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        <article-title>Personal Dynamic Memories are Necessary to Deal with Meaning and Understanding in Human-Centric AI</article-title>
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      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Luc Steels</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Human-centric AI requires not only a fundamental shift in the way AI systems are conceived and designed but also a reorientation in basic research in order to figure out how AI can come to grips with meaning and understanding. Meanings are made up of distinctions to categorize and conceptualize an experience at different levels, from directly observable factual meanings to expressional, social, conventional and intrinsic meanings. Meanings get organised into larger-scale narratives that conceptualize experiences from a particular perspective. Understanding is the process of constructing and then integrating these narratives into a Personal Dynamic Memory that stores narratives from past experiences. This memory plays a crucial role to construct more narratives and thus works intimately together with inferences, mental simulations, and the analysis of experiences in terms of syntactic and semantic structures. This paper outlines this approach to meaning and understanding by clarifying what it entails, outlining technical challenges that must be overcome, and providing links to earlier relevant AI work as well as new technical advances that could make Personal Dynamic Memories a reality in the near future. 2 What is human-centric AI?</p>
      </abstract>
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    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        “Human-centric AI focuses on collaborating with humans,
enhancing human capabilities, and empowering humans to better achieve
their goals.” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]. Human-centric AI has become a focal point of
current research, particularly in Europe, where it is now the stated
objective of the EU strategy recently (February 2020) issued by the
European Commission. This strategy calls for AI that shows human
agency and oversight, technical robustness and safety, privacy and
data governance, transparency, care for diversity, non-discrimination
and fairness, focus on societal and environmental well-being, and
accountability [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref36">36</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Achieving human-centric AI requires a number of changes in
focus compared to current AI:
(i) Human-centric AI systems should be made aware of the goals and
intentions of their users and base their own goals and dialog on
meanings rather than on statistical patterns of past behavior only, even if
statistical patterns can play a very important role, for example for
drastically reducing search or carrying out approximate inference.
Human goals and values should always take precedence. Respect for
human autonomy should be built into the system by design, leading
to qualities such as fairness and respect.
(ii) Human-centric AI requires that a system is able to explain its
reasoning and learning strategies so that the decisions are
understandable by humans. Only by emphasizing human understandability will
human-centric AI achieve proper explainability and transparency.
(iii) Human-centric AI should not only learn by observation or
theorizing about reality but also by taking advice from humans, as
suggested in John McCarthy’s original 1958 proposal of the Advice
Taker [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
(iv) Human-centric AI should be able to use natural communication,
i.e. communication primarily based on human language, not only by
mimicking language syntax but, more importantly, using the rich
semantics of natural languages, augmented with multi-modal
communication channels. This is needed to support explainability, and
accountability.
(v) Human-centric AI should have the capacity of self-reflection
which can be achieved by a meta-level architecture that is able to
track decision-making and intervene by catching failures and
repairing them. By extension, the architecture should support the
construction of a theory of mind of other agents, i.e. how they see the world,
what their motivations and intentions are, and what knowledge they
are using or lacking. Only through this capacity can AI achieve
intelligent cooperation and adequate explicability, and learn efficiently
through cultural transmission.
(vi) Finally, human-centric AI should reflect the ethical and moral
standards that are also expected from humans or organisations in our
society, particularly for supporting tasks that are close to human
activity and interest.
