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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Artificial Intelligence in the Judiciary: Uses and Threats</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Cinara Rocha</string-name>
          <email>cinarar@mpdft.mp.br</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>João Carvalho</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Algoritmi Centre, Univesity of Minho</institution>
          ,
          <country country="PT">Portugal</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Justice institutions have been slower than other government sectors to intensive use of Information Technology-IT. Nevertheless, there is an increasing volume of digital information resulting from IT in legal procedures in most countries. The repositories of such information/data bring up the opportunity to apply AI in justice-related organisations. AI can be used for a wide range of purposes that might help solve chronic problems in justice-related organisations, such as slow justice processes and high operating costs. At the same time, AI use raises important concerns about safeguarding the values of Justice. This article presents and discusses the applications of AI in support of the work of judges and the main threats to justice values posed by their use in courts.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Justice institutions have been slower than other government sectors to intensive use of
Infor</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. AI in the Justice Domain</title>
      <p>
        AI can be defined as ”a set of scientific methods, theories and techniques whose aim is to
reproduce, by a machine, the cognitive abilities of human beings. Current developments seek to
have machines perform complex tasks previously carried out by humans” ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], p. 69). The actual
use of AI largely consists of machine learning applications that depend on a huge amount of
data used to recognise patterns on their own and make predictions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] which have the potential
to drive considerable transformative innovations for institutions and society [9].
      </p>
      <p>
        AI deployment in the Judiciary can enhance eficiency. In the contemporary world, the
demand for Justice has grown as society becomes more complex and citizens engage more in
commercial and legal disputes [10]. In fact, Justice is expensive, the time spent solving litigious
is high, and the workload of judges is increasing [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">11, 12, 6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        However, many lawsuits are simple, similar (if not identical), repetitive and with a predictable
outcome. Using AI to automate human manual processes in these cases can streamline decisions,
reduce litigation volume, and thus lead to lower costs. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">10, 5, 13, 14, 6</xref>
        ]. Another benefit of using
AI in the Judiciary is that the automation of simple and repetitive cases gives judges more time
to dedicate to their main role: deciding in court cases. Furthermore, speedy up Justice generally
increases the subjective sense of fairness [15, 16].
      </p>
      <p>
        Impartiality, objectivity, uncertainty reduction, and human error elimination are advantages
AI decisions ofer compared to humans’ decisions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">10, 6, 17</xref>
        ]. AI can also help reduce disparities
in similar suits, for example, avoiding disproportional treatment between convicted in the cases
of setting bail or determining sentences [14] .
      </p>
      <p>This article was based on a review of 28 papers from Scopus, limited to the period between
2000 and 2022. AI evidence production and AI to support the police were not the object of our
study. The ODR literature that most refers to non-judicial disputes was also excluded.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Uses of AI in the Judiciary</title>
      <p>A recurring and controversial question is whether AI could replace the work of judges. Garoupa
speculates that AI will gradually replace judges, prosecutors, and lawyers [18]. Other authors
believe that AI applications will not get to decide judicial cases but support decision-making, as
creativity would be needed to choose between competing rules and create new ones [19, 13].</p>
      <p>The European Commission for the Eficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) afirms that applications of
AI in the Judiciary are restricted to machine learning applications specialised in solving one
problem as follows:</p>
      <p>
        ”In most occasions, the objective of these systems is not to reproduce legal reasoning but to
identify the correlations between the diferent parameters of a decision and through the use of
machine learning, to infer one or more models. Such models would be used to ’predict’ or ’foresee’ a
future judicial decision ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], p.29).”
      </p>
      <p>Reviewing the literature concerned with AI uses in the Judiciary, eight categories emerged
from the content analyses considering the type of applications and functionalities. The main
solutions we found are:
1. Similar cases push systems: Designed to automatically push similar judicial cases to
help judges and staf reflect on specific cases. Generally, the system works by inserting
keywords, and then similar cases (or related to the subject) are pushed for human review
[20, 21, 22, 16].
2. Litigation risk assessment systems: Systems based on judicial statistics and analysis of
similar cases give basic information that could evaluate the possible judgment result
in advance and though helping parties decide whether to enter the litigation process
[14, 15, 23].
3. Document assisted generation systems: Application that automatically generates
decisions to help judges write their judicial documents. May include suggestions of the
applicable law and penalty [22].
4. Speech-to-text applications: The system converts spoken language into the written text
used in courtroom records or hearings [24? , 25, 20, 21].
