>
          ,
          <volume>3</volume>
          , pp
          <fpage>325</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>355</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>81</volume>
          ,
          <year>2005</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref22">
        <mixed-citation>
          22.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Leo</given-names>
            <surname>Esakia</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Weak</surname>
          </string-name>
          Transitivity - Restitution.,
          <source>Logical Studies</source>
          , pp.
          <fpage>244</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>255</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>8</volume>
          ,
          <year>2001</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref23">
        <mixed-citation>
          23.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Leo</given-names>
            <surname>Esakia</surname>
          </string-name>
          .,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Intuitionistic</given-names>
            <surname>Logic</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <article-title>Modality via topology</article-title>
          .
          <source>Annals of Pure Applied Logic</source>
          , pp.
          <fpage>155</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>170</lpage>
          , Vol.
          <volume>127</volume>
          (
          <issue>1-3</issue>
          ),
          <year>2004</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>