      </p>
      <p>Today the dominating perspective on AI is not human-centric. It
focuses primarily on achieving high predictive performance on
predefined benchmarks, trying to exceed human performance so that
humans can be replaced in the task being considered. This approach is
machine-centric rather than human-centric. It emphasizes
numerical (subsymbolic) techniques (from neural network research, pattern
recognition, information retrieval, and data science), often ignoring
valuable contributions from symbolic AI that are needed to achieve
explicability and robustness.</p>
      <p>Admittedly the machine-oriented focus has recently lead to a jump
in performance on chosen benchmarks, particularly in the domain of
pattern recognition and computer vision, but unfortunately also to a
kind of AI that is opaque, cannot explain or defend its decisions, is
unable to take human advice, is not robust against adversarial attacks,
has no understanding of the motivations of its users, and requires vast
amounts of data and computing power. Although for a large, growing
class of applications these shortcomings are not an issue, for AI
applications that touch on human lives and are socially consequential,
these disadvantages are highly problematic.</p>
      <p>
        Different approaches to human-centric AI have been proposed
recently. They are all valuable. Some researchers have advocated
guidelines and design methodologies to make AI more trust-worthy
and responsible by emphasizing safety, privacy, data governance,
transparency, diversity, fairness, and accountability [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">30</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
Others have emphasized that we need more human-centric interfaces
for AI systems, including better explanation facilities and ways for
humans to provide guidance during machine learning or
decisionmaking[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref38">38</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Here I focus on the idea that human-centric AI requires above all
another kind of AI, namely AI which has meaning and understanding
at its core. The present paper is a position paper, trying to clarifying
this point of view and reflecting on the key issues and possible
technical solutions. But first, what do we mean by meaning and
understanding?
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Meaning and understanding</title>
      <p>The notion of meaning is related to how we try to understand how
humans make sense of an experience. An experience can be a behavior
or the observation of a behavior, an image or a sequence of images,
sounds, soundscapes, smells and tastes, spoken or written text, and
more generally cultural artefacts like scenes in a theatre play. In the
real world, there is a flow of experiences that we need to interpret
and cope with quickly. For example, if we are driving a car there is
a quick succession of situations that we have to gauge correctly in
order to act appropriately, even in unusual situations: Why is the car
behind mine honking its horn? Is the woman with a baby stroller
going to cross the street or has she seen me coming? Why is everybody
slowing down? What does this red light on the dashboard mean?</p>
      <p>
        Meanings are built from categorisations of reality, for example,
colors, actions types, temporal and spatial relations, etc.
Categorisations are distinctions that are relevant for the interaction between
humans (or agents more generally) and their environment,
including other agents [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ]. For example, the distinction between red and
green is relevant in traffic lights because it tells you whether it is safe
to start driving or cross the road. The distinction between angry and
sad is relevant for knowing how to behave with respect to another
person. The distinction between left and right is relevant for giving
or following instructions how to reach a location or how to find an
object in a scene.
      </p>
      <p>
        Categories are the building blocks for constructing different levels
of meaning for an experience, The following levels are often
discussed in the appreciation of art works [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ] but are actually useful
for interpreting any kind of experience [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
        ]:
      </p>
      <p>The base level of an experience details the external formal
properties directly derivable from the perceived appearance of the
experience, for example, the lines, shapes, color differences in hue,
value (brightness) and saturation, textures, shading, spatial
positions of elements, etc. in the case of images.</p>
      <p>The first level of meaning is that of factual meaning. It
identifies and categorises events, actors, entities and roles they play in
events, as well as the temporal, spatial and causal relations
between them. In the case of images they require a suite of
sophisticated processing steps, starting from object segmentation,
object location, object recognition, 3D reconstruction, tracking over
time, etc.</p>
      <p>When there are actors involved, a second level, that of
expressional meaning becomes relevant. It identifies the intentions,
goals, interests, and motivations of the actors and their
psychological states or the manner in which they carry out actions.
The next level is that of social meaning. It is about the social
relations between the actors and how the activities are integrated into
the local community or the society as a whole.</p>
      <p>The fourth level is that of conventional meaning, based on figuring
out what is depicted or spoken about and the historical or cultural
context, which has to be learned from conversations or cultural
artefacts, like books or films.</p>
      <p>The fifth level is known as the intrinsic meaning or content of
an experience. It is about the ultimate motive of certain images
or texts, or why somebody is carrying out a certain behavior. It
explains why this particular experience may have occurred.
