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    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>No.</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A Proposed Methodology for The Development of Application-Based Formal Ontologies</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Dr. Eric Little Ontological Engineer University at Buffalo Center for Multisource Information Fusion (CMIF) Center for Cognitive Science</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>1985</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>6</volume>
      <issue>6</issue>
      <fpage>67</fpage>
      <lpage>73</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Formal ontologies are currently being developed for numerous applications. But the question of what constitutes a formal ontology, and how one goes about constructing such a thing, remains an open research topic. This paper proposes a general methodology for ontology construction through which it is argued that the successful design of ontology products depends upon the reciprocal relationship between abstract philosophical reasoning and application-based systems engineering. The proposed methodology offers insight into the rational, philosophically-grounded motivations for upperlevel ontology construction, coupled with certain empirical, domain-specific motivations necessary for its lower-level construction and implementation. To convey this methodology, I provide a brief examination of one such current research project, a Disaster-Response Ontology (Dis-ReO) aimed at improving data fusion for disaster-response activities such as casualty servicing, ambulance routing, and structural damage assessment.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1 The Philosophical Impetus of Ontology Development</title>
      <p>
        One of the largest advantages brought about by the last several decades of work in computer
science and related computational fields is the ability to gather, store and transfer large
amounts of data from numerous disparate sources. Humans have collected a wealth of
information about the world within which they live. A large portion of that information
continues to be cataloged in various kinds of information systems for instant retrieval by a
few clicks of a mouse button. Given the extraordinary amount of data present to artificial
system users, a problem of information organization has risen to the surface. Unstructured
data is far less useful than data which is neatly grouped into meaningful categories. Hence,
recent attention has shifted to understanding scientific principles of organizing the vast
amount of information stored within data systems. One increasingly popular method for
information organization is sought through the construction and implementation of formal
ontologies
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Bowman, 2001; Gruber, 1993, 1994, 1995; Guarino, 1998; Lenat &amp; Guha, 1990,
1996; Noy &amp; McGuinness, 2001)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Formal ontologies are logically-structured bundles of information about a given domain
of existent physical entities, attributes of those entities, and the relations between them.
Proper ontologies act as transparent representations, or models, of the common-sense world
within which humans live
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12 ref15">(Smith, 2001c)</xref>
        . They are transparent in the sense that they do not
obfuscate or alter the items they organize. A proper ontology should mirror those
organizational properties of the world’s built-in structure. To understand the built-in
structure of the world, consider an ordinary water molecule. It is composed of two hydrogen
atoms and one oxygen atom which share both spatial as well as other physical relations to one
another. In this sense, the molecular structure of the world, which an ontology of physics or
chemistry can represent, exists independently of, and logically prior to, those theories that
describe or model it. Factual features of the world, such as its molecular structure, predate
any theoretical artifacts which serve to explain or categorize them in a rigorous empirical
fashion (e.g., the Periodic Table of Elements). Chemists, professional or not, utilize
references such as the Periodic Table to accurately classify those items of which all matter,
such as water, is composed. However, the study of chemistry is not the study of references
like The Periodic Table, rather the study of chemistry is the study of the real existing
elements of the world, which are represented within the Periodic Table. The Periodic Table
should be understood as a transparent, empirical tool which is used to examine factual states
of affairs in the world much the same way that a visually impaired person’s spectacles serve
to focus their vision on physical objects. Just as the person’s spectacles do not physically
alter or obfuscate the objects of their perception (rather they alter the visual perspective of
such objects), so too do ontological tools such as the Periodic Table avoid altering objects in
question. A properly constructed ontology should serve as a transparent artifact for clarifying
those objects within a given domain, just as spectacles do for visual stimuli.
      </p>
      <p>
        An ontology is a conceptual tool, designed to organize those independently existing
elements that compose the fabric of reality
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref10 ref11 ref11 ref12 ref12 ref15 ref15 ref5">(Gibson, 1979; Smith, 2001b; Welty &amp; Smith,
2001)</xref>
        . Just as the Periodic Table has proven to be an indispensable tool for understanding
the independent structure of the physical world – independent in that our conceptualization of
the world necessarily depends on the existence of the world itself, but not vice versa – so too
will formal ontologies prove to be an indispensable tool for modeling and understanding the
myriad of metaphysical items that compose a given domain, situation or state of affairs.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2 Application-based Engineering of Ontologies</title>
      <p>
        The design and implementation of ontologies is steadily growing into a burgeoning new field
of applied engineering. Ontologies are being sought for various broad-based applications
including: inventory/organizational purposes, user-interface solutions, classification of
abstract entities, domain specification/identification, database construction, information
fusion, data mining, and information querying
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref8">(Gruber, 1993; Uschold &amp; Gruninger, 1996;
Gruninger and Fox, 1995; Hendler and McGuiness, 2000; Slattery, 1997)</xref>
        . Due to the variety
and complexity of these applications, ontologies are being developed in highly
interdisciplinary settings, by individuals from various academic and non-academic
communities, for both civilian and military purposes.
