The effect of active information, system and resource threats on the printing technology structure with a hierarchical organization of production is complex, and therefore the identification of influence channels and methods of countering attacks is an important challenge. In order to solve problems of this type, it is necessary, in accordance with the hierarchical structure, to separate the processes of technological, informational, managerial and actual preparation of the printing production product. Accordingly, the primary threats can be made at the stage of document design (content distortion). Information threats and system attacks on the management of the production process have a complex structure and their detection is an important task, as it is necessary to identify sources of threats, channels of attacks and assess the level of risk if attacks occur. According to the protection tasks analysis, the structural scheme of decision-making in technical and publishing systems is substantiated and developed. On the basis of the decisionmaking process studies, the model of man-made structure under threats on ACSPP resources is constructed.
Accordingly, a table has been developed to assess possible intrusion channels and failure criteria and the risk of destruction of system protection. 2. Control of complex hierarchical structures under threats and information attacks
Solving the problems of control of complex hierarchical structures under threats and information
attacks requires forming a set of methods for each type of object and system and decompose the
problem into subject-oriented components (Fig. 1) [
Sustainable operation of permanent systems, taking into account the impact of a set of factors, is
maintained by constant management influences based on decision-making and implementation, both
automatic system and DM (DM – a decision maker) at different levels of the hierarchy of structural
organization [
The decision, in a broad sense, means the choice of action mode to achieve the goals of the system control. The decision process has two components of activity [6] (Fig. 2): 1. Intellectual one (problem, goal, control, purposeful decision-making strategy); 2. Procedural, organizational and technological one (methods of implementing management actions). 2.1.
Characteristic features of the decision-making process are respectively [7-13] (Fig. 3): • the ability to choose how to act on a variety of alternatives (action plans) according to a goaloriented strategy; • the goal (clear or blurred by the situation) that needs to be realized under threat factors; • the need for a willful act of DM in choosing the method of solving the problem and the corresponding mental determination to target actions; • the timeliness, according to the stages of development and analysis of the situation, solving the problem of overcoming the crisis of the control system; • the authority of DM to act within its rights and powers; • the specificity of the procedure for choosing the method of the control implementation; • the constructiveness – taking into account the cost of changing the situation and the quality of management actions in relation to the target based on the analysis of the situation; • targeting of executive mechanisms of both ACS and DM; • the implementation of strategies and management plans in accordance with the goal; • the terminality of time for decision-making and implementation of actions in normal and emergency situations caused by active threats.
Thus, the situational control in hierarchical human-machine local and distributed systems is a method of forming control actions based on strategies for predicting hazards and analyzing their destructive factors, symptoms and strategies to reduce negative consequences, maintaining the functional structure and technological modes with limited resources and acceptable product quality (Fig. 4) [8].
Accordingly, all actions are formed on a set of control cycles, which corresponds to the allowable terminal time of their implementation Тці ® {t j=1,m } on the axis Тці . Each cycle corresponds to: performed by the agent-operator.
Terminal time is divided into intervals {ti , t i i=1,m } (Fig. 4).
the assessment of the situation in the system and threats based on data processing; the formation of a model for the situation solving according to the object condition; the generation of action plans and acts in accordance with the goal and situation; the distribution of tasks for intelligent and automatic implementation; • • • • • • time markers (ti ,i = 1, k ) on the axis of the decision-making interval; time intervals of operations and actions on Тці ® {t i j=1,m } for every control act {Ai }, • decision-making and its implementation by an active intelligent agent-operator for block management.
In this case, the balance condition of real and terminal time on the control cycle, which is formed by the ACS operator [9], must be met, respectively:
" Tці МTF {е im= 1t i Ј е im= 1t iT }, wherе t iT
— is a terminal time interval (t iT ОTF ) for the operation implementation. decision-making process; (tos ,toa ,tr ),t p ,(t pr ,tl ,tla ) — are time markers needed to complete cycles of decision-making procedures according to the situation and the target task; ВМ – is an executive mechanism; ПS – is a state space of the object; Тm — is the terminal time of the decision cycle (formation and action); Fa, FB, Fc — are factors of influence, probability of occurrence of disturbances and information attacks and threats to infrastructure; DAi — is the flow of aggregate data on the control objects condition; (t os , t o , t sr , t pr , t os , t ad , t lk ) — are time intervals of operations implementation when making decisions on the management cycle under threats and attacks on the object; CUS — is a goal-oriented system that implements the management strategy.
Factors of internal and external influence can be the causes of crisis problem situations. Such factors include: • natural phenomena (storms, typhoons, floods) threats; • production and technical processes that went out of normal operation due to loss of reliability of units; • political and economic situation; • insufficient level of the operational staff skills; • instability of the functional and structural system, random deviations, engineering errors in the design, system); • intentional provocative actions of external threats of the target type; • loss of design documentation as a basis for the formation of action chains in decision-making and project errors; • conflict situations in the management team (leadership); • equipment failures and breakdowns due to active intervention.
The above factors can negatively affect the decision-making process itself, as well as the functioning of the hierarchical structure as a whole. Therefore, they need to be analyzed in detail and their level of risk should be studied in the formation of protection systems, as well as in the process of functioning of complex hierarchical structures, in particular those located in high-risk areas. It is necessary to take into account both the losses that may result from the occurrence of negative factors of external and internal influences, and methods of restoring the information system due to the occurrence of such factors. 3.1.