We define a narrative as a coherent reconstruction of the different
levels of meaning of an experience or a set of experiences based on
one or more perspectives. It contains categorised entities at each of
these levels, links between the levels, and possibly additional
crosslevel categorisations. The perspective, which is often the perspective
of the agent itself, is unavoidable because categories are most of the
time observer-dependent. For example, an object which is to my left
is for a person opposite of me to the right. I may categorise a
gesture as aggressive whereas the person making the gesture may have
performed it to defend herself. I may not know a particular historical
figure and believe it is just the representation of an old man, whereas
you may recognize the figure and be repulsed by the atrocities that
were conducted under his command. Transforming a narrative from
one perspective into a narrative for the same experience from
another perspective is a critical component in handling meaning. Even
to communicate properly in language we often have to look at the
viewpoint of the interlocutor and categorise spatial and other
relations accordingly.</p>
      <p>Understanding is a process with three functions: (i) Reconstruct
the different levels of meaning by casting them into coherent
narratives that explain the events underlying the experience, (ii) predict
how the experience will unfold in the future and reconstruct what has
happened in the past and (iii) integrate these narratives into a
Personal Dynamic Memory. A Personal Dynamic memory is an active
store of past experiences which may include partly some of the
original data but mostly the webs of meanings and the narratives that have
been constructed during the interpretation of earlier experiences. A
Personal Dynamic Memory is crucial for supporting the construction
of narratives of new experiences but it is today missing from existing
AI systems.</p>
      <p>Here is a simple example to illustrate these ideas. Consider the
image in Figure 1 (left). This is from a poster that used to be
employed in French and Belgian schools to teach children about daily
life and to learn how to talk about it. We instantly recognize that this
is a scene from a restaurant, using cues like the dress and activities of
the waiter and waitress or the fact that people are sitting at different
tables in the room. Current image recognition algorithms would be
able to segment and identify some of the people and objects in the
scene and in some cases label them with a fair degree of accuracy,
see Fig. 1 (right).</p>
      <p>However a normal observer would see a lot more than that. For
example, when asked whether a person is missing at the table on
the right, the answer would be straightforward: Yes, because there
is an empty chair, a plate and cutlery on the table section in front of
the chair, and a napkin hanging over the chair. So there must have
been a third person sitting there, probably the mother of the child.
Moreover nobody has a lot of difficulty to imagine where she went.
There is a door marked ‘lavabo’ (meaning ‘toilet’ in French) and
it is quite plausible that she went to the toilet while waiting for the
meal to arrive. Any human viewer would furthermore guess without
hesitation why the child is showing his plate to the waitress arriving
with the food and why the person to the left of the child (from our
perspective) is probably the father looking contently at the child. We
could go on further completing the narrative, for example, ask why
the cat at the feet of the waitress looks eagerly at the food, observe
that the food contains chicken with potatoes, notice that it looks
quite windy outside, that the vegetation suggests some place in the
south of France, and so on.</p>
      <p>Fig. 1. Left. Didactic image of a scene in a restaurant. Right. Image
segmentation identifying regions that contain people (based on Google’s Cloud
Vision API).</p>
      <p>Clearly these interpretations rely heavily on inferences reflecting
knowledge about restaurants, families, needs and desires, roles
played by people in restaurants (waiter, waitress, bar tender, cashier,
customer). These inferences are not only necessary to properly
interpret the visual image in Fig. 1 but also to answer questions
such as ’Who is the waitress?’, ’Why is she approaching the table?’,
’Where is the missing person at the table?, ’Who will get food first?’,
etc., We can also make predictions and reconstructions, for example,
that the waitress will reach the table, put the food on the table, cut
the chicken into pieces, and put them on the different plates, or that
the mother of the child will come back from the toilet, sit down
again at the table, and start eating herself.</p>
      <p>Each of us has a vast Personal Dynamic Memory that stores
narratives based on prior experiences: from visiting restaurants, seeing
images in pictures or movies, reading about them, etc. Our daily life
is filled from morning to evening with activities to feed and
reorganise our Personal Dynamic Memories and the richer they become the
more we are able to make sense of new experiences. What is truly
amazing is that by the time we reach the adult stage these memories
must already contain a massive number of facts, which are
nevertheless searched at an incredibly fast rate with relevant parts of memory
becoming primed and ready for use for handling novel experiences.</p>
      <p>Understanding uses information both from syntactic and semantic
parsing of the experience and from inferences based on a Personal
Dynamic Memory, in order to fill in unexpressed or un-observable
information, e.g. via logical reasoning and mental simulation.