      </p>
      <p>
        The application of ontologies to specific domains involves an application of
scienceminded, rigorous philosophy to those domains
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12 ref15 ref9">(Smith, 1996, 2001c, Welty &amp; Smith, 2001)</xref>
        .
A formal ontologist is forced to wear two hats at one time. One is that of the traditional
metaphysician, the other is that of a systems engineer. The former position is one which is
largely based on rationalistic principles of formally structured information. The traditional
metaphysician deals with information which is highly abstract and irrespective of domain
considerations or any significant amount of experimental data. The latter position (i.e., that
of a systems engineer) is largely an empirical endeavor whereby information is perceptually
gathered from some specific domain of interest, and subsequently tested over and against that
domain
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Blanchard et al, 1998)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>Acting as metaphysicians, ontologists must do the required philosophical work involved
with constructing broad-based, abstract categories which capture the logico-philosophical
subtleties of a sound metaphysical system. It is in this regard that the ontologist should apply
their philosophical training to abstract categories such as ‘enduring item,’ ‘dependent item,’
‘independent entity,’ ‘part,’ ‘whole,’ or ‘relation.’ The meanings of such terms must be
gleaned from areas such as investigations into formal logic and the history of metaphysics in
general. The theoretical underpinnings of philosophical ontology are necessary, though not
sufficient, conditions for a sound ontological framework which is capable of being applied to
countless domains of inquiry, since the items found therein are neither domain-specific, nor
task-specific. Sound philosophical reasoning should always underlie applied ontologies in
order to guarantee that the ontology in question will not be reduced to an ad hoc application,
whereby broader applications get neglected.</p>
      <p>
        Acting as systems engineers, on the other hand, ontologists must concern themselves
with a plethora of concrete, material, domain-specific, or conceptually-specific items. The
systems engineer is concerned with those specified needs and requirements that a given
system is to fulfill
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Blanchard et al, 1998)</xref>
        . A system’s needs and requirements are largely
determined by the measurable use-value of the system in question. For this reason, an
adequate system cannot be engineered without the system’s purpose or use-value already in
mind. Here it is useful to inquire about domain- or conceptually-specific information which
experts in a given field are often able to provide. If, for example, one is seeking to construct
an ontology for disaster-response applications, it is necessary to first understand the needs
and requirements of those individuals working within disaster-response situations (e.g., what
kinds of items exist in these types of domains? Who uses them and how? What kinds of
socio-cultural, or political components (e.g., chain-of-command) are present?). Unlike the
purely logico-philosophical items examined by metaphysicians (e.g. part-whole relations,
processes), many items found within the domain of a given disaster require elucidation by
some expert within that field.