5. Risk prediction systems: The application used in the penal system is supposed to predict
risks for violent crime, sexual ofender, and recidivism risks, helping judges decide about
depriving people of their freedom [26, 27, 28, 23].
6. Answering questions robots: The application answers questions submitted to the Judiciary
via a keyboard or verbally concerning a relevant case, verdicts, laws, how to bring a
lawsuit, how to investigate their legal rights, and how to obtain evidence [14, 29, 20].
7. Emotion recognition systems: The system can identify the speaker’s emotional state,
improving the information obtained in the courtroom. While this application is already
deployed (in Poland and Italy), similar innovative AI research promises to disrupt the
hearing and trials by better predicting deception than humans [25, 30].
8. Filtering Systems: The system organises information according to a defined criterion
and takes action, such as grouping cases and returning or allocating the cases to judges
[12, 29, 23].</p>
      <p>
        The results of our research align substantially with the classification suggested by CEPEJ,
taking into account the service ofered: advanced case-law search engines, online dispute
resolution, assistance in drafting deeds, analysis (predictive, scales), categorisation of contracts
according to diferent criteria and detection of divergent or incompatible contractual clauses,
”Chatbots” to inform litigants or support them in their legal proceedings ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], p. 17). Realing
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] suggests general classification and asserts that Al can be useful in courts for organising
information, advising, and predicting and can be applied in many ways to meet diferent
requirements.
      </p>
      <p>Regarding law matters, the major uses of AI in the Judiciary are concentrated in specific
subjects, mainly in civil and administrative matters involving minor disputes and less complex
cases. The main subject that AI applications deal with is small claims, domain-name disputes,
ecommerce disputes, copyright disputes, neighbourhood disputes, landlord-tenant, condominium
disputes, property and income tax disputes, driving misdemeanours and parking fines [ 31, 14,
15, 16].</p>
      <p>Considering the activity of full replacement of judicial work, we found only the applications
developed in the Netherlands. An e-Court application renders arbitrational verdicts by default
in debt collection proceedings solely resulting from AI. The system was designed to be no longer
a product of any human reasoning. The application did not get to operate as the law doesn’t
provide the possibility for a ”digital judge” [10].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Threats Posed by AI for Justice</title>
      <p>
        CEPEJ highlights concerns about potential threats to the use of AI for the principles of Justice
when approving the European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial
Systems and their environment. The principles posed in the document are: 1) respect for
fundamental rights, 2) non-discrimination, 3) quality and security, 4) transparency, impartiality
and fairness, and 5) ”under user control” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. The threats posed by AI to the Judiciary respect to
possible break of these principles.
      </p>
      <p>The most cited risk in literature is bias, which can violate fundamental rights and result in
discrimination [32, 33, 13, 14, 15]. Bias can be intentional or unintentional. Intentional bias
refers to those derived by decision-makers when creating the algorithms and representing their
value judgments and priorities [14].</p>
      <p>Referring to system developers’ bias, researchers highlight the threat of lack of expertise, such
as the possibility of computer programmers making certain improper assumptions in coding
legal norms [15, 17]. Another risk is that the judicial decision, which is the judge’s exclusive
prerogative, is eventually taken indirectly by the programmers since they are the creators of
the system’s rules. As Contini afirms, ”… while systems developers delegate a suggestion to
the system, they end up achieving a delegation of the decision they are supposed to support
([34], p. 13).”</p>
      <p>Unintentional bias occurs when algorithms replicate the existing bias in the real world
[33, 13, 17]. Using skewed data sets can lead to poor predictive accuracy models. The most
famous case of bias is a widely used AI application for criminal Justice in the USA, called
COMPAS (Correctional Ofender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions), which
evaluates the potential of recidivism of criminal defendants and helps judge decision-making.
ProPublica found that black defendants were far more likely than white defendants to be
incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism. In contrast, white defendants were more
likely to be incorrectly flagged as a low risk than black defendants [ 27].</p>
      <p>Another important point is related to opacity [35]. If litigants don’t’ know the construction
and operation of the system, suggestions given by AI may be questionable [20]. Technical and
legal ”black-boxes” refer to a lack of transparency or dificulty understanding the algorithm [ 9].
The technical black box occurs when the algorithm process is unknown even to its developers
or is impossible to understand for humans due to our cognitive limitations. Legal black box
concerns relate to the public disclosure of algorithmic code legally protected by contracts.