Moreover the understanding process changes the contents of Personal
Dynamic Memory, not only because the new experience, its
interpretation, and links to other experiences are stored, but also because
earlier experiences are revisited and their storage may be affected by
newer experiences. Memory needed for understanding is therefore
highly dynamic, unlike computer memory that remains unchanged
once something has been stored.</p>
      <p>This leads to the proposal for a general architecture for AI
systems that handle understanding depicted in Fig. 2. It shows the flow
from experience to syntactic and semantic structures, and from there
towards the construction of narratives, integrated into a Personal
Dynamic Memory. The flow of information is not only bottom-up but
also top-down, shown with the green arrows. The narrative under
construction is partially guiding semantic analysis and cutting down
combinatorial search in syntactic analysis, whereas the narratives
already contained in the Personal Dynamic Memory are guiding the
construction of narratives of new experiences.</p>
      <p>analysis
experiences and data</p>
      <p>integration
personal
dynamic memory
syntactic and
semantic
structures
interpretation
narratives</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Current AI does not handle meaning properly</title>
      <p>Before putting some more technical flesh on this architectural
skeleton, I want to emphasize that current techniques and AI design
methodologies are not handling meaning and understanding. Current
techniques fall into two classes: numerical (or subsymbolic)
techniques and symbolic techniques with shades in between.</p>
      <p>Simplifying, numerical (or subsymbolic) AI techniques translate
problems into a numerical form (real numbers and vectors) and
perform numerical operations over them. The numerical representations
are constructed using information-theoretic considerations,
specifically, their ability to help predict or complete patterns. Most neural
networks fall into this class, but also other techniques like Latent
Distributional Semantics, which associates a vector representation
known as an embedding with words, images, or actions. The
embeddings capture the syntactic and semantic contexts in which an
element appears and can be used to compute similarities, predict the
next word or image, relate an image to a label, answer textual queries,
or perform many other useful subfunctions for building intelligent
applications. Embeddings are computed either by statistical methods
or by using deep learning algorithms.</p>
      <p>
        Importantly, and as pointed out clearly by Claude Shannon [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
        ]
who can be considered the father of numerical AI,
informationtheoretic representations do not try to capture meaning. For example,
a word embedding captures the kinds of contexts in which a word
may occur but this is only an indirect substitute for the real meaning
of the word. Ignoring meaning makes it feasible to use these
numerical techniques in circumstances where there is no representation of
meaning available for learning or training - which is in fact almost
always the case. But it leaves out a crucial aspect of (human)
intelligence.
      </p>
      <p>Thus, ‘Neural image labeling’ associates rather directly labels
with images (sometimes even using only pixel-based image
representations), without attempting to discern individual objects, actors,
or events, and without trying to figure out the situation underlying
the image, the nature of the action, the motivations of the actors
depicted in an action, the historical setting, the reason why the image is
made, and many other aspects which human viewers spontaneously
come up with. ‘Neural translation’ does not try to perform a syntactic
analysis using grammars and parsers nor semantic analysis using
interpreters building conceptual representations of what is being said.