      </p>
      <p>For example, suppose one wanted to construct an ontology which would help to
facilitate better casualty servicing by organizing information in a way that benefited
individuals responsible for such services (e.g., an ontology could provide a shared lexicon of
terms used to diagnose the severity of injuries, a shared protocol for ambulance
routing/dispatch, or a shared protocol for hospital admittance of both walk-in and delivered
casualties). The construction of such an ontology would require the following two steps: 1)
the upper-most, abstract levels of the ontology would be designed in accordance with a
rationally-based, formal ontology grounded upon a sound metaphysical theory; 2) the lower,
more concrete levels of the ontology would be designed in accordance with the vast amount
of domain-specific knowledge possessed by those disaster-response experts (e.g., FEMA or
Red Cross workers) who are familiarized with the host of tangible objects, events and
situations found within disaster sites. In essence, the ontologist must work the problem from
two angles simultaneously. One angle is purely rational and devoid of any real content, while
the other is empirical and highly content-specific. Traditional philosophical training helps
the ontologist to perform step one above, but not step two. Step two requires that ontology
construction be an interdisciplinary endeavor, since large amounts of empirical information
must be gathered from experts familiarized with the given application. Disaster-response
experts would, for example, be able to inform the ontologist of many significant terms,
tactics, relationships, hazards, etc., all needing to be included within the formal structure of
the ontology in question. Without such information, the ontology would not be fully
applicable to that particular domain, since it would not address the specific needs of
disasterresponse personnel who would serve to benefit from the ontology.</p>
      <p>Each of the two steps listed above contain numerous subsequent steps, some of which
overlap. The steps depicted in this paper form a proposed methodology that seeks to capture
the synergy between certain philosophical and empirical principles associated with the task of
ontology construction. By capturing this important synergy, one can more easily understand
the role of the ontologist as one who provides a sound conceptual product (i.e., a
representational framework) capable of properly organizing large, disparate chunks of
information within various application-driven domains.</p>
      <p>The Center for Multisource Information Fusion (CMIF) is presently constructing a
disaster-response ontology (Dis-ReO) through a grant from the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research (AFOSR). The following will serve as both a general discussion and prescription
for ontology development methodologies, as well as provide information about the specifics
of the Dis-ReO itself. Using specific examples taken from the Dis-ReO should prove
advantageous in understanding certain abstract conceptual issues related to ontology
development in general.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3 Ontology Development Steps</title>
      <p>A formal ontology must be able to represent the myriad complexities of states of affairs
within the world. In order to do so, it is crucial that ontologies be both consistent as well as
comprehensive. The consistency of an ontology rests on its formal logical structure, which
means that the terms within an ontology: 1) must be used in the same manner throughout the
ontology; 2) must not be conflated (assume implicit terms within them); and 3) must have
the same conceptual extension and intension. The comprehensiveness of an ontology
guarantees that it is of sufficient size and complexity to accurately represent all items in a
given domain. The consistency of the ontology can be verified by rational means, whereas
the comprehensiveness can be verified by empirical measures, once again showing that
applied ontology design amounts to the fusing of both rational and empirical activities.</p>
      <p>It is argued here that a consistent and comprehensive ontology can be designed through
the following six steps:</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>1. Develop a sufficiently large and representative lexicon of terms.</title>
        <p>2. Develop a set of metaphysically-grounded upper-level (abstract) categories.
3. Develop a sufficiently large set of region-specific (lower-level) categories.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>4. Diagram formal relations between terms/categories.</title>
        <p>5. Develop/find a computational framework capable of capturing all items in 4.
6. Develop methodologies for evaluating the ontology.</p>
        <p>By following the above steps, ontologists would be able to provide their clients with the
following: 1) a shared lexicon of terms which both denote and connote the wide range of
items (physical and non-physical) within a given domain; 2) A formal structure capable of
capturing the relations between those lexical items; 3) a methodology for checking the
consistency and comprehensiveness of those lexical/categorical items; and 4) a sufficiently
complex artificial system capable of querying information within a given domain and
inferring new (and possibly more complex) relations within that domain. We shall now
examine each step of the developmental cycle in order to better understand the methodology
being put forth here.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>3.1 Lexicon Development</title>
      <p>The first step in ontology development should be to define that domain of items which the
ontology is to capture. One can define such a domain (and its contents) by constructing an
appropriately large lexicon of terms that represents everything within it that is of interest.
Any domain of interest will be composed of objects, events, processes, states of affairs,
attributes of objects, parts of objects, segments of processes, etc. Each item within the
domain – whether physical or nonphysical, spatial or temporal – must be accurately
represented in the ontology. Many items of interest within the ontology will be compound
items, meaning that they should be thought of as wholes, unities, or aggregates, containing
simpler items which are subordinate items. The lexical definitions of compound items will
contain many subordinate terms, which themselves will need to be accurately defined.</p>
      <p>For example, if one is interested in developing an ontology for disaster response, one
will be concerned with understanding concepts such as ‘damage’ and therefore designing a
lexicon that captures the types of damage resulting from various kinds of disasters. Damage
is a relational item, meaning its very existence depends on the existence of other items
(substances, processes), so the term ‘damage’ is necessarily a compound term. The term
‘damage’ refers to damage of some object or other, thus it exists as a property, state, or
attribute of that object. Furthermore, damage is caused by some action which brought about
the damaged state of that object.</p>
      <p>Since the Dis-ReO is focused on earthquake disaster response, it must be capable of
capturing all of the various types of damage that result from earthquakes. Examples of the
types of damage associated with earthquakes include: 1) structural damage to buildings,
bridges and dwellings; 2) bodily damage to various agents (e.g., civilian, military) located
within affected areas in the form of injuries/casualties; 3) psychological damage to various
agents both inside and outside the affected area that can be caused by stress or emotional
trauma from the loss of loved ones, loss of property, or potential health hazards resulting
from pollutants or contaminants; 4) general damages to personal belongings, the contents of
dwellings, and the surrounding environment.</p>
      <p>The job of constructing a sufficiently large lexicon of terms is quite labor-intensive.