Technical black boxes are more dificult to address as explaining the outcomes is part of rights
protection in the democratic rule of law. Currently, all transparency requirements cannot yet
be established [33, 13].</p>
      <p>A 2017 report from AI Now Institute from New York University got to the point of
recommending to public agencies, such as those responsible for criminal justice, no longer use
black-box AI once such systems raise serious due process concerns. They recommend that the
algorithm be available for public auditing, testing, and review and subject to accountability
standards [36].</p>
      <p>However, Contini [34] demonstrates that opacity is relative as the equivalence between input
and output can be or cannot be checked. He afirms that even inscrutable algorithms can
raise operational transparency. The case cited by the author to exemplify is AI speech-to-text
applications used in the courtroom, which permit at the same time the text produced in court
to be read and reviewed by judges and parties, no matter if there is a black box. Also, arguing
in favour of AI, Thornton [15] asserts that traditional paper-based courts’ opinions are often
complex, long, and technical, and jury determinations are opaque and intelligible for citizens.</p>
      <p>The overreliance on technology is another risk. Humans tend to become reliant on automated
decision-making systems. They trust statistical data and begin to give up on their own
independent judgment, and become blind to systems errors [14, 15, 17, 16]. As Contini states, ”the
decision remains with the judge, but it can be dificult for the judge to resist these ’disinterested’
and ’science-based’ suggestions ([34], p. 13)”.</p>
      <p>The protection of personal data, both concerning parties/witnesses and judges/prosecutors,
also arises as an important issue from the use of AI in Justice. Justice collects critical information
about citizens, and researcher debates involve the dificulty of balancing privacy in court records
versus the right of public access to them [37, 38].</p>
      <p>The digital divide is highlighted as a threat to AI deployment in the justice domain too. It
includes the skills to use digital services and access the internet and devices [17]. Susskind
[39] emphasises that it can be an obstacle to Justice, and it is an important challenge to face.
However, he points out solutions such as the availability of a traditional paper-based physical
court system in parallel or ”some kind of practical help and support to those unable to use the
online court services ([39? ] p. 218)”. He also argues that today’s traditional courts exclude
many people because of their physical or other disabilities.</p>
      <p>Thornton [15] refutes the criticism of the use of AI in the Judiciary. He disputes that AI-based
systems are less reliable or fair than human-based ones, arguing that legal automation’s fairness
benefits are two types: objective and subjective. Objectively, automated systems would be able
to deal with ”highly complex and multifaceted legal frameworks that human operatives simply
cannot holistically oversee” and would ofer a promising perspective to eliminate human biases”
([15], p. 1840). Subjectively, he indicates impartiality and trustworthiness as positive aspects of
AI. He also recognises some problems related to considering a disputant’s voice and the degree
to which the treatment of disputants is respectful and dignified.</p>
      <p>Spitsin &amp; Tarasov [40], considering the doctrinal aspect, argue that a problem still unsolved
is the absence of an AI concept suitable for legal science. The authors afirm that the current
definitions of AI are non-judicial (technical), so they don’t bring enough clarity required to the
paradigm of the science of law.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The use of AI is just beginning in the Judiciary. Still, it seems to have a promising future to
help address the historical problems of Justice, such as slowness and, therefore, the backlog of
judicial cases. Our research points to eight main uses, or possible uses, of AI in the Judiciary:
similar cases push systems, litigation risk assessment systems, document assisted generation
systems, speech-to-text applications, risk prediction of accused systems, answering questions
robots, emotion recognition systems and filtering Systems.</p>
      <p>In the meantime, important threats to the values of Justice can arise from the inadequate
implementation of AI systems. The main is the bias originating from the algorithm building
process or the bias already existing in past data. Discrimination arises as a worrying issue in
this context. Opacity is another important problem related to legal industry secrecy involving
algorithm construction. Opacity can also be related to the impossibility of understanding the
result of the decision-make process of AI, which is a more problematic issue. The need to legally
define AI before regulations was also cited in the literature. The solutions for resolving these
threats are unclear, and the area is still poorly regulated.</p>
      <p>
        Despite the intense speculation, ’predictive justice’ is still little used [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. The debate that
AI will replace human judges seems, for now, it is a remote reality. Justice is trying to
deploy technology solutions that can enhance eficiency and replace the repetitive judicial work
by grouping, classifying and organising information, which is the base for more advanced
technology deployment.
      </p>
      <p>The classification of AI use in the Judiciary is important as it allows scholars and practitioners
can restrict research areas. The main threat identification helps to highlight the challenges to be
faced while planning and implementing AI projects for justice. Although, in this study, it was
not possible to further discuss each application and deepen the knowledge of their interactions,
which could be an object for future research. A broader search in other search engines would
also be recommended to broaden the research scope.
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