Rather, they associate n-grams in the source language with n-grams
in the target language based on word vectors that capture statistical
co-occurrences in dual (source/target) corpora.</p>
      <p>Circumventing meaning has made the current wave of deep
learning based AI applications possible but it is also responsible for the
brittleness of image labeling, the nonsensical nature of translations,
failures in answering questions that fall slightly outside of the
statistical patterns in the corpora used to train them, the success of
adversarial attacks for interpreting images or texts that do not confuse
humans but throw off AI systems, the non-transparency of decision
making, and many other features that human-centric AI considers
undesirable.</p>
      <p>Intuitively a kind of hybrid or integrated AI that combines the
virtues of numerical with those of symbolic AI is a possible way
out and has indeed been proposed by several researchers. Symbolic
AI maps problems into symbols and symbolic structures and
performs transformations over these symbolic structures, for example
guided by rules of sound logical inference. This approach flourished
in the 1970s and 1980s leading to expert systems built for
interactively supporting experts, large-scale ontologies and domain models
as now used in the semantic web or in encyclopedic
knowledgegraphs, computer-assisted theorem proving, constraint solvers for
scheduling or design, precision language processing, and much more.</p>
      <p>
        The symbolic approach has tried, at least in principle, to get closer
to handling meaning. It has used terms like semantic information
processing [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ], or story understanding[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ], talked about AI able to
take advice, rather than be programmed explicitly or trained with
large data sets[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], and built sophisticated explanation facilities for
expert systems using deep human-comprehensible models of the
domain and an explicit representation of the problem solving methods
being used[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Nevertheless, the symbolic approach has its own limitations with
respect to handling meaning and understanding. A key criticism,
reflected in Searle’s Chinese Room argument and known as the symbol
grounding problem, is that symbolic AI operates in a world of
symbols with no systematic connection to the real world. To solve this
problem requires an integration of a symbolic and a numerical
approach, because the latter starts from the (real) numbers delivered
by sensors and actuators that are directly connected to the world,
so that the categories that constitute the meaning of symbols indeed
become properly grounded. However, it is important that the
grounding of symbols is based on what is meaningful, i.e. relevant, to the
agent, which is different from grounding based on success in
prediction tasks. When agents cooperate on tasks in a shared environment,
particularly if they have to communicate about tasks, they
implicitly have to coordinate the way the categorize reality and how these
categorizations are expressed.[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">28</xref>
        ]
      </p>
      <p>In addition, the transformations of symbolic structures are formal
operations, similar to a set of axioms and rules of logical inference
as in mathematics. But the problem is that it is very hard, if not
impossible, to define axioms exhaustively for real world open-ended
domains due to the unavoidable exceptions, lack of knowledge, and
the problem of making clear-cut definitions. These problems have
been discussed widely under the title of the frame problem. Also here
an integration of numerical and symbolic techniques is a way to go
forward so that the flexibility of pattern recognition and action
selection based on neurally inspired models, which gives only
approximate answers, can be married to the precision and compositionality
of symbolic reasoning.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Relevant work</title>
      <p>
        The ideas proposed here are certainly not new. For a long time it has
been commonly accepted in cognitive science that the construction
of narratives is an essential ingredient of cognitive intelligence
because it allows us to make sense of reality [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref35">35</xref>
        ]. Also in AI there
has been significant prior work, although mostly in the context of
story generation and story understanding, which are the textual
manifestations of internally constructed narratives [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. We find symbolic
approaches from the late nineteen-seventies onwards, such as in the
work of Schank and colleagues [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ], Winston’s proposals for
Computational Narrative Intelligence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref37">37</xref>
        ], or more recently the work of
Gervas and his group on narrative generation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. There is also
increasing work at the moment using numerical approaches towards
narrative intelligence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ], particularly within the context of building
question-answering and dialog systems.
      </p>
      <p>
        In the psychological literature there has also been extensive work
on personal memory, often based taking Tulving as a starting point
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref33">33</xref>
        ]. He introduced the distinction between procedural (knowledge
of skills) and declarative memory, usually divided into semantic
memory, which contains general factual knowledge, and episodic
memory, which refers to specific autobiographical experiences stored
in the form of contextualized past perceptions, actions and temporal
and causal structures. Schank and colleagues have made proposals
in the late 1980s on how such dynamic memories could be built[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ].
This has lead in the nineteen nineties to significant work on
casebased reasoning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] and memory-based reasoning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
        ]. Much of this
has been overshadowed by the current peak of interest in deep
learning, but it remains highly valuable for the aims discussed in this
paper.