First, one must manually search out various representative dictionaries related to the domain
of interest. Once found, some individual must manually sift through those dictionaries in
order to extrapolate all of the relevant terms for that domain. This amounts to developing a
rough-draft, resource lexicon (a la Guarino) which is a merger of other disparate sources of
information. Second, once the rough-draft lexicon is compiled, each term in that lexicon
must be examined in order to uncover conflated or compound terms, whose definitions
contain subordinate terms which themselves require definition. For example, the definition
of a term such as ‘damage’ will require the ontologist to delve into other subordinate
definitions such as ‘cause,’ ‘object,’ or ‘event.’ Understanding the term ‘damage’ depends on
understanding several other related terms associated with it. It is here that the ontologist
begins to apply certain rationalistic, philosophical principles to the task of ontology
construction. Sorting out the relations between subordinate terms which support compound
terms is no small task, since often the subordinate terms at hand are highly abstract, and at
times can provide inconsistencies when comparing various definitions. Dictionaries and
glossaries that contain disaster-specific terms such as ‘damage’ will almost never contain the
definitions of subordinate terms such as ‘cause,’ ‘object,’ or ‘event’ that are implicit in its
definition. Moreover, different sources will sometimes define like terms in different ways.
This can lead to inconsistencies when these incompatible definitions are merged together
from disparate sources into a single lexicon. Therefore, the task of developing lexicons for
applied ontologies must be done manually, because the task is a semantic one, not a syntactic
one. Automated information systems are of little use in constructing lexicons for applied
ontologies, since the task of constructing those lexicons requires the use of common-sense,
semantic reasoning skills as well as philosophical analysis, things which automated systems
lack. The job of compiling terms from disparate sources, and weaving them into a
meaningful and representative lexicon that captures the subtleties of a given domain, is still
the function of a human in the loop.</p>
      <p>The lexicon for a formal ontology must be both consistent and comprehensive. Here
again, we see the task of the ontologist as representing the merger of rationalism and
empiricism. Consistency-checking is a logical function, and it is here where perhaps
machines can aid ontologists in their task, since it is possible that a sufficiently complex
software product could perform many of the tasks associated with checking the consistency
of terms within a lexicon. The comprehensiveness of the lexicon, however, is an empirical
function, in that it requires gathering input from human domain experts who are most familiar
with the terms in the lexicon, their specific relations to one another, and their usage. For this
reason, a formal ontology’s lexicon should remain an open item of investigation. This means
that it should always be open to revision in the form of addition or deletion of terms, based on
what experts in the field recommend. Ontologies, after all, are meant to capture dynamic
portions of the world. So it makes sense to assume that as the domain changes (e.g., the
passing of events, the shifting of boundaries), or as someone’s understanding of the domain
changes (e.g., the understanding of the transmission of a disease is better understood), the
lexicon that represents that domain will also change in response to it.</p>
      <p>For Dis-ReO, it is up to disaster domain experts to say whether the Dis-ReO lexicon is
sufficiently large to capture all of the items encountered within that domain. The Dis-ReO
lexicon is presently 85 pages in length, only counting disaster-specific terms. It was
compiled from ten separate on-line disaster dictionaries/glossaries including those produced
by The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), The American Red Cross, and
The Disaster-Recovery Journal (see the attached Disaster Lexicon References for an
exhaustive list of these sources). The lexicon is being checked by various disaster experts
familiar with earthquakes and the effects of earthquakes, the agencies that respond to
earthquakes, the command and control features of those agencies, and the various kinds of
resources needed to effectively respond to earthquake disaster areas. For this reason, the
DisReO lexicon (and thereby the entire Dis-ReO) remains open to constant scrutiny from
disaster-response experts of various types.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>3.2 Upper-level Category Development</title>
      <p>The second step in the methodology for formal ontology development is to develop a set of
inter-related upper-level categories in order to provide a solid metaphysical underpinning for
the ontology. The metaphysical structure of the ontology is crucial to its design as well as its
implementation and re-usability. The upper-level categories of a formal system provide an
abstract, philosophical basis under which every specific category within the ontology will
fall. The upper-level categories are not content-specific, meaning that they are not influenced
by the specific items which are their members. They exert their influence downwards in such
a way as to encompass all categories and specific objects which fall within their scope.