Classification and assessment of threats, research methodology The threat, as a potential opportunity for attacks, has the ability to damage the IS and its assets. If the threat is realized, it can interact with the IS and cause unwanted incidents that adversely affect the system. Threats can be based on both natural and human factors, they can be realized accidentally or intentionally. Sources of both accidental and intentional threats should be identified and the probability of their implementation assessed [5-9]. The general classification of threats by type, action, source and object of action is presented in Fig. 5 [10]. A specialized IS threat catalog developed by Digital Security2, one of the leading Russian consulting companies in the field of information security, as well as in the field of assessing the compliance of IS with the requirements of ISO 27001/ISO 177993, was used to assess threats. In the course of the work, a survey was conducted among system administrators of printing companies of Ukraine in order to increase the reliability of assessment of criticality, probability of implementation and frequency of threats. Respondents were sent a chart of the relationships between ACSPP assets, a table listing ACSPP assets and threats, and asked to assess the criticality, probability, and frequency of threats to each ACSPP asset, taking into account the relationships between assets. A scale from 0 to 3 was used for the assessment, where “0” 2 Official website — http://www.dsec.ru. 3 https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html is the absence of criticality, probability or frequency of threat to the asset, and “1”, “2” and “3”, respectively, “low”, “medium” and "high" level of these indicators. The survey involved 10 respondents working in 10 printing companies. In order to cover the widest possible risks of ACSPP, the analysis of the results was carried out on the principle of "maximum assessment", i.e. the highest value was selected from a number of assessments of one indicator.
To conduct research, a scheme of possible types of threats that operate in the control system of the technological process in printing on the basis of the system concept of classification of threats by type, action, source and object of action was developed. 3.1.1. Critical threat assessment methodology, which act on the management information and aggregate structure of the technological system
Examining the assets of automated control systems for printing production (ACSPP), it can be concluded that the objects of threats may be one or more assets of ACSPP. Tables 1 – 5 present a list of possible threats to ACSPP, according to the classification (Fig. 5), as well as the criticality of the threats implementation to ACSPP assets.
Table 1
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP f o s e l u do PP rem SCA a w t f o S 6
3 3 3 3 3 4 The criticality of the treat is a measure of damage caused by this threat in its implementation.
Threat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 5 0 0 0 0
stored and processed on the resource
2 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 2
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
Unauthorized connection to wireless networks 0 0 0 0 0
Interception of network traffic at the logical 0 0 0 0 0 level due to incorrect configuration of network devices or inability to differentiate traffic between network nodes 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
psychological actions of outsiders on the
company employees Modification or destruction of information as a 0 0 0 0 3 result of psychological actions of third parties on the company employees
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 2 0 3 3 3 7 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 2 2 0 3 3 3 9 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
As some threats are not critical to any of ACSPP assets, there is no need to provide further results of their assessment.
Comparing the data from Table 1 - 5, it is possible to make the list of the most critical threats for typical ACSPP: 1. Human physical threats aimed at IS resources: • unauthorized use of equipment; • damage or intentional change of equipment operation modes • disclosure, transfer or loss of access restriction attributes; 2. Human physical threats aimed at IS communication channel: • Cable damage; 3. Global physical threats aimed at IS (full list of threats); 4. Local physical threats aimed at IS: • cross-reference; • failure of external energy sources; • failure of internal (reserve) energy sources; • sharp voltage fluctuations in the power grid; • air conditioning system failure; 5. Physical threats related to the equipment failure: • loss of information as a result of data carrier failure; • defective data carriers; • reduction of equipment reliability after the end of its service life; • data loss or system malfunction due to overflow of storage devices; 6. Local logical threats aimed at OS: • running files with viruses that affect the OS; • running the OS from external media; • modification of OS components; • failure to service the OS; 7. Local logical threats aimed at software: • opening files with macro viruses; • modification of application software; • failure to service the application software;
Thus, a list of critical threats to ACSPP is received, which may occur with a medium or high probability and cause significant damage to one or more assets, which will lead to serious violations in the work of ACSPP. For a more accurate analysis of threats in ACSPP, it is also necessary to analyze the probability of their detection and the frequency of recurrence over a period of time, which is planned to be done in future studies.
The analysis of information support of the complex system control process with a hierarchical structure under threats is done as well as the process of document circulation in the formation and decision-making process, based on which a structural and functional scheme is developed and substantiated to counter threats and attacks on the control process in the hierarchical structure.
The block diagram of decision-making in technical and publishing systems under risk is substantiated and developed.
The characteristic features of the decision-making process and parameters affecting this process are analyzed, as a result of which a model of technogenic structure under threats to resources is constructed.
Management actions on a set of control cycles to which the admissible time of their performance corresponds are studied and the block diagram of the scenario of situational management under threats on a terminal cycle is constructed.
The system concept of classification of threats and crisis situations in hierarchical structures by type, action, source and object of action, influencing the decision-making processes, is presented.
A survey of ACSPP system administrators is conducted in order to increase the reliability of assessing the threat criticality. Based on the studied data, the most critical threats to a typical automatic control system are presented.
The results of research can be implemented in the design of control and protection systems not only for automatic control systems, but also for any complex systems with a hierarchical structure under threats and crises.