      </p>
      <p>Meanwhile various important technological advances have been
made in other areas that make a renewed effort towards the
experimentation with Personal Dynamic Memories and narratives a
realistic prospect. Among these advances I just want to highlight the
following:</p>
      <p>
        Very large knowledge bases. One of the critical bottlenecks for
effective Personal Dynamical Memories is the sheer size of the
knowledge that has to be represented and processed. If we
express this in terms of facts, then we must expect to handle at least
tens of millions, if not billions. This was totally impossible two
decades ago but very significant progress, pushed by the
development of the semantic web, has changed the situation. It is now
possible to represent fact-bases up to 100 billion triples using
standard knowledge representations (RDF statements and OWL) and
perform inferences over them fast enough to be used in
interactive applications[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref34">34</xref>
        ]. So the issue of computational complexity
for Personal Dynamic Memories can be considered to be solved.
Robotic embodiment Another critical bottleneck is that Personal
Dynamic Memories have to be grounded in sensori-motor
experiences. A few decades ago the state of the art in computer vision
and robotics was simply not advanced enough to tackle this issue
in any realistic way. But also here there have been tremendous
advances, both in the availability of lower cost robotic hardware
including cameras and signal processing chips and in software for
perception and action control, primarily using techniques from
deep learning. These developments in themselves do not solve
the issue of symbol grounding but they have made it possible to
start addressing it seriously. One example of recent work uses
language games between embodied autonomous robots that
generate not only their own communication system but also an
ontology containing the relevant distinctions in a specific domain [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31">31</xref>
        ].
These experiments have shown how perceptually grounded
categories (for example for color or size) or spatial and temporal
relations grounded in event recognition can emerge in populations of
agents pushed by the task of communication. Another example is
the Open-Ease framework http://www.open-ease.org/
that supports the recording and storage of inhomogeneous
interpretation data from robots and human manipulation episodes so
that they can be used to build semantically oriented tools
interpreting, analyzing, visualizing, and learning from these
experience data.[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]
Mental simulation Another bottleneck for building realistic
Personal Dynamic Memories has been the role of mental simulations
of actions and situations. This is considered an essential function
of memory by many psychologists, particularly for predicting how
a perceived situation will continue to evolve in the future[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. This
hypothesis has also inspired AI researchers[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] but
implementations could only explore simple isolated examples until very
recently. However, significant advances in virtual reality technology
have now pushed the state of the art in computer graphics to allow
a very high degree of realistic simulation even for complex world
situations, thanks also to dedicated hardware (game engines who
have now reached performances of 12 terraflops) and highly
optimized software. This technology is already being used for
cognitive robotics experiments in order to plan future behavior through
mental simulation, complementary to classical planning based on
symbol manipulation, and to understand human language
instructions or descriptions.[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] So also for this aspect, there are
promising developments that make Personal Dynamic Memories much
more feasible.
      </p>
      <p>
        Finally there have been significant advances recently in
Computational Construction Grammar. Most linguistic formalisms, such
as Chomskyan generative grammar, remain close to the
morphosyntactic structure of a language. Construction Grammar in
contrast focuses on capturing the systematic ways in which grammar
expresses meaning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. It is therefore a more appropriate basis for
natural language processing for an AI approach that seeks to
handle meaning and understanding, particularly because Construction
Grammarians have worked closely with cognitive semantics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref32">32</xref>
        ],
an approach to semantics that seeks to understand the conceptual
patterns with which humans organise their experiences in order
to make it expressable in their language. A decade ago usable
implementations of construction grammar and cognitive
semantics were in their infancy but this has changed completely. A first
big effort, spearheaded by ICSI in Berkeley, developed an
Embodied Construction Grammar[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], which not only formalized and
operationalized construction grammars but also subscribed to the
‘mental simulation’ approach to meaning mentioned in the
previous paragraphs. Another big effort, at the University of
Brussels VUB AI Lab and the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in
Paris, developed Fluid Construction Grammar[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
        ], which has now
a very solid implementation and a growing user community.(see
www.fcg.org) Given that language communication plays a
major role in the way that human Personal Dynamic Memories get
formed, this line of research provides another hopeful
contribution towards achieving meaningful AI.