Upper-level ontological categories are akin to taxonomies in biological systems which serve
to organize specific organisms by creating a hierarchical tree-like structure where each higher
level of the tree represents a higher level of abstraction or generality. For example, some
particular animal ‘Spot’ is subsumed under the more general category of ‘dog,’ which in turn
is subsumed under the category ‘canine,’ which in turn is subsumed under the category
‘mammal,’ and so on, until one reaches the upper-most biological category of ‘life form’ or
something of the sort.</p>
      <p>The Dis-ReO uses the Snap/Span Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as its upper-level
category scheme (IFOMIS program, Leipzig). The Snap/Span BFO is a
philosophicallygrounded categorical structure that is divided into two orthogonally-related ontologies. The
Snap BFO is an ontological structure indexed by time instants, meaning that the items within
Snap are considered independently of any of their temporal parts. There are no processes,
events, actions, or the like found within the Snap BFO. The Snap BFO categorizes the world
in terms of its static ontological structure, similar to taking a photographic snapshot of reality.
Photos do not directly represent processes as they are unfolding in time. Rather, photos show
objects and relations as they stand to one another at some very instant in time (e.g., the
moment the photo is taken). A blurred object in a photo can be understood,
representationally perhaps, as an object in motion, but the brunt of that interpretation is
shouldered by the perceiver of the photo, meaning some layer of epistemic understanding is
added to the photo itself. Similarly, the Snap BFO captures only those items and relations in
the world that form static metaphysical relations to one another at some given place and time.</p>
      <p>Conversely, the Span BFO is a videoscopic ontology indexed by temporal intervals or
processes. The Span BFO, unlike its Snap counterpart, does not model static items existing
as instants of time, but rather, it models the unfolding of events over some span of time. The
Span ontology is similar to recording an event on a video camera or tape recorder, in that,
rather than producing a static snapshot of items and relations, it produces a continuous stream
of dynamic events whose very nature is temporal, rather than spatial.</p>
      <p>The reason for dividing the BFO into two orthogonal sections, Snap and Span, is to
avoid confusing objects (instants) and events (processes). For example, one can think of their
hand as part of them, and one can also think of their biography as part of them. However,
one’s hand and one’s biography are, metaphysically speaking, very different sorts of items.
One’s hand can stand in the same immediate part-relation to one’s body at different instances
in time. Plus, the relation between the hand and the body can be captured in one go, since,
considered in spatial terms, it is a static relation. One’s biography, however, is never a static
relational item. By definition, a biography is fluid, since its essential characteristic is that it
unfolds over time. It is an essentially temporal thing, and therefore, resists being captured in
any instance.</p>
      <p>The Dis-ReO is currently being developed in conjunction with the Snap/Span distinction
found within the BFO. Up to the present, research into the Dis-ReO has focused on modeling
Snap items alone, since Span items (i.e., processes) are dependent on substances, and
therefore are relational in nature. The Dis-ReO is first and foremost concerned with
accurately representing the kinds of objects, agencies, damages, losses, emergency personnel,
and spatial regions found within disaster sites. That being said, since disasters are temporally
unfolding events that take place over spans of time, and since responses to those events are
also temporal events, the Dis-ReO will need to be expanded to include Span items such as
processes, parts of processes, quasi-processes, spatio-temporal regions of processes, etc.
However, since the Snap BFO can capture items that exist within processes, it is a good place
to begin the initial steps for ontology development. Since the task of ontology development
is a difficult and tangled one that deals with objects, attributes and processes, one must
choose an appropriate place to begin. Because Span items depend on Snap items for their
existence, it can be argued that Snap is the better place to begin. A Snap ontology can
provide a model of those items whose permanence can serve as the basis for Span items.
Thus, all of the discussion below will focus solely on the Snap Dis-ReO.</p>
      <p>The most general category in the Snap Dis-ReO is Enduring Item, which is the category
that includes any item existing in space and time, but which has no temporal parts (i.e., no
Span items) (see Figure 1). Enduring items can be broken down into three subordinate
categories: 1) Spatial Region (any extended area of dimension 0,1,2, or 3); 2) Dependent
Item (any relational item such as a quality, state or attribute, which cannot stand alone as a
separately existing entity. This category is synonymous with Husserl’s use of the term
moment); and 3) Independent Item (any maximally connected, causally unitary thing, which
has a more or less rigid boundary, an identity, and whose existence is not predicated on
anything else’s existence. This category is synonymous with Husserl’s use of the term part
or piece) (Husserl, 1900-01). Each of these three categories contains several subordinate
categories beneath it.</p>
      <p>Spatial</p>
      <p>Region
Fee Portion</p>
      <p>of Space
Physically Bound</p>
      <p>Portion of Space
Stationary</p>
      <p>Mobile</p>
      <p>Enduring Item
[Exists in space and
time, has no
temporal parts]
Dependent</p>
      <p>Item</p>
      <p>Quality, State, Power
(Sometimes form Quality, Region</p>
      <p>or Scale)
Quasi-Quality, Quasi-State,</p>
      <p>Quasi-Power</p>
      <p>Independent
Items, their</p>
      <p>Substance
(Maximally connected</p>
      <p>causal unity)
Aggregate of Substances</p>
      <p>Fiat Part of Substance
Boundary of a Substance</p>
      <p>Quasi-Substance</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>3.3 Domain-Specific Category Development</title>
      <p>The domain-specific categories of an ontology can be derived from the ontology’s lexicon,
which, once again, points to the need for a consistent and comprehensive set of
domainspecific terms. It is important to note that many of the domain-specific categories needed for
the ontology may not be exhausted by the specific, alphabetically listed set of terms within
the lexicon. Many terms’ definitions will contain subsequent terms within them that will also
need to be categorized within the ontology. However, these subordinate terms will not
necessarily be explicit within the lexicon, but instead, will need to be manually fleshed out by
the ontologist. For example, consider the following definition from the Dis-ReO:</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>Assisting Agency An agency directly contributing suppression, rescue, support or service resources to another agency. (IMS/ICS) (source: Emergency Management Glossary (U.S. Steel Gary Works) (Snap Dis-ReO, 2003).</title>
        <p>The definition above contains information about certain items, objectives, and activities
related to assisting agencies, namely: suppression resources, rescue resources, support
resources, and service resources, all of which may contain subordinate, more highly specific,
categories within them (e.g., rescue resources will contain fire services and ambulance
transportation services, all of which could be further categorized as ‘active,’ ‘inactive,’
‘available,’ or ‘unavailable’). Simply modeling the term ‘assisting agency’ within a
disasterresponse ontology, without modeling certain terms embedded within its definition, will not
suffice in capturing the ontological structure of what assisting agencies are, what kinds of
members they have, or what kinds of services they perform.</p>
        <p>Domain-specific categories represent the material of the formal ontology, whereas the
upper-level categories represent the ontology’s form. In this manner, ontology development
represents a type of Aristotelian hylomorphism, where it is assumed that all matter possesses
some abstract form and, simultaneously, all form is existentially constituted by some matter.
In this manner, rationalistic philosophical principles inform us about the form of the
ontology, while data-driven empirical facts inform us about the concrete material of it.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>3.4 Diagram Formal Relations Between Terms/Categories</title>
      <p>The connection between the upper-level form and the domain-specific material within an
ontology is made through the manual integration of the ontology’s upper-level categories
with their domain-specific counterparts. Consider once again the category ‘damage’ within
the Dis-ReO. ‘Damage’ is one sub-category of the more general category ‘Dependent Item,’
which in turn, is a sub-category of ‘Enduring Item’ (see Figure 1). As previously discussed,
there are various kinds of damage that are associated with various kinds of objects in a given
domain. All damage is a quality (attribute) of some substance or other. Specific kinds of
damages result from specific activities (earthquakes, fires, flooding) and the specific kinds of
material substances one is investigating (e.g., agents, structures). The specifics of damage
types results, at least in part, from the specifics of substance-types. The domain-specific
level of the ontology serves to provide these kinds of specifics. The Dis-ReO recognizes
various kinds of hierarchically-arranged substances, all of which can be damaged in a disaster
event (see Figure 2).</p>
      <p>Damage</p>
      <p>Physical</p>
      <p>Contents
Structural</p>
      <p>Bodily</p>
      <p>Food
Clothing
Furniture</p>
      <p>Major
Appliances</p>
      <p>Severe
Moderate</p>
      <p>Light</p>
      <p>Injury
Malnourished</p>
      <p>Radiation
Exposure
Chemical
Exposure</p>
      <p>Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4</p>
      <p>Death
Psychological</p>
      <p>Trauma</p>
      <p>Severe-Minor
General</p>
      <p>Pain/Suffering</p>
      <p>The above diagram shows the marriage of rational principles and empirical data on
various interconnected levels. For example, when servicing casualties, it is important to
understand the severity of their injuries. The HAZUS program used by disaster agencies to
provide state estimates of injuries and casualties categorizes injuries into four specified
levels, the first being minor, the fourth being mortally wounded (leading to immanent death).