5
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>The organisation of memory</title>
      <p>In my opinion, the most critical bottleneck at the moment is: How
should a Personal Dynamic Memory be organised at the
microlevel and what kind of basic computations (including inferencing and
learning) should be supported. Obviously a linear list of facts,
possibly represented in RDF, will not do, we need higher level structuring
devices, partly for managing inferential and combinatorial
complexity, partly for dealing with the frame problem, and partly for
achieving fast access to the most relevant prior experiences that will help
to make sense of a new experience. What will also not work is to
blindly store the vast amount of information generated by an
experience, the complete sensori-motor data streams, the data from the
mental simulations that are triggered, the language descriptions and
their semantic interpretations, or all the facts relevant for an
experience. If eveything is stored this is not only costly from an energetic
point of view but will certainly get in the way of fast retrieval and
inference.</p>
      <p>
        The cognitive science and AI literature already contains various
proposals for the organisation of memory. Many of them start from
Bartlett’s original idea of a schema also called a frame. It was
formulated in the 1930s and revived again in the 1970s by psychologists
such as David Rumelhart [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ], linguists such as Charles Fillmore
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], and sociologists, such as Erwin Goffman [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>A schema is a way of framing a particular situation in terms of
a set of entities, roles for these entities, constraints on the kind of
entities that can fill these roles, and relations between the entities
based on their roles. Each schema has various associated cues to
recognize quickly whether it applies to the current situation. Once it is
triggered, a schema casts a web over the sensori-motor inputs and
facts associated with the situation and it makes us see or infer
certain aspects of the experience more clearly at the expense of others.
Schemas impose a bias and perspective on a situation and often also
an emotional reaction. They come with a lot of defaults. These are
facts which can be expected to be the case if a particular schema
matches well with an experience, but are not explicitly mentioned or
observable. Sometimes these defaults even override perception or fly
in the face of obvious facts.</p>
      <p>
        The notion of a schema was introduced into AI by Minsky[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]
who used the term frame. It lead to a variety of frame-based
knowledge representation systems in the 1970s, which were used
extensively to model the perception of complex scenes, story telling and
story understanding, and expert reasoning. Frame-based
representation systems feature datastructures for representing frames, basic
inference operations over frames, and languages and interfaces to
define frames and maintain large collections of frames. Frame-based
knowledge representation systems also support various kinds of
relations between frames, in particular subtype relations so that there
could be the inheritance of information from one frame handling a
broad set of experiences to another frame concerned with a more
specific situation. Another example are priming relations, so that if
one frame fits well with a situation, another frame covering a
subsequent event would already be made ready for activation. Besides
mechanisms for handling defaults, the earlier frame-based
representation systems also supported procedural attachment, so that
procedures like image or sound processing or robotic action in the real
world could be seamlessly integrated.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>The paper argued that human-centric AI, with its implications of
explainability, transparency, robustness, etc., is only going to be
possible when AI comes to grips with meaning and understanding. This
requires that we go beyond the numerical AI paradigm that is
currently dominating AI, where meaning is captured only very indirectly
in embeddings and operations over embeddings, but also beyond the
symbolic paradigm, which focuses on formal operations over
nongrounded symbols.</p>
      <p>First of all we need at the very least a form of integrated or
hybrid AI that combines numerical and symbolic AI. But we need to go
beyond both. The paper argued that a central characteristic of
understanding is the ability to build a coherent narrative of an experience
based on narratives of past experiences stored in a Personal Dynamic
Memory, and integrate this narrative in memory. The big challenge
for AI is partly technical, to solve problems of computational
complexity to handle the very large knowledge bases and huge inferences
that are required. But it is also conceptual. We need to understand
much better how new experiences and the narratives built for them
get integrated into a Personal Dynamic Memory in such a way that
they get triggered again on the most relevant new experiences, and
how facts or narratives that are deemed no longer relevant can be
forgotten or simply not stored in the first place.</p>
      <p>Acknowledgement The author is funded by the Catalan Institute
for Advanced Studies (ICREA) embedded in the Institute for
Evolutionary Biology (UPF/CSIC) in Barcelona. This work was made
possible by H2020 grants within the frame of the Humane AI
Flagship preparation project and the AI4EU project.</p>
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