The Dis-ReO is able to capture that information and draw relationships between those
HAZUS categories and the more abstract conceptual categories of the SnapBFO. In this way,
one can see that a ‘Level 3 (serious) injury’ is a subcategory of ‘Injury,’ which is a
subcategory of ‘Bodily Damage,’ which is a subcategory of ‘Physical Damage’ and so on.
Thus, one important advantage to an ontology of this type is seen in its ability to map the
relations between those well-understood concrete physical items (e.g., an injured person) and
those perhaps-not-so-well-understood abstract nonphysical items (e.g., possessing the
attribute of ‘being damaged’).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>3.5 Computational Ontology Capture Method</title>
      <p>In order to utilize the ontological model developed by the merger of the Upper-and
Lowerlevel categories, it is important to find (or construct) a sufficiently complex computational
language which can capture that model. While it is open to much debate as to which kind of
computational tools are appropriate for this task (e.g., first-order predicate logic, description
logic), there is general consensus that the language strike a balance between being
sufficiently formal on the one hand, and conceptually inclusive on the other hand. A
computational language that is overly formal, to the detriment of its expressive power will
not be optimal. In the same way, a language that is highly expressive, but which lacks
formality, will also be inadequate for the task.</p>
      <p>Since the formal structure of the ontology is fully expressed within its diagrammatic
model, the transformation from diagram to formal language is trivial, so long as the formal
language is capable of capturing the subtle formal connections within the diagram. When
choosing a computational language, certain factors need to be considered. These factors
entail that the formal ontology is: 1) rigorous and formal; 2) interoperable; 3) user-friendly;
4) reusable; 5) customizable; and 6) capable of easily interfacing with both humans and
other formal systems. Taking these factors into account, one must once again strike a balance
between rational and empirical considerations. Rational considerations are those that point to
the philosophical complexity and expressiveness of the formal ontology. One must be
concerned with whether the ontology is capable of accurately capturing certain metaphysical
relations within the world. Empirical considerations point to industry standards and
computational constraints within engineering or computer science communities. In this
regard, one must be concerned with whether the ontology will easily interface with the kinds
of systems currently being used by members of those communities.</p>
      <p>
        Due to such factors, it is important to survey the landscape of computer science and
engineering, in order to develop an ontology which complies with the various kinds of
systems currently under use within these subject areas. Description logics are one example of
a commonly used computational tool for computer software design. Description logics have
been extensively used by the AI community for the last couple of decades
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Baader et al,
2003)</xref>
        . They have been used for a plethora of applications including conceptual modeling,
information integration, query mechanisms, view maintenance, software management
systems, planning systems, configuration systems, and natural language understanding.
Therefore, description logics possess the kind of industry standard that must be considered
when building new kinds of conceptual modeling tools like formal ontologies. Description
logics are knowledge representation languages tailored for expressive knowledge about
concepts and concept hierarchies. They offer a balance between expressive power on one
hand and computational complexity on the other, and are considered an important tool for
unifying and giving a logical basis for the following items: 1) frame-based systems; 2)
semantic networks; 3) KL-ONE-like languages; 4) object-oriented representations; 5)
semantic data models; and 6) type systems.
      </p>
      <p>The Dis-ReO is being modeled within the Protégé 2000 software tool from Stanford
University’s KSL laboratories (Noy &amp; McGuinness, 2001; McGuinness et al, 2000). Protégé
2000 is a description logic tool that has been designed to be interoperable with DAML and
other DARPA-funded AI projects (Hendler, et al, 2000). Since the Dis-ReO is meant to
interoperate with private sector agencies, governmental agencies, and military agencies, it
was important to use a software tool that has been designed with these agencies in mind.
Another feature of Protégé 2000 is that it is easy to understand and use. It is a
straightforward tool designed for individuals who may not be entirely familiar with the intricate
operations/structure of complex computational tools. Lastly, Protégé 2000 is shareware, so it
can be both locally installed and it is highly cost effective.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>3.6 Ontology Evaluation</title>
      <p>The final step in the ontology development process is that of evaluation. It represents the
most difficult step because the evaluation of the ontology amounts to an elaborate feedback
mechanism, nearly identical to the form of feedback found within life-cycle models in other
areas of systems engineering (see Figure 3).</p>
      <p>
        An ontology’s system life-cycle begins by defining the needs and requirements of that
system which, along with research findings, influence the system’s conceptual design
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Blanchard, et al, 1998)</xref>
        . The conceptual design then serves as the ground for the system’s
preliminary design. The system’s preliminary design should, in turn, provide a certain level
of feedback that will re-influence and perhaps inform the conceptual design of the ontology.
The preliminary design of the ontology will include those steps necessary for development of
the lexicon and upper-level categories, for example. The ontology’s preliminary design will
then inform its detailed design and development. This step will include, among other things,
the addition of the domain-specific concepts/categories harvested from the lexicon as well as
the application of the ontology to some logic system (descriptive or other), amounting to a
functional, computational prototype of the ontology. This step within the design process will,
in turn, feedback once more to the overall conceptual design of the ontology. It is here where
problems of fit between upper- and lower-level categories should become most apparent,
since it is this stage where the ontology is first fitted to a computational system capable of
expressing the relations therein. The detailed design of the ontology subsequently leads to
steps involving the production/construction of a full-blown prototype that is housed within a
software system. Production of the software’s prototype leads to issues surrounding its
utilization/support and finally its phaseout/disposal.
      </p>
      <p>INITIAL ONTOLOGY STEPS</p>
      <p>DEFINE NEED/</p>
      <p>REQUIREMENT
CONCEPTUAL</p>
      <p>DESIGN
RESEARCH</p>
      <p>PRELIMINARY DESIGN (DEVELOPMENT)</p>
      <p>The difficulty in evaluating an ontology can hopefully be alleviated by a systematized
life-cycle analysis, such as the one described above. Problems can still arise in the actual
design of the ontology itself, since there are continued issues of fit between certain
upperlevel formal models such as the SnapBFO and certain descriptive logic systems such as
Protégé 2000. However, the goal of systematics should not be understood solely in terms of
the success of the prototype developed. The goal of systematics, and to a large degree, the
goal of contemporary ontology design, should be focused on the methodology for its design,
not the outcome. Systems engineers, after all, do not design products per se. They design
systems which facilitate better product development. Therefore, the end result of ontology
design, like that of systematics, can be conceived of as the system itself. We should be
concerned here with a conceptual methodology first, and its product implementation second.
If we can achieve a higher level of success at the conceptual and methodological level,
successes at the implementation and application levels will follow suit.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>4 Conclusion</title>
      <p>It is the hope that formal ontological systems such as the Dis-ReO can aid various types of
engineers and other practitioners by properly categorizing the various, disparate amounts of
information contained within their disciplines. It is argued here that in order to do this job
adequately, ontologies must be designed under the auspice of two complementary
methodologies: rationalism and empiricism. By applying both methodologies to ontology
design, ontologists will be able to: 1) better understand the function of ontology construction
itself, as a philosophical exercise, and 2) better understand those empirical features of the
world that an ontology categorizes. If applied correctly, the methodology argued for in this
paper should be able to further marry the fields of engineering, computer science and
philosophy into an overarching interdisciplinary field of ontological engineering capable of
producing fantastic results across numerous other relevant fields.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>Support for this research paper was graciously provided by The Center for Multisource
Information Fusion (CMIF) at The University of Buffalo, State University of New York and
The Calspan-UB Research Center (CUBRC) under the auspices of an Air Force Office of
Scientific Research (AFOSR) Grant # F49620-01-1-0371. Special thanks go out to Prof.
James Llinas (CMIF director) and Prof. Peter Scott (UB Dept. of Computer Science) for their
support and guidance throughout the development of this project.</p>
    </sec>
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